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Independent Orbiter Assessment
Analysis of the Life Support and Airlock Support Systems
1.0 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company (MDAC) was selected in
June 1986 to perform an Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of
the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items
List (CIL). Direction was given by the STS Orbiter and GFE
Projects Office to perform the hardware analysis using the
instructions and ground rules defined in NSTS _2206° Instructions
for PreDaration of FMEA and CIL, i0 October 1986. The IOA
approach features a top-down analysis of the hardware to
determine failure modes, criticality, and potential critical
items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished
without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA
FMEA/CIL documentation. This report documents the independent
analysis results corresponding to the Orbiter Life Support System
(LSS) and Airlock Support System (ALSS) (Appendix C). All the
Electrical Power Distribution and Control CEPDC) hardware items,
and the mechanical hardware items are included in this report.
The IOA analysis process utilized available LSS and ALSS hardware
drawings and schematics for defining hardware assemblies,
components, and hardware items. Each level of hardware was
evaluated and analyzed for possible failure modes and effects.
Criticality was assigned based upon the severity of the effect
for each failure mode.
Figure 1 presents a breakdown of the two major systems analysed
and a summary of the failure criticalities. The data is shown
summarized at the subsystem level of the LSS, namely the Supply
Water, the Waste Management, and the Smoke Detection and Fire
Suppression subsystems. The airlock does not have any major
subsystem. The data is also summarized at the system level and
then totalled for the LSS/ALSS Analysis Summary. A summary of
the number of failure:modeS by Criticality is presented below
with hardware (HW) criticality first and then functional (F)
criticality second.
Summary of IOA Possible Failure Modes by Criticalities (HW/F)
Criticality:
LSS
o SWS
o WMS
o SD/FS
ALSS
i/1
9
8
2/IR
3
i0
6
7
2/2
36
25
6
21
3/IR
1
3
12
3
3/2R
40
81
m
17
Um
3/3
59
96
33
35
TOTAL
139
224
65
83
1
z o. ,_ c,, ,_
iJ _ OD
_ ..=°_,..
I--
i
D
i
I
im_
For each failure mode identified, the criticality and redundancy
screens were examined to identify potential critical items. A
summary of Potential Critical Items (PCIs) is presented as
follows:
Summary of IOA Potential Critical Items (HW/F)
Criticality:
LSS
o SWS
o WMS
o SD/FS
ALSS
i/I
w
9
8
2/IR 2/2
3 36
i0 25
6 6
7 21
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TOTAL
46
44
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2 •0 INTRODUCTION
2.1 Purpose
The 51-L Challenger accident prompted the NASA to readdress
safety policies, concepts, and rationale being used in the
National Space Transportation System (NSTS). The NSTS Office has
undertaken the task of reevaluating the FMEA/CIL for
the Space Shuttle design° The MDAC is providing an independent
assessment of the Orbiter FMEA/CIL reevaluation results for
completeness and technical accuracy.
2.2 Scope
The scope of the independent FMEA/CIL assessment activity
encompasses those Shuttle Orbiter subsystems and GFE hardware
identified in the Space Shuttle Independent _A/CiL Assessment
Contractor Statement of Work. Each subsystem analysis addresses
hardware, functions, internal and external interfaces, and
operational requirements for all mission phases.
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2.3 Analysis Approach
The independent analysis approach is a top-down analysis
utilizing as-built drawings to breakdown the respective subsystem
into components and low-level hardware items. Each hardware item
is evaluated for failure mode, effects, and criticality. T_ese
data are documented in the respective subsystem analysis report,
and are used to assess the NASA and Prime Contractor FMEA/CIL
reevaluation results. The IOA analysis approach is summarized in
the following Steps 1.0 through 3.0. Step 4.0 summarizes the
assessment of the NASA and Prime Contractor FMEAs/CILs that is
performed and documented at a later date.
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Step 1.0 Subsystem Familiarization
I.i Define subsystem functions
1.2 Define subsystem components
1.3 Define subsystem specific ground rules and
assumptions
Step 2.0 Define subsystem analysis diagram
2.1 Define subsystem
2.2 Define major assemblies
2.3 Develop detailed subsystem representations
Step 3.0 Failure events definition
3.1 Construct matrix of failure modes
3.2 Document IOA analysis results
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Step 4.0 Compare IOA analysis data to NASA FMEA/CIL
4.1 Resolve differences
4.2 Review in-house
4.3 Document assessment issues
4.4 Forward findings to Project Manager
2.4 LSS and ALSS Ground Rules and Assumptions
The LSS and ALSS ground rules and assumptions used in the IOA are
defined in Appendix B.
w
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3.0 SUBSYSTEM DESCRIPTION
3.1 Design and Function
The LSS provides for the management of the supply water,
collection of the metabolic waste, management of the waste water,
smoke detection, and fire suppression. The ALSS provides water,
oxygen, and electricity to support an Extra vehicular Activity
(EVA) in the airlock. Below is a brief description of each of
these categories.
la Supply Water Subsystem - The SWS provides ullage for the
storage of the fuel cells generated water and the management
of this water throughout the mission. The water is used to
meet the Flash Evaporator System (FES) requirement, crew
usage, and EVA requirement. For the purpose of this study
the SWS was divided into five main assemblies as shown in
Figures 2 through 5.
The tank assembly is made up of four tanks (A, B, C, and D)
and associated plumbing which interconnects them as shown in
Figure 2. Each tank is constructed of thin-wall aluminum
with Inconel steel bellows pressurized by the gaseous
nitrogen from the Atmospheric Revitalization Pressure
Control System (ARPCS). Each tank can be isolated from the
line by an inlet valve and an outlet valve in the event of a
leak. The fuel cells generated water flows into the tanks A,
B, C, and D respectively after passing through two hydrogen
separators. The flow to a given tank is accomplished
automatically by use of two 1.5 psid relief valves. Before
flowing into the Tank A the water passes through a microbial
filter/check valve which prevents passage of micro-organisms
into the potable water tank.
The galley line assembly contains the plumbing for the
transport of the potable water from Tank A to the
Environmental Control and Life Support System (ECLSS) bay
for connection to the galley or the water dispenser as shown
in Figure 3. The water is avaiable at the bay either
directly (70 F) or chilled. Chilled water is accomplished by
interfacing the potable water with the ARS water coolant
loops through a heat exchanger called water chiller.
The FES line assembly is comprised of two separate FES feed
water lines supplying water to meet FES requirement as shown
in Figures 4 and 5. The two lines may be isolated from each
other by a crossover valve or an isolation valve on Line B.
All the associated hardware beyond this isolation valve is
considered as part of the ATCS analysis, and therefore not
covered in this report.
The dump line assembly, shown in Figures 2 and 4, provides
for expulsion of excess water through a dump nozzle during
on-orbit dump operation. The line incorporates an isolation
valve, a dump valve, and line and nozzle heaters. Also,
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capability exists to cross-tie the supply water dump line to
the waste water dump line in the event one dump line becomes
inoperative. The line and nozzle heaters provide thermal
conditioning of the dump line and nozzle to prevent ice
formation in the area. The line heaters are thermostatically
controlled.
The gaseous nitrogen line assembly pressurizes the tanks
with the nitrogen from the ARPCS storage tanks as shown in
Figure 3. Cabin atmosphere may also be used to pressurize
the tanks if the GN2 pressurization is lost. Most of the
hardware in this assembly are covered in the ARPCS analysis
except for the Tank A pressure/vent panel which is included
in this report.
Waste Management Subsystem - The WMS is made up of Waste
Collection Subsystem (WCS), Waste Water Subsystem (WWS), and
the Vacuum Vent Subsystem (VVS) as shown in Figure 6. These
subsystems are used in an integrated process for the
collection and storage of the crewmember biowaste and the
overboard dumping of the waste fluid and gases. The
schematics for these subsystems are shown in Figures 7
through i0.
The WCS, shown in Figure 7, is an integrated multifunctional
zero-g device used to collect and process biowaste from the
crewmembers, gases from the wet trash stowage area, and
waste water from the EMU/Airlocksupport station. The
WCS accomodates both male and female crewmembers and is
comprised of hhe_commode assembly, urinal assembly,
interconnecting plumbing, mounting framework, crew
restraints, and instrumentation. The subsystem uses a system
of valves to direct cabin air flow through the urinal and
fecal collection systems to draw the biowaste into the
collection chamber. In the case of the waste fluids, a
centrifugal separator is used to separate the waste fluids
from the transport air flow. The waste fluids are then
directed into the waste water subsystem and the separated
air passes through the muffler assembly for bacteria and
odor removal. This air is then injected into the crew cabin
atmosphere. The WCS incorporates two redundant fan/separator
units with one unit being operational at a time.
The WWS, shown in Figure 8, provides storage and overboard
dump capability for urine, atmospheric condensate, EMU waste
water, and contingency cooling water to the FES. The waste
water storage is a single thin wall aluminum tank shell
surrounding an Inconel steel bellows. The tank is identical
to the supply water tanks. The bellows is pressurized with
nitrogen gas to facilitate waste water expulsion. All tubing
is stainless steel. Flow control into and out of thetank is
via the inlet valve. The outlet valve is used only during
GSE operation. Both valves are electrically operated
solenoid latching type valves.
7
r
•The WWS provides control for the overboard dump of the waste
water through a dump nozzle at the mid fuselage as shown in
Figure 9. All plumbing exterior to the crew module is
protected by electrical heaters and thermal insulation. The
subsystem also contains a provision to cross-tie the waste
dump line to the supply water dump line which make it
possible to provide waste water to the FES or supply water
dump nozzle under contingency cases. The use of the supply
water dump line or FES line poses serious contamination
problems. Further, a Contingency Water Container (CWC) is
flown which provides additional ullage to the waste water
tank, but has not been used nor flight tested.
The VVS, shown in figures i0, provides voluntary and
involuntary venting of the ECLSS gases. Voluntary use of
the vacuum vent occurs during airlock and cabin
depressurization, and the WCS use. During on-orbit
operation, the VVS may also be utilized in order to regain
automatic pressure control of the cabin atmosphere in the
event that the cabin pressure should exceed 14.7 psia.
Involuntary venting is available for hydrogen gas from the
H2/H20 separators, fecal vapors from the WCS, and wet trash
vapors from the trash stowage.
The VVS consists of a 2.0 inch O.D., 302 stainless steel duct,
two independent line heaters, thermostats, an isolation
valve, a single nozzle heatr, and a 1.93 inch O.D. nozzle.
The isolation valve was'analyzed under the ALSS in this
report. The line heaters are continuously wrapped together
for the full length of the line. Each of the heaters
contains a single thermostat.
Smoke Detection and Fire Suppression Subsystems - These two
subsystems are emergency subsystems within the shuhtle
Caution and Warning (c&w) system. The smoke detection uses
electronic sensors to provide on-board warning of an
impending fire pre-smoke phase, indications are provided
through a light matrix, siren tone, and various CRT data.
Fire suppression is provided by fire suppressant (Halon)
bottles to suppress the ignition source• The schematic for
these subsystems are shown in Figures Ii through 14.
The Smoke/Detection Subsystem consists of nine smoke
detectors. A typical detector is shown in Figures ii. Six
detectors provide redundant sensing within Avionics Bays 1,
2, and 3 and three detectors sense the cabin atmosphere.
Each avionics bay has two redundant sensors (Sensors A&B).
The cabin sensors are two sensors in the flight deck at the
left and right return air ducts, and one sensor in the cabin
fan plenum outlet. The cabin fan plenum sensor is
considered to provide redundancy to the left and right
flight deck sensors. Further, a fire sensed by the left or
right sensor will be followed by an indication on the cabin
sensor. Another input is also available for certain types of
payloads such as Spacelab modules.
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Smoke detection operation is based upon sensing of invisible
submicron particles emitted from materials subjected to
abnormal energy levels. The detectors measure current flow
in a measuring chamber, and the current flow in a reference
chamber, shown in Figure 12. Air molecules in each chamber
are ionized by a radiation source and in the measuring
chamber the interaction of particles with the air molecules
reduces current flow. The difference in the level sensed
provides an indication of the particle level present. If
either a preset level (2000+/- 200 micro g per m3) for five
seconds or an increase in rate build-up (22 micro g per m3
per sec) for twenty seconds is maintained, then a continuous
alarm signal is output until a reset signal is issued. The
system is powered from circuit breakers on Panel 014, 015,
and 016. The indicator light matrix is located on Panel LIA1
in the CDRs station and CRT data is available on the flight
deck CRTs. The siren alarm is output through speakers in the
flight and middeck and through headset assemblies via the
Audio Terminal Units.
A test circuit controlled by a switch on Panel LiAI provides
for sensor and alarm checkout. The actual sensing capability
is not checked but the electronics which process the
measuring and reference chamber current outputs are verified
by inducing signals representative of the sensor trip
levels. Reset of a test or actual sensor trip is through a
switch also located on Panel LIAI. In this test mode, three
conditions must be present to indicate an operable sensor
namely: pump running, particle concentration, and the
particle rate of change greater than the preset levels.
The Fire Suppression Subsystem consists of three permanently
mounted fire suppressant bottles mounted in Avionics Bay i,
2, and 3. A typical bottle is shown in Figure 13. These
bottles are permanently attached within each bay and
remotely activated from panel LIAI since access to the bay
is difficult. Activation requires an Arm/Fire Pyrotechnic
Initiator Controller (PIC) sequence from a switch and push-
button indicator. A pressure switch on the bottle is used
to indicate bottle discharge. The power for the system
comes through circuit breakers on panels 014, 015, and 16.
The agent discharge indication is part of the Push-Button
indicator on Panel LIAI. The PIC capacitor voltage and bottle
empty indications are telemetered to the ground. In addition
to the permanently mounted bottles, the crew has available
portable bottles mounted in the crew compartment. A typical
portable bottle is shown in Figure 14. These are used by the
crew to dispense suppressant to the source of ignition
within the cabin area and behind panels through the fire
holes.
=
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. Airlock Support System - The airlock is a modular
cylindrical structure with two hatch openings as shown in
Figure 15. It provides oxygen, water, and electrical
interfaces to accomodate EVA operation. It is also equipped
with pressure equalization valves on each hatch and a
decompression system. The vacuum vent isolation valve is
also included with the airlock analysis even though it is
mounted at the Xo576 bulkhead.
The interface between the airlock and an Extravehicular
Mobility Unit (EMU) is provided by the Service and Cooling
Umbilical (SCU), shown in Figure 16. The SCU is composed of
hoses and electrical wiring to suppiy the oxygen, wa£er, and
electricity to the EMU while in the airlock. The SCU also
contains valving which allows supply and waste water flow
through a single connection at the SCU/EMU interface. The
SCU is bolted to the airlock, leak proved and checked prior
to launch and is permanently attached for the duration of
the mission.
The oxygen interface is used by the crew while in the
airlock and it is used to recharge the EMU oxygen tanks.
The water in the three EMU tanks can be dumped through the
SCU into the orbiter waste water tank and the quantity
observed on the orbiter water tank gauge. They are then
refilled from tank C of the supply water system. During the
refilling process (approximately 15 minutes), the supply
water system crossover valve is opened, the FES is disabled
and tank C is isolated so the quantity of water loaded into
the E_ can be checked by the tank C gauge.
The airlock depressurization is controlled by a three
position valve, the valve and system are shown in Figures 16
and 17. The valve is connected to a 2 inch, stainless
steel, overboard vacuum vent line. The closed position
prevents any airflow from escaping the airlock. The second
position, labeled "5", opens the smallest orifice which
allows the pressure to decrease to 5 psi at an initial rate
of 0.09 psi/sec The third valve position, labeled "0"
reduces the-airlock pressure to 0.2psi. At this pressure
the airlock can be opened. When not in use, the valve is
covered with a pressure/dust cap. Prior to removing the
cap, it is necessary to equalize the pressure across it with
the cap vent valve•
The airlock repressurization is controlled by two pressure
equalization valves on the hatch to the cabin, a typical set
is shown in Figure 17. Normal repressurization is
accomplished by placing one valve in the "normal" position•
When completed, the airlock and the cabin are pressurized to
approximately 14 psia. The orbiter environmental control
system will automatically compensate for the lower pressure
and repressurize the cabin and airlock to 14.7 psia. The
equalization valves on the payload bay hatch may be used to
depressurize the airlock in the event of depress valve failure•
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The EMU power supply/battery charger provides 17.0 volts dc
at 5 amps at the airlock interface. The Electrical System is
shown in Figure 18. MAIN Bus A or B must be selected with
the bus select switch and the mode selection switch must be
in the POWER position to supply the power to the SCU. The
mode switch in the POWER position makes the power available
at the SCU connector and also closes a circuit that provides
a battery feedback voltage charger control. This circuit
inhibits EMU power when any discontinuity is sensed in the
SCU/EMU circuitry. The mode switch in the POWER position
also supplies power through the SCU for the EMU microphone
amplifiers for hardline communication.
The vacuum vent isolation valve is mounted at the Xo576
bulkhead which provides capability to isolate the waste
management vent lines and the airlock vent line. However,
the valve has an internal bleed port to vent the hydrogen
separator and waste collection gases when it is in the
closed position. The valve is designed to close within 2
seconds in the event of an excessive cabin pressure loss
rate. This is accomplished via the cabin oxygen system 1
and 2 flow sensor circuitry. The valve can also be opened
on demand through a bus selection and control switches
(SI0 & SII) mounted in the panel ML31C and shown in Figure
19.
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Figure 16 - Airlock Piping And Instrumentation Diagram
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Figure 18 - Airlock Electrical Schematic
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3.2 Interfaces and Locations
The life support and airlock support items are located at various
places within the crew compartment, and avionics bays as shown in
Figures 20 to 22. The FES and dump nozzles are located outside
the payload bay past 576 bulkhead.
The LSS and ALSS interfaces with the adjoining subsytems were
identified, and are explained below:
i• EPS - The Electrical Power Subsystem provides bus power to
drive valves, switches, instrumentation, and heaters
throughout the systems. Also, the EPS recharges the EMU
batteries in the airlock at the SCU.
. ARPCS - Gaseous nitrogen from the ARPCS storage tanks are
used to pressurize the supply/waste water tanks. It is also
used to recharge the MMU nitrogen tanks. Cabin pressure may
be used to maintain pressure in the water tanks in the event
that gaseous nitrogen is not available.
• ARS - The water coolant loops from the ARS chills the
potable water through the water chiller heat exchanger. They
are aloso used to cool the EMU suites while in the airlock.
. ATCS - The Flash Evaporator System (FES) uses water from the
water tanks to provide thermal cooling of the freon loops.
o PRSD - The Power Reactant Storage and Distribution System
provides oxygen for recharge of the EMU bottles in the
airlock at the SCU interface.
• EMU - The EMU interfaces with the ALSS through the SCU for
water, oxygen, and electrical power recharges.
. CE - Crew Euipment such as galley or water dispenser is
connected to the potable lines at the ECLSS bay in the crew
compartment•
3.3 Hierarchy
Figures 23 and 24 illustrates the hierarchy of the LSS and ALSS
hardware and the corresponding subcomponents.
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4.0 ANALYSIS RESULTS
Detailed analysis results for each of the identified failure
modes are presented in Appendix C. Table I presents a summary of
the failure criticalities for each of the two major subdivisions
of the LSS and ALSS. Further discussion of each of these
subdivisions and the applicable failures are provided in
subsequent paragraphs.
TABLE I
- Summary of IOA Possible Failure Modes
Criticality:
LSS
o SWS
o WMS
o SD/FS
ALSS
1/i
9
8
17TOTAL
by Criticalities (HW/F)
m m_w
2/IR
3
i0
6
7
26
2/2
36
25
6
21
88
3/IR
1
3
12
3
19
3/2R
40
81
w
17
138
3/3
59
96
33
35
223
TOTAL
139
224
65
83
511
I
mm
M
R
mm
g
mm
Of the 511 failures analyzed, 17 failures were determined to
result in loss of crew or vehicle, and 114 were determined to
result in loss of mission. A summary of the potential critical
items is presented in Table II. Appendix D presents a cross
reference between each potential critical item (PCI) and a
specific worksheet in Appendix C.
_www_m_wm
TABLE II - Summary of IOA Potential Critical Items (HW/F)
1/1 2/1R 2/2 3/1S 3/2R ICriticality:
LSS
o SWS
o WMS
o SD/FS
ALSS
- 3
9 i0
8 6
- 7
17 26
36
25
6
21
88
w
m
w
2
TOTAL
TOTAL
7 I 46
- 44
- I 20
- , 30
I
7 I 140
The following subsections provide discussions of the indiviual
subsystems with the emphasis on the potential critical items.
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SWS Analysis Results - The SWS analysis incorporates all of
the associated electrical and mechanical hardware items. The
results for the various criticalities are presented in Table
I. Of the total of 139 failure modes identified, 46 failures
were found to be Potential Critical Items due to mission loss.
No i/i criticalities were identified in this anaylsis.
The failures which precluded hydrogen separators function
(separating hydrogen and water) were essentially considered
to be a mission loss category. This was done since the
excessive presence of hydrogen in the tanks could jeopardize
the operation of FES, dump, EMU, and it may cause crew
sickness. All of these were deemed necessary functions to
maintain a successful mission.
Also some PCIs were due to failures which resulted in
loss of providing clean filtered potable water to the crew.
Under severe case, mission may be shorten if water is not
available for such things as drinking, hygiene, and food
preparation.
Of the remaining PCIs, several were identified to be due to
failure of Redundancy Screen C. These were primarily
associated with the dump line items where a severe
contamination could cause blockage of the line and the
redundant FES line.
Please refer to MDAC-IDs ii00 to 1238 Appendix C.I for
further definition.
WMS Analysis Results - The WMS analysis incorporates all
of the associated electrical and mechanical hardware items.
The results for the various criticalities are presented in
Table I. Of the total of 224 failures identified, 44 failures
were found to be Potential Critical Items (PCIs) due to
mission loss. Further breakdown of these criticalities as
explained below:
a. The Waste Collection Subsystem (WCS) analysis identified
Ii0 failures, MDAC-ID 2001 to 2110 (Appendix C.2).
Most of the failures were identified as criticality
3/2R and 3/3. Only 7 failures were identified as PCIs,
and were mostly due to external leakage of waste fluids
to the cabin.
bo The Waste Water Subsystem (WWS) analysis identified 96
failures, MDAC-ID 2111 to 2206 (Appendix C.2). Most of
the failures were identified as criticality 3/2R and
3/3. 26 failures were identified as potential critical
items, due to three major failure modes of electrical,
restricted flow, and external leakage.
37
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Co The Vacuum Vent Subsystem (VVS) analysis identified 18
failures, MDAC ID 2207 to 2224 (Appendix C.2). Nine
were identified as criticality I/i due to external
leakage of the lines and fittings, and the failure of
the heaters. The remaining failures were two at 2/IR,
and seven at 3/3.
Smoke Detection and Fire Suppression Analysis Results -
Of the 65 failures identified, 21 failures were found to
be PCIs producing mission loss. There were no i/i failure
criticalities identified in this analysis. The majority of
the failure modes were identified as 3/IR and 3/3, however
none of these failures were PCIs.
Please refer to MDAC-IDs 3001 thru 3065 in Appendix C.3 for
further definition.
ALSS Analysis Results - The 2/2 potential critical items
were mostly due to failure modes which prevented completion of
the EMU pre-EVA activities. For example, the inability to top
off the EMU water tanks and purge the system of air bubbles
were caused by the supply valve failure to open. Failure to
deliver oxygen to a crewman was also deemed a loss of mission
due to depletion of the PLSS oxygen tanks prior to an EVA.
Other failure modes which were considered mission critical
pertained to waste water valve failed closed, failure to
depressurize the airlock, and various power losses.
Oxygen external leaks were deemed to pose a serious threat
for fire, therefore they were assigned 2/IR criticalities.
Other failures such as airlock pressure leak, failure of the
pressure equalization valve to open to the cabin, and
restricted fl0w failure of the filter to allow
repressurization of the airlock were considered life
threatening.
Two of the 3/IR electrical failures related to closing the
vacuum isolation valve on demand did not pass the redundancy
Screen B. These failures, will not be detectable in time to
allow corrective action by the crew.
Please refer to MDAC-IDs 5001 to 5083 in Appendix C.4 for
further definition.
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Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items
List (CIL), October i0, 1986 changes 1 and 2.
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Basic Rev A, Volume 15, January 6, 1984.
JSC-12770, Shuttle Flight Operation Manual, crew
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JSC-2102C, Waste Collection System Workbook,
November 26, 1984.
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APPENDIX A
ACRONYMS
AAP
ac
ACA
ALSS
AOA
AOS
ARPCS
ARS
ASSY
ATCS
ATO
AUX
AV
CB
CCH
CDR
CE
CIL
CL
CNTL
CNTRL
CONT
CRIT
CRT
CV
CWC
C&W
dc
ECLSS
EI
EMU
EPD&C
EPS
EVA
F
Fan/Sep
FDA
FES
FLT
FMEA
Airlock Adapter Plate
Alternating Current
Annunciator Control Assembly
Airlock Support System
Abort Once Around
Acquisition of Signal
Atmospheric Revitalization Pressure Control System
Atmospheric Revitalization System
Assembly
Active Thermal Control System
Abort to Orbit
Auxiliary
Avionics
Circuit Breaker
Commode Control Handle
Commander
Crew Equipment
Critical Items List
Close
Control
Control
Contingency
Criticality
Cathode Ray Tube
Check Valve
Contingency Water Container
Caution and Warning
Direct Current
Environmental Control and Life Support System
Entry Interface
Extravehicular Mobility Unit
Electrical Power Distribution and Control
Electrical Power Subsystem
Extravehicular Activity
Functional
Fan/Separator
Fault Detection Annunciation
Flash Evaporator System
Flight
Failure Modes and Effects Analysis
A-I
mACRONYMS (continued) mm
GFE
GN2
GO2
GSE
HTR
HW
H2
H20
IOA
JSC
LSS
LTS
LVL
MDAC
MECO
MET
MM
MMU
NA
NASA
NSTS
N2
OPS
PCI
PCS
PIC
P/L
PLB
PLSS
PNL
PORT
PRSD
psi
psia
psid
psig
Government Furnished Equipment
Gaseous Nitrogen
Gaseous Oxygen
Ground Support Equipment
Heater
Hardware
Hydrogen
Water
Independent Orbiter Assessment
Johnson Space Center
Life Support System
Lights
Level
McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company
Main Engine Cut-off
Mission Elapsed Time
Major Mode
Manned Maneuvering Unit
Not Applicable
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
National Space Transportation System
Nitrogen
Operations Sequence
Potential Critical Items
Pressure Control System
Pyrotechnic Initiator Controller
Payload
Payload Bay
Portable Life Support Subsystem
Panel
Portable
Power Reactant Storage and Distribution
Pounds per Square Inch
Pounds per Square Inch, Absolute
Pounds per Square Inch, Differential
Pounds per Square Inch, Gauge
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ACRONYMS(continued)
QD
QR
REG
RTLS
SCU
SD/FS
sec
SM
SOP
STS
SW
SWS
TAL
UCD
VAC
VLV
WS
WCS
WMS
WWS
X-DCR
XOVR
Quick Disconnect
Quick Release
Regulator
Return To Landing Site
Service and Cooling Umbilical
Smoke Detection and Fire Suppression Subsystem
second
System Management
Secondary Oxygen Pack
Space Transportation System
Switch
Supply Water Subsystem
Transoceanic Abort Landing
Urine Collection Device
Volts - AC
Valve
Vacuum Vent Subsystem
Waste Collection Subsystem
Waste Management Subsystem
WasteWater Subsystem
Transducer
Cross-over
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APPENDIX B
t DEFINITIONS, GROUND RULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS
S°l
B.2
B.3
Definitions
Project Level Ground Rules and Assumptions
Subsystem-Specific Ground Rules and Assumptions
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APPENDIX B
DEFINITIONS, GROUND RULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS
B.I Definitions
Definitions contained in NSTS 22206. Instructions For PreDaration
of FMEA/CIL. i0 October 1986, were used with the following
amplifications and additions.
INTACT ABORT DEFINITIONS:
RTLS - begins at transition to OPS 6 and ends at transition
to OPS 9, post-flight
TAL - begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
transition to OPS 9, p0st'flight
AOA - begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
transition to OPS 9, post-flight
ATO - begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
transition to OPS 9, post-flight
CREDIBLE (CAUSE) - an event that can be predicted or expected in
anticipated operational environmental conditions. Excludes an
event where multiple failures must first occur to result in
environmental extremes
CONTINGENCY CREW PROCEDURES - procedures that are utilized beyond
the standard malfunction procedures, pocket checklists, and cue
cards
EARLY MISSION TERMINATION - termination of onorbit phase prior to
planned end of mission
EFFECTS/RATIONALE - description of the case which generated the
highest criticality
HIGHEST CRITICALITY - the highest functional criticality
determined in the phase-by-phase analysis
MAJOR MODE (MM) - major sub-mode of software operational sequence
(OPS)
MC - Memory Configuration of Primary Avionics Software System
(PASS)
MISSION - assigned performance of a specific Orbiter flight with
payload/objective accomplishments including orbit phasing and
altitude (excludes secondary payloads such as GAS cans,
middeck P/L, etc.)
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MULTIPLE ORDER FAILURE - describes the failure'due to a single
cause or event of all units which perform a necessary (critical)
function
OFF-NOM_NAD CREW PROCEDURES - procedures that are utilized beyond
the standard malfunction procedures, pocket checklists, and cue
cards
OPS - software operational sequence
pRIMARY MISSION OBJECTIVES - worst case primary mission objec-
tives are equal to mission objectives
PHASE DEFINITIONS:
PRELAUNCH PHASE - begins at launch count-down Orbiter
power-up and ends at moding to OPS Major Mode 102 (liftoff)
L_FTOFF MISSION PHASE - begins at SRB ignition (MM 102) and
ends at transition out of OPS 1 (Synonymous with ASCENT)
ONORBIT PHASE - begins at transition to OPS 2 or OPS 8 and
ends at transition out of OPS 2 or OPS 8
pEORBIT PHASE - begins at transition to OPS Major Mode
301 and ends at first main landing gear touchdown
"LANDING/$AFING PHASE - begins at first main gear
touchdown and ends with the completion of post-landing
safing operations
w
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APPENDIX B
DEFINITIONS, GROUND RULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS
B.2 IOA Project Level Ground Rules and Assumptions
The philosophy embodied in NSTS 22206, Instructions for
Preparation of FMEA/CIL° i0 October 1986, was employed with the
following amplifications and additions•
ii The operational flight software is an accurate
implementation of the Flight System Software Requirements
(FSSRs).
RATIONALE: Software verification is out-of-scope of
this task.
2. After liftoff, any parameter which is monitored by system
management (SM) or which drives any part of the Caution and
Warning System (C&W) will support passage of Redundancy
Screen B for its corresponding hardware item.
RATIONALE: Analysis of on-board parameter availability
and/or the actual monitoring by the crew
is beyond the scope of this task.
3. Any data employed with flight software is assumed to be
functional for the specific vehicle and specific mission
being flown.
•
•
RATIONALE: Mission data verification is out-of-scope of
this task.
All hardware (including firmware) is manufactured and
assembled to the design specifications/drawings.
RATIONALE: Acceptance and verification testing is
designed to detect and identify problems
before the item is approved for use.
All Flight Data File crew procedures will be assumed
performed as written, and will not include human error in
their performance.
RATIONALE: Failures caused by human operational error
are out-of-scope of this task.
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10.
ii.
All hardware analyses will, as a minimum, be performed at
the level of analysis existent within NASA/Prime Contractor
Orbiter FMEA/CILs, and will be permitted to go to greater
hardware detail levels but not lesser.
RATIONALE: Comparison of IOA analysis results with
other analyses requires that both analyses
be performed to a comparable level of
detail.
Verification that a telemetry parameter is actually
monitored during AOS by ground-based personnel is not
required.
RATIONALE: Analysis of mission-dependent telemetry
availability and/or the actual monitoring of
applicable data by ground-based personnel is
beyond the scope of this task.
The determination of criticalities per phase is based on the
worst case effect of a failure for the phase being analyzed.
The failure can occur in the phase being analyzed or in
any previous phase, whichever produces the worst case
effects for the phase of interest•
RATIONALE: Assigning phase criticalities ensures a
thorough and complete analysis.
Analysis of wire harnesses, cables, and electrical connectors
to determine if FMEAs are warranted will not be performed
nor FMEAs assessed.
RATIONALE: Analysis was substantially complete prior
to NSTS 22206 ground rule redirection.
Analysis of welds or brazed joints that cannot be inspected
will not be performed nor FMEAs assessed•
RATIONALE: Analysis was substantially complete prior
to NSTS 22206 ground rule redirection.
Emergency system or hardware will include burst discs and
will exclude the EMU Secondary Oxygen Pack (SOP), pressure
relief valves and the landing gear pyrotechnics.
RATIONALE: Clarify definition of emergency systems to
ensure consistency throughout IOA project.
B-5
APPENDIX B
DEFINITIONS, GROUND RULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS
B.3 LSS and ALSS Specific Ground Rules and Assumptions
The IOA analysis was performed to the component or assembly level
of the LSS and ALSS subsystem. The analysis considered the worst
case effects of the hardware or functional failure on the
subsystem, mission, and crew and vehicle safety.
im The Flash Evaporator System (topper only) was
considered an unlike but redundant operation to the
supply water dump operation during on-orbit phase.
RATIONALE: Past missions have adequately demonstrated
the use of FES for dumping excess water
without significant impact to the mission
timeline.
u The fuel cells dedicated dump line was considered an
unlike but redundant way of expelling the generated
water.
•
RATIONALE: The fuel cells dedicated line has not been
flight tested, but the NSTS-22206 (para
2.3.2.d) considers interfacing subsystems to
be operating within their specified
tolerances.
The cross-tie capability was considered an unlike but
redundant to the supply water dump line•
RATIONALE: The use of cross-tie capability is
anticipated to be under severe circumstances
when no other method is available to expel
£h_water. _ ......
The newly added water line from the fuel cells to Tank B
was considered in this study.
RATIONALE: This line is an approved design change and
will be incorporated on all vehicles•
e The airlock analysis assumed two crewmen for a typical
EVA activity.
RATIONALE: Rule 2-24 of the JSC-12820, STS Operational
Flight Rules.
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The airlock analysis did not consider emergency EVA to
close the payload bay doors.
RATIONALE: The payload bay door failure was considered
to constitute a second failure•
The Apollo Fecal Bags and the Urine Collection
Devices (UCD) are considered as unlike redundant
hardware to the WMS.
RATIONALE: The Apollo Fecal Bags or UCD are not employed
unless the WMS is non-functional. There
are adequate contingency waste collection
supplies for every crew member for at least
3 days usage of the UCD and enough Apollo
Fecal Bags for the mission life. If there
is a generic material failure present in the
contingency waste collection supplies, a
mission loss would be developed at that time.
The Contingency Water Container (CWC) is emergency
hardware and if failed requires a change in the mission
schedule and loss of waste collection methods.
RATIONALE: The CWC is not employed unless the waste
water storage and dump subsystems are
inoperative. There is a mission schedule
impact•
If either the Vacuum Vent line or nozzle heater fails,
a mission critical failure is assumed to have occured.
RATIONALE: If the heaters fail, there is a potential
for line or nozzle freezing and the
possibility of line blockage due to ice
formation. The line blockage would cause
H2 contamination of the supply water due to
excessive H2 pressure• There could be a
life or vehicle critical condition if the
hydrogen concentration in the vacuum vent
dump line reaches an explosive concentration.
Noxious gases released into the cabin atmosphere was not
considered a mission loss event.
RATIONALE-. There is a crew discomfort judgement and
the effects on the crew is to be determined
on a real-time basis.
B-7
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12.
13.
14.
15.
The siren is the primary indication of a fire with FDA
as a redundant indication.
RATIONALE: The annunciator requires someone at the CDR
station to know a fire exists if the siren
fails. Telemetry data requires AOS.
The Flight Deck RT and LT sensors are parallel redundant
to each other and the Cabin sensor is serial redundant to
both the RT and LT sensors. The time lag in sensor trig-
gers could be a problem.
RATIONALE: The ECLSS ductwork where the RT, LT and
Cabin sensors are located, is such that the
other flight deck sensor would not be
triggered until the airflow had proceeded
to the middeck and back up to the flight
deck. By the time the contaminated air
reaches the other flight deck sensor, any
incipient fire Condition could be a well
developed fire base, thus producing a
possible loss of life condition.
The Test and Reset switches were not considered as
emergency hardware, i.e., do not need to function
during a fire situation.
RATIONALE: The consideration is that once used after
lift-off, they could create situations
where redundancy was lost and therefore
directly affect the emergency system.
Loss of fire sensor checkout capabilities was
considered a condition for mission termination.
RATIONALE: The fear of a loss of crew as a result of
the safety hardware failure.
The portable fire-suppression bottles were not
considered redundant to the AV Bay bottles
ascent or entry.
during
RAT I ONALE : The mission event loads preclude crew
motion about the cabin during these mission
phases.
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16. A ground rule for the SD/FS analysis was that the only
failure modes for the portable fire extinguishers were
premature operation or inoperative. No component level
analysis was performed.
RATIONALE: The details of the portable fire extinguishers
were not available at the time the analysis was
performed, thus no component analysis was
possible.
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APPENDIX C
DETAILED ANALYSTS
This section contains the IOA analysis worksheets employed during
the analysis of the Life Support system. The information on
these worksheets is intentionally similar to the FMEA's written
by Rockwell and the NASA. Each of these sheets identifies the
item being analyzed, and parent assembly, as well as the
function. For each failure mode, the possible causes are
outlined, and the assessed hardware and functional criticality
for each mission phase is listed, as described in the Rockwell
Desk Instructions 100-2G. Finally, effects are entered at the
bottom of each sheet, and the worst case criticality is entered
at the top.
w
!
LEGEND FOR IOA ANALYSIS WORKSHEETS
Hardware Criticalities :
1 = Loss of life or vehicle
2 = Loss of mission
3 = Non loss of life or vehicle or mission
Functional Criticalities :
IR = Redundant identical hardware components or redundant
functional paths all of which, if failed, could cause
loss of life or vehicle.
2R = Redundant identical hardware components or redundant
functional paths all of which, if failed, could cause
loss of mission.
Redundancy Screen A :
1 = Is Checked Out PreFlight
2 = Is Capable of Check Out PreFlight
3 = Not Capable of Check Out PreFlight
4 = Do Not Know
Redundancy Screens B and C :
P = Passed Screen
F = Failed Screen
NA = Not Applicable
C-I
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SUPPLY WATER SUBSYSTEM
Analysis Worksheets
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MDAC-ID
SUPPLY WATER SUBSYSTEM
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY
FLIGHT ABORT SCREENS
H/F H/F A B C
ii00 (*) 2/2 2/2
ii01 (*) 2/2 2/2
1102 (*) 2/2 2/2
1103 (*) 2/2 2/2
1104 3/2R 3/2R P P P
1105 (,) 2/2 2/2
1106 (*) 2/2 2/2
1107 3/3 /NA
1108 3/3 3/3
1109 3/2R 3/2R P P P
111o (*) 2/2 2/2
iiii 3/2R 3/2R P P P
1112 3/2R 3/2R P P P
1113 (*) 2/2 2/2
1114 3/2R 3/2R P P P
1115 3/2R 3/2R P P P
1116 3/3 3/3
1117 3/3 3/3
1118 3/3 3/3
1119 3/3 3/3
1120 3/3 3/3
1121 3/2R 3/2R P P• P
1122 3/3 3/3 "
1123 3/2R 3/2R P P P
1124 3/3 3/3
1125 3/3 ,3/3
1126 3/3 3/3
1127 3/3 3/3
1128 3/2R 3/2R P P P
1129 3/IR 3/IR P P P
1130 3/2R 3/2R P P P
1131 3/2R 3/2R P P P
1132 3/2R 3/2R P P P
1133 3/3 3/3
1134 3/3 3/3
1135 (*) 2/2 2/2
1136 3/3 3/3
1137 (*) 2/2 2/2
1138 3/3 /NA
1139 3/3 /NA
1140 3/3 /NA
ITEM NAME
H2 SEPARATOR (2)
H2 SEPARATORS (2)
H2 SEPARATORS (2)
H2 SEPARATORS
MICROBIAL FILTER (i)
MICROBIAL FILTER (I)
MICROBIAL FILTER QD (2)
MICROBIAL FILTER QD (2)
TANKS INLET SOLENOID VLV (4)
TANKS INLET SOLENOID VLV (4)
TANKS INLET ISOLATION VLV (4
TANKS OUTLET ISOLATION VLV (4)
TANKS OUTLET ISOLATION VLV (4)
TANKS OUTLET ISOLATION VLV (4)
SWITCH, INLET ISOL VALVE (4)
SWITCH, INLET ISOL VALVE (4)
SWITCH, INLET ISOL VALVE (4)
POS. IND., ISOL VLV SW (8)
RESISTOR, ISOL VLV SW (8)
DIODE, ISOL VALVE SWITCH (8)
SOLENOID, INLET ISOL VALVE (4)
SOLENOID, INLET ISOL VALVE (4)
SOLENOID, OUTLET ISOL VALVE (4)
SOLENOID, OUTLET ISOL VALVE (4)
CB, INLET ISOL VALVE (4)
CB, INLET ISOL VALVE (4)
CB, OUTLET ISOL VALVE (4)
CB, OUTLET ISOL VALVE (4)
TANKS A, B, C AND D (4)
TANKS A, B, C AND D (4)
TANKS A, B, C AND D (4)
SENSOR, TANKS QUANTITY (4)
FILTER, GN2-TANKS INLET (4)
FILTER, GN2-TANKS INLET (4)
SENSOR, PRESSURE (i)
RELIEF VALVE, 1.5 PSID (2)
RELIEF VALVE, 1.5 PSID (2)
RELIEF VALVE, 1.5 PSID (2)
QD, GSE FILL/DRAIN (2)
QD, GSE FILL/DRAIN (2)
QD, GSE FILL/DRAIN (2)
(*) Potential Critical Items.
C-3
MDAC- I D
SUPPLYWATERSUBSYSTEM(cont'd)
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY
FLIGHT ABORT SCREENS
H/F H/F A B C
1141 (,) 2/2 2/2
1142 3/2R 3/2R
1143 3/3 /NA
1144 3/2R 3/2R
1145 (.) 2/2 3/3
1146 3/3 3/3
1147 (*) 2/2 3/3
1148 (.) 2/2 3/3
1149 (*) 2/2 3/3
P P P
P P P
ITEM NAME
QD, GSE FILL/DRAIN (2)
QD, GSE FILL/DRAIN (2)
CAP, GSE QD (2)
CAP, GSE QD (2)
TANK A PRESS CNTRL VALVE (I)
TANK A PRESS CNTRL VALVE (I)
TANK A PRESS CNTRL VALVE (i)
TANK A PRESS CNTRL VALVE (I)
TANK A VENT VALVE (I)
115o 3/3 3/3
115_ (.) 2/2.... 3/3
1152 3/3 3/3
1153 3/3 3/3
1154 (*) 2/2 2/2
1155 3/3 3/3
1156 3/3 3/3
1157 3/3 3/3
I158 _ 3/3 3/3
1159 3/3 3/3
1160 3/3 3/3
1161 3/3 3/3
1162 3/3 313
1163 3/3 3/3
1164 3/3 3/3
1165 3/2R 3/2R
1166 3/3 3/3
1167 (*) 2/2 2/2
1168 3/2R 3/2R
1169 3/3 3/3
1170 3/3 3/3
1171 3/3 3/3
1172 3/2R 3/2R
1173 3/3 3/3
1174 3/3 3/3
1175 _ 3/3 3/3
1176 3/3 3/3
1177 3/3 3/3
1178 (*) 2/2 3/3
1179 (*) 2/2 3/3
i180 (*) 2/2 2/2
1181 (*) 2/2 3/3
1182 (*) 2/2 3/3
1183 (*) 2/2 3/3
1184 (*) 2/2 3/3
1185 (*) 2/2 3/3
P P P
PPP
PPP
TANK A VENT VALVE (i)
TANK= A _ VAL_ _(i) ....
CROSSOVER VALVE (I)
CROSSOVER VALVE (I)
CROSSOVER VALVE (i)
SOLENOID, XOVR VALVE (1)
SOLENOID, XOVR VALVE (i)
SWITCH, XOVR VALVE (1)
SWITCH, XOVR VALVE (1)
SWITCH, XOVR VALVE (1)
POS. IND., XOVR VALVE (1)
DIODE, XOVR VALVE (I)
RESISTOR, XOVR VALVE (I)
CB, XOVR VALVE (1)
CB, XOVR VALVE (I)
ISOL VALVE, FES B LINE (i)
ISOL VALVE, FES B LINE (i)
ISOL VALVE, FES B LINE (1)
SOLENOID, FES ISOL VALVE (1)
SOLENOID, FES ISOL VALVE (i)
SWITCH, FES ISOL VALVE (i)
SWITCH, FES ISOL VALVE (I) _ i
SWITCH, FES ISOL VALVE (1)
CB, FES ISOL VALVE (1)
CB, FES ISOL VALVE (1) ......
POS. IND. ,_FES IS()L VALVE (I)
RESISTOR, FES ISOL VALVE (1)
DIODE, FES ISOL VALVE (1)
SUPPLY VALVE, GALLEY (i) ......
SUPPLY VALVE, GALLEY (I)
SUPPLY VALVE, GALLEY (I)
SOLENOID, GALLEY VALVE (I)
SOLENOID, GALLEY VALVE (i)
SWITCH, GALLEY VALVE (1)
SWITCH, GALLEY VALVE (i)
SWITCH, GALLEY VALVE (I)
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(*) Potential Critical Items.
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MDAC-ID
SUPPLY WATER SUBSYSTEM (cont'd)
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY
FLIGHT ABORT SCREENS
H/F H/F A B C
1186 3/3 3/3
1187 3/3 3/3
1188 3/3 3/3
1189 (*) 2/2 3/3
1190 3/3 3/3
1191 (*) 312R INA P P F
1192 3/3 /NA
1193 (*) 2/IR 3/3 P P F
1194 3/3 3/3
1195 3/2R /NA P P P
1196 3/2R /NA P P P
1197 3/2R /NA P P P
1198 3/2R /NA P P P
1199 3/3 3/3
1200 3/3 3/3
1201 3/3 3/3
1202 3/2R /NA P P P
1203 3/3 3/3
1204 (*) 3/2R /NA P P F
1205 (*) 3/2R 3/3 P P F
1206 (*) 3/2R /NA P P F
1207 3/2R /NA P P P
1208 3/2R 3/3 P P P
1209 3/2R /NA P P P
1210 (*) 2/IR 3/3 P F P
1211 3/2R /NA P P P
1212 3/2R /NA P P P
1213 3/2R /NA P P P
1214 3/3 /NA
1215 3/2R /NA P P P
1216 3/3 /NA
1217 3/3 3/3
1218 3/3 3/3
1219 3/3 3/3
1220 3/2R /NA P P P
1221 (*) 2/2 /NA
1222 (*) 2/2 /NA
1223 (*) 2/2 /NA
1224 3/2R /NA P P P
1225 3/2R /NA P P P
1226 3/2R /NA P P P
1227 3/3 /NA
1228 (*) 2/2 /NA
1229 (*) 2/2 /NA
1230 3/3 /NA
ITEM NAME
POS. IND., GALLEY VALVE (i)
DIODE, GALLEY VALVE (i)
RESISTOR, GALLEY VALVE (i)
CB, GALLEY VALVE (I)
CB, GALLEY VALVE (I)
DUMP ISOL VALVE (I)
DUMP ISOL VALVE (I)
DUMP ISOL VALVE (I)
SOLENOID, DUMP ISOL VALVE (I)
SOLENOID, DUMP ISOL VALVE (i)
SWITCH, DUMP ISOL VALVE (i)
SWITCH, DUMP ISOL VALVE (i)
SWITCH, DUMP ISOL VALVE (i)
POS. IND., DUMP ISOL VALVE (I)
DIODE, DUMP ISOL VALVE (I)
RESISTOR, DUMP ISOL VALVE (1)
CB, DUMP ISOL VALVE (1)
CB, DUMP ISOL VALVE (I)
DUMP VALVE (I)
DUMP VALVE (I)
DUMP VALVE (i)
SOLENOID, DUMP VALVE (i)
SOLENOID, DUMP VALVE (I)
SWITCH, DUMP VALVE (I)
SWITCH, DUMP VALVE (I)
SWITCH, DUMP VALVE (i)
SWITCH, DUMP NOZZLE HEATER (i)
SWITCH, DUMP NOZZLE HEATER (i)
SWITCH, DUMP NOZZLE HEATER (i)
CB, DUMP VALVE (i)
CB, DUMP VALVE (i)
POS. IND., DUMP VALVE (I)
RESISTOR, DUMP VALVE (2)
DIODE, DUMP VALVE (i)
SENSOR, NOZZLE TEMPERATURE (2)
NOZZLE HEATER (i)
NOZZLE HEATER (I)
DUMP NOZZLE
DUMP LINE HEATER (2)
DUMP LINE HEATER (2)
THERMOSTAT, LINE HEATER (4)
THERMOSTAT, DUMP LINE HTR (4)
QD, CONTINGENCY CROSS-TIE (i)
QD, CONTINGENCY CROSS-TIE (I)
SENSOR, DUMP LINE TEMP (i)
(*) Potential Critical Items.
C-5
L
MDAC-ID
SUPPLY WATER SUBSYSTEM (concluded)
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY
FLIGHT ABORT SCREENS
H/F H/F A B C
1231 (*) 3/2R 3/3 P P F
1232 (*) 3/2R 3/3 P P F
1233 (*) 2/2 2/2
1234 (*) 2/2 2/2
1235 (*) 2/2 2/2
1236 (*) 2/2 2/2
1237 (*) 2/IR 2/IR P P P
1238 (*) 3/2R /NA P P F
ITEM NAME
QD, ECLSS BAY (2)
QD, GALLEY/DISPENSER (2)
LINES AND FITTINGS
LINES AND FITTINGS
LINES AND FITTINGS
LINES AND FITTINGS
WATER CHILLER (i)
WATER CHILLER (i)
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(*) Potential Critical Items.
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mINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6128187
LIFE SUPPORT
ii00
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
2/2
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
H2 SEPARATOR (2)
RESTRICTED FLOW
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ERROR
SUPPLY WATER SUBSYSTEM
TANK ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/2
LIFTOFF: 2/2 TAL: 2/2
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 2/2
DEORBIT: 2/2 ATO: 2/2
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
ECLSS BAY
90V62ABI
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF PRIMARY WATER LINE TO THE TANKS. GENERATED WATER WILL
FLOW TO TANK B THROUGH A SECONDARY LINE (NEW DESIGN) WITH NO H2
REMOVAL CAPABILITY. EXCESSIVE AMOUNT OF H2 IN THE WATER WILL
CAUSE FES SHUTDOWN AND DUMP FREEZING AND THE WATER WILL NOT BE
PALATABLE FOR CREW USAGE. THE MISSION SHOULD BE TERMINATED AND
RETURNED ON REMAINING WATER IN THE TANK.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-7
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 6/25/87
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: Ii01
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
2/2
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
H2 SEPARATORS (2)
INTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ERROR
SUPPLY WATER SUBSYSTEM
TANK ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/2
LIFTOFF: 2/2 TAL: 2/2
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 2/2
DEORBIT: 2/2 ATO: 2/2
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: ECLSS BAY
PART NUMBER: 90V62ABI
] B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF GENERATED WATER TO VACUUM RESULTING IN REDUCED WATER FOR
FES, CREW, AND P/L. ALSO, THE FUEL CELLS WATER AND HYDROGEN
LINES WILL BE EXPOSED TO VACUUM STARVING FUEL CELLS OF HYDROGEN
IF THE VENT LINE IS NOT ISOLATED. ISOLATION OF THE VENT LINE
WILL FORCE DUMPING OF THE FUEL CELLS WATER VIA EPS LINE, AND
ABORT MISSION AND RETURN ON EXISTING WATER IN THE TANK. WASTE
WATER ALSO AVAILABLE TO SUPP_NT SUPPLY WATER FOR FES
OPERATION.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/25/8 
LIFE SUPPORT
1102
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
2/2
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
H2 SEPARATORS (2)
INTERMITTENT OPERATION, PARTIAL OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ERROR
SUPPLY WATER SUBSYSTEM
TANK ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/2
LIFTOFF: 2/2 TAL: 2/2
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 2/2
DEORBIT: 2/2 ATO: 2/2
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
ECLSS BAY
90V62ABI
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUCED HYDROGEN REMOVAL CAPABILITY. EXCESSIVE HYDROGEN IN THE
WATER LINE WILL CAUSE FREEZING DURING DUMP OPERATION AND WILL
FORCE FES SHUTDOWNS. ALSO, CREW STOMACH DISCOMFORT/NAUSEA WILL
BE INDUCED AS CREW CONSUMES THE WATER. TOTAL LOSS OF CAPABILITY
TO DISCHARGE H2 CAN BE SERIOUS. PRESENCE OF H2 IN THE TANKS MAY
NOT BE READILY DETECTABLE UNTIL FES/DUMP OPS OR CREW DRINKS IT.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-9
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 6/25/87
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 1103
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
2/2
ITEM: H2 SEPARATORS
FAILURE MODE: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ERROR
SUPPLY WATER SUBSYSTEM
TANK ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 2/2
ONORBIT: 2/2
DEORBIT: 2/2
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: 2/2
TAL: 2/2
AOA: 2/2
ATO: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [
LOCATION: ECLSS BAY
PART NUMBER: 90V62ABI
] B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE EXTERNAL LEAKAGE WILL EXPOSE CREW CABIN ATMOSPHERE TO VACUUM
LINE THEREBY RESULTING IN CABIN DECOMPRESSION. VACUUM LINE CAN
BE SHUTOFF BUT IT WOULD PLACE H2 INTO THE CABIN - FIRE HAZARD.
THE FUEL CELLS SHOULD BE ISOLATED FROM THE WATER LINES
GENERATED WATER DUMPED THROUGH EPS VENT, ABORT THE MISSION, AND
RETURN ON EXISTING WATER IN THE TANKS. PRESENCE OF H2 IN THE
CABIN IS NOT READILY DETECTABLE.
REFERENCES:
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REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-10
ms
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/25/8 
LIFE SUPPORT
1104
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MICROBIAL FILTER (i)
RESTRICTED FLOW
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ERROR
SUPPLY WATER SUBSYSTEM
TANK ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: 3/2R
TAL: 3/2R
AOA: 3/2R
ATO: 3/2R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: MID-DECK (CABIN)
PART NUMBER: 90V62BCI
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
B[P] C[P]
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUCED/LOSS OF POTABLE WATER TO REPLENISH TANK A FOR DIRECT CREW
USE. ADEQUATE WATER IS IN TANK A TO PROVIDE FOR CREW BUT MAY BE
LIMITED FOR A FULL MISSION SCENARIO. CREWMAY USE POTABLE WATER
BOTTLES (SURVIVAL KIT). ALSO WATER DISPENSER INCORPORATES
AN ADDITIONAL MICROBIAL FILTER IF TANK A WATER IS USED.
REFERENCES:
L
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-ll
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/2s/87
LIFE SUPPORT
1105
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
2/2
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MICROBIAL FILTER (i)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ERROR
SUPPLY WATER SUBSYSTEM
TANK ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/2
LIFTOFF: 2/2 TAL: 2/2
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 2/2
DEORBIT: 2/2 ATO: 2/2
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
ECLSS BAY
90V62BCI
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF MICROBE REMOVING CAPABILITY TO PROVIDE POTABLE WATER TO
THE CREW AND EXPULSION OF WATER INTO THE CABIN (MID-DECK) FLOOR.
LEAK CANNOT BE ISOLATED AND MAY CAUSE ELECTRICAL SHORTS. ABORT
MISSION IF LEAKAGE IS SEVERE.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/25/87
LIFE SUPPORT
1106
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
2/2
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MICROBIAL FILTER QUICK DISCONNECT (2)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ERROR
SUPPLY WATER SUBSYSTEM
TANK ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/2
LIFTOFF: 2/2 TAL: 2/2
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 2/2
DEORBIT: 2/2 ATO: 2/2
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
ECLSS BAY
90V62BCI
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF MICROBE REMOVING CAPABILITY TO PROVIDE POTABLE WATER TO
THE CREW AND EXPULSION OF WATER INTO THE CABIN (MID-DECK) FLOOR.
LEAK CANNOT BE ISOLATED AND MAY CAUSE ELECTRICAL SHORTS. ABORT
MISSION IF LEAKAGE IS SEVERE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-13
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
612s18v
LIFE SUPPORT
1107
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MICROBIAL FILTER QUICK DISCONNECT
INABILITY TO MATE/DEMATE
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) ERROR
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
s)
9)
SUPPLY WATER SUBSYSTEM
TANK ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: /NA
ONORBIT: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: ECLSS BAY
PART NUMBER: 90V62BCI
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: /NA
TAL: /NA
AOA: /NA
ATO: /NA
B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MISHANDLING/ABUSE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FILTER IS INSTALLED PRELAUNCH AND REMOVED POST FLIGHT - NO
MAJOR IMPACT IS SEEN. ....
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 6/25/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 1108 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TANKS INLET SOLENOID VALVES (4)
FAILS TO CLOSE, INTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
8)
9)
ERROR
SUPPLY WATER SUBSYSTEM
TANK ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
ECLSS BAY
90V62LV1, LV3, LV5, LV7
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
NOMINALLY NO PROBLEM. THE GENERATED WATER IS FLOWN THROUGH THE
TANK. HOWEVER, THE CAPABILITY IS LOST TO ISOLATE A TANK FROM THE
LINE IN THE EVENT THERE IS A LEAKAGE. UNDER SINGLE FAILURE
CONDITION THE VALVE HAS FAILED IN ITS NOMINAL POSITION AND NO
MAJOR IMPACT IS ANTICIPATED.
REFERENCES :
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-15
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/25/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
LIFE SUPPORT FLIGHT: 3/2R
1109 ABORT: 3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE :
FLOW
TANKS INLET SOLENOID VALVE (4)
FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN, FAILS TO OPEN, RESTRICTED
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ERROR
SUPPLY WATER SUBSYSTEM
TANK ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/2R
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: ECLSS BAY
PART NUMBER: 90V62LVl, LV3, LV5, LV7
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART STRUCTURE,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
LOSS OF ONE TANK (UNDER SINGLE FAILURE) TO ACCEPT GENERATED WATER
- SMALLER VOLUME FROM REMAINING THREE TANKS WILL FORCE MORE
PERIODIC DUMPS. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANT VALVES WILL PRECLUDE
CAPABILITY FOR WATER MANAGEMENT. FUEL CELLS WATER MAY HAVE TO BE
VENTED OUTSIDE AT EPS, AND ADEQUATE WATER COULD NOT BE MANAGED
FOR CONTINGENCY SCENARIOS - THUS LOSS OF MISSION THAT IS ABORT
AND RETURN ON EXISTING WATER AT THE TIME. THE SECONDARY WATER
LINE MAY BE USED TO ACCEPT GENERATED WATER, BUT WITH NO H2
REMOVAL CAPABILITY.
REFERENCES:
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/2s/sv
LIFE SUPPORT
Iii0
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 2/2
ABORT: 2/2
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TANKS INLET ISOLATION VALVE (4)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
S)
9)
ERROR
SUPPLY WATER SUBSYSTEM
TANK ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/2
LIFTOFF: 2/2 TAL: 2/2
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 2/2
DEORBIT: 2/2 ATO: 2/2
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
ECLSS BAY
90V62LVl, LV3, LV5, LV7
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
EXPULSION OF FUEL CELLS GENERATED WATER INTO THE ECLSS BAY. THE
WATER IN THE AFFECTED TANK MAY BE DUMPED OVERBOARD AND THE TANK
KEPT EMPTY IF THE LEAK IS ON THE TANK SIDE. THIS WILL REDUCE
OPERATIONAL FLEXIBILITY FOR WATER MANAGEMENT. LOSS OF ONE OR
MORE REDUNDANT ITEMS MAY FORCE MISSION TO RETURN WITH EXISTING
WATER IN THE TANKS AND WATER LEAK INTO THE BAY. IF THE LEAKAGE
IS ON THE UPSTREAM SIDE, IT CANNOT BE STOPPED WITHOUT ISOLATING
FUEL CELL LINE - SPECIALLY FOR TANK A ISOL VALVE.
REFERENCES:
w
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-17
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/25/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
LIFE SUPPORT FLIGHT: 3/2R
iiii ABORT: 3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LEAKAGE
TANKS OUTLET ISOLATION VALVE (4)
FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED, FAILS TO CLOSE, INTERNAL
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ERROR
SUPPLY WATER SUBSYSTEM
TANK ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH{ 3/3 RTLS: 3/2R
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: ECLSS BAY
PART NUMBER: 90V62LV2, LV4, LV6, LV8
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
VIBRATION
E??ECTSyRATION_LE[ _ ................................
LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO ISOLATE THE AFFECTED TANK FROM WATER LINE.
DOWNSTREAM VALVES (CROSSOVER VALVE OR DUMP VALVE) MAY BE USED TO
ISOLATE TANKS A, B FROM C & D. HOWEVER, WATER MANAGEMENT WILL BE
MORE SEVERE AND LESS FLEXIBLE. FURTHERMORE, TANK A WATER
INTEGRITY MAY NOT BE PROTECTED.
REFERENCES:
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/25/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
LIFE SUPPORT FLIGHT: 3/2R
1112 ABORT: 3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE :
FLOW
TANKS OUTLET ISOLATION VALVE (4)
FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN, FAILS TO OPEN, RESTRICTED
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
S)
9)
ERROR
SUPPLY WATER SUBSYSTEM
TANK ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/2R
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
ECLSS BAY
90V62LV2, LV4, LV6, LV8
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF WATER USAGE FROM THE AFFECTED TANK FORCING MORE PERIODIC
DUMPS AND LESS WATER RESERVED FOR CONTINGENCY P/L BAY DOOR
PROBLEM. LOSS OF FUNCTION (WATER MANAGEMENT) WILL FORCE WATER
DUMPS THROUGH FUEL CELLS LINE, AND WILL FORCE FES SHUTDOWN.
MISSION IS TERMINATED AND RETURNED WITHOUT FES OPS. LOSS OF FES
OPERATION DURING ENTRY AND ASCENT IS NOT FULLY UNDERSTOOD WITHOUT
TEST/ANALYSIS RESULTS. WASTE WATER MAY BE USED FOR FES, BUT
SEVERE CONTAMINATION WILL OCCUR IN THE LINES.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-19
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
_AC ID:
6125/87
LIFE SUPPORT
1113
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
2/2
ITS:
FAIL_ MODE:
TANKS OUTT._T ISOLATION VALVE (4)
EXTE_AL _GE
_D ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI SUBSYS T._AD: M.J. SAIIDI
BRE__ HIE_CHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
E_OR
SUPPLY WATER SUBSYST_
TANK ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT P_SE HDW/_C ABORT HDW/_NC
P_LA_CH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/2
LIFTOFF: 2/2 TAL: 2/2
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 2/2
DEORBIT: 2/2 ATO: 2/2
_DING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
EC_S BAY
90V62LV2, LV4, LV6, LV8
CAUSES: MEC_ICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
EXPULSION OF WATER INTO THE ECLSS BAY PERHAPS CREATING ELECTRICAL
SHOOTS IN THE ASSOCIATED EQUIPMENT. THE AFFECTED TANK MUST BE
DRAINED AND ISOLATED (SHUTOFF INLET VALVE) IF LEAKAG_IS SEVERE.
_CTIONALLO__L PRECLUDE=_PLY_T_ FOR FES USAGE
_DER SEVERE T._A_GE (LEA_GE >> GENERATION). FES OPS _Y USE
WASTE WATER. AN EXTE_AL LEA_GE ON UPST_ SIDE CANNOT BE
ISOLATED AND _Y DRAIN THE TANK CONTENT (165 LBM) INTO THE EC_S
BAY.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE :
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/2s/By
LIFE SUPPORT
1114
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, INLET ISOL VALVE (4)
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) ERROR
2) SUPPLY WATER SUBSYSTEM
3) TANK ASSEMBLY
4) EPDC
5)
6)
v)
s)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/2R
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL RI2A2 - CABIN
$3, 9, 14 AND 6
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE MODE (PHYSICALLY JAMMED IN CLOSED POSITION) WILL
PREVENT OPENING OF THE INLET ISOL VALVE TO ALLOW FLOW OF WATER TO
THE AFFECTED TANK - THAT IS LOSS OF ONE TANK FROM WATER
MANAGEMENT SCENARIO. FUNCTIONAL LOSS OF REDUNDANT ITEMS WILL
HAVE SAME EFFECTS AS MDAC-II09.
REFERENCES:
w
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WO_SHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/25/87
LIFE SUPPORT
1115
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/_C
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, INT._.T ISOL VALVE (4)
SHORTED, SINGLE CONTACT
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI SUBSYS ;._.AD: M.J. SAIIDI
B__HIE_CHY:
1) ERROR
2) SUPPLY WATER SUBSYSTEM
3) TANK ASSEMBLY
4) EPDC
5)
6)
7)
s)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/_C ABORT HDW/_C
P_LAUNCH: 3/3 RT_: 3/2R
LI_OFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
_DING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL RI2A2 - CABIN
$3, 9, 14 AND 6
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, CORROSION
EFFECTS/RATIONALR: .................
A SHORT ACROSS "C_SE" CONTACTS IS P_ERQEI_D TO.B_E MORE SEVERE
THAN ACROSS "OPEN" CONTACTS. IN THIS CASE, THE AFFECTED TANK
WILL BE I_QLATED FROM GENERATED WATERLINE _p_ THE EFFECT IS SAME
AS EXPLAINED FOR INLET VALVE FAILED CLOSED, MDAC-II09.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/25/8G
LIFE SUPPORT
1116
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, INLET ISOL VALVE (4)
OPEN (ELECTRICAL), SINGLE CONTACT
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
I) ERROR
2) SUPPLY WATER SUBSYSTEM
3) TANK ASSEMBLY
4 ) EPDC
5)
6)
v)
s)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL RI2A2 - CABIN
$3, 9, 14 AND 6
B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A SINGLE CONTACT OPEN ACROSS "OPEN" PINS WILL PREVENT OPENING OF
THE ISOL VALVE THEREFORE ISOLATING THE AFFECTED TANK FROM
GENERATED WATER LINE - SEE MDAC-II09. HOWEVER, THE VALVES ARE
ALL CONFIGURED TO OPEN POSITION THROUGHOUT MISSION, AND NO CREW
ACTION IS ANTICIPATED TO CLOSE THEM.
REFERENCES".
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INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/2s/87
LIFE SUPPORT
Ii17
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
POSITION INDICATION, ISOL VALVE SWITCH (8)
LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ERROR
2) SUPPLY WATER SUBSYSTEM
3) TANK ASSEMBLY
4) EPDC
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ]
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
c [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL RI2A2 - CABIN
DSI, 2, 5, 2*6, 7, 9, i0
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF BARBER POLE_ VALVE POSITION INDICATION IS INSIGNIFICANT
SINCE THE VALVE POSITION CAN BEVERIFIED BY CHANGE OF WATER IN
THE TANK AND TELEMETRY DATA.
REFERENCES:
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/2s/87
LIFE SUPPORT
1118
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, ISOL VALVE SWITCH (8)
OPEN (ELECTRICAL), LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ERROR
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
SUPPLY WATER SUBSYSTEM
TANK ASSEMBLY
EPDC
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: 3/3
TAL: 3/3
AOA: 3/3
ATO: 3/3
B [ ] c [ ]
LOCATION: PNL RI2A2, CABIN
PART NUMBER: A3RI/42, A6RI/R2, A9RI/R2, A4RI/R2
CAUSES: THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
OPEN RESISTOR WILL RESULT IN LOSS OF VALVE POSITION INDICATION TO
THE MDM OTHERWISE NO MAJOR IMPACT.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-25
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 6/25/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 1119 - ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: DIODE, ISOL VALVE SWITCH (8)
FAILURE MODE: OPEN (ELECTRICAL), LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
l
D
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) ERROR
2) SUPPLY WATER SUBSYSTEM
3 ) TANK ASSEMBLY
4 ) EPDC "
5)
6)
7) I
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 5/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAYING: 3/3
BC ] cc ]REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
PNL RI2A2 - CABIN
AIOCRI/CR2, AIOCR6/CRT, AIOCR9/CRIO, ASCRI/CR2
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
OPEN DIODE WILL RESULT IN LOSS OF ISOL VALVE POSITION INDICATION
ON THE BARBER POLE, OTHERWISE NO MAJOR IMPACT.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE".
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/25/87
LIFE SUPPORT
1120
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SOLENOID, INLET ISOL VALVE (4)
OPEN (ELECTRICAL), FAILS TO START/STOP
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ERROR
--2) SUPPLY WATER SUBSYSTEM
3) TANK ASSEMBLY
4) EPDC
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
ECLSS BAY
90V62LVl, 3, 5 & 7
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO OPERATE THE AFFECTED VALVE - THE VALVE
REMAINS IN ITS EXISTING POSITION. THE WORST CASE IS CONSIDERED
FOR WANTING TO CLOSE THE VALVE (VALVE IS CONFIGURED OPEN
THROUGHOUT MISSION) IN ORDER TO ISOLATE THE TANK. HOWEVER, THIS
SCENARIO WOULD BE OFF-NOMINAL AND UNDER MULTIPLE CONDITION.
REFERENCES:
w
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-27
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/25/87
LIFE SUPPORT
1121
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SOLENOID, INLET ISOL VALVE (4)
FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN, SHORTED LATCH
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) ERROR
2) SUPPLY WATER SUBSYSTEM
3) TANK ASSEMBLY
4) EPDC
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
3/2R
3/2R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
_CATION:
P_T _BER:
ECLSS BAY
90V62LVl, 3, 5, 7
CAUSES: CONT_INATION, PIECE-P_T FAILURE, CO_OSION
EFFECTS/_TIONALE:
_SS OF CAPABILITY TO OPEN THE VALVE, T_S THE AF?ECTING TANK
WI_BE ISOLATED FROM THE GENE_TED WATER LINE RES_ICTiNG
FLEXIBILITY IN WATER _AGEMENT. S_E EFFECT AS THE VALVE FAILED
TO OPEN - MDAC-II09. THE FAILLE MAY NOT BE _DILY APP_ TO
BE DUE TO SOLENOID FA_.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/25/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
LIFE SUPPORT FLIGHT: 3/3
1122 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TO START/STOP
SOLENOID, OUTLET ISOL VALVE (4)
FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED, OPEN (ELECTRICAL), FAILS
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ERROR
2) SUPPLY WATER SUBSYSTEM
3) TANK ASSEMBLY
4) EPDC
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
ECLSS BAY
90V62LV2, 4, 6, 8
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO MAJOR EFFECT SINCE ALL THE VALVES REMAIN OPEN (NOMINAL
CONFIGURATION) EXCEPT FOR TANK A. TANK A WOULD REMAIN CLOSED
THROUGHOUT MISSION, BUT COULD NOT BE USED FOR ADDITIONAL WATER
REQUIREMENT TO SUSTAIN NOMINAL MISSION. THE LATCH FAILURE MAY
NOT BE READILY APPARENT.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-29
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 6/25/87
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 1123
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM: SOLENOID, OUTLET ISOL VALVE (4)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN, SHORTED LATCH
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
m
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BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY : --
i) ERROR
2) SUPPLY WATER SUBSYSTEM
3) TANK ASSEMBLY i
4 ) EPDC
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/2R
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
ECLSS BAY
90V62LV2, 4, 6, 8
B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, CORROSION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WILL FORCE THE VALVE TO CLOSE THEREBy PRECLUDING THE
TANK FOR FES/DUMP OPS AND RESERVE REQUIREMENT. THE EFFECT WILL
BE SAME AS ISOL VALVE FAILED CLOSED, MDAC-III2. THE FAILURE MAY
NOT BE READILY APPARENT TO BE DUE TO SOLENOID.
REFERENCES:
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/25/87
LIFE SUPPORT
1124
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE :
(ELECTRICAL)
CB, INLET ISOL VALVE (4)
FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED, FAILS TO OPEN, OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) ERROR
2) SUPPLY WATER SUBSYSTEM
3) TANK ASSEMBLY
4) EPDC
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL ML86B
CBI, 5, 7, 12
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL SHOCK,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF POWER TO OPERATE THE INLET ISOL VALVES. HOWEVER, NO
MAJOR IMPACT SINCE THE VALVE REMAIN IN THEIR OPERATING POSITIONS.
WITH A SUBSEQUENT FAILURE, THE TANK(S) COULD NOT BE ISOLATED FROM
LINE - MULTIPLE FAILURE.
w
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-31
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
mm
DATE: 6/25/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 1125 ABORT: 3/3 B
CB, INLET ISOL VALVE (4)
FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN, FAILS TO OPEN
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDILEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI
m
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY: m
i) ERROR
2) SUPPLY WATER SUBSYSTEM
3) TANK ASSEMBLY _
4) EPDC m
5)
6)
7) []
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFT0?F: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: PNL ML86B
PART NUMBER: CBI, 5, 7, 12
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, CORROSION
B[ ] C[ ]
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO MAJOR PROBLEM, EXCEPT FOR LOSS OF OVERLOAD CIRCUIT PROTECTION.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/25/87
LIFE SUPPORT
1126
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
(ELECTRICAL)
CB, OUTLET ISOL VALVE (4)
FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED, FAILS TO CLOSE, OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) ERROR
2) SUPPLY WATER SUBSYSTEM
3) TANK ASSEMBLY
4) EPDC
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: 3/3
TAL: 3/3
AOA: 3/3
ATO: 3/3
B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL ML86B
CB2, 3, 6, ii
CAUSES:
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO RE-CONFIGURE THE VALVES. HOWEVER, NO MAJOR
PROBLEM SINCE THE VALVES REMAIN IN THEIR NOMINAL OPERATING
POSITION, EXCEPT THAT TANK A WATER WOULD NO LONGER BE AVAILABLE
IF NEEDED. WATER MANAGEMENT IS DO-ABLE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-33
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESS_NT
ORBITER SUBSYST_ALYSIS WO_H_T
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM".
MDAC ID:
6/25/87
LIFE SUPPORT
1127
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/_NC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAIL_ MODE:
CB, OUTT._T ISOL VAL_ (4)
FAI_ TO _IN OPt, FAI_ TO OPEN, SHORTED
_D _ALYST: M.J. SAIIDI SUBSYS L_AD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAK_WN HIERARCHY:
i) E_OR
2) SUPPLY WATER SUBSYSTEM
3) T_K_SEMBLY
4) EPDC
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT P_SE HDW/_C
P__CH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3
_DING/SAFING: 3/3
ABORT HDW/_C
RT_: 3/3
TAL: 3/3
AOA: 3/3
ATO: 3/3
REDUND_CY SCREENS:
_CATION:
P_T _BER:
A [ ] B[ ] c[ ]
CAUSES: CO_INATION
EFFECTS/_TIONA_-.
NO MAJOR IMPACT EXCEPT FOR _SS OF O_R_AD CIR_IT PROTECTION.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/25/87
LIFE SUPPORT
1128
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TANKS A, B, C AND D (4)
INTERNAL LEAKAGE, RUPTURE BLADDER
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ERROR
SUPPLY WATER SUBSYSTEM
TANK ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/2R
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
ECLSS BAY
90V62TKI, 2, 3 AND 4
CAUSES: OVERLOAD, STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE RUPTURE OF BLADDER WILL RESULT IN HIGH PRESSURE NITROGEN TO
MIX AND FLOW DOWN THE WATER LINE TO FES/DUMP NOZZLE, CAUSING
POSSIBLE SHUTDOWN OF FES AND ICING OF THE DUMP NOZZLE UPON DUMP.
ALSO THE NITROGEN WILL BE CONSUMED VERY RAPIDLY. THE TANK
SHOULD BE ISOLATED FROM THE LINE WHICH MAKES THE WATER MANAGEMENT
MORE STRINGENT. LOSS OF FUNCTION WILL FORCE DUMPING OF GENERATED
WATER THROUGH THE FUEL CELLS DEDICATED VENT LINE AND RETURN WITH
FES ON WASTE WATER.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-35
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
6/25/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
LIFE SUPPORT FLIGHT:
1129 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TANKS A, B, C AND D (4)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ERROR
SUPPLY WATER SUBSYSTEM
TANK ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: 3/IR
TAL: 3/IR
AOA: 3/IR
ATO: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: ECLSS BAY
PART NUMBER: 90V62TKI, 2, 3 AND 4
B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
AN EXTERNAL LEAK OF GN2 INTO THE CABIN WILL RAISE THE PPN2 IN THE
CABIN, FORCING CABIN POSITIVE RELIEF VALVE TO CONTINUOUSLY VENT
CABIN ATMOSPHERE. THE TANK MUST BE ISOLATED FROM THE LINE, THUS
NEGATING ITS USE FOR WATER MANAGEMENT. LOSS OF FUNCTION
MAY REQUIRE WASTE WATER CROSS-TIE TO SUPPORT FES UPON ENTRY.
LOSS OF FUNCTION WITHOUT CREW ACTION WILL DEPLETE GN2 SUPPLY
REQUIRED FOR CABIN PRESSURE MAINTENANCE.
REFERENCES:
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE :
SUBSYSTEM."
MDAC ID:
6/25/87
LIFE SUPPORT
1130
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TANKS A, B, C AND D (4)
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING OF THE BELLOWS
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ERROR
SUPPLY WATER SUBSYSTEM
TANK ASSEMBLY
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/2R
3/2R TAL: 3/2R
3/2R AOA: 3/2R
ATO: 3/2R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] c[p]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF PRESSURE TO EXPEL WATER TO FES AND DUMP LINES. LOSS OF
FUNCTION (PRESSURIZATION) IN ALL TANKS MAY FORCE WASTE WATER
CROSS-TIE IN ORDER TO MANAGE SUPPLY WATER GENERATION THROUGH
WASTE TANK.
REFERENCES".
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-37
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/09/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT FLIGHT: 3/2R
MDAC ID: 1131 ABORT: 3/2R
ITEM: SENSOR, TANKS QUANTITY (4)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OUT OF TOLERANCE, INTERMITTENT OPERATION,
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT, LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: M,J. SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
SUPPLY WATER SUBSYSTEM
TANK ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHTPHASE HDW/_C ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/2R
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: ECLSS BAY
PART NUMBER: V62Q0410A, 420A, 548A, 544A
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL SHOCK,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF A SINGLE TRANSDUCER IS NOT SIGNIFICANT. THE WATER
QUANTITY _AN ° BE_TED BY WA_ GENERATION MINUS USAGE.
HOWEVER, LOSS OF FUNCTION (NO WATER MEASUREMENT) MAY CAUSE OVER
FILLING OF THE TANKS, AND FLOODING OF THE FUEL CELLS - NOMINAL
DUMP SCHEDULES BUILT INTO THE FLIGHT PROCEDURE SHOULD PRECLUDE
THIS. PRECISE WATER REQUIREMENT/RESERVES MAY NOT BE MET.
m
i
g
mR
i
i
I
D
I
mm
,,m
m
I
REFERENCES:
g
l
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-38
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7109187
LIFE SUPPORT
1132
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FILTER, GN2-TANKS INLET (4)
RESTRICTED FLOW
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
SUPPLY WATER SUBSYSTEM
TANK ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/2R
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
ECLSS BAY
90V62FLI, FL2, FL4, FL5
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF PRESSURIZATION TO EXPEL WATER FOR FES, DUMP, AND CREW
USAGE. A SINGLE FAILURE WILL HAVE MINOR PROBLEM FOR TANK A ONLY
- WATER MAY NOT FLOW EASILY. LOSS OF FUNCTION (EXPULSION OF
WATER) MAY REQUIRE CROSS-TIE TO SUPPORT FES FROM WASTE TANK AND
RETURN. FAILURE MAY BE DETECTED BY NO CHANGE IN THE TANK
QUANTITY.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-39
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/09/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1133 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: FILTER, GN2-TANKS INLET (4)
FAILURE MODE: STRUCTURAL FAILURE (RUPTURE)
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
s)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
SUPPLY WATER SUBSYSTEM
TANK ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [
LOCATION: ECLSS BAY
PART NUMBER: 90V62FLI, FL2, FL4, FL5
] c [ ]
CAUSES: STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
UNDER A SINGLE FAILURE, THERE IS NO MAJOR IMPACT. HOWEVER, WITH
A SUBSEQUENT BLADDER RUPTURE WATER WILL FLOW INTO THE CABIN.
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mINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/09/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 1134 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: SENSOR, PRESSURE (I)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OUT OF TOLERANCE, INTERMITTENT OPERATION,
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT, LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
SUPPLY WATER SUBSYSTEM
TANK ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
OUTLET OF MICROBIAL FILTER
V62P0430A
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF WATER LINE PRESSURE INDICATION. NO IMPACT SINCE THE
SENSOR IS NOT TERRIBLY IMPORTANT - TANK QUANTITY READINGS WILL
PROVIDE ADEQUATE SUPPORT.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-41
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
 /o9/87
LIFE SUPPORT
1135
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT".
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
2/2
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELIEF VALVE, 1.5 PSID (2)
FAILS TO OPEN, RESTRICTED FLOW
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
B_DOWNHIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
SUPPLY WATER SUBSYSTEM
TANK ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 2/2 TAL:
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA:
DEORBIT: 2/2 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
2/2
2/2
2/2
2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: ECLSS BAY
PART NUMBER: 90V62RVl AND RV2
B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FAILURE OF EITHER VALVE WILL PRECLUDE THE PRIMARY WATER LINE.
THE WATER FROM FUEL CELLS WILL BE FLOWN TO THE TANKS THROUGH THE
NEWLY DESIGNED SECONDARY BUT WITH NO HYDROGEN REMOVAL CAPABILITY.
THE FAILURE OF FIRST VALVE WILL ISOLATE TANKS B, C,
AND D FROM THE LINE, AND THE FAILURE OF THE SECOND VALVE WILL
ISOLATE TANKS C & D. AT ANY RATE, THERE WILL BE LESS STORAGE
CAPABILITY FOR WATER MANAGEMENT/RESERVE.
REFERENCES:
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE :
SUBSYSTEM :
MDAC ID:
7/09/87
LIFE SUPPORT
1136
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELIEF VALVE, 1.5 PSID (2)
FAILS TO CLOSE, INTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
SUPPLY WATER SUBSYSTEM
TANK ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] c[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
ECLSS BAY
90V62RVI AND RV2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO MAJOR IMPACT, EXCEPT THAT THE BACK FLOW OF WATER CANNOT BE
STOPPED WITH A SUBSEQUENT FAILURE (DOUBLE FAILURE).
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-43
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE :
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7109187
LIFE SUPPORT
1137
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
2/2_
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELIEF VALVE, 1.5 PSID (2)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
SUPPLY WATER SUBSYSTEM
TANK ASSEMBLY
CRI_ICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/2
LIFTOFF: 2/2 TAL: 2/2
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 2/2
DEORBIT: 2/2 ATO: 2/2
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
ECLSS BAY
90V62RVI AND RV2
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAIL U/_E WILLRESULT IN CONTINUOUS pLOW OF WATER INTO THE
ECLSS BAY, AND POSSIBLY CAUSING CORROSION AND ELECTR_CAL SHORTS.
THE EXTERNAL LEAKAGE CANNOT BE STOPPED WITHOUT SHUTTING DOWN THE
FUEL CELLS. MISSION IS ABORTED AND RETURNED WITH EXISTING
WATER IN THE TANKS AND EXTERNAL LEAKAGE.
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SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
7/09/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
LIFE SUPPORT FLIGHT:
1138 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
QD, GSE FILL/DRAIN (2)
INABILITY TO MATE/DEMATE
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWNHIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
SUPPLY WATER SUBSYSTEM
TANK ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: /NA
• LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: /NA
DEORBITz /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FWD FUSELAGE
90V62TP80, 80V62TP85
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WILL ONLY AFFECT THE PRELAUNCH/POSTLANDING OPERATION
AND NOT APPLICABLE TO FLIGHT. NO SIGNIFICANT PROBLEM IS
ANTICIPATED.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-45
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER _SSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
7/09/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
LIFE SUPPORT FLIGHT:
1139 - ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
QD, GSE FILL/DRAIN (2)
FAILS TO OPEN, RESTRICTED FLOW
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
SUPPLY WATER SUBSYSTEM
TANK ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL:
ONORBIT: /NA AOA:
DEORBIT: /NA ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
/NA
/NA
/NA
/NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ]
LOCATION: FWD FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: 90V62TPS0, 80V62TP85
CAUSES- CO  INATION, PIeCE-PARTFAILUR 
c [ ]
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF RECHARGE/SERVICING ACTIVITIES - THE UNIT MAY BE REPLACED.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/09/87
LIFE SUPPORT
I140
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT".
ITEM".
FAILURE MODE:
QD, GSE FILL/DRAIN (2)
FAILS TO CLOSE
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
SUPPLY WATER SUBSYSTEM
TANK ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION. "
PART NUMBER:
FWD FUSELAGE
90V62TP80, 80V62TP85
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF RECHARGE/SERVICING OF THE TANKS - THE UNIT MAY BE
REPLACED.
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
w
REFERENCES :
w
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-47
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITERSUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/09/87
LIFE SUPPORT
1141
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
2/2
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
QD, GSE FILL/DRAIN (2)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
S)
9)
SUPPLY WATER SUBSYSTEM
TANK ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 2/2 TAL:
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA:
DEORBIT: 2/2 ATO:
LAI_DING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
2/2
2/2
2/2
2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ]
LOCATION: FWD FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: 90V62TP80, 80V62TP85
B [ ] c [ ]
CAUSES : MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE"
THE LEAKAGE FROM THE FILL DRAIN (ON THE UPSTREAM SIDE) CANNOT BE
STOPPED, AND IF SEVERE, IT WILL PREVENT THE TANKS FROM BEING
REPLENISHED - LIMITED WATER MANAGEMENT, AND POSSIBLE ICING ON THE
SIDE OF THE VEHICLE. THE LEAKAGE WITH THE DRAIN DISCONNECT
CAN BE STOPPED BY ISOLATING TANKS C AND D. HOWEVER, WATER
MANAGEMENT BECOMES TOO STRINGENT AND LESS FLEXIBLE. ALSO NOT
ENOUGH RESERVE FOR CERTAIN REQUIREMENTS.
REFERENCES:
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE".
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/o9/87
LIFE SUPPORT
1142
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT".
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
QD, GSE FILL/DRAIN (2)
INTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
S)
9)
SUPPLY WATER SUBSYSTEM
TANK ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
3/2R
3/2R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] c[p]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FWD FUSELAGE
90V62TP80, 80V62TP85
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
AN INTERNAL LEAKAGE THROUGH THE QD WILL HAVE NO EFFECT SINCE THE
CAP PROVIDES A REDUNDANT SEAL. HOWEVER, WITH SUBSEQUENT FAILURE
OF THE CAP, THE WATER LEAKAGE CANNOT BE STOPPED FROM THE FILL
LINE CAUSING ICING AND LOSS OF WATER MANAGEMENT.
REFERENCES:
L
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-49
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
LIFE SUPPORT
1143
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CAP, GSE QD (2)
INABILITY TO MATE/DEMATE
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
SUPPLY WATER SUBSYSTEM
TANK ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: /NA
"DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FWD FUSELAGE
CAUSES : CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE CAP MAY BE REPLACED, AND THE FAILURE IS NOT APPLICABLE AFTER
LIFT OFF.
I
U
J
m
m
I
U
B
mm
M
m
B
i
i
m
l
REFERENCES:
E
mm
g
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-50
I
u
mw
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/09/87
LIFE SUPPORT
1144
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CAP, GSE QD (2)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
SUPPLY WATER SUBSYSTEM
TANK ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/2R
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FWD FUSELAGE
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE GSE DISCONNECTS ARE SELF-SEALING DISCONNECTS WHICH PREVENT
ANY INTERNAL LEAKAGE. UNDER SINGLE FAILURE, THERE WILL BE NO
SIGNIFICANT IMPACT. HOWEVER, WITH A SUBSEQUENT FAILURE OF THE
QD, THE LEAKAGE CANNOT BE STOPPED AND THE FUEL CELLS WATER WILL
CONTINUOUSLY DRAIN OUT CAUSING POSSIBLE ICING AND LOSS OF WATER
MANAGEMENT.
REFERENCES:
l
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-51
u
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/09/87
LIFE SUPPORT
1145
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TANK A PRESSURE CONTROL VALVE (i)
FAILS TO OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
SUPPLY WATER SUBSYSTEM
GN2 LINE ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3::_:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CABIN
PNL-ML26C
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF PRESSURIZATION ON TANK. MINi_ IMPACT DURING ASCENT _
(NOMINALLY CLOSED) AND ENTRY (WATER AVAILABLE FROM B, C, AND D).
ON-ORBIT POTABLE WATER WILL NOT BE AVAILABLE FROM TANK A. WATER
FLOW VERY SLOW AND IF NOT ADEQUATE FOR CREW USE WILL HAVE
MISSION IMPACT.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/09/87
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 1146
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT".
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: TANK A PRESSURE CONTROL VALVE (i)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO CLOSE, INADVERTENT OPERATION/OPEN,
INTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
SUPPLY WATER SUBSYSTEM
GN2 LINE ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: CABIN
PART NUMBER: PNL-ML26C
] B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
TANK A WILL BE PRESSURIZED DURING ASCENT WHICH MAY CAUSE WATER
BACK PRESSURE TO RISE AND ALLOWS THE GENERATED WATER TO FILL TANK
B DIRECTLY (SECONDARY PATH). TANK B IS GENERALLY FULL AND
SUPPORT FES DURING ASCENT WILL RATE OF USE MUCH GREATER THAN
GENERATION. THEREFORE, NO SIGNIFICANT PROBLEM WILL BE
ANTICIPATED.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-53
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
71o9187
LIFE SUPPORT
1147
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TANK A PRESSURE CONTROL VALVE (i)
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
SUPPLY WATER SUBSYSTEM
GN2 LINE ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBiT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: CABIN
PART NUMBER: PNL-ML26C
] B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO PRESSURIZE TANK A, RESULTING IN PARTIAL
LOSS OF WATER FOR CREW USE. WATER IS STILL AVAILABLE FROM
DISPENSER, BUT AT A VERY LOW SPEED - IT MAY NOT BE ADEQUATE FOR
HIGH DEMAND. CREW INCONVENIENCE MAY NECESSITATE MAJOR CHANGES IN
THE ORIGINAL MISSION PROFILE - REAL TIME CALL. ALSO, ONE TANK
LESS IN THE OVERALL WATER MANAGEMENT, THUS MORE STRINGENT AND
COMPLICATED WATER MANAGEMENT, RESULTING IN MORE FREQUENT DUMPS OR
FES OPS, AND NOT ADEQUATE RESERVE FOR CERTAIN SCENARIOS.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/09/87
LIFE SUPPORT
1148
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TANK A PRESSURE CONTROL VALVE (i)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
SUPPLY WATER SUBSYSTEM
GN2 LINE ASSEMBLY
SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CABIN
PNL-ML26C
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CONTINUOUS FLOW OF NITROGEN INTO CABIN COMPLICATING CABIN
PRESSURE CONTROL SYSTEM. A LEAK UPSTREAM OF THE VALVE CANNOT BE
ISOLATED WITHOUT TOTAL ISOLATION OF ALL TANKS FROM GN2
PRESSURIZATION - CABIN WILL BE AVAILABLE AS BACK-UP.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-55
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/09/87
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDACID: 1149
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
3/3
ITEM: TANK A VENT VALVE (i)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO CLOSE, INTERNAL LEAKAGE, PHYSICAL
BINDING/JAMMING
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
SUPPLY WATER SUBSYSTEM
GN2 LINE ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CABIN
PNL-ML26C
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART STRUCTURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
TANK A CANNOT BE PRESSURIZED FROM GN2 LINE. LOSS OF TANK A FROM
OVERALL WATER MANAGEMENT. CABIN PRESSURE MAY BE USED TO EXPEL
WATER FROM ALL TANKS. LOSS OF ONE TANK FROM PRIMARY WATER
MANAGEMENT, THUS LESS RESERVE FOR CERTAIN MISSION REQUIREMENTS.
WATER FLOW FROM THE TANK WILL BE SEVERELY DIMINISHED.
REFERENCES:
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/09/87
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 1150
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: TANK A VENT VALVE (I)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO OPEN, PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING,
RESTRICTED FLOW
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
SUPPLY WATER SUBSYSTEM
GN2 LINE ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CABIN
PNL-ML26C
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE VALVE IS USED PRELAUNCH TO VENT TANK A PRESURE TO CABIN.
UNDER NOMINAL AND SINGLE FAILURE, NO EFFECT IS ANTICIPATED.
REFERENCES:
w
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-57
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/09/87
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 1151
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
3/3
ITEM: TANK A VENT VALVE (i)
FAILURE MODE: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
SUPPLY WATER SUBSYSTEM
GN2 LINE ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: CABIN
PART NUMBER: PNL-ML26C
] B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
UNREGULATED FLOW OF NITROGEN INTO THE CABIN AFTER THE TANK IS
PRESSURIZED. COMPLICATING CABIN PRESSURE CONTROL SYSTEM TANK
SHOULD BE ISOLATED THUS RESULTING IN LOSS A TANK FROM WATER
MANAGEMENT SCHEME AND POSSIBLE MISSION IMPACT.
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nINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/09/87
LIFE SUPPORT
1152
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CROSSOVER VALVE (I)
FAILS TO OPEN, RESTRICTED FLOW
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
SUPPLY WATER SUBSYSTEM
TANK ASSEMBLY
SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF_ 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
ECLSS BAY
90V62LVI3
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO SIGNIFICANT PROBLEM EXCEPT THAT WATER FROM FOUR TANKS WILL NOT
BE AVAILABLE AT THE SAME TIME. WITH SINGLE FAILURE OF THIS VALVE
ONLY, THE WATER MANAGEMENT AND FES/DUMP OPS ARE DOABLE. TWO
TANKS RESERVE IS ADEQUATE FOR NOMINAL ENTRY.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-59
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE".
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/09/87
LIFE SUPPORT
1153
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CROSSOVER VALVE (i)
FAILS TO CLOSE, INTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
SUPPLY WATER SUBSYSTEM
TANK ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [
LOCATION: ECLSS BAY
PART NUMBER: 90V62LVI3
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION
]
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DIRECT CAPABILITY IS LOST TO ISOLATE TANK A AND B FROM TANKS C
AND D. THIS MAY BE ACCOMPLISHED THROUGH TANKS OUTLET VALVES AND
THE FES LINE B ISOL VALVE. HOWEVER, WITH A SUBSEQUENT FAILURE
SUCH AS EXTERNAL LEAKAGE ON FES LINE A, THE LEAK CANNOT BE
ISOLATED WITHOUT ISOLATING ALL TANKS.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/09/87
LIFE SUPPORT
1154
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CROSSOVER VALVE (I)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
2/2
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BRE_DOW_ HIERARCHY:
I) LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
SUPPLY WATER SUBSYSTEM
TANK ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/2
LIFTOFF: 2/2 TAL: 2/2
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 2/2
DEORBIT: 2/2 ATO: 2/2
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: ECLSS BAY
PART NUMBER: 90V62LVI3
] B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
AN EXTERNAL LEAKAGE IF SEVERE AND NOT STOPPABLE BY THE VALVE WILL
FORCE SHUTTING DOWN THE TANKS OUTLET VALVES IN ORDER TO ISOLATE
THE LEAK. THIS IN ESSENCE WILL PRECLUDE FES/DUMP OPS. GENERATED
WATER TO BE VENTED ABOARD THROUGH FUEL CELLS LINE AND
ABORT WITHOUT FES (POSSIBLY).
REFERENCES:
w
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-61
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE. "
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/09/87
LIFE SUPPORT
I155
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SOLENOID, XOVR VALVE (i)
FAILS TO CLOSE, OPEN (ELECTRICAL), SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
I) LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
2) SUPPLY WATER SUBSYSTEM
3) TANK ASSEMBLY
EPDC
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/F_C
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/3 AOA: 3/3
ATO: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ -
LOCATION: ECLSS BAY
PART NUMBER: 90V62LVI3
] B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART FAILURE, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE CROSSOVER VALVE WILL REMAIN OPEN - SEE MDAC-II53.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/09/87
LIFE SUPPORT
1156
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3_
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SOLENOID, XOVR VALVE (i)
FAILS TO OPEN, OPEN (ELECTRICAL), SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
2) SUPPLY WATER SUBSYSTEM
3) TANK ASSEMBLY
4) EPDC
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:. A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
ECLSS BAY
90V62LVI3
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE".
U_PON ACTIVATION OF THIS SWITCH AND THE FAILURE, POWER WILL BE
APPLIED TO BOTH SIDES OF THE SOLENOID RESULTING IN POPPING THE
CIRCUIT BREAKER AND/OR BURNING OF THE SOLENOID. VALVE
RECONFIGURATION WILL BE LOST. HOWEVER, UNDER SINGLE FAILURE
SCENARIO NO SIGNIFICANT IMPACT IS ANTICIPATED.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-63
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/09/87
LIFE SUPPORT
1157
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3-
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, XOVR VALVE (i)
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING, FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
s)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
SUPPLY WATER SUBSYSTEM
T_K ASSEMBLY
EPDC
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/31
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION : PNL RI2A2
PART NUMBER: $5
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF SWITCH ACTION TO RECONFIGURE THE XOVR VALVE. THE VALVE
IS SET CLOSED PRELAUNCH AND WILL REMAIN CLOSED THROUGHOUT THE
MISSION - SEE MDAC-1152. ANY SINGLE POSITION FOR BINDING/JAMMING
WILL HAVE NO SIGNIFICANT IMPACT (VALVE EITHER OPEN OR
CLOSED).
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DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
7/09/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
LIFE SUPPORT FLIGHT: 3/3
1158 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH
SWITCH, XOVR VALVE (1)
OPEN (ELECTRICAL), ANY SINGLE CONTACT, FAILS TO
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
SUPPLY WATER SUBSYSTEM
TANK ASSEMBLY
EPDC
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
ECLSS BAY
90V62LVI3
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE CAUSES THE CROSSOVER VALVE TO REMAIN OPEN - SEE
MDAC-II53.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-65
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/o9187
LIFE SUPPORT
1159
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, XOVR VALVE (i)
SHORTED, ANY SINGLE CONTACT
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
SUPPLY WATER SUBSYSTEM
TANK ASSEMBLY
EPDC
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LI?TO_F" 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
LOCATION: ECLSS BAY
PART NUMBER: 90V62LVI3
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CONTINUOUS POWER IS APPLIED TO THE SOLENOID CAUSING IT TO FAIL
(BURN OUT) OR POP THE CIRCUIT BREAKER. ALSO, IF A SHORT OCCURS
AND THE SWITCH IS ACTIVATED THE POWER MAY BE APPLIED TO BOTH
SIDES OF THE SOLENOID, BURNING THE SOLENOID. AT EITHER CASE, THE
ABILITY TO RECONFIGURE THE VALVE IS LOST AND THE WORST CASE IS
THE LOSS OF ABILITY TO OPEN THE VALVE - SEE MDAC-II52.
REFERENCES:
I
i
m
mm
B
m
mm
I
i
mm
z
I
I
i
l
J
mm
D
l
g
I
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-66
I
B
lm
w
i
w
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/09/87
LIFE SUPPORT
1160
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT"
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
POSITION INDICATION, XOVR VALVE (i)
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT, LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
SUPPLY WATER SUBSYSTEM
TANK ASSEMBLY
EPDC
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 412A2
DS3
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, LOSS OF INPUT, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE POSITION OF THE VALVE MAY BE DETECTED BY THE EFFECT OF WATER
FLOW THROUGH THE LINE OR TELEMETRY DATA ON MDM-OF4.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-67
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/09/87
LIFE SUPPORT
1161
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, XOVR VALVE (I)
OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAK_ HIE_CHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
SUPPLY WATER SUBSYST_
TANK ASSEMBLY
EPDC
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT P_SE HDW/_NC
PRE_CH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3
DEO_IT: 3/3
_ING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
ABORT
B [ ]
RT_:
TAL:
AOA:
ATO:
HDW/_NC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
c [ ]
_CATION:
P_T _BER:
PNL 412A2
AIOCR3
CAUSES: _C_ICAL SHOCK, THE_L SHOCK, VIB_TION
EFFECTS/_TIONA_:
_SS OF THE CROSSO_R VAL_ POSITION INDICATION ON THE B_BER
_7._. NO SIGNIFICANT EFFECT.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/09/87
LIFE SUPPORT
1162
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, XOVR VALVE (i)
OPEN (ELECTRICAL), SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
SUPPLY WATER SUBSYSTEM
TANK ASSEMBLY
EPDC
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 412A2
AI7RI
CAUSES: MECHANICKL SHOCK, TEMPERATURE, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF VALVE POSITION INDICATION TO MDM-OF4.
IMPACT.
NO SIGNIFICANT
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-69
INDEPENDENTOPq_ER 3SESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM/ALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/09/87
LIFE SUPPORT
1163
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT".
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CB, XOVR VALVE (i)
FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED, OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
SUPPLY WATER SUBSYSTEM
TANK ASSEMBLY
EPDC
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL RI2A2
CBI4
CAUSES: PIECE-PART FAILURE, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF POWER TO RE-CONFIGURE THE XO_rR VALVE. THE VALVE WILL
REMAIN IN ITS POSITION BEFORE THE FAILURE - SEE MDAC-iI52 AND
1153.
REFERENCES:
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wINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/09/87
LIFE SUPPORT
1164
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CB, XOVR VALVE (i)
FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN, SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
SUPPLY WATER SUBSYSTEM
TANK ASSEMBLY
EPDC
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3.
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LAND_NG/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF CIRCUIT PROTECTION WITH OVER VOLTAGE/CURRENT, OTHERWISE
NO MAJOR IMPACT.
i
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-71
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE :
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/09/87
LIFE SUPPORT
1165
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ISOL VALVE, FES B LINE (I)
FAILS TO OPEN, RESTRICTED FLOW
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
SUPPLY WATER SUBSYSTEM
FES LINE ASSEMBLY
SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/2R
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL:- 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBiT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: ECLSS BAY
PART NUMBER: 90V62LVI2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ONE LEG OF REDUNDANCY TO PROVIDE WATER TO THE FES. LINE
A IS AVAILABLE TO SUPPORT FES. FUNCTIONAL LOSS (NO WATER TO FES)
IS CONSIDERED MISSION IMPACT ONLY. HOWEVER, IN ORDER TO HAVE A
FUNCTIONAL LOSS, THE TANKS A AND B OUTLET VALVES AND
CROSSOVER VALVE SHOULD HAVE FAILED CLOSED (MULTIPLE FAILURE).
OTHER FAILURES WHICH MAY PRECLUDE USE OF LINE A ARE IN THE ATCS
(FES) ANALYSIS AND MUST BE CONSIDERED OPERATIONALLY SOUND. THERE
IS NO DIRECT REDUNDANCY FOR THIS VALVE. THE FAILURE LEAVES
FES WITH ONE FEED WATER LINE. VALVE IS NOMINALLY CONFIGURED
CLOSED AND RECONFIGURED ON-ORBIT FOR LINE B REDUNDANCY CHECKOUTS.
REFERENCES:
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REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-72
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nINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/09/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
LIFE SUPPORT FLIGHT: 3/3
1166 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LEAKAGE
ISOL VALVE, FES B LINE (i)
FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED, FAILS TO CLOSE, INTERNAL
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) \
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
SUPPLY WATER SUBSYSTEM
FES LINE ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: ECLSS BAY
PART NUMBER: 90V62LV12
] B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO ISOLATE FES FEEDLINE B IN CASE OF A LEAKAGE
DOWNSTREAM, OTHERWISE CONTINUE TO OPERATE ON LINE B. XOVER VALVE
AND TANKS C/D OUTLET VALVES MAY BE USED TO ISOLATE THE FEEDLINE.
FES, ALSO HAS DEDICATED ISOL VALVE TO COMPENSATE FOR THE
LOSS. NOMINAL CONFIGURATION OF THE VALVE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-73
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/09/87
LIFE SUPPORT
1167
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
2/2
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ISOL VALVE, FES B LINE (i)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
SUPPLY WATER SUBSYSTEM
FES LINE ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 2/2 TAL:
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA:
DEORBIT: 2/2 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
2/2
2/2
2/2
2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [
LOCATION: ECLSS BAY
PART NUMBER: 90V62LVI2
CAUSES:
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
EXPULSION OF WATER INTO THE ECLSS BAY. THE LINE MUST BE ISOLATED
VIA XOVR VALVE AND TANKS C/D OUTLET VALVES. REDUCED FLEXIBILITY
IN WATER MANAGEMENT, AND LOSS OF ONE LEG OF REDUNDANT FEEDWATER
LINE TO FES.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/o9/8;
LIFE SUPPORT
1168
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SOLENOID, FES ISOL VALVE (i)
FAILS TO OPEN, OPEN (ELECTRICAL), SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SA!IDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
SUPPLY WATER SUBSYSTEM
FES LINE ASSEMBLY
EPDC
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/2R
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
ECLSS BAY
90V62LVI2
CAUSES : PIECE-PART FAILURE, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IN THIS CASE THE VALVE REMAINS CLOSED - SEE MDAC-II65. THE
EFFECT OF THE FAILURE IS DETECTABLE, BUT IT COULD NOT BE DETECTED
TO BE DUE TO SOLENOID.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-75
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE."
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/09/87
LIFE SUPPORT
1169
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SOLENOID, FES ISOL VALVE (I)
FAILS TO CLOSE, OPEN (ELECTRICAL, SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
SUPPLY WATER SUBSYSTEM
FES LINE ASSEMBLY
EPDC
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDiNG/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
.3/3
3/3
c [ ]REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
ECLSS BAY
90V62LVI2
CAUSES: PIECE-PART FAILURE, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE".
THE VALVE REMAINS OPEN - SEE MDAC-II66.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE".
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/09/87
LIFE SUPPORT
1170
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT".
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, FES ISOL VALVE (i)
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
SUPPLY WATER SUBSYSTEM
FES LINE ASSEMBLY
EPDC
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
ECLSS BAY
S16
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, CORROSION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO ACTIVATE THE FES ISOL VALVE. THE VALVE IS
CONFIGURED OPEN THROUGHOUT THE MISSION AND NO FURTHER ACTION IS
REQUIRED. THUS THE VALVE WILL REMAIN OPEN - SEE MDAC-1166.
REFERENCES:
u
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-77
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/09/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
LIFE SUPPORT FLIGHT: 3/3
1171 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH
SWITCH, FES ISOL VALVE (1)
OPEN (ELECTRICAL), ANY SINGLE FAILURE, FAILS TO
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
SUPPLY WATER SUBSYSTEM
FES LINE ASSEMBLY
EPDC
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ]
HDW/_C
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
c [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL RI2A2
S16
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF SWITCHING CAPABILITY TO ACTIVATE THE VALVE.
REMAINS OPEN (NOMINALLY SETTING) - SEE MDAC-1166.
THE VALVE
REFERENCES:
m
m
B
R
mm
B
z
B
U
zl
g
I
I
I
i
m
I
I
I
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-78
m
F±
t..
w
w
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/09/87
LIFE SUPPORT
1172
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, FES ISOL VALVE (i)
SHORTED, ANY SINGLE CONTACT
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
SUPPLY WATER SUBSYSTEM
FES LINE ASSEMBLY
EPDC
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/2R
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: PNL RI2A2
PART NUMBER: S16
CAUSES:
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CONTINUOUS POWER APPLIED TO THE SOLENOID WHICH MAY CAUSE IT TO
BURN OUT. ALSO, UPON ACTIVATION OF SWITCH ON THE OPPOSITE
CONTACT, POWER WILL BE APPLIED TO BOTH SIDES OF THE SOLENOID
RESULTING IN LOSS OF SOLENOID AND POTENTIAL FOR FIRE (IF CB DOES
NOT POP). THE WORST CASE IS THE FAILURE WHICH CAUSES THE VALVE
TO REMAIN CLOSED - LOSS OF FES FEEDWATER LINE B - SEE MDAC-II65.
REFERENCES:
w
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-79
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/09/87
LIFE SUPPORT
1173
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT".
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CB, FES ISOL VALVE (I)
RAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED, OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
_)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
SUPPLY WATER SUBSYSTEM
FES LINE ASSEMBLY
EPDC
SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
P_UNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ] :
LOCATION: PNL ML86B
PART NUMBER: CB9
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF POWER TO ACTIVATE THE ISOL VALVE - VALVE WILL REMAIN IN
ITS POSITION (OPEN-NOMINAL SETTING) - SEE MDAC-II66.
REFERENCES:
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REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-80
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iINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE :
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/09/87
LIFE SUPPORT
1174
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CB, FES ISOL VALVE (i)
FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN, SHORTED
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
SUPPLY WATER SUBSYSTEM
FES LINE ASSEMBLY
EPDC
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: PNL ML86B
PART NUMBER: CB9
] B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO SIGNIFICANT EFFECT EXCEPT FOR CIRCUIT PROTECTION AGAINST
OVERCURRENT.
l
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-81
INDEPENDENTORB[TE_ ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/09/87
LIFE SUPPORT
1175
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
POSITION INDICATION, FES ISOL VALVE (I)
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT, LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
SUPPLY WATER SUBSYSTEM
FES LINE ASSEMBLY
EPDC
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL RI2A2
DSI1
CAUSES: PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO SIGNIFICANT EFFECT. THE VALVE-POSIT_ON _SDETECTED_BY SIGNAL
TO THE MDM OF4, OR BY ITS EFFECT DOWNSTREAM.
REFERENCES:
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/09/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
LIFE SUPPORT FLIGHT: 3/3
1176 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
OUTPUT
RESISTOR, FES ISOL VALVE (i)
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT, OPEN (ELECTRICAL), LOSS OF
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
SUPPLY WATER SUBSYSTEM
FES LINE ASSEMBLY
EPDC
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: PNL Ri2A2
PART NUMBER: ASRI
] B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF SIGNAL TO THE MDM-OF4.
AVAILABLE.
BARBER POLE INDICATION IS
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-83
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/09/87
LIFE SUPPORT
1177
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, FES ISOL VALVE (i)
OPEN (ELECTRICAL), LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
SUPPLY WATER SUBSYSTEM
FES LINE ASSEMBLY
EPDC
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS : 3/3
TAL: 3/3
AOA: 3/3
ATO : 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: PNL RI2A2
PART NUMBER: AIOCRII
] B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF BARBER POLE INDICATION - MDM SIGNAL IS AVAILABLE.
REFERENCES:
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3/3
m
m
.,m
m
m
m
m
ms
m
ms
m
m
m
mm
mm
mm
ms
m
mm
m
mm
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-84
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nINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/09/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
LIFE SUPPORT FLIGHT: 2/2
1178 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LEAKAGE
SUPPLY VALVE, GALLEY (i)
FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED, FAILS TO CLOSE, INTERNAL
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
SUPPLY WATER SUBSYSTEM
GALLEY LINE ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: ECLSS BAY
PART NUMBER: 90V62LV9
B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
UNDER SINGLE FAILURE NO PROBLEM IS ANTICIPATED SINCE THE VALVE
HAS FAILED TO ITS NORMAL SETTING. HOWEVER, CAPABILITY IS LOST TO
ISOLATE THE GALLEY LINE IN THE EVENT OF A LEAKAGE. IN THIS CASE,
WATER LEAKAGE COULD NOT BE STOPPED. THEREFORE WITH THIS
SINGLE FAILURE, MISSION ABORT IS SUGGESTED. FAILURE IS NOT
DETECTED UNTIL AN ATTEMPT IS MADE TO CLOSE THE VALVE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-85
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE'.
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
v/og/sv
LIFE SUPPORT
1179
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SUPPLY VALVE, GALLEY (i)
FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN, FAILS TO OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
SUPPLY WATER SUBSYSTEM
GALLEY LINE ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2
DEORBIT: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: 3/3
TAL: 3/3
AOA: 3/3
ATO: 3/3 ......
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: ECLSS BAY
PART NUMBER: 90V62LV9
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF POTABLE WATER TO CREW FOR DRINKING, FOOD PREP, HYGIEN,
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REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-86
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/09/87
LIFE SUPPORT
1180
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
2/2
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SUPPLY VALVE, GALLEY (i)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
SUPPLY WATER SUBSYSTEM
GALLEY LINE ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/2
LIFTOFF: 2/2 TAL: 2/2
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 2/2
DEORBIT: 2/2 ATO: 2/2
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] cc ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
ECLSS BAY
90V62LV9
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE LEAK CANNOT BE STOPPED, AND IF SEVERE, IT MAY CAUSE
ELECTRICAL SHORT, RAISING HUMIDITY IN THE CABIN, CAUSING
CONDENSATION IN SOME AREAS OF CABIN: THE EFFECT OF THESE FACTORS
IS NOT FULLY UNDERSTOOD TO ASSESS WHETHER A POTENTIAL FOR LOSS OF
LIFE EXISTS. HOWEVER, THE MISSION IS TERMINATED AND RETURNED
WITH EXISTING PROBLEM.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-87
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/09/87
LIFE SUPPORT
1181
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SOLENOID, GALLEY VALVE (i)
FAILS TO CLOSE, OPEN (ELECTRICAL), SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
B_AK_WN HIE_CHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYST_
SUPPLY WATER SUBSYST_
GALLEY LINE ASSEMBLY
EPDC
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT P_SE HDW/_C ABORT HDW/_C
PRE_UNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTO?F: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
L_DING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: ECLSS BAY
PART NUMBER: 90V62LV9
CAUSES: THERMAL SHOCK
] B [ ] C [ ]
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO ACTIVATE THE VALVE - VALVE REMAINS OPEN -
SEE MDAC-II78.
_FE_NCES :
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nINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7109/87
LIFE SUPPORT
1182
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SOLENOID, GALLEY VALVE (1)
FAILS TO OPEN, OPEN (ELECTRICAL), SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
2) SUPPLY WATER SUBSYSTEM
3) GALLEY LINE ASSEMBLY
4 ) EPDC
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
. CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3 _
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
ECLSS BAY
90V62LV9
CAUSES: THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO OPEN THE VALVE - VALVE REMAINS CLOSED - SEE
MDAC-II79.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-89
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE".
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
7/09/87
LIFE SUPPORT
1183
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, GALLEY VALVE (I)
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWNHIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
SUPPLY WATER SUBSYSTEM
GALLEY LINE ASSEMBLY
EPDC
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL RI2A2
SII
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/_TIONALE:
LOSS OF THE VALVE RECONFIGURATION IF SWITCH CANNOT BE MOVED - SEE
MDAC-II78 AND 1179.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-90
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/09/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
LIFE SUPPORT FLIGHT: 2/2
1184 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH
SWITCH, GALLEY VALVE (i)
OPEN (ELECTRICAL), ANY SINGLE CONTACT, FAILS TO
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
SUPPLY WATER SUBSYSTEM
GALLEY LINE ASSEMBLY
EPDC
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL RI2A2
SII
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF POWER INPUT TO ACTIVATE THE VALVE IF THE VALVE COULD NOT
BE OPENED OR CLOSED, THE EFFECT IS THE SAME AS MDAC-II78 AND
1179.
REFERENCES:
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REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-91
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/09/87
LIFE SUPPORT
1185
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT-.
HDW/FUNC
2/2
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, GALLEY VALVE (i)
SHORTED, ANY SINGLE CONTACT
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
SUPPLY WATER SUBSYSTEM
GALLEY LINE ASSEMBLY
EPDC
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL RI2A2
SII
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CONTINUOUS POWER APPLIED TO THE SOLENOID CAUSING IT TO FAIL
(BURN), THUS_SS OF CAPABILITY TO RECONFIGURE THE_LVE
THEREAFTER.
REFERENCES".
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM".
MDAC ID:
7109187
LIFE SUPPORT
1186
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
POSITION INDICATION, GALLEY VALVE (i)
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT, LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
\
SUPPLY WATER SUBSYSTEM
GALLEY LINE ASSEMBLY
EPDC
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF BARBER POLE INDICATION; MDM-OF4 AND THE EFFECT OF VALVE
ACTION ARE AVAILABLE TO DETECT VALVE POSITION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-93
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
71o9187
LIFE SUPPORT
1187
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, GALLEY VALVE (I)
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
SUPPLY WATER SUBSYSTEM
GALLEY LINE ASSEMBLY
EPDC
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL RI2A2
AIOCR8
CAUSES: THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF BARBER POLE INDICATION - SEE MDAC-II86.
HDW/FUNC
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3/3
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE :
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/09/87
LIFE SUPPORT
1188
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, GALLEY VALVE (i)
OPEN (ELECTRICAL), SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
SUPPLY WATER SUBSYSTEM
GALLEY LINE ASSEMBLY
EPDC
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3. AOA; 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL RI2A2
A7R2
CAUSES: THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF SIGNAL TO THE MDM-OF4; BARBER POLE INDICATION IS
AVAILABLE TO COMPENSATE FOR THE LOSS.
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-95
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/09/87
LIFE SUPPORT
1189
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT BREAKER, GALLEY VALVE (i)
FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED, OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
_)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
SUPPLY WATER SUBSYSTEM
GALLEY LINE ASSEMBLY
EPDC
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 323
LIFTOFF: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2
DEORBIT: 3/3
_Iq_G/SAFi_G: 3/3
ABORT HDW/FUN c
RTLS : 3/3 -__ -
TAL: 3/3 -_
AOA: 3/3
ATO: 3/3 z_
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: PNL ML86B
PART NUMBER: CBI5
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF POWER TO RECONFIGURE THE VALVE. NOMINALLY NO PROBLEM
SINCE THE VALVE IS OPEN ALWAYS, BUT CAPABILITY iS LOST TO CLOSE
IT IF NEEDED.
REFERENCES:
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/o9187
LIFE SUPPORT
1190
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT".
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE :
CIRCUIT BREAKER, GALLEY VALVE (i)
FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN, SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
SUPPLY WATER SUBSYSTEM
GALLEY LINE ASSEMBLY
EPDC
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL RI2A2
CBI5
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT, EXCEPT OVER VOLTAGE/OVERCURRENT PROTECTION IS LOST.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-97
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
LIFE SUPPORT FLIGHT: 3/2R
1191 ABORT: /NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FLOW
DUMP ISOL VALVE (i) _
FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN, FAILS TO OPEN, RESTRICTED
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
SUPPLY WATER SUBSYSTEM
DUMP LINE ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELA6"NCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA:
DEORBIT: /NA ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ]
HDW/FUNC
/NA
/NA
/NA
/NA
C [ F ]
LOCATION: ECLSS BAY
PART NUMBER: 90V62LVII
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: ............_ ....................-___ =_-
LOSS OF PRIMARY METHOD OF EXPELING_WATER.-FES IS AVAILABLE (WITH
57 DEGREES F RADIATOR) TO BOIL EXCESS WATER, BUT IT MAY IMPACT
THE MISSION DUE TO ADDED CREW ACTIVITY. LOSS OF FUNCTION (NO
DUMP AND NO 57 DEGREES F FES) WILL CERTAINLY HAVE NO OTHER
MEANS OF EXPELING WATER (EXCEPT FOR RAD BYPASS AND FES) - MISSION
IMPACT. SEVERE CONTAMINATION IN THE WATER LINE MAY SHUTDOWN DUMP
LINE AS WELL AS FES LINE - SCREEN C FAILS.
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LINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
LIFE SUPPORT FLIGHT: 3/3
1192 ABORT: /NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LEAKAGE
DUMP ISOL VALVE (i)
FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED, FAILS TO CLOSE, INTERNAL
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
SUPPLY WATER SUBSYSTEM
DUMP LINE ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION'.
PART NUMBER:
ECLSS BAY
90V62LVli
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE VALVE IS CLOSED AND THE CB PULLED FOR ASCENT AND ENTRY. ON-
ORBIT, THE VALVE IS CONFIGURED OPEN. HOWEVER, THE DIRECT CROSS-
TIE (SUPPLY/WASTE) CAPABILITY WILL BE LOST WITH THE ISOL VALVE
FAILED OPEN. THE CROSS-TIE IS USED ONLY UNDER SEVERE
CONTINGENCY WHEN NO CAPABILITY EXISTS TO DUMP EITHER WASTE OR
SUPPLY WATER. FES IS AVAILABLE FOR FES AND CWC IS AVAILABLE FOR
WASTE WATER - ALSO THIS SCENARIO BECOMES MUTI-FAILURE SCENARIO.
ON THE OTHER HAND, CROSS-TIE MAY BE STILL USED BY CLOSING THE
XOVR VALVE AND TANKS A AND B OUTLET VALVES.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-99
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
712o/87
LIFE SUPPORT
1193
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
211R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DUMP ISOL VALVE (I)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
SUPPLY WATER SUBSYSTEM
DUMP LINE ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTO?F: 3/3 .... TAL:
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDiNG/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: ECLSS BAY
PART NUMBER: 90V62LVli
B [ P ] C [ F ]
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE_
FLOW OF WATER TO THE ECLSS BAY. _E CROSSOVER VALVE AND TANKS A
& B OUTLET VALVES MUST BE SHUT OFF CLOSED TO ISOLATE THE LEAK,
AND THEREFORE BOIL EXCESS WATER THROUGH FES FEEDLINE B. HOWEVER,
RECHARGE CAPABILITY FOR MMU AND FES FEEDLINE A BECOME
INOPERATIVE. THE EFFECT OF THIS FAILURE ON ASCENT AND ENTRY WAS
CONSIDERED MINIMAL DUE TO THE SHORT DURATION OF MISSION PHASE.
IF THE LEAKAGE IS SEVERE, IT MAY IMPACT FES OPERATION (LINE A)
DURING ASCENT ENTRY.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/20/87
LIFE SUPPORT
1194
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SOLENOID, DUMP ISOL VALVE (i)
FAILS TO CLOSE
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
SUPPLY WATER SUBSYSTEM
DUMP LINE ASSEMBLY
EPDC
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
ECLSS BAY
90V62LVII
CAUSES: PIECE-PART FAILURE, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE VALVE CONFIGURED CLOSED PRELAUNCH AND REMAINS CLOSED DURING
ASCENT, THEREFORE THE FAILURE IS NOT APPLICABLE. DURING ON-
ORBIT,THE VALVE IS CONFIGURED OPEN UNTIL AFTER THE LAST DUMP AT
WHICH TIME IT IS CLOSED FOR ENTRY. THEREFORE DURING ENTRY THE
WATER IN THE LINE BETWEEN THE DUMP ISOL VALVE AND DUMP VALVE MAY
FREEZE BUT SINCE THE MISSION IS COMPLETED NO SIGNIFICANT IMPACT
IS SEEN.
REFERENCES:
w
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-101
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/20/87
LIFE SUPPORT
1195
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SOLENOID, DUMP ISOL VALVE (I)
FAILS TO OPEN, OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
SUPPLY WATER SUBSYSTEM
DUMP LINE ASSEMBLY
EPDC
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA:
DEORBIT: /NA ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
/NA
/NA
/NA
NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] c[p]
LOCATION: ECLSS BAY
PART NUMBER: 90V62LVII
CAUSES: PIECE-PART FAILURE, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE VALVE WILL REMAIN CLOSED. SEE MDAC-II91.
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DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESS_NT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM _ALYSIS WORKSHEET
7/20/87
LIFE SUPPORT
1196
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
/NA
ITEM:
FAIL_ MODE:
SWITCH, DUMP ISOL VALVE (i)
PHYSICAL BINDING/J_ING, FAI_ TO SWITCH
T.RAD _ALYST: M.J. SAIIDI SUBSYS L_AD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
s)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
SUPPLY WATER SUBSYSTEM
DUMP LINE ASSEMBLY
EPDC
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUND_CY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
_CATION: PNL RI2A2
P_T _BER: $6
CAUSES: CONT_INATION, PIECE-P_T FAIL_
EFFECTS/HATIONALE:
_SS OF CAPABILITY TO SWITCH THE VAL_ OPEN AFTER LIFT OFF.
MDAC-II91.
SEE
_FERENCES:
i
_PORT DATE 10/23/87 C-I03
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
7/20/87
LIFE SUPPORT
1197
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT".
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CONTACT
SWITCH, DUMP ISOL VALVE (I)
FAILS TO OPEN, OPEN (ELECTRICAL) ANY SINGLE
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
SUPPLY WATER SUBSYSTEM
DUMP LINE ASSEMBLY
EPDC
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: PNL RI2A2
PART NUMBER: $6
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A MORE SERIOUS CASE IS WHEN CONTACTS BETWEEN THE CLOSE PINS
CANNOT BE MADE DUE TO CONTAMINATION. IN THIS THE VALVE CANNOT BE
OPENED POST LIFT OFF. SEE MDAC-II91.
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wINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/20/87
LIFE SUPPORT
1198
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, DUMP ISOL VALVE (i)
FAILS TO OPEN, SHORTED, ANY SINGLE CONTACT
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
2) SUPPLY WATER SUBSYSTEM
3) DUMP LINE ASSEMBLY
4) EPDC
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R
DEORBIT: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: /NA
TAL: /NA
AOA: /NA
ATO: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: PNL RI2A2
PART NUMBER: $6
B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A SHORT ACROSS THE CLOSE PINS WILL KEEP THE VALVE CLOSED AND
APPLY CONTINUOUS POWER TO THE SOLENOID WHICH WILL MAKE IT BURN
EVENTUALLY - SEE MDAC-II91. IF THE SWITCH ATIVATED TO OPEN AFTER
LIFT OFF AND SHORT HAS OCCURED ACROSS CLOSE PINS, THE SOLENOID
WILL RECEIVE POWER ON BOTH TERMINAL - BURN SOLENOID AND POP THE
CB.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-I05
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
7/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
LIFE SUPPORT FLIGHT:
1199 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: POSITION INDICATION, DUMP ISOL VALVE (I)
FAILURE MODE: ERRONEOUS OUTPUT, LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
SUPPLY WATER SUBSYSTEM
DUMP LINE ASSEMBLY
EPDC
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS :
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT : 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
_DING/SAFING: _ 3/3 _
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL RI2A2
DS4
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE".
LOSS OF THE WATER POSITION INDICATION BY THE BARBER'POLE' THE
MDM OF-4 AND THE EFFECT VALVE POSITION CAN BE USED TO DETECT THE
VALVE CONFIGURATION.
REFERENCES:
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7120187
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 1200
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/3
ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: DIODE, DUMP ISOL VALVE (i)
FAILURE MODE: OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
SUPPLY WATER SUBSYSTEM
DUMP LINE ASSEMBLY
EPDC
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL RI2A2
AIOC4
CAUSES: THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF BARBER-POLE INDICATION. SEE MDAC-II98.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-I07
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/20/87
LIFE SUPPORT
1201
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, DUMP ISOL VALVE (i)
OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
SUPPLY WATER SUBSYSTEM
DUMP LINE ASSEMBLY
EPDC
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ]
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
c [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: A4RI
CAUSES: THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF VALVE POSIT!ONSIGNAL TO THE MpM.
IS AVAILABLE TO COMPENSATE FOR THE LOSS.
BARBER-POLE INDICATION
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wINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/20/87
LIFE SUPPORT
1202
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CB, DUMP ISOL VALVE (i)
FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED, OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
SUPPLY WATER SUBSYSTEM
DUMP LINE ASSEMBLY
EPDC
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: PNL ML86B
PART NUMBER: CB8
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
MOST LIKELY THE CB COULD BE HELD DOWN LONG ENOUGH TO ACTIVATE THE
VALVE. BUT WITH SERIOUS FAILURE SUCH THAT POWER COULD NOT BE
APPLIED, THE VALVE WILL REMAIN CLOSED AFTER LIFT OFF. SEE MDAC-
1191.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-I09
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
7/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
LIFE SUPPORT FLIGHT:
1203 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CB, DUMP ISOL VALVE (i)
FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN, SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
SUPPLY WATER SUBSYSTEM
DUMP LINE ASSEMBLY
EPDC
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT_ 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: PNL ML86B
PART NUMBER: CB8
] B[ ] c[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO SIGNIFICANT IMPACT IS SEEN EXCEPT THAT OVER_NT/OVERVOLTAGE
PROTECTION I_L_)ST. SWITCH __L POSITION PROVIDES
COMPENSATION FOR THE LOSS.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
LIFE SUPPORT FLIGHT: 3/2R
1204 ABORT: /NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE :
FLOW
DUMP VALVE (i)
FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN, FAILS TO OPEN, RESTRICTED
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
SUPPLY WATER SUBSYSTEM
DUMP LINE ASSEMBLY
EPD&C
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ F ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID FUSELAGE
40V62LVI0
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF PRIMARY METHOD OF EXPELLING EXCESS WATER. FES MAY BE
USED (WITH 57 DEGREES F RAD) TO COMPENSATE FOR THE LOSS.
EMERGENCY CROSS-TIE IS ALSO AVAILABLE AS A LAST RESORT. HOWEVER,
WITH LOSS OF FUNCTION (NO MEANS OF EXPELLING WATER), THE MISSION
SHOULD BE TERMIANTED AND RETURNED. ALSO, THE FES USE AS A WAY OF
DUMPING WATER MAY IMPACT THE MISSION TIMELINE. SEVERE
CONTAMINATION MAY RESTRICT FLOW IN THE DUMP LINE AND FES LINES.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-ill
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT FLIGHT: 3/2R
MDAC ID: 1205 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LEDGE
DUMP VALVE (I)
FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED, FAILS TO CLOSE, INTERNAL
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
2) SUPPLY WATER SUBSYSTEM
3) DUMP LINE ASSEMBLY
4) EPD&C
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDiNG/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ F ]
LOCATION: MID FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: 40V62LVI0
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE i
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/_TIONALE:
LOSS OF PRIMARY METHOD OF DUMP PROCEDURE RESULTING IN ACTIVATION
OF THE DUMP ISOL VALVE INSTEAD TO ACCOMPLISH A DUMP - POSSIBILITY
OF WATERTRAPPED IN THE LINE AND FREEZING EXISTS IMMEDIATELY
DOWNSTREAM OF THE ISOL VALVE. ALSO, THE D_P_LINE WILL BE
EXPOSED TO VACUUM UPON A SUBSEQUENT FAILURE SUCH A INTERNAL
LEAKAGE OF THE DUMP ISOL VALVE. IF FREEZING OCCURS IN THE LINE,
FES SHOULD BE USED.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7120187
LIFE SUPPORT
1206
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DUMP VALVE (I)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
SUPPLY WATER SUBSYSTEM
DUMP LINE ASSEMBLY
EPD&C
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ F ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID FUSELAGE
40V62LVI0
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE LINE MUST BE ISOLATED BY DOSING THE DUMP ISOL VALVE AND USING
FES FOR WATER DUMPS. SEE MDAC-1204.
REFERENCES:
w
m
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-I13
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
7/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
LIFE SUPPORT FLIGHT:
1207 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SOLENOID, DUMP VALVE (i)
FAILS TO OPEN, OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
SUPPLY WATER SUBSYSTEM
DUMP LINE ASSEMBLY
EPDC
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/2R _ AOA:
DEORBIT: /NA ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
/NA
/NA
/NA
/NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID FUSELAGE
40V62LVI0
CAUSES: STRUCTURAL FAILURE, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE DUMP VALVE WILL REMAIN CLOSED. SEE MDAC-1204.
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
/NA
mR
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7120187
LIFE SUPPORT
1208
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE :
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/2R
ABORT: 3/3
SOLENOID, DUMP VALVE (i)
FAILS TO CLOSE, OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
SUPPLY WATER SUBSYSTEM
DUMP LINE ASSEMBLY
EPDC
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ]
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID FUSELAGE
40V62LVIO
CAUSES: STRUCTURAL FAILURE, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE VALVE WILL REMAIN OPEN. SEE MDAC-1205.
k
REFERENCES:
m
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-i15
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
v12OlSV
LIFE SUPPORT
1209
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, DUMP VALVE (i)
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
/NA
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
I) LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
S)
9)
SUPPLY WATER SUBSYSTEM
DUMP LINE ASSEMBLY
EPDC
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: PNL RI2A2
PART NUMBER: $7
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO ACTIVATE/DEACTIVATE THE DUMP VALVE. THE
WORST CASE WILL BE THE CASE FOR WHICH THE VALVE CANNOT BE OPENED.
SEE REMARKS FOR MDAC-1204.
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REFERENCES:
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REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-I16
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mINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE".
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/20/87
LIFE SUPPORT
1210
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT".
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, DUMP VALVE (i)
SHORTED, ANY SINGLE CONTACT
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
SUPPLY WATER SUBSYSTEM
DUMP LINE ASSEMBLY
EPDC
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: PNL RI2A2
PART NUMBER: $7
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A SHORT ACROSS THE OPEN PINS WILL HAVE NO EFFECT DURING ASCENT OR
ENTRY SINCE THE CB IS PULLED AND ALSO THE ISOL VALVE IS CLOSED.
HOWEVER, PRIOR TO THE FIRST DUMP AND WITH THIS FAILURE, THE
HEATER SWITCH WILL BE ACTIVATED "ON" IN ANTICIPATION FOR A
DUMP. THIS PROCESS WILL AUTOMATICALLY OPEN THE DUMP VALVE. AND
SINCE THE ISOL VALVE IS OPEN AT THIS TIME, WATER WILL FLOW BEFORE
NOZZLE HEATERS DEVELOP ADEUQATE TEMPERATURE, THEREBY RESULTING IN
ICE FORMATION OUTSIDE THE NOZZLE. ICE MUST BE REMOVED
BEFORE ENTRY IS ATTEMPTED. ATTITUDE CHANGES, EVA, AND/OR RMS MAY
BE USED TO BREAK THE ICE.
REFERENCES".
u
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-i17
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT FLIGHT: 3/2R
MDAC ID: 1211 ABORT: /NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, DUMP VALVE (i)
OPEN (ELECTRICAL), ANY SINGLE FAILURE
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
SUPPLY WATER SUBSYSTEM
DUMP LINE ASSEMBLY
EPDC
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATo: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: PNL R12A2
PART NUMBER: $7
B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE MORE SEVERE CASE IS FOR OPEN PINS BEING OPEN THAT IS THE
VALVE WILL REMAIN CLOSED AND THEREFORE LOSS OF DUMP CAPABILITY.
SEE MDAC-1203 REMARKS.
REFERENCES:
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REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-I18
I
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7120187
LIFE SUPPORT
1212
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
312R
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, DUMP NOZZLE HEATER (i)
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING, FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
2) SUPPLY WATER SUBSYSTEM
3) DUMP LINE ASSEMBLY
4) EPDC
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL RI2A2
S17
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE (SWITCH IS JAMMED IN "OFF" POSITION) WILL NEGATE THE
OPERATION OF THE DUMP VALVE AND NOZZLE HEATERS - LOSS OF DUMP
CAPABILITY. FES OR X-TIE MAY BE USED TO COMPENSATE FOR THE LOSS.
THE FAILURE IS ONLY DETECTED WHEN SWITCH ACTIVATION IS
ATTEMPTED.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-I19
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT FLIGHT: 3/2R
MDAC ID: 1213 ABORT: /NA
ITEM: SWITCH, DUMP NOZZLE HEATER (i)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO OPEN, OPEN (ELECTRICAL), ANY SINGLE
CO,ACT _ ........ r_ ........
LEAD ANALYST : M.J. SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
SUPPLY WATER SUBSYSTEM
DUMP LINE ASSEMBLY
EPDC
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL RI2A2
S17
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: i
THE DUMP VALVE SWITCH _OT BE OPERA_ TO'ACTIVATE THE DUMP
VALVE AND THE NOZZLE HEATERS WILL BE INOPERATIVE RENDERING LOSS
OF DUMP CAPABILITY. FES OR X-TIE AVAILABLE TO COMPENSATE FOR THE
LOSS.
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REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-120
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=INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/20/87
LIFE SUPPORT
1214
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT".
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, DUMP NOZZLE HEATER (i)
SHORTED, ANY SINGLE CONTACT
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
SUPPLY WATER SUBSYSTEM
DUMP LINE ASSEMBLY
EPDC
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3
DEORBIT: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
ABORT
RTLS:
TAL:
AOA:
ATO:
HDW/FUNC
/NA
/NA
/NA
/NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
LOCATION: PNL RI2A2
PART NUMBER: S17
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO SIGNIFICANT EFFECT SINCE THE REDUNDANT PINS WILL PREVENT FLOW
OF ELECTRICITY WHEN THE SWITCH IS TURNED OFF. THE REVERSE ACTION
WOULD OPERATE NOMINALLY.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-121
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
7/20/87
LIFE SUPPORT
1215
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRBUIT BREAKER, DUMP VALVE (i)
FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED, OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
SUPPLY WATER SUBSYSTEM
DUMP LINE ASSEMBLY
EPDC
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL ML86B
CB64
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DIFFICULT TO OPERATE THE NOZZLE HEATERS BY HOLDING DOWN THE CB.
I? NOT, THE DUMPCAPABILITY IS LOST SINCE NO POWER WILL BE
AVAILABLE TO OPERATE THE DUMP VALVE AND NOZZLE HEATERS - FES AND
X-TIE AVAILABLE.
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REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-122
m
m
ww
u
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/20/87
LIFE SUPPORT
"1216
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRBUIT BREAKER, DUMP VALVE (i)
FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN, SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
SUPPLY WATER SUBSYSTEM
DUMP LINE ASSEMBLY
EPDC
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL ML86B
CB64
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO SIGNIFICANT IMPACT SINCE THE HEATER SWITCH AND DUMP VALVE
SWITCH HAVE OFF POSITIONS (NO POWER).
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-123
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
: = =
7/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
LIFE SUPPORT FLIGHT:
1217 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: POSITION INDICATION, DUMP VALVE (i)
FAILURE MODE: ERRONEOUS OUTPUT, LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
2) SUPPLY WATER SUBSYSTEM
3) DUMP LINE ASSEMBLY
4) EPDC
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL RI2A2
DS5
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE, LOSS OF INPUT,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF BARBER'POLE INDICATION DETERMINING THE STATUS OF THE
SWITCH (DUMP VALVE) POSITION. MDM SIGNALS, AND THE EFFECT OF
VALVE POSITION ON THE DUMP LINE ARE AVAILABLE TO COMPENSATE FOR
THE LOSS.
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REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-124
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7120/87
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 1218
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
313
ITEM: RESISTOR, DUMP VALVE (2)
FAILURE MODE: OPEN (ELECTRICAL), SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
SUPPLY WATER SUBSYSTEM
DUMP LINE ASSEMBLY
EPDC
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL RI2A2
A4R2 AND R3
CAUSES: THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF SIGNALS (DUMP VALVE SWITCH POSITION INDICATION AND THE
NOZZLE HEATER STATUS) TO THE MDM OF-4. BARBER-POLE INDICATION
AND THE NOZZLE TEMPERATURE SENSORS ARE AVAILABLE TO COMPENSATE
FOR THE LOSS.
i
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-125
m
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
7/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
LIFE SUPPORT FLIGHT:
1219 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: DIODE, DUMP VALVE (i)
FAILURE MODE: OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHYz
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
SUPPLY WATER SUBSYSTEM
DUMP LINE ASSEMBLY
EPDC
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] BC ] cc ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL RI2A2
AIOCR5
CAUSES: THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF SIGNAL FOR THE BARBER-POLE INDICATION. MDM SIGNALS AND
TEMP SENSORS ARE AVAILABLE TO COMPENSATE FOR THE LOSS.
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REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-126
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7120187
LIFE SUPPORT
1220
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SENSOR, NOZZLE TEMPERATURE (2)
OPEN (ELECTRICAL), SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
SUPPLY WATER SUBSYSTEM
DUMP LINE ASSEMBLY
EPDC
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID FUSELAGE
V62T0439 AND T0440
CAUSES: PIECE-PART FAILUIRE, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ONE SENSOR IS NOT SIGNIFICANT, SINCE THE OTHER SENSOR IS
STILL AVAILABLE. LOSS OF BOTH SENSORS WILL NEGATE DUMP OPERATION
- FES IS AVAILABLE TO EXPEL ADDITIONAL WATER BUT MAY AFFECT
MISSION TIMELINE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-127
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/20/87
LIFE SUPPORT
1221
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
NOZZLE HEATER (i)
OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
SUPPLY WATER SUBSYSTEM
DUMP LINE ASSEMBLY
EPDC
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: MID FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: 40V62HR3
] B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF DUMP CAPABILITY THROUGH THE NOZZLE. SWITCH TO FES TO
COMPENSATE FOR THE LOSS. WITHOUT HEATER, WATER FREEZE-UP IS
EMMINENT. USE OF FES FOR WATER DUMP MAY IMPACT THE MISSION
TIMELINE.
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REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-128
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iINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
?/2o/8 
LIFE SUPPORT
1222
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
NOZZLE HEATER (i)
SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
SUPPLY WATER SUBSYSTEM
DUMP LINE ASSEMBLY
EPDC
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: MID FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: 40V62NZI
] B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE HEATER WILL DRAW EXCESSIVE CURRENT POPPING THE CIRCUIT
BREAKER RESULTING IN INTERRUPTION AND COOL-DOWN OF THE NOZZLE
BAKE-OUT PROCEDURE. DUMP THROUGH THE NOZZLE MAY NOT BE
ACCOMPLISH IF CB CANNOT BE HELD DOWN.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-129
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/2o/87
LIFE SUPPORT
1223
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DUMP NOZZLE
RESTRICTED FLOW
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
SUPPLY WATER SUBSYSTEM
DUMP LINE ASSEMBLY
EPDC
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION'.
PART NUMBER:
MID FUSELAGE
40V62NZI
CAUSES: coNT_INATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
EXCESSIVE CONTAMINATION WILL REDUCE THE WATER DUMP FLOW CAUSING
ICING PROBLEM AND HINDERING DUMP PROCEDURES.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE"
SUBSYSTEM".
MDAC ID:
7/20/87
LIFE SUPPORT
1224
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DUMP LINE HEATER (2)
OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
SUPPLY WATER SUBSYSTEM
DUMP LINE ASSEMBLY
EPDC
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID BODY AREA 40
HTR A AND B
CAUSES: THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ONE HEATER CAN BE COMPENSATED BY SWITCHING TO THE
REDUNDANT HEATER. LOSS OF BOTH HEATERS MAY CREATE FREEZING OF
WATER IN THE LINE NEGATING DUMP OPERATION AND POSSIBLY RUPTURING
THE LINE. FES MAY BE USED TO EXPEL ADDITIONAL WATER.
r_
u
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-131
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/20/87
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 1225
ITEM: DUMP LINE HEATER (2)
FAILURE MODE: SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
/NA
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
SUPPLY WATER SUBSYSTEM
DUMP LINE ASSEMBLY
EPDC
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID BODY AREA 40
HTR AAND B
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A SHORT WILL DRAW EXCESSIVE CURRENT POPPING THE CB AND/OR CAUSING
THE THERMOSTAT TO OPEN. AT ANY RATE, THIS FAILURE WILL INTERRUPT
UNIFORM HEATING OF THE HEATER IN THE LINE WHICH MAY CAUSE
FREEZING AND BLOCKING OF LINE FOR ANY DUMP OPERATIONS. SWITCH
TO REDUNDANT HEATER SET.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-132
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/2o/87
LIFE SUPPORT
1226
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
THERMOSTAT, LINE HEATER (4)
OPEN (ELECTRICAL), FAILS TO START
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
SUPPLY WATER SUBSYSTEM
DUMP LINE ASSEMBLY
EPDC
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID BODY AREA 40
40V62SI08, 208, 308 AND 408
CAUSES: PIECE-PART FAILURE, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ONE LEG OF HEATER REDUNDANCY (THERMOSTATS - 2 PER SIDE -
ARE IN SERIES) - THE OTHER HEATER WILL BE AVAILABLE. LOSS OF
FUNCTION (NO THERMOSTAT) WILL PRECLUDE DUMP OPERATION SINCE NO
HEATER CAN BE ENERGIZED. DUMP TO BE ACCOMPLISHED THORUGH FES.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-133
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
712o187
LIFE SUPPORT
1227
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
THERMOSTAT, DUMP LINE HEATER (4)
SHORTED, FAILS TO STOP
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
SUPPLY WATER SUBSYSTEM
DUMP LINE ASSEMBLY
EPDC
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: /NAN
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID BODY AREA 40
40V62SI08, 208, 308 AND 408
CAUSES: PIECE-PART FAILURE, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
THE AFFECTED THERMOSTAT WILL NOTCYC_, BUT THE REDUNDANT
THERMOSTAT WILL BE ABLE TO SHUT OFF POWER AT HIGHER TEMPERATURE.
WARMER WATER IN THE LINE, OTHERWISE NO SIGNIFICANT IMPACT. ALSO,
THE RESPECTIVE CB'S MAY BE USED TO DEACTIVATE THE HEATERS.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
LIFE SUPPORT FLIGHT: 2/2
1228 ABORT: /NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LEAKAGE
QD, CONTINGENCY CROSS-TIE (i)
FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED, FAILS TO CLOSE, INTERNAL
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
SUPPLY WATER SUBSYSTEM
DUMP LINE ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: CABIN
PART NUMBER: -ii01
CAUSES: PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WATER WILL FLOW CONTINUOUSLY INTO THE CABIN UNLESS THE DUMP LINE
IS ISOLATED BY CLOSING THE DUMP ISOLATION VALVE. THEREFORE LOSS
OF SUPPLY WATER DUMP THROUGH THE NOZZLE AND SUBSEQUENT SWITCHING
TO FES FOR EXPELLING EXCESSIVE WATER. DURING THE ASCENT
AND ENTRY THE DUMP ISOL VALVE IS CLOSED AND THE FAILURE OF QD
BECOMES NOT APPLICABLE.
REFERENCES :
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-135
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/20/87
LIFE SUPPORT
1229
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
QD, CONTINGENCY CROSS-TIE (i)
FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN, FAILS TO OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
SUPPLY WATER SUBSYSTEM
DUMP LINE ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: CABIN
PART NUMBER: -Ii01
CAUSES: PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: _ _ _
LOSS OF CONTINGENCY CROSS-TIE CAPABILITY TO EXPEL SUPPLY WATER
THROUGH THE WASTE WATER DUMP NOZZLE. THE CROSS-TIE BECOMES
NECESSARY IF THERE IS NO MEANS OF EXPELLING (FES OR NOZZLE)
EXCESS WATER. CONSIDERING THIS TO BE A CONTINGENCY ACTION, THE
MISSION SHOULD BE TERMINATED AND RETURN WITH WATER FLOW THROUGH
FUEL CELLS DEDICATED DUMP LINE.
REFERENCES:
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/20/87
LIFE SUPPORT
1230
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SENSOR, DUMP LINE TEMPERATURE (i)
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT, LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
SUPPLY WATER SUBSYSTEM
DUMP LINE ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID FUSELAGE
V62TO418A
CAUSES: PIECE-PART FAILURE, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF INDICATION TO FIND ANY MALFUNCTIONS WITH THE LINE HEATERS
OR THERMOSTATS. UNDER SINGLE FAILURE ONLY, THERE IS NO
SIGNIFICANT PROBLEM SINCE HEATERS ARE OPERATING NOMINALLY. WITH
A SUBSEQUENT HATER AND/OR THERMOSTAT LOSS, THE LINE MAY FREEZE UP
RESULTING IN LOSS OF DUMP CAPABILITY AND USE OF FES INSTEAD.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-137
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/20/87
LIFE SUPPORT
1231
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
QD, ECLSS BAY (2)
RESTRICTED FLOW
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT".
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
B__ HIE_CHY:
I) LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
SUPPLY WATER SUBSYSTEM
GALLEY LINE ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT P_SE HDW/_C ABORT HDW/_C
PRE_UNCH: 3/3 RT_: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
_DING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ F ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID DECK-EC_S BAY
-3302 AND -1201
CAUSES: CO_INATION, PIECE-PART FAIL_
EFFECTS/_TIONALE:
LOSS OF ONE WATER PORT (CHILLED OR _BIENT) FoR USE BY THE CREW.
ADDITIONAL _RT WILL BE ADEQUATE TO CONTI_E WITHOUT IMPACTING
THE MISSION. _CTIONAL LOSS WILL P_CLUDE USE OF WATER FOR
DRINKING, HYGIENE, FOOD PREP, ...ETC. A SEVE_ CONT_INATION
mY RESTRI_ FLOW T_OUGH BOTH WATER PORTS - SCREEN C.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
v/2o/8v
LIFE SUPPORT
1232
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
QD, GALLEY/DISPENSER (2)
RESTRICTED FLOW
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
SUPPLY WATER SUBSYSTEM
GALLEY LINE ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ]
LOCATION: CABIN
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECEUPART FAILURE
C [ F ]
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ADDITIONAL PORT WILL BE ADEQUATE TO CONTINUE WITHOUT IMPACTING
THE MISSION. FUNCTIONAL LOSS WILL PRECLUDE USE OF WATER FOR
DRINKING, HYGIENE, FOOD PREP, ...ETC. A SEVERE CONTAMINATION
MAY RESTRICT FLOW THROUGH BOTH WATER PORTS - SCREEN C.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-139
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/20/87
LIFE SUPPORT
1233
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/_C
2/2
2/2
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LINES _D FITTINGS
EXTE_AL LEDGE, STRUC_L FAILU_ (RU_)
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
SUPPLY WATER SUBSYSTEM
GALLEY LINE ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/2
LIFTOFF: 2/2 TAL: 2/2
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 2/2
DEORBIT: 2/2 ATO: 2/2
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUND_CY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART _BER:
CABIN-UPST_ OF THE T_KS IN_T VALVES
CAUSES: MEC_ICAL SHOCK, MIS_D_G/ABUSE, VIBHATION
EFFECTS/RATIONAl:
CONTINUOUS FLOW OF THE FUEL CELLS GENERATED WATER INTO THE
MIDDECK AREA - LINE CANNOT BE ISOLATED WITHOUT SHUTTING DOWN THE
FUEL CELLS.
REFERENCES:
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7120187
LIFE SUPPORT
1234
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
2/2
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LINES AND FITTINGS
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE, STRUCTURAL FAILURE (RUPTURE)
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
SUPPLY WATER SUBSYSTEM
GALLEY LINE ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/2
LIFTOFF: 2/2 TAL: 2/2
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 2/2
DEORBIT: 2/2 ATO: 2/2
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CABIN, BETWEEN THE TANKS INLET/OUTLET VALVES
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE AFFECTED TANK SHOULD BE DEPRESSURIZED AND ISOLATED FROM THE
LINE BY CLOSING THE INLET/OUTLET VALVES. LOSS OF TANK A WILL
HAVE GREATER IMPACT SINCE THE WATER FOR CREW USAGE WILL BE
REDUCED SUBSTANTIALLY. ALSO LESS TANKAGE AVAILABLE FOR
CONTINGENCY RESERVES AND LESS FLEXIBLE WATER MANAGEMENT.
REFERENCES".
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-141
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
7/20/87
LIFE SUPPORT
1235
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
2/2
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LINES AND FITTINGS
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE, STRUCTURAL FAILURE (RUPTURE)
LEAD ANALYST: MoJ. SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
SUPPLY WATER SUBSYSTEM
GALLEY LINE ASSEMBLY
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 2/2
2/2 TAL: 2/2
2/2 AOA: 2/2
2/2 ATO: 2/2
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CABIN, DOWNSTREAM OF THE TANKS OUTLET VALVES
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE MOST SEVE_RE CASE IS AN EXTERNAL LEAKAGE ON THE LINE
DOWNSTRE_ OF THE XOVR VALVE, IN THIS CASE, THE FES FEEDLINE A
ADN DUMP CAPABILITY WOULD BE LOST SINCE IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO
ISOLATE THE LINE AFTER THE LEAK. WATER MANAGEMENT WILL BE
_DUCED TO TANKS C AND D ONLY THROUGH FES FEEDLINE B. THIS
FAILURE IS MOST CRITICAL DURING ASCENT/ENTRY WHEN THE FES IS
OPERATING ON LINE A.
REFERENCES-.
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wINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7120287
LIFE SUPPORT
1236
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
2/2
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LINES AND FITTINGS
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE, STRUCTURAL FAILURE (RUPTURE)
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
SUPPLY WATER SUBSYSTEM
GALLEY LINE ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/2
LIFTOFF: 2/2 TAL: 2/2
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 2/2
DEORBIT: 2/2 ATO: 2/2
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CABIN, GALLEY LINE
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A LEAK UPSTREAM OF THE GALLEY SUPPLY VALVE CANNOT BE STOPPED -
LINE CANNOT BE ISOLATED. CONTINUOUS FLOW OF WATER TO THE CABIN
AND LOSS OF WATER TO THE CREW THROUGH GALLEY/DISPENSER LINES. IT
MAY ALSO STARVE FES DURING ASCENT/ENTRY IF THE LEAKAGE IS
APPRECIABLE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-143
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/20/87
LIFE SUPPORT
1237
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT".
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
WATER CHILLER (i)
INTERNAL LEAKAGE, WCL-H20
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
SUPPLY WATER SUBSYSTEM
GALLEY LINE ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/1R
LIFTOFF: 2/1R TAL: 2/1R
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: 2/1R
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCAT ION ."
PART NUMBER:
ECLSS BAY
9061HXI
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE MODE IS COVERED BY THE AIR REVITALIZATION SUBSYTEM
(ARS) MDAC-204. IT WILL RESULT IN LOSS OF ONE WCL LOOP AS WELL
AS CONTAMINATION OF THE POTABLE WATER FOR CREW USE. A SIMILAR
LEAK IN THE REDUNDANT WCL WILL LEAVE NO THERMAL COOLING OF THE
CABIN, AVIONICS, ...ETC POTENTIAL LOSS OF VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS
OF AVIONICS EQUIPMENT.
REFERENCES:
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/20/87
LIFE SUPPORT
1238
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
312R
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
WATER CHILLER (i)
RESTRICTED FLOW, POTABLE WATER
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
SUPPLY WATER SUBSYSTEM
GALLEY LINE ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ F ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
ECLSS BAY
9061HXI
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A CONTAMINATION IN THE HX PASSAGES WILL BLOCK FLOW OF CHILLED
WATER TO THE CREW. AMBIENT WATER IS AVAILABLE FOR USE, BUT NOT
PALATABLE. ARS-201 STUDIED RESTRICTED FLOW FOR WCL - WCL ONLY.
IF SEVERE CONTAMINATION OCCURS, THE AMBIENT WATER FLOW WILL BE
CLOGGED AND NO WATER WILL BE AVAILABLE TO THE CREW AT ALL -
MISSION ABORT.
REFERENCES:
L
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WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
Analysis Worksheets
C-146
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MDAC-ID
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY
FLIGHT ABORT SCREENS
H/F H/F A B C
2001 3/2R /NA P P P
2002 3/2R /NA P P P
2003 3/2R /NA P P P
2004 3/3 /NA
2005 3/3 3/3
2006 3/2R /NA P P P
2007 3/2R /NA P P P
2008 (*) 2/2 /NA
2009 3/2R /NA P P P
2010 3/3 /NA
2011 3/2R /NA P P P
2012 3/2R /NA P P P
2013 (*) 2/2 /NA
2014 (*) 2/2 /NA
2015 (*) 2/2 /NA
2016 3/2R /NA P P P
2017 3/2R /NA P P P
2018 3/2R /NA P P P
2019 3/2R /NA P P P
2020 3/2R /NA P P P
2021 3/3 /NA
2022 3/2R /NA P P P
2023 3/3 /NA
2024 3/2R /NA P P P
2025 3/3 /NA
2026 3/2R /NA P P P
2027 3/3 /NA
2028 3/3 /NA
2029 3/3 3/3
2030 3/3 3/3
2031 3/3 3/3
2032 3/3 /NA
2033 3/2R /NA P P P
2034 3/2R /NA P P P
2035 3/3 3/3
2036 3/3 3/3
2027 3/3 3/3
2038 3/2R /NA P P P
2039 3/2R /NA P P P
2040 3/2R /NA P P P
2041 (*) 2/2 /NA
2042 (*) 2/2 /NA
2043 (*) 2/2 /NA
2044 3/3 /NA
2045 3/2R /NA P P P
ITEM NAME
URINAL, MALE AND FEMALE (i)
URINAL, MALE AND FEMALE (i)
URINAL COUPLER (I)
URINAL CON SCRN PREFILTER(1)
URINAL CON SCRN PREFILTER(1)
URINAL HOSE (i)
URINAL HOSE (i)
URINAL ADPTR QR (i)
URINAL ADPTR QR (i)
URINAL HOSE CLAMP (i)
URINAL DYNATUBE (2)
URINAL DYNATUBE (2)
TUBE, EMU EXTENSION (i)
TUBE, EMU EXTENSION (i)
EMU QD (i)
COMMODE STORAGE CONTAINER (i)
COMMODE/LINER (i)
COMMODE UPPER RING (I)
COMMODE SLIDE VLV (i)
COMMODE SLIDE VLV (I)
COMPACTOR DRIVE UNIT (I)
COMPACTOR DRIVE UNIT (I)
COMPACTOR DRIVE UNIT (i)
COMMODE BOTTOM FLANGE (i)
COMMODE BOTTOM FLANGE (i)
COMMODE EXIT, MESH SCRN (1)
COMMODE EXIT, MESH SCRN (i)
COMMODE VANES (2)
AUX. WET TRASH VENT LINE (I)
AUX. WET TRASH VENT LINE QD (i)
VACUUM PORT LINE (1)
VACUUM PORT QD AND PLUG (i)
VACUUM PORT QD AND PLUG (i)
VACUUM PORT QD AND PLUG (i)
WET TRASH VENT LINE (i)
WET TRASH VENT LINE (i)
WET TRASH VENT QD (I)
URINE COLLECTION HOSES (2)
URINE COLLECTION HOSES
WCS TO WWS QD (i)
WCS TO WWS QD (i)
WCS TO WWS LINE (1)
WCS TO WWS DYNATUBE (i)
WCS TO WWS DYNATUBE (i)
CCH LINKAGE (I)
(*) Potential Critical Items.
C-147
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM (cont'd)
MDAC-ID
2046
2047
2048
2049
2050
2051
2052
2053
2054
2055
2056
2057
2058
2059
2060
2061
2062
2063
2064
2065
2066
2067
2068
2069
2070
2071
2072
2073
2074
2075
2076
2077
2078
2079
2080
2081
2082
2083
2084
2085
2086
2087
2088
2089
2090
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
H/F
oDme_
3/3
3/2R
3/2R
312R
3/2R
313
3/2R
312R
3/2R
3/2R
3/3
3/3
3/2R
3/3
3/3
3/2R
3/2R
3/2R
3/2R
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/2R
3/2R
3/3
3/2R
3/2R
3/2R
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY
ABORT SCREENS
H/F A B C
/NA
/NA P P P
3/3 _ P P P
/NA P P P
/NA P P P
/NA
/HA P P P
/NA P P P
/NA P P P
/NA P P P
/NA
/HA
/NA P P P
/NA
/NA
/NA P P P
/NA P P P
/NA P P P
/HA P P P
/HA
/NA
/NA
/NA P P P
/NA P P P
/NA
/NA P P P
/NA P P P
/NA P P P
/HA
/NA
3/3 INA
3/2R /HA
3/3 /NA
3/3 /NA
3/2R /NA
3/3 /NA
3/3 /NA
3/3 /NA
3/2R /NA
3/3 /NA
3/3 ./NA
3/3 /NA
3/2R /NA
3/2R /NA
3/3 /NA
PNP
PPP
PPP
PPP
P PP
ITEM NAME
MANUAL VENT VLV (I)
MANUAL VENT VLV (I)
MANUAL VENT VLV (1)
COMMODE OUTLET CNTRL VLV (I)
COMMODE OUTLET CNTRL VLV (I)
COMMODE OUTLET CNTRL VLV (i)
COMMODE REPRESS VLV (I)
COMMODE REPRESS VLV (i)
COMMODE REPRESS VLV (I)
BALLAST AIR CONTROL VLV (I)
BALLAST AiR CONTROL VLV (i)
BALLAST AIR CONTROL VLV (i)
FAN/SEP VLV (I)
FAN/SEP VLV (I)
FAN/SEP VLV (i)
FAN/SEP_TORS (2)
FAN/SEPARATORS (2)
FAN/SEPARATORS (2)
FAN/SEPARATORS (2)
FAN/SEP TP (4)
FAN/SEP TP (4)
FAN/SEP INLET HOSE (I)
FAN/SEP INLET HOSE (i)
FAN/SEP INLET HOSE (i)
DUAL CHECK VALVES (2)
DUAL CHECK VALVES (2)
DUAL CHECK VALVES (2)
HOSE ASSY, FAN/SEP TO CV (I)
MUFFLER HOUSING INLET DUCT (i)
BACTERIA FILTER (2)
BALLAST VLV SCRN (i)
BALLAST VLV ASSY (i)
BALLAST VLV ASSY (i)
COMMODE SEAT (i)
COMMODE SEAT (i)
SEAT BASE (I)
THIGH BAR RESTRAINT (2)
RESTRAINT HARNESS (THIGH) (4)
FOOT RESTRAINT (i)
FOOT RESTRAINT (i)
TOE BAR RESTRAINT (I)
TOE BAR RESTRAINT (I)
APOLLO FECAL BAG (SUFFICIENT)
UCD (3 DAY SUPPLY)
COMMODE PRESS XDCR (i)
(*) Potential Critical Items.
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MDAC-ID
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM (cont'd)
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY
FLIGHT ABORT SCREENS
H/F H/F A B C
2091 3/2R /NA P P P
2092 3/2R /NA P N P
2093 3/3 /NA
2094 3/3 /NA
2095 3/2R /NA P P P
2096 3/3 /NA
2097 3/2R /NA P P P
2098 3/2R /NA P P P
2199 3/3 /NA
2100 3/2R /NA P P P
2101 3/2R /NA P P P
2102 3/2R /NA P p p
2103 3/3 /NA
2104 3/3 /NA
2105 3/2R /NA P P P
2106 3/IR /NA P P P
2107 3/2R /NA P P P
2108 3/2R /NA P P P
2109 . 3/2R /NA P P P
2110 3/2R /NA P P P
2111 (*) 2/2 3/3
2112 (*) 2/2 3/3
2113 (*) 2/2 3/3
2114 (*) 2/2 3/3
2115 3/2R /NA P P P
2116 (*) 2/2 3/3
2117 3/3 /NA
2118 3/2R 3/3 P P P
2119 3/2R 3/3 P P P
2120 3/IR 3/IR P P P
2121 3/2R 3/3 P P P
2122 3/2R 3/3 P P P
2123 3/3 /NA
2124 3/3 /NA
2125 3/IR 3/IR P P P
2126 3/3 3/3
2127 3/2R /NA P P P
2128 3/3 3/3
2129 3/3 /NA
2130 3/3 /NA
2131 3/3 3/3
2132 3/3 /NA
2133 3/3 /NA
2134 3/3 /NA
2135 3/3 /NA
ITEM NAME
SW, WCS FAN/SEP (i)
SW, WCS FAN/SEP (i)
SW, WCS FAN/SEP (I)
WCS MODE SWITCH (i)
WCS MODE SWITCH (i)
WCS MODE SWITCH (I)
WCS FAN/SEP RELAY (2)
WCS FAN/SEP RELAY (2)
FAN/SEP NOISE SUPPRESSION (i)
FAN/SEP NOISE SUPPRESSION (I)
FAN/SEP MOTOR THERMOSTAT (i)
FAN/SEP MOTOR THERMOSTAT (i)
FAN/SEP BYPASS SWITCH (2
FAN/SEP BYPASS SWITCH (2
CB, WCS CNTLR (2)
CB, WCS CNTLR (2)
FAN/SEP MOTOR (2)
FAN/SEP MOTOR (2)
CB, WCS FAN/SEP (I)
CB, WCS FAN/SEP (1)
WWS LINE, UNIONS, AND JUNCT (i)
WWS LINE, UNIONS, AND JUNCT (1)
ARS CONDENSATE SUPPLY TUBE (1)
ARS CONDENSATE SUPPLY TUBE (I)
cwc (1)
WTNK INLET VLV (i)
WTNK INLET VLV (i)
WTNK INLET VLV (i)
WASTE TANK 1 (i)
WASTE TANK 1 (I)
WTNK LINER (BELLOWS)(1)
WTNK INLET LINES (i)
WTNK OUTLET LINES (I)
WTNK FLUID LEVEL XDUCR (I)
WTNK N2 LINE (i)
WTNK N2 HYDROPHOBIC FLTR (1)
WTNK DRAIN VLV (I)
WTNK DRAIN VLV (I)
WTNK DRAIN VLV (I)
GSE FILL QD AND PLUG (i)
GSE FILL AND PLUG (i)
GSE FILL QD AND PLUG (i)
GSE DRAIN QD AND PLUG (i)
GSE DRAIN QD AND PLUG (i)
GSE DRAIN QD AND PLUG (I)
(*) Potential Critical Items.
C-149
WASTEMANAGEMENTSUBSYSTEM(cont'd)
MDAC-ID
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY
FLIGHT ABORT SCREENS
H/F H/F A B C
2136 (*) 2/2 /NA
2137 (*) 2/2 /NA
2138 (*) 2/2 /NA
2139 (*) 2/2 2/2
2140 3/2R /NA
2141 (*) 2/2 /NA
2142 (*) 2/2 /NA
2143 3/3 /NA
2144 (*) 2/2 /NA
2145 (*) 2/IR 2/IR
2146 3/2R /NA
2147 (*) : 2/IR /NA
2148 3/2R /NA
2149 3/3 3/3
2150 3/3 3/3
2151 3/3 3/3
2152 3/3 3/3
2153 3/3 3/3
2154 3/2R 3/3
2155 3/3 /NA
2156 3/3 /NA
2157 3/3 3/3
2158 3/3 3/3
2159 3/3 3/3
2160 5/3 /NA
2161 3/3 /NA
2162 3/3 /NA
2163 3/3 /NA
2164 3/3 /NA
2165 3/3 /NA
2166 3/3 3/3
2167 3/3 3/3
2168 3/3 3/3
2169 3/3 /NA
2170 3/3 /NA
2171 (*) 2/2 /NA
2172 3/3 /NA
2173 (*) 2/2 /NA
2174 (*) 2/2 /NA
2175 (*) 2/2 /NA
2176 (*) 2/2 /NA
2177 (*) 2/2 /NA
2178 3/3 3/3
2179 3/3 3/3
2180 3/3 3/3
P PP
PPP
PPP
PPP
PPP
PPP
ITEM NAME
DUMP LINES (I)
DUMP LINES (I)
WWS DMP ISOL VLV (i)
WWS DMP ISOL VLV (i)
WWS DMP ISOL VLV (I)
QD @ HIGH CAP. FILTER (i)
HIGH CAPACITY FILTER (i)
HIGH CAPACITY FILTER (I)
CONT X-TIE QD (i)
WTNK DUMP VLV (I)
WTNK DUMP VLV (I)
WTNK DUMP VLV (i)
DUMP NOZZLE (i)
TANK FLD QTY LVL SENS (i)
WTNK FLD LVL SIG COND (i)
WTNK INLET VLV (i)
WTNK INLET VLV (1)
WTNK INLET VLV SWITCH (1)
WTNK INLET VLV SWITCH (1)
WTNK INLET VLV, SOLENOID (2)
WTNK INLET VLV, SOLENOID (2)
WTNK INLET VLV OPN INDCTR (1)
WTNK INLET VLV INDCTR DIODE (1)
WTNK INLET VLV INDCTR RESIS (1)
CB, WTNK OUTLET VLV (1)
CB, WTNK OUTLET VLV (I)
WTNK OUTLET VLV SWITCH (2)
WTNK OUTLET VLV SWITCH (2)
WTNK OUTLET VLV, SOLENOID (1)
WTNK OUTLET VLV, SOLENOID (1)
SW, WTNK OUTLET VLV INDCTR (1)
WTNK OUTLET VLV DIODE (I)
WTNK OUTLET VLV RESIS, TO MDM (1)
PRESS SENSOR (I)
PRESS SENSOR SIG COND (i)
CB, WWS DMP ISOL VLV (1)
CB, WWS DMP ISOL VLV (1)
CB, WWS DMP ISOL VLV (1)
CB, WWS DMP ISOL VLV (1)
CB, WWS DMP ISOL VLV (I)
CB, WWS DMP ISOL VLV (1)
CB, WWS DMP ISOL VLV (1)
WWS DMP ISOL VLV INDCTR (1)
WWS DMP ISOL VLV RESIS, OF2 (1)
SW, WWS DMP ISOL INDCTR (i)
(*) Potential Critical Items.
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MDAC-ID
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM (concluded)
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY
FLIGHT ABORT SCREENS
H/F H/F A B C
2181 (*) 2/IR 3/3 P P P
2182 3/3 3/3
2183 3/2R 3/3 P P P
2184 3/2R /NA P P P
2185 3/3 3/3
2186 3/2R 3/3 P P P
2187 3/2R /NA P P P
2188 3/2R /NA P P P
2189 3/2R /NA P P P
2190 3/3 /NA
2191 3/2R /NA P P P
2192 3/2R /NA P P P
2193 3/2R /NA P P P
2194 3/2R /NA P P P
2195 (*) 2/IR /NA P P P
2196 (*) 2/IR /NA P P P
2197 (*) 2/IR /NA P P P
2198 (*) 2/IR /NA P P P
2299 (*) 2/IR /NA P P P
2200 3/3 /NA
2201 3/3 /NA
2202 3/3 /NA
2203 3/2R /NA P P P
2204 3/2R /NA P P P
2205 3/2R /NA P P P
2206 3/3 /NA
2207 (*) I/i I/i
2208 (*) i/i I/I
2209 (*) i/I i/I
2210 (*) i/I i/I
2211 (*) i/i 3/3
2212 3/3 3/3
2213 (*) 2/IR /NA P P P
2214 (*) 2/IR /NA P P P
2215 3/3 /NA
2216 3/3 3/3
2217 3/3 /NA
2218 (*) I/I /NA
2219 (*) 1/1 /NA
2220 (*) I/I /NA
2221 3/3 /NA
2222 (*) i/i /NA
2223 3/3 /NA
2224 3/3 /NA
ITEM NAME
CB, DMP LINE HTR (I)
CB, DMP LINE HTR (I)
WWS DMP LINE HEATER (2)
WWS DMP LINE HEATER (2)
WWS DMP HTR LINE THERMO (I)
WWS DMP HTR LINE THERMO (I)
WWS DMP LINE TEMP XDCR (I)
WWS DMP LINE TEMP XDCR (I)
CB, DMP VLV/NOZ HTR (I)
CB, DMP VLV/NOZ HTR (i)
SW, DMP VLV ENA/NOZ HTR (1)
SW, DMP VLV ENA/NOZ HTR (1)
SW, DMP VLV ENA/NOZ HTR (i)
INDCTR, DMP VLV ENA/NOZ HTR (1)
SW, WWS DMP VLV (i)
SW, WWS DMP VLV (1)
SW, WWS DMP VLV (i)
WWS DMP VLV SOLENOID (I)
WWS DMP VLV SOLENOID (i)
WWS DMP VLV SOLENOID (i)
DUMP VLV INDCTR RESIS TO OF3 (i)
WWS DMP VLV INDCTR DIODE (i)
DUMP NOZZLE HEATER (I)
WWS DMP NOZ TEMP XDCR (2)
WWS DMP NOZ SIG COND (2)
WWS DMP NOZ RESIS TO OF4 (I)
CREW MODULE INTERNAL LINE (i)
INTERNAL LINE AND FITTINGS (I)
EXTERNAL LINE AND FITTINGS (I)
DYNATUBE, CREW CABIN (I)
VACUUM VENT NOZZLE (i)
VACUUM VENT LINE HTR THERM (2)
VACUUM VENT LINE HTR THERM (2)
VACUUM VENT LINE HEATER (2)
LINE TEMP SIG COND (i)
LINE TEMPERATURE SENSOR (i)
CB, NOZ HTR (1)
CB, NOZ HTR (1)
SW, NOZ HTR (1)
SW, NOZ HTR (i)
RESIS TO MDM OF4 (HTR INDCTR)(1)
VACUUM VENT NOZZLE HEATER (i)
VVS NOZZLE TEMPERATURE SENSOR (i)
VVS NOZZLE TEMP SENS COND (i)
(*) Potential Critical Items.
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INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/28/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT FLIGHT: 3/2R
MDAC ID: 2001 ABORT: /NA
ITEM: URINAL, MALE AND FEMALE (I TYPE PER CREW MEMBER)
FAILURE MODE: EXTE_AL_AKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIE_ :
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE COLLECTION SUBSYSTEM
URINE/WASTE FLUID COLLECTION ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
199C3082PI]
ECLSS AREA 90
WCS 80V62AI4 (5.2) [G.E. DWG 199C3102PI,
CAUSES: MISHANDLING/ABUSE, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POSSIBLE WASTE FLUID CONTAMINATION INTO CABIN ATMOSPHERE DUE TO
BLOCKAGE OF URINAL HOSE OR FAILURE (CRACKING)OF URINAL HOUSING OR
GASKET SEALS. REQUIRES USE OF CONTINGENCY WASTE COLLECTION
METHOD.
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REFERENCES: I) WCS ASSEMBLY [G.E. DWG 47J232750GI6]; 2) SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEM HANDBOOK, DWG. NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC
HANDBOOK, VS70-960102, PAGE 60EC
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT FLIGHT: 3/2R
MDAC ID: 2002 ABORT: /NA
ITEM: URINAL, MALE AND FEMALE (i TYPE PER CREW MEMBER)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO LATCH
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE COLLECTION SUBSYSTEM
URINE/WASTE FLUID COLLECTION ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: ECLSS AREA 90
PART NUMBER: WCS 80V62AI4 (5.2)
199C3082PI]
B [ P ] C [ P ]
[G.E. DWG 199C3102PI,
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REQUIRES CREW MEMBER TO USE CONTINGENCY URINAL COLLECTION BAGS.
THERE IS ONLY A 3 DAYS' SUPPLY OF BAGS PER CREW MEMBER, THUS
POTENTIAL LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: i) WCS ASSEMBLY [G.E. DWG 47J232750GI6]; 2) SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEM HANDBOOK, DWG. NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC
HANDBOOK, VS70-960102, PAGE 60EC
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/28/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2003 ABORT:
ITEM: URINAL COUPLER (I)
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
/NA
FAILURE MODE: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE, PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDILEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE COLLECTION SUBSYSTEM
URINE/WASTE FLUID COLLECTION ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
ECLSS AREA 90
WCS 80V62AI4 (5.2) [G.E. DWG 199C3088G2, P2]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POSSIBLE WASTE FLUID CONTAMINATION OF CABIN ATMOSpHER_EpUE TO
INEFFECTIVE SEALING SURFACE AND GASKETS AND IMPROPER LATCHING OF
ASSEMBLY. REQUIRES USE OF ALTERNATE WASTE COLLECTION METHOD.
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REFERENCES: i) WCS ASSEMBLY [G.E. DWG 47J232750GI6]; 2) SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEM HANDBOOK, DWG. NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC
HANDBOOK, VS70-960102, PAGE 60EC I
J
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-154
i
I
iw
!
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/28/87
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 2004
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM: URINAL CONICAL SCREEN PREFILTER (i)
FAILURE MODE: RESTRICTED FLOW
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE COLLECTION SUBSYSTEM
URINE/WASTE FLUID COLLECTION ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
ECLSS AREA 90
WCS 80V62AI4 (5.2) [G.E. DWG 199C3083GI]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POSSIBLE CONTAMINATION OF CABIN ATMOSPHERE WITH WASTE FLUIDS DUE
TO RESTRICTED AIR FLOW. FLIGHT REPLACEABLE HARDWARE, REPLACE
FILTER.
REFERENCES: i) WCS ASSEMBLY [G.E. DWG 47J232750GI6]; 2) SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEM HANDBOOK, DWG. NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC
HANDBOOK, VS70-960102, PAGE 60EC
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
LIFE SUPPORT
2005
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
URINAL CONICAL SCREEN PREFILTER (i)
INTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE COLLECTION SUBSYSTEM _
URINE/WASTE FLUID COLLECTION ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
ECLSS AREA 90
WCS 80V62AI4 (5.2) [G.E. DWG 199C3083GI]
CAUSES: STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE".
UNFILTERED URINE HOSE, POSSIBLE CABIN CONTAMINATES INTO WCS LINES
RESULTING IN POTENTIAL REQUIREMENT FOR CONTINGENCY WASTE
COLLECTION METHODS OR AT WORST CASE JAMMING DUMP AND DUMP
ISOLATION VALVES-PRODUCING LIFE CRITICAL SITUATION.
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REFERENCES: i) WCS ASSEMBLY [G.E. DWG 47J232750GI6]; 2) SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEM HANDBOOK, DWG. NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC
HANDBOOK, VS70-960102, PAGE 60EC
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/28/87
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 2006
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
/NA
ITEM: URINAL HOSE (I)
FAILURE MODE: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE COLLECTION SUBSYSTEM
URINE/WASTE FLUID COLLECTION ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
ECLSS AREA 90
80V62AI4 (5.2)
CAUSES: MISHANDLING/ABUSE, CHEMICAL REACTION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WASTE FLUIDS DUMPED ONTO EXTERNAL SURFACE OF HOSE, CONTAMINATION
OF CABIN ATMOSPHERE WITH WASTE FLUID AND NOXIOUS GASES. UNDER
SEVERE CONDITIONS WILL NEED TO USE URINE COLLECTION BAGS.
REFERENCES: I) WCS ASSEMBLY [G.E. DWG 47J232750GI6]; 2) SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEM HANDBOOK, DWG. NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC
HANDBOOK, VS70-960102, PAGE 60EC
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INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/28/87
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 2007
ITEM: URINAL HOSE (i)
FAILURE MODE: RESTRICTEDFLOW
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
/NA
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE COLLECTION SUBSYSTEM
URINE/WASTE FLUID COLLECTION ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
ECLSS AREA 90
80V62AI4 (5.2)
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INEFFECTIVE SUCTION, POSSIB_ CONTAMINATION OF CABIN ATMOSPHERE
BY WASTE FLUID BY BACK FLOW INTO CABIN, REQUIRES IMPLEMENTATION
OF FLIGHT RULE 13-17 FOR SPILL CLEAN-UP. REQUIRES USE OF
ALTERNATE WASTE COLLECTION METHODS.
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REFERENCES: i) WCS ASSEMBLY [G.E. DWG 47J232750GI6]; 2) SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEM HANDBOOK, DWG. NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC
HANDBOOK, VS70-960102, PAGE 60EC
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/28/87
LIFE SUPPORT
2008
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
URINAL ADAPTER QUICK RELEASE (i)
MISALIGNMENT
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE COLLECTION SUBSYSTEM
URINE/WASTE FLUID COLLECTION ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
ECLSS AREA 90
WCS 80V62AI4 (5.2) [G.E. DWG 199C3016GI]
CAUSES: INADVERTENT OPERATION/ACTIVATION, SHOCK, VIBRATION.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POSSIBLE RELEASE OF URINE/WASTE FLUID CONTAMINANTS INTO CABIN DUE
TO IMPROPER FAN/SEPARATOR MANUAL VALVE AND CLAMP QUICK RELEASE
OPERATION, ALSO LOSS OF EMU DRAIN LINE CAPABILITY DUE TO PLUGGED
LINE, RESULTING IN EMU DUMP LOSS AND SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF
EVA CAPABILITY.
REFERENCES: i) WCS ASSEMBLY [G.E. DWG 47J232750GI6]; 2) SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEM HANDBOOK, DWG. NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC
HANDBOOK, VS70-960102, PAGE 60EC
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/28/87
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 2009
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
/NA
ITEM: URINAL ADAPTER QUICK RELEASE (I)
FAILURE MODE: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE COLLECTION SUBSYSTEM
URINE/WASTE FLUID COLLECTION ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/_C ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: ECLSS AREA 90
PART NUMBER: WCS 80V62AI4 (5.2) [G.E. DWG 199C3016GI]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING OF THE CLAMP,
GASKET FAILURE.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WASTE FLUID LEAKAGE INTO CABIN ATMOSPHERE OR STANDBY
FAN/SEPARATOR PRODUCING IMPLEMENTATION OF FLIGHT RULE 13-17.
REQUIRES USE OF ALTERNATE WASTE COLLECTION PATHS.
REFERENCES: I) WCS ASSEMBLY [G.E. DWG 47J232750GI6]; 2) SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEM HANDBOOK, DWG. NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC
HANDBOOK, VS70-960102, PAGE 60EC
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REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-160
m
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
7/28/87
LIFE SUPPORT
2010
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
URINAL HOSE CLAMP (I)
IMPROPER CLAMPING FORCE
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE COLLECTION SUBSYSTEM
URINE/WASTE FLUID COLLECTION ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
ECLSS AREA 90
WCS 80V62AI4 (5.2) [G.E. DWG 199C3122GI]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF THE CLAMP COULD LEAD TO LEAKAGE OF ADDITIONAL AIR
BETWEEN THE URINAL HOSE AND ADAPTER QUICK RELEASE, PRODUCING LOSS
IN COLLECTION EFFICIENCY.
REFERENCES: i) WCS ASSEMBLY [G.E. DWG 47J232750GI6]; 2) SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEM HANDBOOK, DWG. NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC
HANDBOOK, VS70-960102, PAGE 60EC
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/28/87
LIFE SUPPORT
2011
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
URINAL DYNATUBE (2)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE COLLECTION SUBSYSTEM
URINE/WASTE FLUID COLLECTION ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION".
PART NUMBER:
ECLSS AREA 90
WCS 80V62AI4
CAUSES: MISHANDLING/ABUSE, STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
CHEMICAL REACTION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WASTE FLUID LEAKAGE INTO CABIN ENVIRONMENT BECAUSE OF DYNATUBE
FAILURE' USE ALTERNATE FAN/SEPARATOR OR CONTINGENCY WASTE
COLLECTION METHODS.
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REFERENCES: i) WCS ASSEMBLY [G.E. DWG 47J232750GI6]; 2) SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEM HANDBOOK, DWG. NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC
HANDBOOK, VS70-960102, PAGE 60EC
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/28/87
LIFE SUPPORT
2012
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
URINAL DYNATUBE (2)
RESTRICTED FLOW
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE COLLECTION SUBSYSTEM
URINE/WASTE FLUID COLLECTION ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
ECLSS AREA 90
WCS 80V62AI4
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
RESTRICTED FLOW AND OPERATION OF URINAL, POSSIBLE BACK FLOW OF
WASTE FLUIDS INTO THE CABIN ATMOSPHERE.
REFERENCES: i) WCS ASSEMBLY [G.E. DWG 47J232750GI6]; 2) SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEM HANDBOOK, DWG. NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC
HANDBOOK, VS70-960102, PAGE 60EC
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/28/87
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 2013
ITEM: TUBE, EMU EXTENSION (I)
FAILURE MODE: RESTRICTED FLOW
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT"
SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE COLLECTION SUBSYSTEM
URINE/WASTE FLUID COLLECTION ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: ECLSS AREA 90
PART NUMBER: WCS 80V62AI4 [G.E. DWG 238B5134GI]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POSSIBLE INABILITY TO DUMP EMU RESERVOIRS, LOSS OF MISSION•
HDW/FUNC
2/2
/NA
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REFERENCES: I) WCS ASSEMBLY [G.E. DWG 47J232750GI6]; 2) SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEM HANDBOOK, DWG. NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC
HANDBOOK, VS70-960102, PAGE 60EC
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
LIFE SUPPORT
2014
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TUBE, EMU EXTENSION (i)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE COLLECTION SUBSYSTEM
URINE/WASTE FLUID COLLECTION ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS:
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL:
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA:
DEORBIT: /NA ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
HDW/FUNC
/NA
/NA
/NA
/NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
LOCATION: ECLSS AREA 90
PART NUMBER: WCS 80V62AI4 [G.E. DWG 238B5134GI]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION, CORROSION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INABILITY TO DUMP EMU RESERVIORS WITHOUT FLUID LEAKAGE INTO CABIN
ATMOSPHERE, LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: i) WCS ASSEMBLY [G.E. DWG 47J232750GI6]; 2) SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEM HANDBOOK, DWG. NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC
HANDBOOK, VS70-960102, PAGE 60EC
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INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
LIFE SUPPORT
2015
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT".
HDW/FUNC
2/2
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
EMU QD (i)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
S)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE COLLECTION SUBSYSTEM
URINE/WASTE FLUID COLLECTION ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS:
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL:
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA:
DEORBIT: /NA ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
HDW/FUNC
/NA
/NA
/NA
/NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ]
LOCATION: ECLSS AREA 90
PART NUMBER: WCS 80V62AI4 [G.E. DWG 238BSI34GI]
c [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PRESSURE (HIGH), CORROSION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INABILITY TO DUMP EMU RESERVIORS WITHOUT FLUID LEAKAGE INTO CABIN
ATMOSPHERE, LEADING TO LOSS OF MISSION.
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REFERENCES: i) WCS ASSEMBLY [G.E. DWG 47J232750GI6]; 2) SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEM HANDBOOK, DWG. NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC
HANDBOOK, VS70-9_0i02, PAGE 60EC
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/28/87
LIFE SUPPORT
2016
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
"ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
COMMODE STORAGE CONTAINER (i)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE COLLECTION SUBSYSTEM
FECAL/EMISIS COLLECTION ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
ECLSS AREA 90
WCS 80V62AI4 [G.E. DWG 47E232901G3]
CAUSES: MISHANDLING/ABUSE, PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION,
CHEMICAL REACTION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
BECAUSE OF CABIN PRESSURE LOSS THRU MANUAL VACUUM VALVE WHILE
COMMODE IS NOT IN USE THE VALVE MUST BE CLOSED. THE CLOSURE OF
THE MANUAL VENT VALVE PRECLUDES VENTING/DRYING OF THE COMMODE
CONTENTS AND POSSIBLE NOXIOUS GAS RELEASE DURING WCS USAGE. IF
LEAKAGE IS EXTREMELY SEVERE THE CONTINGENCY WASTE COLLECTION
METHODS MUST BE USED. CREW INCONVENIENCE, THE ODOR EFFECT MUST
BE EVALUATED AS A REAL TIME DECISION.
REFERENCES: i) WCS ASSEMBLY [G.E. DWG 47J232750GI6]; 2) SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEM HANDBOOK, DWG. NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC
HANDBOOK, VS70-960102, PAGE 60EC
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DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
7/2 /87
LIFE SUPPORT
2017
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
COMMODE/LINER (i)
INTERNAL LEAKAGE, OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE COLLECTION SUBSYSTEM
FECAL/EMISIS COLLECTION ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
ECLSS AREA 90
WCS 80V62A14 [G.E. DWG 63E905763G2]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
CHEMICAL REACTION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POSSIBLE SOLID AND/OR FLUID WASTE CONTAMINATION OF MUFFLER
ASSEMBLY OR WASTE FLUID IN CABIN ATMOSPHERE; REQUIRING ACTIVATION
OF FLIGHT RULE 13-17. NEED TO USE CONTINGENCY WASTE COLLECTION
METHODS. THIS ALLOWS ONLY 3 DAYS OF URINE COLLECTION DEVICES
PER CREW MEMBER.
REFERENCES: I) WCS ASSEMBLY [G.E. DWG 47J232750GI6]; 2) SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEM HANDBOOK, DWG. NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC
HANDBOOK, VS70-960102, PAGE 60EC
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/28/87
LIFE SUPPORT
2018
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
COMMODE UPPER RING (i)
INTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE COLLECTION SUBSYSTEM
FECAL/EMISIS COLLECTION ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: ECLSS AREA 90
PART NUMBER: WCS 80V62AI4 [G.E. DWG 238B5052GI]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART FAILURE, CHEMICAL REACTION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF THIS RING OR ATTACHMENT TO COMMODE TANK ALLOWS SOLID
WASTE CONTAMINANTS TO ENTER FAN/SEPARATOR LINES, POSSIBLE NOXIOUS
FUMES DUE TO SOLID WASTE ENTRAPPED IN MUFFLER ASSEMBLY. NEED TO
USE CONTINGENCY WASTE COLLECTION METHODS. THIS ALLOWS
ONLY 3 DAYS OF URINE COLLECTION DEVICES PER CREW MEMBER. THE
FAILURE IS DETECTABLE; HOWEVER, THE EXACT CAUSE OF THE FAILURE
MAY NOT BE DETERMINED.
REFERENCES: i) WCS ASSEMBLY [G.E. DWG 47J232750GI6]; 2)SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEM HANDBOOK, DWG. NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC
HANDBOOK, VS70-960102, PAGE 60EC
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/28/87
LIFE SUPPORT
2019
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
COMMODE SLIDE VALVE (i)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE, FAILS TO CLOSE
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIE_CHY :
I)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE COLLECTION SUBSYSTEM _A ......
FECAL/EMISIS COLLECTION ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT_ 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
ECLSS AREA 90
WCS 80V62A14 [G.E. DWG 47E232918G2 AND 47E232903P2]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
CHEMICAL REACTION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PRESSURE LOSS DUE TO INABILITY TO CLOSE SLIDE VALVE, WITHOUT
CAPABILITY TO VENT COMMODE TO VACUUM, CREATES NOXIOUS OFFGASSING.
NEED TO USE CONTINGENCY WASTE COLLECTION METHODS. THIS ALLOWS
ONLY 3 DAYS OF URINE COLLECTION DEVICES PER CREW MEMBER.
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REFERENCES: I) WCS ASSEMBLY [G.E. DWG 47J232750GI6]; 2) SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEM HANDBOOK, DWG. NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC
HANDBOOK, VS70£960102, PAGE 60EC
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE".
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/28/87
LIFE SUPPORT
2020
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
COMMODE SLIDE VALVE (i)
FAILS TO OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE COLLECTION SUBSYSTEM
FECAL/EMISIS COLLECTION ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: ECLSS AREA 90
PART NUMBER: WCS 80V62AI4 [G.E. DWG 47E232903P2 AND 47E232918G2]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
CHEMICAL REACTION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INABILITY TO OPEN COMMODE REQUIRES USE OF CONTINGENCY WASTE
COLLECTION METHODS.
REFERENCES: i) WCS ASSEMBLY [G.E. DWG 47J232750GI6]; 2) SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEM HANDBOOK, DWG. NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC
HANDBOOK, VS70-960102, PAGE 60EC
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-171
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/28/87
LIFE SUPPORT
2021
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
COMPACTOR DRIVE UNIT (i)
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE COLLECTION SUBSYSTEM
FECAL/EMISIS COLLECTION ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION".
PART NUMBER:
ECLSS AREA 90
WCS 80V62AI4 [G.E. DWG 63D717635G2]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
CHEMICAL REACTION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: .... _
INABILITY TO OPERATE COMPACTOR ASSEMBLY AND RESULTING LOSS OF
COMMODE EFFICIENCY DUE TO RESTRICTED AIR FLOW.
u
I
i
mm
l
I
mm
l
g
l
g
D
i
I
REFERENCES: i) WCS ASSEMBLY [G.E. DWG 47J232750GI6]; 2) SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEM HANDBOOK, DWG. NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC
HANDBOOK, VS70-960102, PAGE 60EC
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mINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/28/87
LIFE SUPPORT
2022
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
COMPACTOR DRIVE UNIT (i)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
/NA
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE COLLECTION SUBSYSTEM
FECAL/EMISIS COLLECTION ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: ECLSS AREA 90
PART NUMBER: WCS 80V62AI4 [G.E. DWG 63D717635G2]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF O-RING GASKET SEALS OF DRIVE SHAFT COULD PRODUCE CABIN
PRESSURE LEAK T_U VACUUM _'T, _QUI_S _AL _VAC_ VENT TO BE
CLOSED. NEED TO USE CONTINGENCY WASTE COLLECTION METHODS. THIS
ALLOWS ONLY 3 DAYS OF URINE COLLECTION DEVICES PER CREW
MEMBER.
REFERENCES: i) WCS ASSEMBLY [G.E. DWG 47J232750GI6]; 2) SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEM HANDBOOK, DWG. NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC
HANDBOOK, VS70-960102, PAGE 60EC
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-173
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
LIFE SUPPORT
2023
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
COMPACTOR DRIVE UNIT (i)
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE COLLECTION SUBSYSTEM
FECAL/EMISIS COLLECTION ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
ECLSS AREA 90
WCS 80V62AI4 [G.E. DWG 63D717635G2]
CAUSES: STRUCTURAL FAILURE, FRACTURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SHEARING OF DRIVE SHAFT OR GEARING DOES NOT ALLOW COMPACTING OF
SOLID BIOWASTE PRODUCES POSSIBLE COMMODE AIRFLOW INEFFICIENCY,
CREW INCONVENIENCE.
REFERENCES: i) WCS ASSEMBLY [G.E. DWG 47J232750GI6]; 2) SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEM HANDBOOK, DWG. NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC
HANDBOOK, VS70-960102, PAGE 60EC
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REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-174
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wINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/28/87
LIFE SUPPORT
2024
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
COMMODE BOTTOM FLANGE (i)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE COLLECTION SUBSYSTEM
FECAL/EMISIS COLLECTION ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
ECLSS AREA 90
WCS 80V62AI4
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
GASKET FAILURE WILL PRODUCE AN CABIN ATMOSPHERE LEAK THROUGH THE
MANUAL VACUUM VENT VALVE. NEED TO USE CONTINGENCY WASTE
COLLECTION METHODS. THIS ALLOWS ONLY 3 DAYS OF URINE COLLECTION
DEVICES PER CREW MEMBER.
REFERENCES: i) WCS ASSEMBLY [G.E. DWG 47J232750GI6]; 2) SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEM HANDBOOK, DWG. NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC
HANDBOOK, VS70-960102, PAGE 60EC
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-175
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/28/87
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 2025
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM: COMMODE BOTTOM FLANGE (i)
FAILURE MODE: STRUCTURAL FAILURE
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM __.
WASTE COLLECTION SUBSYSTEM _ _E_: _
FECAL/EMISIS COLLECTION ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS:
Li_OFF: /NA TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT". 3/3 ATO".
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
HDW/FUNC
/NA
/NA
/NA
/NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
LOCATION: ECLSS AREA 90
PART NUMBER: WCS 80V62AI4
CAUSES: STRUCTURAL FAILURE, FRACTURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WASTE GAS VAPORS INTO CREW CABIN, CAUSING CREW INCONVENIENCE
WHICH MUST BE EVALUATED AS A REAL TIME DECISION.
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REFERENCES: I) WCS ASSEMBLY [G.E. DWG 47J232750GI6]; 2) SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEM HANDBOOK, DWG. NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC
HANDBOOK, VS70-960102, PAGE 60EC
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wINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/28/87
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 2026
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
/NA
ITEM: COMMODE EXIT, MESH SCREEN (i)
FAILURE MODE: RESTRICTED FLOW, BLOCKED FLOW
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
s)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE COLLECTION SUBSYSTEM
FECAL/EMISIS COLLECTION ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: ECLSS AREA 90
PART NUMBER: WCS 80V62AI4
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE'.
RESULTS IN INEFFECTIVE COMMODE AIRFLOW AND REDUCED EFFICIENCY.
NEED TO USE CONTINGENCY WASTE COLLECTION METHODS. THIS ALLOWS
ONLY 3 DAYS OF URINE COLLECTION DEVICES PER CREW MEMBER.
REFERENCES: I) WCS ASSEMBLY [G.E. DWG 47J232750GI6]; 2) SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEM HANDBOOK, DWG. NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC
HANDBOOK, VS70-960102, PAGE 60EC
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-177
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
LIFE SUPPORT
2027
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
COMMODE EXIT, MESH SCREEN (I)
FAIL OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE COLLECTION SUBSYSTEM
FECAL/EMISIS COLLECTION ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: ECLSS AREA 90
PART NUMBER: WCS 80V62AI4
] B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION, CHEMICAL
REACTION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE IMMEDIATE LOSS OF THE FILTER DOES NOT EFFECT USABILITY,
HOWEVER LOOSE CONTAMINATION COULD CAUSE FAILURE OF THE WASTE
COLLECTION SUBSYSTEM.
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REFERENCES: i) WCS ASSEMBLY [G.E. DWG 47J232750Gi6]; 2) SPACE
SHUTT_SYSTEMHANDBOOK, DWG. NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC
HANDBOOK, VS70-960102, PAGE 60EC
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/28/87
LIFE SUPPORT
2028
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
COMMODE MOVEABLE AND STATIONARY VANES (2)
STRUCTURAL FAILURE (RUPTURE)
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE COLLECTION SUBSYSTEM
FECAL/EMISIS COLLECTION ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
ECLSS AREA 90
WCS 80V62AI4 [G.E. DWGS 199C3134PI, 199C3135PI]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, OVERLOAD, PIECE-PART
FAILURE, CHEMICAL REACTION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INABILITY TO COMPACT COMMODE CONTENTS, CREW INCONVENIENCE.
REFERENCES: i) WCS ASSEMBLY [G.E. DWG 47J232750GI6]; 2) SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEM HANDBOOK, DWG. NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC
HANDBOOK, VS70-960102, PAGE 60EC
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INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/28/87
LIFE SUPPORT
2029
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
AUX. WET TRASH VENT LINE (i)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
WASTE MANAG_NT SUBSYSTEM _ =_ _
WASTE COLLECTION SUBSYSTEM
LIQUID AND AIR LINE INSTALLATION
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
ECLSS AREA 90
WCS 80V62AI4
CAUSES: PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF CABIN PRESSURE, REQUIRES CLOSURE OF MANUAL VENT VALVE. _
NOT POSSIBLE TO VENT COMMODE, PRODUCES NOXIOUS GASES IN COMMODE
TANK AFTER ON-ORBIT INSERTION. IF THE LEAK DEVELOPS UPSTREAM OF
THE ORIFICE, THE LEAK IS RESTRICTED TO 3 POUNDS/DAY.
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REFERENCES: I) WCS ASSEMBLY [G.E. DWG 47J232750GI6]; 2) SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEM HANDBOOK, DWG. NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC
HANDBOOK, VS70-960102, PAGE 60EC
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
?/28/87
LIFE SUPPORT
2030
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
AUX. WET TRASH VENT LINE QD (I)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE COLLECTION SUBSYSTEM
LIQUID AND AIR LINE INSTALLATION
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
ECLSS AREA 90
WCS 80V62AI4
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION, CHEMICAL
REACTION, VACUUM
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF PROPER VENTILATION OF THE WET TRASH VENT PATH, OTHERWISE
NO SIGNIFICANT PROBLEM.
REFERENCES: i) WCS ASSEMBLY [G.E. DWG 47J232750GI6]; 2) SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEM HANDBOOK, DWG. NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC
HANDBOOK, VS70-960102, PAGE 60EC
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INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
v/2s/sv
LIFE SUPPORT
2031
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
VACUUM PORT LINE (i)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE COLLECTION SUBSYSTEM
LIQUID AND AIR LINE INSTALLATION
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:- 3/3
ONDRBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
ECLSS AREA 90
WCS 80V62AI4
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATICN
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PRODUCE LESS EFFICIENT VENTILATION OF THE WET TRASH AREA. THE
COMMODE AND THE MANUAL VENT VALVE MAY STILL BE USED NOMINALLY,
BUT SOME NOXIOUS GASES WILL LEAK INTO THE CABIN. THE UPSTREAM
ORIFICE WILL RESTRICT THE LEAKAGE FLOW WITH THE VENT VALVE OPEN.
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REFERENCES: i) WCS ASSEMBLY [G.E. DWG 47J232750GI6]; 2) SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEM HANDBOOK, DWG. NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC
HANDBOOK, VS70-960102, PAGE 60EC
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
LIFE SUPPORT
2032
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
VACUUM PORT QD AND PLUG (i)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE COLLECTION SUBSYSTEM
LIQUID AND AIR LINE INSTALLATION
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTDFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
ECLSS AREA 90
WCS 80V62AI4
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WHEN THE QD IS CONNECTED, IT IS POSSIBLE TO DEVELOP AN EXTERNAL
LEAK DUE TO LINE FITTING CONTAMINATION. THE VACUUM VENT IS ONLY
USED IN THE EVENT OF A MAJOR FLUID SPILL. THIS LEAK WOULD BE A
CABIN PRESSURE LEAK THAT WOULD HAVE TO BE EVALUATED ON A REAL
TIME BASIS. AN EXTERNAL LEAK WITH THE QD PLUG IN PLACE IS
UNLIKELY.
REFERENCES: i) WCS ASSEMBLY [G.E. DWG 47J232750GI6]; 2) SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEM HANDBOOK, DWG. NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC
HANDBOOK, VS70-960102, PAGE 60EC
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DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
LIFE SUPPORT
2033
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
VACUUM PORT QD AND PLUG (i)
FAILS TO OPEN, RESTRICTED FLOW
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE COLLECTION SUBSYSTEM ......
LIQUID AND AIR LINE INSTALLATION
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: . /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
ECLSS AREA 90
WCS 80V62A14
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IMPOSSIBLE TO USE VACUUM VENT AS A MEANS TO DISPERSE A FLUID
SPILL, MUST RELY ON ALTERNATE COLLECTION METHODS SUCH AS
URINE/WASTE FLUID COLLECTION SYSTEM.
REFERENCES: I) WCS ASSEMBLY [G.E. DWG 47J232750GI6]; 2) SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEM HANDBOOK, DWG. NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC
HANDBOOK, VS70-960102, PAGE 60EC
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REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-184
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
t
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 2034
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM: VACUUM PORT QD AND PLUG (i)
FAILURE MODE: MATE AND DEMATE FAILURE
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
/NA
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE COLLECTION SUBSYSTEM
LIQUID AND AIR LINE INSTALLATION
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
ECLSS AREA 90
WCS 80V62AI4
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, CHEMICAL REACTION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INABILITY TO USE VACUUM VENT LINE FOR FLUID SPILL CLEAN-UP OR TO
USE VACUUM PORT TO DRAW A VACUUM. POTENTIAL MISSION IMPACT IF
SECONDARY METHODS ALSO FAIL.
REFERENCES: i) WCS ASSEMBLY [G.E. DWG 47J232750GI6]; 2) SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEM HANDBOOK, DWG. NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC
HANDBOOK, VS70-960102, PAGE 60EC
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-185
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/28/87
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 2035
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: WET TRASH VENT LINE (i)
FAILURE MODE: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
S)
9)
SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE COLLECTION SUBSYSTEM
LIQUID AND AIR LINE INSTALLATION
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDiNG/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [
LOCATION: ECLSS AREA 90, DOWNSTREAM OF ORIFICE
PART NUMBER: WCS 80V62AI4
CAUSES: PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
UNRESTTRICTEDLOSS OF CABIN P RESSURE_ REQUIRES CLOSURE QFMANUAL
VACUUM VENT VALVE. PRODUCES NOXIOUS GAS BUILD-UP IN COMMODE-I_D
WET TRASH CONTAINERS, NO MISSION EFFECT OTHER THAN CREW
DISCOMFORT.
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REFERENCES i) WCS ASSEMBLY [G.E. DWG 47J232750GI6]; 2) SPACE ....
SHUTTLE SYSTEM HANDBOOK, DWG. NO. 6.5; 3) RI_INTEGRATED SCHE_T_C
HANDBOOK, VS70-960102, PAGE 60EC
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DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
7/28/87
LIFE SUPPORT
2036
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
WET TRASH VENT LINE (i)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE COLLECTION SUBSYSTEM
LIQUID AND AIR LINE INSTALLATION
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [
LOCATION: ECLSS AREA 90, UPSTREAM OF ORIFICE
PART NUMBER: WCS 80V62AI4
CAUSES: PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
RESTRICTED LOSS OF CABIN PRESSURE. REDUCTION IN WET TRASH
CONTAINER VENTILATION, BUT NO EFFECT ON MISSION SCHEDULE.
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
REFERENCES: i) WCS ASSEMBLY [G.E. DWG 47J232750GI6]; 2) SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEM HANDBOOK, DWG. NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC
HANDBOOK, VS70-960102, PAGE 60EC
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-187
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER_ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
7/28/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
LIFE SUPPORT FLIGHT:
2037 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
WET TRASH VENT QD (i)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE COLLECTION SUBSYSTEM
LIQUID AND AIR LINE INSTALLATION
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
ECLSS AREA 90
WCS 80V62AI4
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION, CHEMICAL
REACTION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PRODUCES RESTRICTED CABIN PRESSURE LOSS. PRODUCES A REDUCTION IN
WET TRASH CONTAINER VENTILATION, BUT NO EFFECT ON MISSION
SCHEDULE.
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REFERENCES: i) WCS ASSEMBLY [G.E. DWG 47J232750GI6]; 2) SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEM HANDBOOK, DWG. NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC
HANDBOOK, VS70-960102, PAGE 60EC
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/28/87
LIFE SUPPORT
2038
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
URINE COLLECTION HOSES (2)
RESTRICTED FLOW
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE COLLECTION SUBSYSTEM
LIQUID AND AIR LINE INSTALLATION
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: ECLSS AREA 90 (FROM MANUAL DIVERTER VALVE TO
FAN/SEP)
PART NUMBER: WCS 80V62AI4
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MISHANDLING/ABUSE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
RESTRICTEDFLOW TO FAN/SEPARATORS, POSSIBLE RELEASE OF WASTE
FLUIDS INTO CABIN ATMOSPHERE. REQUIRES USE OF ALTERNATE
FAN/SEP_TOR LINE FOR URINE COLLECTION. LOSS OF PRIMARY URINE
COLLECTION METHOD REQUIRES USE OF CONTINGENCY URINE COL_CTION
BAGS.
REFERENCES: i) WCS ASSEMBLY [G.E. DWG 47J232750GI6]; 2) SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEM HANDBOOK, DWG. NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC
HANDBOOK, VS70-960102, PAGE 60EC
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-189
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
7/28/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
LIFE SUPPORT FLIGHT:
2039 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
/NA
ITEM: URINE COLLECTION HOSES
FAILURE MODE: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE COLLECTION SUBSYSTEM
LIQUID AND AIR LINE INSTALLATION
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
FAN/SEP)
PART NUMBER:
ECLSS AREA 90 (FROM MANUAL DIVERTER VALVE TO
WCS 80V62AI4
CAUSES: MISHANDLING/ABUSE, PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION,
CHEMICAL REACTION
EFFECTS/RATi0NALE: _-
LEAKAGE OF WASTE FLUIDS INTO CABIN ATMOSPHERE. REQUIRES USE OF
ALTERNATE FAN/SEPARATOR SYSTEM. IF ALL ELSE FAILS, MUST USE
CONTINGENCY URINE COLLECTION METHODS.
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REFERENCES: I) WCS ASSEMBLY [G.E. DWG 47J232750GI6]; 2) SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEM HANDBOOK, DWG. NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC
HANDBOOK, VS70-960102, PAGE 60EC
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
?/28/8?
LIFE SUPPORT
2040
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
WCS TO WWS QD (i)
RESTRICTED FLOW
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
/NA
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE COLLECTION SUBSYSTEM •
LIQUID AND AIR LINE INSTALLATION
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: ECLSS AREA 90
PART NUMBER: WCS 80V62AI4
B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
EXCESSIVE BACK PRESSURE ON FAN/SEPARATOR, CAUSING OVERFLOW OF FAN
SEPARATOR RESERVOIR WITH WASTE FLUIDS INTO CABIN ATMOSPHERE.
NEED TO USE CONTINGENCY WASTE COLLECTION METHODS. THIS ALLOWS
ONLY 3 DAYS OF URINE COLLECTIONWASTE FLUIDS INTO CABIN
ATMOSPHERE DEVICES PER CREW MEMBER. POTENTIAL FLOODING DURING
EMU DUMP INTO CABIN BY WAY OF URINE HOSE.
REFERENCES: i) WCS ASSEMBLY [G.E. DWG 47J232750GI6]; 2) SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEM HANDBOOK, DWG. NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC
HANDBOOK, VS70-960102, PAGE 60EC
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-191
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/28/87
LiFE SUPPORT
2041
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT-.
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
WCS TO WWS QD (I)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE _J__ _ __
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE COLLECTION SUBSYSTEM .........
LIQUID AND AIR LINE INSTALLATION
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: EC_S AREA 90
PART _BER: WCS 80V62AI4 [5.22]
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CHEMICAL REACTION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WASTE FLUID LEAKAGE INTO WCS ENCLOSU_ AND CABIN ATMOSPHERE._ _=_=
NEED TO USE CONTINGENCY WASTE COLLECTION METHODS. THIS ALLOWS
ONLY3_AY___S_gF URINE COLLECTIO__DEVI_CES PER CREW MEMBER _ THE
FLUID LEAKAGE A_O PRODUCES _ARS CONDENSATE SPILL BECAUSE ....__
THE WASTE TANK 1 IS PRESSURIZED TO 30 PSIA AND FLUID WILL TRAVEL
OUT THE LEAK POINT. THIS IS A MISSION IMPACT ITEM BECAUSE ARS
CONDENSATE SYSTEM WOULD HAVE TO BE SHUT DOWN IF THE LEAK IS TO BE
ELIMINATED.
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REFERENCES:-_i WCS ASSEMBLY [G.E. DWG 47J232750GI6]; 2) sPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEM HANDBOOK, DWG. NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC
HANDBOOK, VS70-960102, PAGE 60EC
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DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
7128187
LIFE SUPPORT
2042
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
WCS TO WWS LINE (I)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE COLLECTION SUBSYSTEM
LIQUID AND AIR LINE INSTALLATION
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
ECLSS AREA 90
WCS 80V62AI4
CAUSES: OVERLOAD, PIECE-PART FAILURE, IONIZING RADIATION,
VIBRATION, CHEMICAL REACTION, VACCUM
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LEAKAGE OF WASTE FLUIDS INTO CREW MODULE MIDDECK FLOOR SPACE,
REQUIRES SHUTTING DOWN WCS AND USE OF CONTINGENCY WASTE
COLLECTION METHODS. THIS PRODUCES A LEAKAGE OF ARS CONDENSATE
AND TO PRECLUDE THE LEAK THE ARS MUST BE SHUT DOWN, THUS LIMITING
MISSIOM LIFE.
REFERENCES: i) WCS ASSEMBLY [G.E. DWG 47J232750GI6]; 2) SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEM HANDBOOK, DWG. NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC
HANDBOOK, VS70-960102, PAGE 60EC
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-193
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
7/28/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
LIFE SUPPORT FLIGHT:
2043 ABORT:
IIDW/FUNC
2/2
/NA
ITEM: WCS TO WWS DYNATUBE (I)
FAILURE MODE: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE COLLECTION SUBSYSTEM
LIQUID AND AIR LINE INSTALLATION _ ...... - _
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
ECLSS AREA 90
WCS 80V62AI4
CAUSES: OVERLOAD, PIECE-PART FAILURE, PRESSURE (HIGH),
VIBRATION, CHEMICAL REACTION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WASTE FLUID LEAK INTO THE WCS ENCLOSURE AND CABIN ATMOSPHERE,
REQUIRES APPLICATION OF FLIGHT RULE 13-17 FOR NOXIOUS FLUID
SPILL. PRODUCES ARS CONDENSATE SPILL BECAUSE THE WASTE TANK 1 IS
PRESSURIZED TO 30 PSIA AND FLUID WILL TRAVEL OUT LEAK POINT.
THIS IS A MISSION IMPACT BECAUSE THE ARS CONDENSATION UNIT WOULD
HAVE TO BE SHUT DOWN AT THE SEPARATOR IF THE LEAK IS TO BE
CONTROLLED OR ELIMINATED.
REFERENCES: i) WCS ASSEMBLY [G.E. DWG 47J232750GI6]; 2) SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEM HANDBOOK, DWG. NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC
HANDBOOK, VS70-960102, PAGE 60EC
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/28/87
LIFE SUPPORT
2044
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
WCS TO WWS DYNATUBE (i)
RESTRICTED FLOW
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE COLLECTION SUBSYSTEM
LIQUID AND AIR LINE INSTALLATION
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
ECLSS AREA 90
WCS 80V62AI4
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DURING EMU DUMP IT IS POSSIBLE TO GET LEAKAGE UP THE URINAL HOSE
INTO THE CREW CABIN DUE TO EXCESSIVE BACK PRESSURE. NEED TO
USE CONTINGENCY WASTE COLLECTION METHODS. THIS ALLOWS ONLY 3
DAYS OF URINE COLLECTION DEVICES PER CREW MEMBER, OR EXCESSIVE
BACKPRESSURE ON FAN/SEPARATORS, CAUSING FAN/SEPARATOR OVERFLOW
AND WASTE FLUID/NOXIOUS GASES INTO CABIN ENVIRONMENT VIA
MUFFLER/EXHAUST PORT.
REFERENCES: i) WCS ASSEMBLY [G.E. DWG 47J232750GI6]; 2) SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEM HANDBOOK, DWG. NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC
HANDBOOK, VS70-960102, PAGE 60EC
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INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/28/87
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 2045
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
/NA
ITEM: COMMODE CONTROL HANDLE LINKAGE (i)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO SWITCH, LOSS OF OUTPUT. PHYSICAL
BINDING/JAMMING (ANY POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
e)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE COLLECTION SUBSYSTEM
LIQUID AND AIR LINE INSTALLATION
VALVE ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/_C
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: ECLSS AREA 90
PART NUMBER: WCS 80V62A14 [G.E. DWGS 47D232927G2-4, G6, P8]
CAUSES: MISHANDLING/ABUSE, OVERLOAD, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION
EFFE_S/RATIONALE:
INEFFECTIVE WCS OPERATION,
COLLECTION BAGS. LOSS OF "UP MOTION" PRECLUDES REPRESSURIZATION
OF COMMODE FOR USE OR STORAGE AND LOSS OF "GATE OPEN" SLIDE
MOTION PRECLUDES COMMODE USAGE ARE THE WORST CASE FAILURE MODES.
OTHER FAILURE EFFECT IS, IN IMPROPER SEQUENCE OF SWITCHING,
CAUSING WASTE GASES INTO CABIN ATMOSPHERE DURING USE.
REFERENCES: i) WCS ASSEMBLY [G.E. DWG 47J232750Gi6]; 2) SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEM HANDBOOK, DWG. NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC
HANDBOOK, VS70-960102, PAGE 60EC
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-196
I
l
I
m
I
i
u
i
mm
[]
mm
ms
B
m
m
I
B
m
mm
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 2046
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/3
ABORT: /NA
ITEM: MANUAL VENT VALVE (i)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO OPEN, PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING,
RESTRICTED FLOW
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE COLLECTION SUBSYSTEM
LIQUID AND AIR LINE INSTALLATION
VALVE ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: .... /NA ATO: /Nk
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: ECLSS AREA 90
PART NUMBER: WCS 80V62AI4 (VALVE 5.8)[G.E. DWG 47D264875G4]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, CORROSION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CANNOT VENT COMMODE, WET TRASH OR AUX. WET TRASH FOR DRYING OF
WET OR FECAL MATERIAL, ALLOWS BUILDUP OF NOXIOUS ODORS IN
COMMODE, BUT COMMODE STILL FUNCTIONAL. IF NOXIOUS GASES BECOME
TOO INTOLERABLE THE EFFECT ON MISSION SCHEDULE BECOMES A REAL-
TIME JUDGEMENT
REFERENCES: i) WCS ASSEMBLY [G.E. DWG 47J232750GI6]; 2) SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEM HANDBOOK, DWG. NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC
HANDBOOK, VS70-960102, PAGE 60EC
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-197
DA_:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
LIFE SUPPORT FLIGHT:
2047 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
/NA
ITEM:
FAIL_ MODE:
t._GE
MANUAL VENT VALVE (i)
FAILS TO CLOSE, PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING, INTERNAL
T._AD ANALYST: K. BARIC_
B_K_ HIE_CHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
WASTE _AGE_NT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE COLLECTION SUBSYSTEM
LIQUID AND AIR LINE INSTAL_TION
VALVE ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT P_SE HDW/_C ABORT HDW/_C
P_UNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
_DING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION :
PART NUMBER:
ECLSS _A 90
WCS 80V62AI4 (VALVE 5.8) [G.E. DWG 47D264875G4]
CAUSES: CONT_INATION, PIECE-PART FAIL_, CO_OSION
EFFECTS/_TIONAt_"
IM_SSIBLE TO _P_SS_IZE CO,ODE AND USE WCS SLIDE GATE. NEED
TO USE CONTINGENCY WASTE COLLECTION _ODS. THIS ALLOWS ONLY 3
DAYS OF URINE CO_CTION DEVICES PER CREW_MBER.
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_FE_NCEs: I) WCS ASSEMBLY [G.E. DWG 47J232750GI6]; 2) SPACE
S_TTLE SYSTEM _DBOOK, DWG. NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEG_TED SC_TIC
_DBOOK, VS70-960102, PAGE 60EC
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
LIFE SUPPORT
2048
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
-3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MANUAL VENT VALVE (i)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE COLLECTION SUBSYSTEM
LIQUID AND AIR LINE INSTALLATION
VALVE ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: ECLSS AREA 90
PART NUMBER: WCS 80V62A14 (VALVE 5.8)[G.E. DWG 47D264875G4]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, CORROSION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE".
HIGHER LOSS OF CABIN ATMOSPHERE THAN ANTICIPATED PAST GASKET
SEALS DUE TO RESTRICTED ATMOSPHERE LOSS THROUGH VACUUM VENT VALVE
WHEN CLOSED. IMPOSSIBLE TO DEPRESSURIZE COMMODE. SUBSEQUENT
LOSS OF VACUUM VENT ISOLATION VALVE WILL CAUSE MAJOR CABIN
PRESSURE LOSS.
REFERENCES: i) WCS ASSEMBLY [G.E. DWG 47J232750GI6]; 2) SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEM HANDBOOK, DWG. NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC
HANDBOOK, VS70-960102, PAGE 60EC
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-199
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
LIFE SUPPORT
2049
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
COMMODE OUTLET CONTROL VALVE (i)
FAILS TO OPEN, RESTRICTED FLOW
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE COLLECTION SUBSYSTEM
LIQUID AND AIR LINE INSTALLATION
VALVE ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
ECLSS AREA 90
WCS 80V62AI4 (VALVE 5.10)[G.E. DWG 47D264875G4]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, CHEMICAL REACTION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IMPOSSIBLE TO USE COMMODE AS STORAGE CONTAINER AFTER
DEPRESSURIZATION OF TANK. MUST USE CO_INGENCY WASTE COLLECTION
METHODS IN ANY CASE. REPRESSURIZATION FROM THE WET TRASH VENT
LINES MAY BE POSSIBLE BUT VERY SLOW.
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REFERENCES: I) WCS ASSEMBLY [G.E. DWG 47J232750GI6]; 2) SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEM HANDBOOK, DWG. NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC
HANDBOOK, VS70-960102, PAGE 60EC
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
LIFE SUPPORT
2050
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
COMMODE OUTLET CONTROL VALVE (I)
FAILS TO CLOSE, INTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE COLLECTION SUBSYSTEM
LIQUID AND AIR LINE INSTALLATION
VALVE ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
ECLSS AREA 90
WCS 80V62AI4 (VALVE 5'I0)[G.E. DWG 47D264875G4]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, CORROSION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
VALVE DOES NOT CLOSE TO FAN/SEPARATOR LINE. POSSIBLE LOSS OF
CABIN ATMOSPHERE THROUGH MANUAL VACUUM VENT VALVE. REQUIRES
CLOSURE OF MANUAL VENT VALVE OR VACUUM VENT ISOLATION VALVE TO
RESTRICT CABIN ATMOSPHERE LOSS. CREW INCONVENIENCE, THE ODOR
EFFECT
MUST BE EVALUATED AS A REAL TIME DECISION. THE URINE/WASTE
COLLECTION SYSTEM IS STILL OPERATIONAL.
REFERENCES: I) WCS ASSEMBLY [G.E. DWG 47J232750GI6]; 2) SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEM HANDBOOK, DWG. NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC
HANDBOOK, VS70-960102, PAGE 60EC
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-201
INDEPENDENT Or:
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM
3SESSMENT
S WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/28/87
LIFE SUPPORT
2051
IGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
COMMODE _0_U_LE__T _
EXTERNAL LE_q_
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN
r.VALVE ::
:S LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
WASTE_AG_NT SUBSYST_
WASTE COLLECTION SUBSYSTE_
LIQUID AND AIR LINE INSTAL
VALVE ASSEMBLY
CRIT _k_ ES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/_C ABORT HDW/_C
P__CH: /NA RT_: /NA
LI_OFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3. AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] ] c[ ]
LOCATION: ECLSS AREA 90
PART NUMBER: WCS 80V62AI4 (VALVZ _ 3) [G.E. DWG 47D264875G4]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE'P_J/ _ILUP.E, CORROSION
EFFECTS/_TIONA_ :
POSSIBLE LOSS OF CABIN A_OSPHE_ >',ST GASKET SEALS DURING
COMMODE EVACUATION AND REDUCED A-A:7 CW DURING COMMODE OPERATION.
CREW INCONVENIENCE AND DISCOMFORT, RZAL TIME DECISION ON MISSION
EFFECT .... _ .....
REFERENCES: i) WCS ASSEMBLY [G.E. E_G 47J232750GI6]; 2) SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEM HANDBOOK, DWG. NO. _ 5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC
HANDBOOK, VS70-960102, PAGE 60EC
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ORIG/NAL PAGE IS
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/28/87
LIFE SUPPORT
2052
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
COMMODE PRESSURIZATION VALVE (i)
RESTRICTED FLOW, FAILS TO OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
S)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE COLLECTION SUBSYSTEM
LIQUID AND AIR LINE INSTALLATION
VALVE ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: ECLSS AREA 90
PART NUMBER: WCS 80V62A14 (VALVE 5.11A)[G.E. DWG 47A232860PI]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, CHEMICAL REACTION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INABILITY TO REPRESSURIZE THE COMMODE, POSSIBLE BIOWASTE INTO
CREW CABIN. REQUIRES CONTINGENCY BIOWASTE STORAGE METHODS OTHER
THAN COMMODE STORAGE AREA.
REFERENCES: I) WCS ASSEMBLY [G.E. DWG 47J232750GI6]; 2) SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEM HANDBOOK, DWG. NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC
HANDBOOK, VS70-960102, PAGE 60EC
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-203
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/28/87
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 2053
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
/NA
ITEM: COMMODE PRESSURIZATION VALVE (i)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO CLOSE, INTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE COLLECTION SUBSYSTEM
LIQUID AND AIR LINE INSTALLATION
VALVE ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
ECLSS AREA 90
WCS 80V62AI4 (VALVE 5.11A)[G.E. DWG A47A232860PI]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, CHEMICAL REACTION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POSSIBLE LEAKAGE INTO CREW CABIN OF NOXIOUS GAS AND WASTES
THROUGH VALVE BODY.
NEED TO USE CONTINGENCY WASTE COLLECTION METHODS. THIS ALLOWS
ONLY 3 DAYS OF URINE COLLECTION DEVICES PER CREW MEMBER.
REFERENCES: I) WCS ASSEMBLY [G.E. DWG 47J232750GI6]; 2) SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEM HANDBOOK, DWG. NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC
HANDBOOK, VS70-960102, PAGE 60EC
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/28/87
LIFE SUPPORT
2054
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
COMMODE PRESSURIZATION VALVE (i)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE COLLECTION SUBSYSTEM
LIQUID AND AIR LINE INSTALLATION
VALVE ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART _BER:
ECLSS AREA 90
WCS 80V62AI4 (VALVE 5.10) [G.E. DWG 47D264875G4]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, CHEMICAL REACTION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POSSIBLE LOSS OF CABIN ATMOSPHERE OR SEEPAGE OF WASTE
FLUIDS/SOLIDS INTO THE WCS ENCLOSURE THROUGH VALVE BODY. NEED TO
USE CONTINGENCY WASTE COLLECTION METHODS. THIS ALLOWS ONLY 3
DAYS OF URINE COLLECTION DEVICES PER CREW MEMBER.
REFERENCES: i) WCS ASSEMBLY [G.E. DWG 47J232750GI6]; 2) SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEM HANDBOOK, DWG. NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC
HANDBOOK, VS70-960102, PAGE 60EC
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-205
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
v/28/8v
LIFE SUPPORT
2055
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
BALLAST AIR CONTROL VALVE (i)
RESTRICTED FLOW, = FA_ TO OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE COLLECTION SUBSYSTEM
LIQUID AND AIR LINE INSTALLATION
VALVE ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
ECLSS AREA 90
WCS 80V62AI4 (VALVE 5.11B)[G/E/ DWG 47A232860PI]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
RESTRICTED AIR FLOW TO SEPARATORS, POSSIBLE WASTE FLUIDS DUMPED
INTO CABIN AIR THROUGH FAN SEPARATOR MUFFLER OUTLET OR THE 5.30
PARTICULATE SCREEN. NEED TO USE CONTINGENCY WASTE COLLECTION
METHODS. THIS ALLOWS ONLY 3 DAYS OF URINE COLLECTION DEVICES
PER CREW MEMBER.
m
M
l
m
m
ms
i
mm
m
D
mm
g
l
l
u
I
REFERENCES: i) WCS ASSEMBLY [G.E. DWG 47J232750GI6]; 2) SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEM HANDBOOK, DWG. NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC
HANDBOOK, VS70-960102, PAGE 60EC
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
LIFE SUPPORT
2056
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
BALLAST AIR CONTROL VALVE (i)
FAILS TO CLOSE, INTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE COLLECTION SUBSYSTEM
LIQUID AND AIR LINE INSTALLATION
VALVE ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
ECLSS AREA 90
WCS 80V62A14 (VALVE 5.11B)[G.E. DWG 47A232860PI]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOWER AIRFLOW FROM COMMODE COULD PRODUCE REDUCED EFFICIENCY BUT
WOULD ONLY CAUSE CREW INCONVENIENCE. NO MISSION IMPACT.
REFERENCES: I) WCS ASSEMBLY [G.E. DWG 47J232750GI6]; 2) SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEM HANDBOOK, DWG. NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC
HANDBOOK, VS70-960102, PAGE 60EC
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-207
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/28/87
LIFE SUPPORT
2057
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
BALLAST AIR CONTROL VALVE (i)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE COLLECTION SUBSYSTEM
LIQUID AND AIR LINE INSTALLATION
VALVE ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
ECLSS AREA 90
WCS 80V62AI4 (VALVE 5.11B)[G.E. DWG 47A232860PI]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, CHEMICAL REACTION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POSSIBLE SEEPAGE OF WASTE GASES INTO WCS ENCLOSURE. CREW
INCONVENIENCE, THE ODOR EFFECT MUST BE EVALUATED AS A REAL TIME
DECISION.
REFERENCES: I) WCS ASSEMBLY [G.E. DWG 47J232750GI6]; 2) SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEM HANDBOOK, DWG. NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC
HANDBOOK, VS70-960102, PAGE 60EC
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/28187
LIFE SUPPORT
2058
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FAN/SEPARATOR VALVE (I)
FAILS TO OPEN, RESTRICTED FLOW
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE COLLECTION SUBSYSTEM
LIQUID AND AIR LINE INSTALLATION
VALVE ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
ECLSS AREA 90
WCS 80V62AI4 (VALVE 5.28B)[G.E. DWG. 47A232859PI]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE".
UNABLE TO OPEN VALVE FOR SELECTED FAN/SEPARATOR, REQUIRES USAGE
OF CONTINGENCY WASTE COLLECTION METHODS.
REFERENCES: i) WCS ASSEMBLY [G.E. DWG 47J232750GI6]; 2) SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEM HANDBOOK, DWG. NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC
HANDBOOK, VS70-960102, PAGE 60EC
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-209
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/28/87
LIFE SUPPORT
2059
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FAN/SEPARATOR VALVE (I)
FAILS TO CLOSE, INTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE COLLECTION SUBSYSTEM
LIQUID AND AIR LINE INSTALLATION
VALVE ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3
DEORBIT: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: /NA
TAL: /NA
AOA: /NA
ATO: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: ECLSS AREA 90
PART NUMBER: WCS 80V62AI4 (VALVE 5.28B)[G.E. DWG 47A232859PI]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
UNABLE TO SWITCH TO NEW FAN/SEPARATOR AND EFFECT AND A GOOD SEAL.
NO EFFECT ON MISSION OR LIFE OF VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: I) WCS ASSEMBLY [G.E. DWG 47J232750GI6]; 2) SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEM HANDBOOK, DWG. NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC
HANDBOOK, VS70-960102, PAGE 60EC
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE :
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/28/87
LIFE SUPPORT
2060
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SEPARATOR VALVE (I)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE COLLECTION SUBSYSTEM
LIQUID AND AIR LINE INSTALLATION
VALVE ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS:
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: /NA ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
HDW/FUNC
/NA
/NA
/NA
/NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [
LOCATION: ECLSS AREA 90
PART NUMBER: WCS 80V62AI4 (VALVE 5.28B)
] c [ ]
[G.E. DWG 47A232859PI]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, CHEMICAL REACTION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POSSIBLE SEEPAGE OF WASTE FLUIDS INTO WCS ENCLOSURE THROUGH VALVE
BODY SEALS AND REDUCED COMMODE VENTILATION EFFICIENCY.
REFERENCES: i) WCS ASSEMBLY [G.E. DWG 47J232750GI6]; 2) SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEM HANDBOOK, DWG. NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC
HANDBOOK, VS70-960102, PAGE 60EC
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-211
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/28/87
LIFE SUPPORT
2061
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FAN/SEPARATORS (2)
INTERNAL LEAKAGE (WATER TO AIR)
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIE_CHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE COLLECTION SUBSYSTEM
LIQUIDAND AIR LINE INSTALLATION
FAN/SEPARATOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
ECLSS AREA 90
WCS 80V62AI4 (ITEM 5.5) [G.E. DWG. 47E225362G2, G4]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, CHEMICAL REACTION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF GASKET SEAL ON FLUID RESERVOIR TO BLOWER HOUSING,
ULTIMATELY WASTE FLUID INTO CABIN AIR BY WAY OF MUFFLER. THE
IMMEDIATE EFFECT OF THE LEAK WOULDN'T BE VISIBLE UNTIL LEAKAGE AT
MUFFLER. USE ALTERNATE FAN/SEPARATOR OR CONTINGENCY WASTE
COLLECTION METHODS.
REFERENCES: i) WCS ASSEMBLY [G.E. DWG 47J232750GI6]; 2) SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEM HANDBOOK, DWG. NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC
HANDBOOK, VS70-960102, PAGE 60EC
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
v/28/sv
LIFE SUPPORT
2062
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FAN/SEPARATORS (2)
RESTRICTED WATER FLOW
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
"1)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE COLLECTION SUBSYSTEM
LIQUID AND AIR LINE INSTALLATION
FAN/SEPARATOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS:
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA:
DEORBIT: /NA ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
HDW/FUNC
/NA
/NA
/NA
/NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
ECLSS AREA 90
WCS 80V62A14 (ITEM 5.5) [G.E. DWG. 47E225362G2, G4]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DUMPING OF WASTE FLUID INTO CABIN AIR DUE TO BLOCKAGE OF THE
PITOT TUBE, EXCESSIVE FLUID DUMP QUANTITY, OR FECAL/EMISIS
CONTAMINATION BLOCKAGE OF FAN/SEPARATOR ASSEMBLY. USE ALTERNATE
FAN/SEPARATOR OR CONTINGENCY WASTE COLLECTION METHODS.
REFERENCES: I) WCS ASSEMBLY [G.E. DWG 47J232750GI6]; 2) SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEM HANDBOOK, DWG. NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC
HANDBOOK, VS70-960102, PAGE 60EC
m
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-213
INDEPENDE_ _BITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WO_SHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/28/87
LIFE SUPPORT
2063
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIG_".
ABORT:
HDW/_NC
3/2R
/NA
ITEM:
FAIL_ MODE:
FAN/SEP_TORS (2)
PHYSICAL BINDING/J_ING
T._AD ANALYST: K. BARIC_ SUBSYS _AD: M.J. SAIIDI
B_AK_ HIE_CHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
WASTE _AG_NT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE COL_CTION SUBSYSTEM ;;_;_....
LIQUID AND AIR LINE INSTAL_TION
FAN/SEP_TOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT P_SE HDW/_NC ABORT
P__CH: /NA RT_:
LI_OFF: /NA TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA:
DEORBIT: /NA ATO:
_DING/SAFING: /NA
HDW/_C
/NA
/NA
/NA
/NA
C [ P ]RED_DANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ]
_CATION: EC_S _EA 90
PART _BER: WCS 80V62AI4 (ITEM 5.5) [G.E. DWG. 47E225362G2, G4]
CAUSES: _C_ICAL SHOCK, PIECE PART FAILU_, VIB_TION,
CONT_INATION,
EFFECTS/_TIONAT._:
BREAKAGE OF PIECE PART STRU_, T_S J_ING FAN/MOTOR AND
_LTING MOTOR OPE_TION. USE ALTE_ATE FAN/SEPARATOR OR
CONTINGENCY WASTE COL_CTION _THODS. IF ALTE_ATE FAN/SEP_TOR
A_O _ES NOT _CTION THEN CANNOT _ SUBSEQUENT EVA'S BECAUSE
E_ D_IN IS _ST.
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REFE_NCES: i) WCS ASSEMBLY [G.E. DWG 47J232750GI6]; 2) SPACE
S_TT_ SYSTEM _DBOOK, DWG. NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEG_TED SCHE_TIC
_DBOOK, VS70-960102, PAGE 60EC
l
mm
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-214
I
I
l
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/28/87
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 2064
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
/NA
ITEM: FAN/SEPARATORS (2)
FAILURE MODE: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE COLLECTION SUBSYSTEM
LIQUID AND AIR LINE INSTALLATION
FAN/SEPARATOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
ECLSS AREA 90
WCS 80V62AI4 (ITEM 5.5) [G.E. DWG. 47E225362G2, G4]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, PRESSURE (HIGH),
VIBRATION, CHEMICAL REACTION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF GASKET SEALS WOULD ALLOW WASTE FLUIDS INTO CABIN
ATMOSPHERE REQUIRING IMPLEMENTATION OF FLIGHT RULE 13-17 FOR
FLUID SPILLS. REQUIRES RESORTING TO ALTERNATE FAN/SEPARATOR OR
CONTINGENCY WASTE COLLECTION METHODS.
REFERENCES: i) WCS ASSEMBLY [G.E. DWG 47J232750GI6]; 2) SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEM HANDBOOK, DWG. NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC
HANDBOOK, VS70-960102, PAGE 60EC
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-215
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESS_NT
ORBI_R SUBSYSTEM _ALYSIS WO_SHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/28/87
LIFE SUPPORT
2065
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/_C
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAIL_ MODE:
F_/SEP_TOR TEST _RTS (4)
FAI_ TO OPEN, PHYSICAL BINDING/J_ING
;._AD _ALYST: K. B_IC_ SUBSYS _AD: M.J. SAIIDI
B_AK_ HIE_CHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYST_
WASTE _AGEMENT SUBSYST_
W_TE COLT._CTION SUBSYSTEM
LIQUID _D AIR LINE INSTAL_TION
F_/SEP_TOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT P_SE HDW/_NC ABORT HDW/_C
P__CH: 3/3 RT_: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
_DING/SAFING: /NA
RED_D_CY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
_CATION:
P_T _BER:
EC_S _EA 90
WCS 80V62A14
CAUSES: CONT_INATION, MIS_DLING/ABUSE
EFFECTS/_TIONAL_:
INABILITY TO CHECK WCS F_W PATHS, NO MISSION EFFECT EXCE_
EXTENDED __O_D TI_.
_FE_NCES: i) WCS ASSEMBLY [G.E. DWG 47J232750GI6]; 2) SPACE
S_TT_ SYSTEM _DBOOK, DWG. NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEG_TED SCHE_TIC
_DBOOK, VS70-960102, PAGE 60EC
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
v/28/sv
LIFE SUPPORT
2066
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FAN/SEPARATOR TEST PORTS (4)
RESTRICTED FLOW
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE COLLECTION SUBSYSTEM
LIQUID AND AIR LINE INSTALLATION
FAN/SEPARATOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA AT0: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
ECLSS AREA 90
WCS 80V62AI4
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUCED FLOW RATE FROM SPECIFICATION, ON-GROUND REPAIR.
MISSION SCHEDULE IMPACT EXCEPT EXTENDED TURNAROUND TIME.
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
NO
REFERENCES: I) WCS ASSEMBLY [G.E. DWG 47J232750GI6]; 2) SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEM HANDBOOK, DWG. NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC
HANDBOOK, VS70-960102, PAGE 60EC
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-217
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
7/28/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
LIFE SUPPORT FLIGHT:
2067 ABORT:
H DW/FUN C
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FAN/SEPARATOR INLET HOSE FROM COMMODE (2)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE COLLECTION SUBSYSTEM
LIQUID AND AIR LINE INSTALLATION
FAN/SEPARATOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
ECLSS AREA 90
WCS 80V62AI4
CAUSES: STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CHEMICAL REACTION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
JUST NQXIOUS GAS EMISSiOnS _ P_$IBLY INSUFFICIENT FLOW THROUGH
COMMODE. THE FAILURE IS DETECTABLE; HOWEVER, THE EXACT CAUSE OF
THE FAILURE MAY NOT BE DETERMINED.
REFERENCES: I) WCS ASSEMBLY [G.E. DWG 47J232750GI6]; 2) SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEM HANDBOOK, DWG. NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHE_TIC
HANDBOOK, VS70-960102, PAGE 60EC
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wINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/28/87
LIFE SUPPORT
2068
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FAN/SEPARATOR INLET HOSE FROM URINAL (i)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE COLLECTION SUBSYSTEM
LIQUID AND AIR LINE INSTALLATION
FAN/SEPARATOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: ECLSS AREA 90
PART NUMBER: WCS 80V62AI4
B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART FAILURE, CHEMICAL REACTION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WASTE FLUID LEAKAGE INTO WCS ENCLOSURE. USE ALTERNATE
FAN/SEPARATOR OR CONTINGENCY WASTE COLLECTION METHODS. IF
ALTERNATE FAN/SEPARATOR DOES NOT FUNCTION, THEN CANNOT PURGE EMU
AND NO SUBSEQUENT EVA'S ARE POSSIBLE. MISSION SCHEDULE
ALTERATION.
REFERENCES: I) WCS ASSEMBLY [G.E. DWG 47J232750GI6]; 2) SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEM HANDBOOK, DWG. NO. 6,5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC
HANDBOOK, VS70-960102, PAGE 60EC
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-219
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESS_NT
ORBITER SUBSYST_ _ALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/28/87
LIFE SUPPORT
2069
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/_C
3/2R -
/NA
ITEM:
FAILU_ MODE:
F_/SEP_TOR IN_T HOSE FROM URINAL (i)
FAI_ C_SED, RESTRICTED F_W
_AD _ALYST: K. B_IC_ SUBSYS T._AD: M.J. SAIIDI
B_AK_ HIE_CHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUP_RT SYST_
WASTE _AGE_NT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE COLLECTION SUBSYSTEM
LIQUID _D AIR LINE INSTAL_TION
F_/SEP_TOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT P_SE HDW/_NC ABORT HDW/_NC
PRE_CH: /NA RT_: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: _A
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
_DING/SAFING: /NA
REDUND_CY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
_CATION:
P_T _BER:
EC_S _EA 90
WCS 80V62AI4
CAUSES: CONT_NATION
EFFECTS/_TIONAL_:
_STRICTED IN_T F_W FROM URINAL, POTENTIAL STOPPED F_W _D
_SS OF _INAL USAGE. NEED TO USE CONTINGENCY WASTE COLT._CTION
_THODS. THIS AL_WS ONLY 3 DAYS OF URINE COL_CTION DEVICES PER
C_W MEMBER.
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_FE_NCES: i) WCS ASSEMBLY [G.E. DWG 47J232750GI6]; 2) SPACE
S_TT_ SYSTEM _DBOOK, DWG. NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEG_TED SCHE_TIC
_DBOOK, VS70-960102, PAGE 60EC
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DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
7/28/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
LIFE SUPPORT FLIGHT: 3/3
2070 ABORT: /NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LEAKAGE
DUAL CHECK VALVES (2)
FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED (SINGLE STAGE), INTERNAL
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE COLLECTION SUBSYSTEM
LIQUID AND AIR LINE INSTALLATION
FAN/SEPARATOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
ECLSS AREA 90
80V62AI4 (TPI20) [G.E. DWG. 47A232884P2]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, CORROSION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POSSIBLE WASTE FLUID BACKFLOW IN FAN SEPARATORS AND CABIN AIR IF
BOTH CHECK VALVES FAIL. VIEWED NOT CRITICAL BECAUSE SECOND STAGE
CHECK VALVE PRECLUDES LEAKAGE.
REFERENCES: I) WCS ASSEMBLY [G.E. DWG 47J232750GI6]; 2) SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEM HANDBOOK, DWG. NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC
HANDBOOK, VS70-960102, PAGE 60EC
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-221
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/28/87
LIFE SUPPORT
2071
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DUAL CHECK VALVES (2)
E_ERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE COLLECTION SUBSYSTEM
LIQUID AND AIR LINE INSTALLATION
FAN/SEPARATOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: ECLSS AREA 90
PART NUMBER: WCS 80V62A14 (TPI20) [G.E. DWG. 47A232884P2]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, CORROSION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POSSIBLE LEAKAGE OF WASTE FLUIDS INTO WCS ENCLOSURE AND CABIN
ATMOSPHERE. USE ALTERNATE FAN/SEPARATOR OR CONTINGENCY WASTE
COLLECTION METHODS. IF ALTERNATE FAN/SEPARATOR DOES NOT
FUNCTION, THEN CANNOT PURGE EMU AND NO SUBSEQUENT EVA'S ARE
POSSIBLE.
MISSION SCHEDULE ALTERATION.
REFERENCES: I) WCS ASSEMBLY [G'E. DwG 47J232750G16]; 2) SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEM HANDBOOK, DWG. NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC
HANDBOOK, VS70-960102, PAGE 60EC
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7128/87
LIFE SUPPORT
2072
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DUAL CHECK VALVES (2)
FAILS TO OPEN, RESTRICTED FLOW
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE COLLECTION SUBSYSTEM
LIQUID AND AIR LINE INSTALLATION
FAN/SEPARATOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: ECLSS AREA 90
PART NUMBER _ WCS 80V62AI4 (TPI20) [G.E. DWG. 47A232884P2]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE'PART FAILURE, _ CHEMICAL REACTION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INEFFECTIVE FAN/SEPARATOR OPERATION REQUIRING USE OF ALTERNATE
FAN/SEPARATOR UNIT OR ALTERNATE WASTE COLLECTION METHOD DUE TO
WASTE FLUID IN CABIN ATMOSPHERE. IF ALTERNATE FAN/SEPARATOR DOES
NOT FUNCTION, THEN CANNOT PURGE EMU AND NO SUBSEQUENT EVA'S
ARE POSSIBLE. MISSION SCHEDULE ALTERATION.
REFERENCES: i) WCS ASSEMBLY [G.E. DWG 47J232750GI6]; 2) SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEM HANDBOOK, DWG. NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC
HANDBOOK, VS70-960102, PAGE 60EC
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-223
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/28/87
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 2073
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HOSE ASSEMBLY, SEPARATOR TO CHECK VALVE (2)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE COLLECTION SUBSYSTEM
LIQUID AND AIR LINE INSTALLATION
FAN/SEPARATOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: ECLSS AREA 90
PART NUMBER: WCS 80V62AI4
CAUSES: PIECE-PART FAILURE, CORROSION, STRUCTURAL FAILURE
(RUPTURE)
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WASTE ?LUID CONTamINATION INTO WCS ENCLOSURE AND CABIN
ATMOSPHERE. USE ALTERNATE FAN/SEPARATOR OR CONTINGENCY WASTE
COLLECTION METHODS. IF ALTERNATE FAN/SEPARATOR DOES NOT
FUNCTION, THEN CANNOT PURGE EMU AND NO SUBSEQUENT EVA'S ARE
POSSIBLE. MISSION SCHEDULE ALTERATION.
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REFERENCES: i) WCS ASSEMBLY [G.E. DWG 47J232750GI6]; 2) SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEM HANDBOOK, DWG. NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC
HANDBOOK, VS70-960102, PAGE 60EC
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/28/87
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 2074
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM: MUFFLER HOUSING INLET DUCT (I)
FAILURE MODE: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE COLLECTION SUBSYSTEM
LIQUID AND AIR LINE INSTALLATION
FAN/SEPARATOR
MUFFLER HOUSING INSTALLATION
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
ECLSS AREA 90
WCS 80V62AI4 (5.1)
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE'PART FAILURE, STRUCTURAL FAILURE
(RUPTURE)
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LEAK OF NOXIOUS FUMES INTO CREW CABIN DUE TO DUCT OR COUPLING
LEAKAGE. CREW INCONVENIENCE, THE ODOR EFFECT MUST BE EVALUATED
AS A REAL TIME DECISION.
REFERENCES: i) WCS ASSEMBLY [G.E. DWG 47J232750GI6]; 2) SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEM HANDBOOK, DWG. NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC
HANDBOOK, VS70-960102, PAGE 60EC
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-225
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/28/87
LIFE SUPPORT
2075
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
BACTERIA FILTER (2)
OPEN, INTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE COLLECTION SUBSYSTEM
LIQUID AND AIR LINE INSTALLATION
FAN/SEPARATOR
MUFFLER HOUSING INSTALLATION
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] S[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
ECLSS AREA 90
WCS 80V62A14 (5.1)
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, STRUCTURAL FAILURE (RUPTURE)
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LEAKAGE OF NOXIOUS FUMES INTO CABIN AIR, REPLACE FILTER. CREW
INCONVENIENCE, THE ODOR EFFECT MUST BE EVALUATED_AS A REAL TIME
DECISION.
REFERENCES: I) WCS ASSEMBLY [G.E. DWG 47J232750GI6]; 2) SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEM HANDBOOK, DWG. NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC
HANDBOOK, VS70-960102, PAGE 60EC
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
v/28/87
LIFE SUPPORT
2076
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
BALLAST VALVE SCREEN (I)
RESTRICTED FLOW, CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
s)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE COLLECTION SUBSYSTEM
LIQUID AND AIR LINE INSTALLATION
BALLAST VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA "
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDIS[G/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
ECLSS AREA 90
WCS 80V62A14 [G.E. DWG. 199C3110P2]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INSUFFICIENT AIRFLOW TO URINAL, EXCESSIVE DRAG ON FAN/SEPARATOR
MOTORS. CLEAN SCREEN. IF FLOW IS BLOCKED, CANNOT USE URINAL OR
EMU DRAIN WITHOUT COMMODE BEING OPEN.
REFERENCES: I) WCS ASSEMBLY [G.E. DWG 47J232750GI6]; 2) SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEM HANDBOOK, DWG. NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC
HANDBOOK, VS70-960102, PAGE 60EC
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-227
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/28/87
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 2077
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
/NA
ITEM: BALLAST VALVE ASSEMBLY (i)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS MID-TRAVEL, PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING,
RESTRICTED FLOW
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE COLLECTION SUBSYSTEM
LIQUID AND AIR LINE INSTALLATION
BALLAST VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/_C
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO; /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: ECLSS AREA 90
PART NUMBER: WCS 80V62AI4 [G.E. DWG. 47C265767G2]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
VIBRATION, INADVERTENT OPERATION/ACTIVATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INSUFFICIENT AIRFLOW TO URINAL, EXCESSIVE DRAG ON FAN/SEPARATOR
MOTORS. NEED TO USE CONTINGENCY WASTE COLLECTION METHODS. THIS
ALLOWS ONLY 3 DAYS OF URINE COLLECTION DEVICES PER CREW MEMBER.
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REFERENCES: i) WCS ASSEMBLY [G.E. DWG 47J232750GI6]; 2) SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEM HANDBOOK, DWG. NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC
HANDBOOK, VS70-960102, PAGE 60EC
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/28/87
LIFE SUPPORT
2078
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
BALLAST VALVE ASSEMBLY (I)
FAILS TO OPEN, RESTRICTED FLOW
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE COLLECTION SUBSYSTEM
LIQUID AND AIR LINE INSTALLATION
BALLAST VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS:
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: /NA ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
HDW/FUNC
/NA
/NA
/NA
/NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
ECLSS AREA 90
WCS 80V62AI4 [G.E. DWG. 47C265767G2]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POTENTIAL FOR NOT SWITCHING BALLAST VALVE POSITION REQUIRING
MAINTENANCE OF VALVE POSITION. THERE IS A POSSIBLE OUTGASSING
FROM THE AUXILLIARY WET TRASH OR WASTE TISSUE CONTAINERS. CREW
INCONVENIENCE, THE ODOR EFFECT MUST BE EVALUATED AS A REAL TIME
DECISION.
REFERENCES: i) WCS ASSEMBLY [G.E. DWG 47J232750GI6]; 2) SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEM HANDBOOK, DWG. NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC
HANDBOOK, VS70-960102, PAGE 60EC
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-229
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
v/2s/sv
LIFE SUPPORT
2079
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
COMMODE SEAT (I)
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
e)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE COLLECTION SUBSYSTEM
CREW RESTRAINT ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS:
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: /NA ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
HDW/FUNC
/NA
/NA
/NA
/NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
ECLSS AREA 90
WCS 80V62AI4 [G.E. DWG. 47E232800G2]
CAUSES: STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION, CHEMICAL REACTION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOOSE COMMODE SEAT IN WCS ENCLOSURE, REQUIRES USE OF TAPE TO
MAINTAIN _CTIONAL POSITION.
REFERENCES: i) WCS ASSEMBLY [G.E. DWG 47J232750GI6]; 2) SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEM HANDBOOK, DWG. NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC
HANDBOOK, VS70-960!02, PAGE 60EC
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/28/87
LIFE SUPPORT
2080
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT".
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
COMMODE SEAT (i)
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE COLLECTION SUBSYSTEM
CREW RESTRAINT ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
ECLSS AREA 90
80V62A14 [G.E. DWG. 47E232800G2]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF SEAT TO REMAIN IN A STABLE POSITION WHEN CREWMEMBER IS
STRAPPED DOWN COULD YIELD INEFFECTIVE OPERATION. WORST CASE DOES
NOT ALLOW USE OF SEAT, MUST USE CONTINGENCY WASTE COLLECTION
METHODS, BUT CAN STILL USE COMMODE FOR STORAGE.
REFERENCES: i) WCS ASSEMBLY [G.E. DWG 47J232750GI6]; 2) SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEM HANDBOOK, DWG. NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC
HANDBOOK, VS70-960102, PAGE 60EC
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-231
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESS_NT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM_ALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
mAC ID:
7/28/87
LIFE SUP_RT
2081
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAIL_ MODE:
SEAT BASE (i)
RESTRICTED F_W
_D _ALYST: K, B_IC_ SUBSYS T._AD: M.J. SAIIDI
B_AK_ HIE_CHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
S)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
WASTE _AGE_NT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE COL_CTION SUBSYSTEM
C_W _ST_INT ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT P_SE HDW/_C A_RT HDW/_C
PRE_CH: /NA RT_: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
_DING/SAFING: /NA
_D_D_CY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
_CATION:
P_T _BER:
EC_S _EA 90
80V62AI4 [G.E. D_WING 47E232751GI]
CAUSES: CONT_INATION
EFFECTS/_TIONAL_:
_SS OF EFFECTIVE AIRF_W T_OUGH SEAT BASE PASSAGES, C_W
INCO_NIENCE _D INEFFE_I_ CO,ODE USAGE.
HDW/_C
3/3
/NA
_FE_NCES: I) WCS ASSEMBLY [G.E. DWG 47J232750GI6]; 2) SPACE
S_TT_ SYSTEM _DBOOK, DWG. NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEG_TED SCHE_TIC
_DBOOK, VS70-960102, PAGE 60EC
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/28/87
LIFE SUPPORT
2082
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
THIGH BAR RESTRAINT (2)
FAILS TO CLOSE
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
s)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE COLLECTION SUBSYSTEM
CREW RESTRAINT ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A[ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
ECLSS AREA 90
G.E. DWG. 63E905736GI
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, OVERLOAD, PIECE-PART
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE".
REQUIRES USE OF ALTERNATE THIGH RESTRAINT SYSTEM.
REFERENCES: i) WCS ASSEMBLY [G.E. DWG 47J232750GI6]; 2) SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEM HANDBOOK, DWG. NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC
HANDBOOK, VS70-960102, PAGE 60EC
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-233
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM_ALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE".
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/28/87
LIFE SUPPORT
2083
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/_C
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
VELCRO RESTRAINT HARNESS (THIGH)(4)
CLIP FAILURE
T_AD ANALYST: K. BARIC_ SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE COLLECTION SUBSYSTEM
CREW RESTRAINT ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUND_CY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
ECLSS AREA 90
G.E. DWG. 63E905736GI
CAUSES: MISHANDLING/ABUSE, OVERLOAD, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INABILITY TO USE VELCO HARNESS ASSEMBLY, MUST RELY ON ALTERNATE
RESTRAINT METHODS.
REFERENCES: i) WCS ASSEMBLY [G.E. DWG 47J232750GI6]; 2) SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEM HANDBOOK, DWG. NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC
HANDBOOK, VS70-960102, PAGE 60EC
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/28/87
LIFE SUPPORT
2084
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT"
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FOOT RESTRAINT (i)
FAILED STOWED POSITION
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE COLLECTION SUBSYSTEM
CREW RESTRAINT ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION"
PART NUMBER:
ECLSS AREA 90
G.E. DWG. 63E905736GI
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, OVERLOAD, PIECE-PART
FAILURE, VIBRATION.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INABILITY TO USE COMMODE DUE TO ACCESS PROBLEM, MUST USE
CONTINGENCY WASTE COLLECTION METHODS FOR FECAL/EMISSIS BIOWASTE.
REFERENCES: I) WCS ASSEMBLY [G.E. DWG 47J232750GI6]; 2) SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEM HANDBOOK, DWG. NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC
HANDBOOK, VS70-960102, PAGE 60EC
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-235
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM _ALYSIS WORKSHEET
i
7/28/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
LIFE SUPPORT FLIGHT:
2085 ABORT:
HDW/_NC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAIL_ MODE:
FOOT REST_INT (i)
FAI_D DEP_YED POSITION
BAD _ALYST: K. B_IC_
BREAK_ HIE_CHY:
i) LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
2) WASTE _AGE_ SUBSYSTEM
3) WASTE COL_CTION SUBSYSTEM
4) C_ REST_INT ASS_BLY
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
SUBSYS L_AD: M.J. SAIIDI
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT P_SE HDW/_C ABORT HDW/_C
PRE_CH: /NA RT_: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: /NA
_DING/SAFING: 3/3
_DUND_CY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
_CATION:
P_T _BER:
EC_S _EA 90
G.E. DWG. 63E905736GI
CAUSES: CONT_INATION, MIS_DLING/ABUSE, PIECE-P_T FAIL_,
VIB_TION.
EFFE_S/_TIONA_:
C_W INCO_NIENCE AT EG_SS, NO MISSION IMPACT.
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REFE_NCES: i) WCS ASSEMBLY [G.E. DWG 47J232750GI6]; 2) SPACE
S__ SYSTEM _DBOOK, DWG. NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEG_TED SCHE_TIC
_DBOOK, VS70-960102, PAGE 60EC
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/28/87
LIFE SUPPORT
2086
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/3
ABORT: /NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TOE BAR RESTRAINT (I)
FAILS TO REMAIN IN OPERABLE POSITION, FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE COLLECTION SUBSYSTEM
CREW RESTRAINT ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS:
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 • AOA:
DEORBIT: /NA ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
HDW/FUNC
/NA
/NA
/NA
/NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
ECLSS AREA 90
G.E. DWG. 47D265876GI
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, OVERLOAD, PIECE-PART
FAILURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INABILITY TO EFFECTIVELY RESTRAIN FEET DURING STAND-UP URINATION,
REQUIRES ALTERNATE RESTRAINT SYSTEM WHICH MAY BE INCONVENIENT TO
CREW USAGE.
REFERENCES: I) WCS ASSEMBLY [G.E. DWG 47J232750GI6]; 2) SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEM HANDBOOK, DWG. NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC
HANDBOOK, VS70-960102, PAGE 60EC
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-237
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/28/87
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 2087
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM: TOE BAR RESTRAINT (I)
FAILURE MODE: FAILED DEPLOYED POSITION
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE COLLECTION SUBSYSTEM
CREW RESTRAINT ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
ECLSS AREA 90
G.E. DWG. 47D265876GI
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, OVERLOAD, PIECE-PART
FAILURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INABILITY TO PROPERLY STOW TOE BAR RESTRAINT.
CREW AT EGRESS, BUT NO MISSION IMPACT
INCONVENIENCE FOR
REFERENCES: i) WCS ASSEMBLY [G.E. DWG 47J232750GI6]; 2) SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEM HANDBOOK, DWG. NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC
HANDBOOK, VS70"960102, PAGE 60EC
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wINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/28/87
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 2088
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
/NA
ITEM: APOLLO FECAL BAG (MISSION LIFE SUPPLY)
FAILURE MODE: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE COLLECTION SUBSYSTEM
ALTERNATE WASTE COLLECTION SYSTEM
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: ECLSS AREA 90
PART NUMBER: WCS 80V62AI4
CAUSES: MISHANDLING/ABUSE, STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CHEMICAL REACTION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PRODUCES WASTE SPILL TO CABIN ATMOSPHERE THAT REQUIRES USE OF
FLIGHT RULE 13-17. SEE GROUND RULE I.
REFERENCES: I) WCS ASSEMBLY [G.E. DWG 47J232750GI6]; 2) SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEM HANDBOOK, DWG. NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC
HANDBOOK, VS70-960102, PAGE 60EC
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INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/28/87
LIFE SUPPORT
2089
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
/NA
ITEM:
CREWMEMBER)
FAILURE MODE:
URINE COLLECTION DEVICE (3 DAYS SUPPLY PER
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE COLLECTION SUBSYSTEM
ALTERNATE WASTE COLLECTION SYSTEM
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
ECLSS AREA 90
WCS 80V62AI4
CAUSES: MISHANDLING/ABUSE, PIECE-PART FAILURE, CHEMICAL REACTION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PRODUCES WASTE FLUID IN CABIN ATMOSPHERE, AND REQUIRES USE OF
FLIGHT RULE 13-17. SEE GROUND RULE I.
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REFERENCES: I) WCS ASSEMBLY [G.E. DWG 47J232750GI6]; 2) SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEM HANDBOOK, DWG. NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC
HANDBOOK, VS70-960102, PAGE 60EC
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
"MDAC ID:
7/28/87
LIFE SUPPORT
2090
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/3
ABORT: /NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
COMMODE PRESSURE TRANSDUCER (i)
FAILS OUT OF TOLERANCE
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE COLLECTION SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL PARTS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
ECLSS AREA 90
WCS 80V62A14 (V62P0505A)
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INEFFECTIVE INDICATION OF MANIFOLD VALVE HOUSING PRESSURE,
REQUIRED TO USE SPECIFIED REPRESSURIZATION TIME (10-30 SECONDS)
BEFORE COMMODE ACTUATION.
REFERENCES: I) WCS ASSEMBLY [G.E. DWG 47J232750GI6]; 2) SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEM HANDBOOK, DWG. NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC
HANDBOOK, VS70-960102, PAGE 60EC
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INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/28/87
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDACID: 2091
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
/NA
ITEM: WCS FAN/SEPARATOR SWITCH (I)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS MID-TRAVEL, PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE COLLECTION SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL PARTS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
ECLSS AREA 90
WCS 80V62AI4 (WCS $4)
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, OVERLOAD, PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INABILITY TO ACTUATE VALVE 5.28 CAUSING RESTRICTED FLOW. RESULTS
IN LOSS OF ABILITY TO USE REDUNDANT FAN/SEPARATOR, REQUIRES USE
OF CONTINGENCY WASTE COLLECTION METHODS IF FAN/SEPARATOR FAILS.
REFERENCES: i) WCS ASSEMBLY [G.E. DWG 47J232750GI6]; 2) SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEM HANDBOOK, DWG. NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC
HANDBOOK, VS70-960102, PAGE 60EC
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/28/87
LIFE SUPPORT
2092
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
WCS FAN/SEPARATOR SWITCH (i)
SHORTED CONTACT
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE COLLECTION SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL PARTS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS:
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA:
DEORBIT: /NA ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ]
LOCATION: ECLSS AREA 90
PART NUMBER: WCS 80V62AI4 (D&C PANEL WCS, $4)
HDW/FUNC
/NA
/NA
/NA
/NA
c[P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
TWO FAILURE MODES: (i) IF SHORTED TO GROUND IT "POPS" CIRCUIT
BREAKER OF SELECTED FAN/SEPARATOR AND MUST ACTIVATE ALTERNATE
FAN/SEPARATOR. (2) IF ALTERNATE FAN/SEPARATOR CONTACTS ARE SHORT
CLOSED, THEN DRIVING BOTH FAN/SEPARATORS AT ONCE CAUSING NO
IMPACT, BECAUSE IF SECOND FAN OVERHEATS THE THERMOSTAT WILL OPEN
CONTACTS UNTIL COOL-DOWN IS PRECIPITATED.
REFERENCES: i) WCS ASSEMBLY [G.E. DWG 47J232750GI6]; 2) SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEM HANDBOOK, DWG. NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC
HANDBOOK, VS70-960102, PAGE 60EC
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE. "
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/28/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
LIFE SUPPORT FLIGHT: 3/3
2093 ABORT: /NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
WCS FAN/SEPARATOR SWITCH (I)
FAILS OPEN (SINGLE CONTACT) _ _
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE COLLECTION SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL PARTS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS:
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: /NA ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
HDW/FUNC
/NA
/NA
/NA
/NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ]
LOCATION: ECLSS AREA 90
PART NUMBER: WCS 80V62AI4 (D&C PANEL WCS, $4)
c [ ]
CAUSES: ACOUSTICS, CONTAMINATION, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, OVERLOAD,
PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INABILiTY_T6ACTUATE FAN/SEPARATOR MOTORS WITHOUT USING SEPARATOR
BYPASS SWITCH.
q_= = : ......
REFERENCES: i) WCS ASSEMBLY [G.E. DWG 47J232750GI6]; 2) SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEM HANDBOOK, DWG. NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC
HANDBOOK, VS70-960102, PAGE 60EC
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE".
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/28/87
LIFE SUPPORT
2094
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT".
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
WCS MODE SWITCH (i)
FAILS MID-TRAVEL, PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE COLLECTION SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL PARTS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
ECLSS AREA 90
WCS 80V62A14 (D&C PANEL WCS, SI)
cAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, OVERLOAD, PIECE-PART
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INABILITY TO COMPLETE FAN/SEPARATOR ENERGIZING CIRCUIT WITHOUT
USING SEPARATOR BYPASS SWITCH.
REFERENCES: I) WCS ASSEMBLY [G.E. DWG 47J232750GI6]; 2) SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEM HANDBOOK, DWG. NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC
HANDBOOK, VS70-960102, PAGE 60EC
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-245
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/28/87
LIFE SUPPORT
2095
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
/NA
ITEM:
FAILLE MODE:
WCS MODE SWITCH (i)
SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAK_ HIE_CHY
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
WASTE_AGE_NT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE COLLECTION SUBSYSTEM
ELE_RICAL P_TS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT P_SE HDW/_C ABORT HDW/_C
PRE_UNCH: /NA RT_: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
_DING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
_CATION: ECLSS _EA 90
P_T _BER: WCS 80V62AI4 (D&C PANEL-WCS_, _ SI)
CAUSES: CONT_INATION, PIECE-P_T FAIL_E, VIB_TION
EFFECTS/_TIONALE:
2 FAILU_ MODES: (I) IN THE CASE OF SHORTED TO GROUND, THE
ASSOCIATED CIR_IT BRE_R "_PS" AND THE ALTE_ATE FAN/SEP_TOR
CIRCU_ BRE_R AND SWITCH _ST BE ACTIVATED (3/2R) TO THE
ALTE_ATE FAN/SEP. (2) THE OTHER CASE IS SHORTED ACROSS TE_INA_
TO
WHERE THE FAN/SEPARATOR MUST BE CONTROLLED BY THE CIRCUIT BREAKER
(3/3).
_FE_NCES: I) WCS ASSEMBLY [G.E. DWG 47J232750GI6]; 2) SPACE
S_TTLE SYSTEM _DBOOK, DWG. NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEG_TED SCHE_TIC
_DBOOK, VS70-960102, PAGE 60EC
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/28/87
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 2096
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA -
ITEM: WCS MODE SWITCH (i)
FAILURE MODE: OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE COLLECTION SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL PARTS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
ECLSS AREA 90
WCS 80V62AI4 (D&C PANEL WCS, SI)
CAUSES: ACOUSTICS, CONTAMINATION, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, OVERLOAD,
PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INABILITY TO MAINTAIN FAN/SEPARATOR RELAY ENERGIZING CIRCUIT
WITHOUT USING SEPARATOR BYPASS SWITCH.
REFERENCES: I) WCS ASSEMBLY [G.E. DWG 47J232750GI6]; 2) SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEM HANDBOOK, DWG. NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC
HANDBOOK, VS70-960102, PAGE 60EC
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INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/14/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT FLIGHT:
MDACID: 2097 ABORT: "
HDW/FUNC
312R
/NA
ITEM: WCS FAN/SEPARATOR RELAY (2)
FAILURE MODE: OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
S)
9)
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE COLLECTION SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL PARTS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS:
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA:
DEORBIT: /NA ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
HDW/FUNC
/NA
/NA
/NA
/NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: WCS 80V62A14
PART NUMBER: RELAY K1 AND K2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INOPERABLE RELAY FOR ANY SINGLE LOSS OF CONTACT OR RELAY COIL
CIRCUIT OPEN, MUST SWITCH TO ALTERNATE FAN/SEPARATOR CIRCUIT
BREAKER OR CONTINGENCY WASTE COLLECTION METHOD.
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REFERENCES: i) RI DRAWING VS70-623201; 2) SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEM
HANDBOOK, DRAWING NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC HANDBOOK,
VS70-960102, PAGE 60ED
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/14/8v
LIFE SUPPORT
2098
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
WCS FAN/SEPARATOR RELAY (2)
SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE COLLECTION SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL PARTS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
WCS 80V62AI4
RELAY K1 AND K2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WORST CASE IS SHORT TO GROUND, ACTIVATING CIRCUIT BREAKER AND
REQUIRING USE OF ALTERNATE FAN/SEPARATOR OR CONTINGENCY WASTE
COLLECTION METHODS. SHORT ACROSS SINGLE CONTACT WOULD CAUSE
CONTINUAL (SINGLE PHASE) POWER TO MOTOR, AND EVENTUALLY CAUSING
MAJOR BURN-OUT AND NEED FOR USE OF ALTERNATE FAN/SEPARATORS.
REFERENCES: i) RI DRAWING VS70-623201; 2) SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEM
HANDBOOK, DRAWING NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC HANDBOOK,
VS70-960102, PAGE 60ED
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-249
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
8/14/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
LIFE SUPPORT FLIGHT:
2099 ABORT:
FAN/SEPARATOR NOISE SUPPRESSION CIRCUIT (4)
OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDILEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE COLLECTION SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL PARTS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
WCS 80V62AI4
G.E. DWG 47C238872
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
TEMPERATURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
UNFILTER AC VOLTAGE, NO MISSION EFFECT.
REFERENCES: I) RI DRAWING VS70-623201; 2) SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEM
HANDBOOK, DRAWING NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC HANDBOOK,
VS70-960102, PAGE 60ED ....
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/14/87
LIFE SUPPORT
2100
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FAN/SEPARATOR NOISE SUPPRESSION CIRCUIT(4)
SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
2) WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
3) WASTE COLLECTION SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL PARTS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: WCS 80V62A14
PART NUMBER: G.E. DWG 47C238872 (FAN/SEP 1 & 2)
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
TEMPERATURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
UNABLE TO SWITCH OFF FAN/SEPARATOR MOTOR FOR SINGLE PHASE LINE,
THUS CAUSING EXCESSIVE HEATING OF MOTOR WINDINGS AND EVENTUAL
FAILURE AND NEED FOR ALTERNATE FAN/SEPARATOR SYSTEM. IF SHORTED
TO GROUND, THIS CAUSES THE CIRCUIT BREAKER TO POP, THUS
REQUIRING USE OF ALTERNATE FAN/SEPARATOR.
REFERENCES: i) RI DRAWING VS70-62320!; 2) SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEM
HANDBOOK, DRAWING NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC HANDBOOK,
VS70-960102, PAGE 60ED
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-251
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM _ALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/28/87
LIFE SUPPORT
2101
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/_C
3/2R
/NA
ITEM:
FAIL_ MODE:
F_/SEP_TOR MOTOR THE_OSTATIC SWITCH (2)
FAI_ TO OPEN
_D _ALYST: K. B_IC_ SUBSYS T._AD: M.J. SAIIDI
B___ HIE_CHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
2) WASTE _AGE_NT SUBSYSTEM
3) WASTE COL_CTION SUBSYSTEM
ET._CTRICAL P_TS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT P_SE HDW/_NC ABORT HDW/_C
P__CH: /NA RT_: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
_DING/SAFING: /NA
_DUND_CY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
_CATION:
P_T _ER:
EC_S _EA 90
WCS 80V62Ai4 (ITEM 5.5) [F_/SEP 1 & 2]
CAUSES: CONT_INATION, PIECE-P_T FAILLE
EFFECTS/_TIONAL_:
POSSIB_ MOTOR B_OUT DUE TO EXCESSI_ TEMPE__. SWITCH TO
ALTE_ATE F_/SEP_TOR OR CONTINGENCY WASTE COLLECTION DEVICES.
1
1
1
1
1
i
1
l
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1
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1
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_FE_NCES: i) WCS ASSEMBLY [G.E. DWG 47J232750GI6]; 2) SPACE
S_TT_ SYSTEM _DBOOK, DWG. NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEG_TED SCHE_TIC
_DBOOK, VS70-960102, PAGE 60EC
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/28/87
LIFE SUPPORT
2102
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FAN/SEPARATOR MOTOR THERMOSTATIC SWITCH (2)
FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED, FAILS TO CLOSE
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE COLLECTION SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL PARTS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
ECLSS AREA 90
WCS 80V62AI4 (ITEM 5.5) [FAN/SEP 1 & 2]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INABILITY TO USE THE FAN/SEPARATOR BECAUSE OF DEACTIVATED
SOLENOID SWITCH. USE ALTERNATE FAN/SEPARATOR OR CONTINGENCY
WASTE COLLECTION METHODS.
REFERENCES: i) WCS ASSEMBLY [G.E. DWG 47J232750GI6]; 2) SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEM HANDBOOK, DWG. NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC
HANDBOOK, VS70-960102, PAGE 60EC
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE :
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/28187
LIFE SUPPORT
2103
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FAN/SEPARATOR BYPASS SWITCH (2)
FAILS TO CLOSE
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
2) WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
3) WASTE COLLECTION SUBSYSTEM
4) ELECTRICAL PARTS
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
ECLSS AREA 90
WCS 80V62AI4 (SWITCH $6 AND $7)
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INABILITY TO USE FAN/SEPARATOR BYPASS SWITCH AND NO ACTIVATION OF
FAN/SEPARATOR IN THE EVENT OF WCS CONTROL SWITCH FAILURE.
REFERENCES: i) WCS ASSEMBLY [G.E. DWG 47J232750GI6]; 2) SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEM HANDBOOK, DWG. NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC
HANDBOOK, VS70-960102, PAGE 60EC
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/28/87
LIFE SUPPORT
2104
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FAN/SEPARATOR BYPASS SWITCH (2)
FAILS TO OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE COLLECTION SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL PARTS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS_ A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
ECLSS AREA 90
WCS 80V62AI4 (SWITCH $6 AND S7)
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
VIBRATION, INADVERTENT OPERATION/ACTIVATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
MUST USE CIRCUIT BREAKER TO REMOVE POWER FROM CIRCUIT. IF
ALTERNATE BYPASS SWITCH IS SHORTED CLOSED THEN COULD RUN
ALTERNATE MOTOR WITHOUT PROPER COOLING AND ACTIVATE THERMOSTATIC
SWITCH--PRODUCING AN INTERMITTENT OPERATION PROBLEM UNLESS THE
ASSOCIATED CIRCUIT BREAKER IS OPENED.
REFERENCES: I) WCS ASSEMBLY [G.E. DWG 47J232750GI6]; 2) SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEM HANDBOOK, DWG. NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC
HANDBOOK, VS70-960102, PAGE 60EC
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INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/28/87
LIFE SUPPORT
2105
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/_C
3/2R
/NA
ITEM:
FAILLE MODE:
CIR_IT B_AKER, WCS CNT_ (2)
FAI_ TO REMAIN C_SED
T._AD ANALYST: K. BARIC_ SUBSYS T._AD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE COLLECTION SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL PARTS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS:
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA:
DEORBIT: /NA ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
HDW/_NC
/NA
/NA
/NA
/NA
RED_DANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] S[P] C[P]
_CATION:
PART _BER:
D&C PANEL ML86B
80V73AI30, WCS CNTLR, CBI9 AND CB22
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD, PIECE-PART
FAILURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALR:
INOPERATIVE FAN/SEP_TOR CONTROLT_R, INABILITY TO USE THE
FAN/SEP_TOR. USE ALTE_ATE F_/SEP_TOR OR CO_INGENCY WASTE
COLLECTION METHODS. _
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RE?ERENCES: i) WCS ASSEMBLY [G.E. DWG 47J232750GI6]; 2) SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEM HANDBOOK, DWG. NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC
HANDBOOK, VS70-960102, PAGE 60EC
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nINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE'.
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/28/87
LIFE SUPPORT
2106
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT BREAKER, WCS CNTLR (2)
FAILS TO OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREA/(DOW-N HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE COLLECTION SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL PARTS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION. -
PART NUMBER:
D&C PANEL ML86B
80V73AI30, WCS CNTLR, CBI0 AND 22
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF OVERLOAD PROTECTION, OTHERWISE NO OTHER EFFECT UNLESS A
SHORT TO GROUND OCCURS IN EITHER THE BYPASS SWITCH OR
FAN/SEPARATOR SWITCH, IN WHICH CASE THERE IS POTENTIAL FOR FIRE
DUE TO OVERHEATING OF THE WIRES.
REFERENCES: i) WCS ASSEMBLY [G.E. DWG 47J232750GI6]; 2) SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEM HANDBOOK, DWG. NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC
HANDBOOK, VS70-960102, PAGE 60EC
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INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/28/87
LIFE SUPPORT
2107
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FAN/SEPARATOR MOTOR (2)
OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE COLLECTION SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL PARTS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /N A
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
EC_S AREA 90
WCS 80V62AI4 (ITEM 5.5) [G.E. DRAWINGS 47E225363P2]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART FAILURE, THERMAL SHOCK.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ELECTRIC MOTOR FAILURE, CAUSES USE OF REDUNDANT SYSTEMS. MOTOR
WILL NOT ST_T WITH A SiNG_ P_SE FAILURE?_'USE ALTERNATE
FAN/SEPARATOR OR CONTINGENCY WASTE COLLECTION METHODS. IF
ALTERNATE FAN/SEPARATOR DOES NOT FUNCTION, THEN CANNOT PURGE EMU
AND NO SUBSEQUENT EVA'S ARE POSSIBLE. MISSION SCHEDULE
ALTERATION.
REFERENCES: i) WCS ASSEMBLY [G.E. DWG 47J232750GI6]; 2) SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEM HANDBOOK, DWG. NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC
HANDBOOK, VS70-960102, PAGE 60EC
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/28/87
LIFE SUPPORT
2108
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FAN/SEPARATOR MOTOR (2)
SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE COLLECTION SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL PARTS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AO_: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] S [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: ECLSS AREA 90
PART NUMBER: WCS 80V62AI4 (ITEM 5.5) [G.E. DRAWINGS 47E225363P2]
CAUSES: STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INSUFFICIENT CURRENT/VOLTAGE TO ELECTRIC MOTOR DUE TO POPPED
CIRCUIT BREAKER OR EXCESSIVE CURRENT DRAW THROUGH MOTOR CAUSING
OVERHEATING AND BURN-OUT REQUIRES USE OF REDUNDANT SYSTEMS. USE
ALTERNATE FAN/SEPARATOR OR CONTINGENCY WASTE COLLECTION METHODS.
IF ALTERNATE FAN/SEPARATOR DOES NOT FUNCTION, THEN CANNOT PURGE
EMU AND NO SUBSEQUENT EVA'S ARE POSSIBLE. MISSION SCHEDULE
ALTERATION.
REFERENCES: I) WCS ASSEMBLY [G.E. DWG 47J232750GI6]; 2) SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEM HANDBOOK, DWG. NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC
HANDBOOK, VS70-960102, PAGE 60EC
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INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/28/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
LIFE SUPPORT FLIGHT: 3/2R
2109 ABORT: /NA
ITEM:
PHASE (6)
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT BREAKER, WCS FAN/SEPARATOR, AC BUS, SINGLE
FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
S)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE COLLECTION SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL PARTS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/_C
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
D & C PANEL 85V73AI29
CB47 AND CB50
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD, PIECE-PART
FAILURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF SINGLE PHASE POWER TO FAN/SEPARATOR AND LOSS OF TOTAL
FAN/SEPARATOR OPERATION. USE ALTERNATE FAN/SEPARATOR OR
CONTINGENCY WASTE COLLECTION METHODS.
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REFERENCES: i) WCS ASSEMBLY [G.E. DWG 47J232750GI6]; 2) SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEM HANDBOOK, DWG. NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC
HANDBOOK, VS70-960102, PAGE 60EC
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/28/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
LIFE SUPPORT FLIGHT: 3/2R
2110 ABORT: /NA
ITEM:
PHASE (6)
FAILURE MODE :
CIRCUIT BREAKER, WCS FAN/SEPARATOR, AC BUS, SINGLE
FAILS TO OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
ri)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE COLLECTION SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL PARTS
SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
D & C PANEL 85V73A129
CB47 AND CB50
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INDICATED POPPING OF OTHER ASSOCIATED FAN/SEPARATOR CIRCUIT
BREAKERS AND LOSS OF OVER-CURRENT PROTECTION, REQUIRES
DEACTIVATION OF CURRENT FAN/SEPARATOR AND ACTIVATION OF ALTERNATE
FAN/SEPARATOR OR CONTINGENCY WASTE COLLECTION METHODS.
REFERENCES: I) WCS ASSEMBLY [G.E. DWG 47J232750GI6]; 2) SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEM HANDBOOK, DWG. NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC
HANDBOOK, VS70-960102, PAGE 60EC
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-261
=
w
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/31/87
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 2111
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT".
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
3/3
ITEM: WWS LINE, UNIONS, AND JUNCTIONS
FAILURE MODE: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
2) WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
3) WASTE WATER SUBSYSTEM
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2" AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: ECLSS AREA 90
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION, CHEMICAL
REACTION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: .....
WASTE FLUID LEAK INTO CABIN ATMOSPHERE AND CABIN PRESSURE LOSS
DURING WASTE FLUID DUMP. NEED TO USE CONTINGENCY WASTE
COLLECTION METHODS. THIS ALLOWS ONLY 3 DAYS OF URINE COLLECTION
DEVICES PER CREWMEMBER_ PRODUCES ARE CONDENSA_rS_ILLBECAUSE
THE WASTE TANK 1 IS PRESSURIZED TO 30 PSIA AND FLUID WILL TRAVEL
OUT LEAK POINT. THIS IS A MISSION IMPACT BECAUSE THE ARS
CONDENSATION UNIT WOULD HAVE TO BE SHUT-DOWN AT THE SEPARATOR IF
THE LEAK IS TO BE CONTROLLED OR ELIMINATED.
REFERENCES: i) RI DRAWING VS70-623201; 2) SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEM
HANDBOOK, DRAWING NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC HANDBOOK,
VS70-960102, PAGE 60ED
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/31/87
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 2112
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
3/3
ITEM: WWS LINE, UNIONS, AND JUNCTIONS
FAILURE MODE: RESTRICTED FLOW, CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE WATER SUBSYSTEM
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
ECLSS AREA 90
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
EXCESSIVE LOAD ON FAN/SEPARATOR. POSSIBLE PLUGGING OF LINES.
NEED TO USE CONTINGENCY WASTE COLLECTION METHODS. THIS ALLOWS
ONLY 3 DAYS OF URINE COLLECTION DEVICES PER CREWMEMBER.
REFERENCES: i) RI DRAWING VS70-623201; 2) SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEM
HANDBOOK, DRAWING NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC HANDBOOK,
VS70-960102, PAGE 60ED
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INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/31/87
LIFE SUPPORT
2113
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ARS CONDENSATE SUPPLY TUBE (I)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE WATER SUBSYSTEM
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
ECLSS AREA 90
CAUSES: PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION, CHEMICAL REACTION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PRODUCES LEAKAGE OF ARS CONDENSATE AND WCS FLUIDS INTO CABIN
ATMOSPHERE, REQUIRES IMPLEMENTATION OF FLIGHT RULE 13-17. LOSS
OF MISSION, NO METHOD FOR ARS CONDENSATE DUMPING.
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REFERENCES: i) RI DRAWING VS70-623201; 2) SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEM
HANDBOOK, DRAWING NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED _S_TIC_ObK_ _
VS70-960102, PAGE 60ED
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wINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9/14/87
LIFE SUPPORT
2114
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ARS CONDENSATE SUPPLY TUBE (i)
RESTRICTED FLOW, CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE WATER SUBSYSTEM
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
ECLSS AREA 90
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO METHOD OF ARS CONDENSATE DUMP PRODUCES CONDENSATE INTO CREW
CABIN ATMOSPHERE AND POTENTIAL FOR SHORTING THE ELECTRICAL
SYSTEM.
REFERENCES: I) RI DRAWING VS70-623201; 2) SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEM
HANDBOOK, DRAWING NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC HANDBOOK,
VS70-960120, PAGE 60ED, 60EF AND 60EM
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DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
7/31/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
LIFE SUPPORT FLIGHT:
2115 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
/NA
ITEM".
FAILURE MODE:
CONTINGENCY WATER CONTAINER (i)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE, STRUCTURAL FAILURE (RUPTURE)
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPP0RT SYSTEM
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE WATER SUBSYSTEM
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: ECLSS AREA 90
PART NUMBER: USED AS BACKUP WASTE FLUID TANK (UNTESTED APPROACH)
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, OVERLOAD, STRUCTURAL
FAILURE, PRESSURE (HIGH), CHEMICAL REACTION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LEAKAGE OF WASTE FLUIDS INTO CABIN ATMOSPHERE IF CONTAINER
RUPTURES OR IF CONTAINER PRESSURE GETS TOO GREAT THEN THE
BACKPRESSURE IN THE FAN/SEPARATOR CAUSES DUMPING OF WASTE FLUIDS
INTO THE CABIN THROUGH THE WCS MUFFLER.
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REFERENCES: I) RI DRAWING VS70-623201; 2) SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEM
HANDBOOK, DRAWING NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC HANDBOOK,
VS70-960102, PAGE 60ED
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7131187
LIFE SUPPORT
2116
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
WASTE TANK 1 INLET VALVE (i)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE WATER SUBSYSTEM
STORAGE ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: "3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
ECLSS AREA 90
90V62LV16
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION, CHEMICAL
REACTION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF VALVE SEALS PRODUCES WASTE FLUID LEAK FROM THE COMMODE
AND ARS CONDENSATE DUMP LINE INTO CABIN ATMOSPHERE. IF NO METHOD
TO COLLECT ARS CONDENSATE, THE MISSION SCHEDULE IS EFFECTED AS
WELL AS EMU DUMP CAPABILITY.
w
w
REFERENCES: i) RI DRAWING VS70-623201; 2) SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEM
HANDBOOK, DRAWING NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC HANDBOOK,
VS70-960102, PAGE 60ED
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-267
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
v13118v
LIFE SUPPORT
2117
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
WASTE TANK 1 INLET VALVE (i)
FAILS TO CLOSE
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:.
I)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE WATER SUBSYSTEM
STORAGE ASSEMBLY
SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF:- /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAYING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: ECLSS AREA 90
PART NUMBER: 90V62LV16
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, OVERLOAD, PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION,
CHEMICAL REACTION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: .....
INABILITY TO SEAL VALVE AND POSSIBLE WASTE FLUID LEAK UPON DE-
ORBIT IF CHECK VALVES FAIL. INABILITY TO ISOLATE THE WASTE TANK
IN THE EVENT OF A_SUBSEQUENT FAILURE ON-ORBIT, THUS CAUSING
MISSION LOSS OR SCHEDULE IMPACT.
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REFERENCES: I) RI DRAWING VS70-623201; 2) SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEM
HANDBOOK, DRAWING NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC HANDBOOK,
VS70-960102, PAGE 60ED
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/31/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
LIFE SUPPORT FLIGHT: 3/2R
2118 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
WAIST TANK 1 INLET VALVE (i)
RESTRICTED FLOW. INADVERTANT OPERATION (CLOSURE)
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
2) WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
3) WASTE WATER SUBSYSTEM
STORAGE ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R- AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
ECLSS AREA 90
90V62LVI6
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, LOSS OF INPUT,
VIBRATION, CHEMICAL REACTION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE RESTRICTED FLOW COULD CAUSE EXCESSIVE BACKPRESSURE ON THE
FAN/SEPARATORS, THUS CAUSING OVERFLOW INTO CABIN ATMOSPHERE.
INADVERTENT CLOSURE REQUIRES HOOKING UP CONTINGENCY WATER
CONTAINER, WHICH IF THAT FAILS THE CONTINGENCY CROSS-TIE TO THE
MUST BE USED. IN EITHER CASE A FAILURE OF THE ARS CONDENSATE
DUMP CAPABILITY WILL CAUSE BACKUP INTO CABIN. BECAUSE OF SHORT
DURATION OF ASCENT/ENTRY PHASE IT IS VIEWED AS NOT MISSION
CRITICAL IF IT OCCURRED DURING THESE MISSION PHASES.
REFERENCES: i) RI DRAWING VS70-623201; 2) SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEM
HANDBOOK, DRAWING NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC HANDBOOK,
VS70-960102, PAGE 60ED
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INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/31/87
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 2119
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM: WASTE TANK 1 (i)
FAILURE MODE: INTERNAL LEAKAGE (WAST E TAN K TO BLADDER SEAL),
BLADDER RUPTURE
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
2) WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
3) WASTE WATER SUBSYSTEM
4) STORAGE ASSEMBLY
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
ECLSS AREA 90
CAUSES:
REACTION
CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION, CHEMICAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INABILITY TO DETERMINE FLUID LEVELS BECAUSE OF MIXING OF WASTE
FLUID AND GN2 AND CONTAMINATION OF N2 LINES, REQUIRES SEALING OF
WASTE TANK. THIS SCENARIO IS BASED ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT THE
GN2 HYDROPHOBIC FILTER PRECLUDES WASTE FLUID IN THE GN2 LINES.
NEED TO USE CONTINGENCY WATER CONTAINER (CWC).
REFERENCES: I) RI DRAWING VS70-623201; 2) SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEM
HANDBOOK, DRAWING NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC HANDBOOK,
VS70-960102, PAGE 60ED
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wINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7131187
LIFE SUPPORT
2120
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
WASTE TANK 1 (i)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE (WASTE TANK TO BLADDER SEAL)
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
2) WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
3) WASTE WATER SUBSYSTEM
STORAGE ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: ECLSS AREA 90
PART NUMBER:
B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION, CHEMICAL
REACTION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LEAKAGE OF WASTE FLUIDS INTO MIDDECK "BELOW DECKS" AREA OR
LEAKAGE OF GN2 INTO CABIN ATMOSPHERE. POTENTIALLY FATAL
CONDITION IF NOT CORRECTED BY CREW BY SHUTTING DOWN GN2
PRESSURIZATION SYSTEM BECAUSE OF UNREGULATED RELEASE OF GN2 INTO
THE CABIN ATMOSPHERE. NEED TO USE CONTINGENCY WATER CONTAINER
(cwc).
REFERENCES: i) RI DRAWING VS70-623201; 2) SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEM
HANDBOOK, DRAWING NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC HANDBOOK,
VS70-960102, PAGE 60ED
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-271
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/14/87
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 2121
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM: WASTE TANK 1 LINER (BELLOWS)(1)
FAILURE MODE: PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE WATER SUBSYSTEM
STORAGE ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/_C ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
ECLSS AREA 90
RI DWG. V070-623022
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
JAMMING OF METAL BELLOWS RESTRICTS OPERATION OF WASTE WATER TANK.
NEED TO CLOSE INLET VALVE AND USE THE CONTINGENCY WATER CONTAINER
CCWC) . ...................
REFERENCES: I) RI DRAWING VS70-623201; 2) SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEM
HANDBOOK, DRAWING NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC HANDBOOK,
VS70-960120, PAGE 60ED, 60EF AND 60EM
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7131187
LIFE SUPPORT
2122
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
312R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
WASTE TANK 1 INLET LINES AND COUPLINGS
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE WATER SUBSYSTEM
STORAGE ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: ECLSS AREA 90
PART NUMBER: V62Q0540A
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, OVERLOAD, PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION,
CHEMICAL REACTION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WASTE FLUID LEAK INTO MIDDECK FLOOR STORAGE AREA, REQUIRES
CONTINGENCY WASTE COLLECTION METHOD, MORE CRITICAL CONDITION IS
THE CABIN PRESSURE LOSS DURING DUMP PROCESS.
REFERENCES: i) RI DRAWING VS70-623201; 2) SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEM
HANDBOOK, DRAWING NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC HANDBOOK,
VS70-960102, PAGE 60ED
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/31/87
LIFE SUPPORT
2123
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
WASTE TANK 1 OUTLET LINES AND COUPLINGS
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE WATER SUBSYSTEM
STORAGE ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
ECLSS AREA 90
V62QO540A
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, OVERLOAD, PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION,
CHEMICAL REACTION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WASTE FLUID LEAK INTO MIDDECK LOWER FLOOR AREA DURING GSE (POST
LANDING/PRELAUNCH). REQUIRES SPILL CLEANUP.
REFERENCES: I) RI DRAWING VS70-623201; 2) SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEM
HANDBOOK, DRAWING NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC HANDBOOK,
VS70-960102, PAGE 60ED
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/31/87
LIFE SUPPORT
2124
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
WASTE TANK FLUID LEVEL TRANSDUCER (i)
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING, LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE WATER SUBSYSTEM
STORAGE ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
ECLSS AREA 90
V62Q0540A
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INABILITY TO DETERMINE TANK FLUID LEVEL, REQUIRES USE OF CONSOLE
CHART TIMELINES FOR DUMP SCHEDULE. CREW WOULD PERFORM SYSTEMATIC
DUMPS BASED ON GROUND SUPPORT PREFLIGHT PREDICTIONS ON CONSOLE
CHARTS.
REFERENCES: i) RI DRAWING VS70-623201; 2) SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEM
HANDBOOK, DRAWING NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC HANDBOOK,
VS70-960102, PAGE 60ED
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-275
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/31/87
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 2125
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/1R
ITEM: WASTE TANK N2 LINE AND COUPLINGS
FAILURE MODE: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE WATER SUBSYSTEM
STORAGE ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 3/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
ECLSS AREA 90
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF N2 PRESSURIZATION CAPABILITY AND NO BACKPRESSURE ON WASTE
TANK BLADDER, UNABLE TO EFFECTIVELY DUMP TANK OVERBOARD.
UNRESTRICTED RELEASE OF N2 INTO CABIN ATMOSPHERE - INABILITY OF
ATMOSPHERE REGULATOR TO CONTROL 02/N2 PARTIAL PRESSURES
YIELDS A POTENTIALLY LETHAL CONDITION DUE TO GAS DEPLETION.
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REFERENCES: i) RI DRAWING VS70-623201; 2) SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEM
HANDBOOK, DRAWING NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC HANDBOOK,
VS70-960102, PAGE 60ED
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/31/87
LIFE SUPPORT
2126
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
WASTE TANK N2 HYDROPHOBIC FILTER (I)
INTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
"I)
8)
9)
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE WATER SUBSYSTEM
STORAGE ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] c[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
ECLSS AREA 90
90V62FLI
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT ON WASTE FLUID DISPOSAL UNLESS THE WASTE TANK 1 BLADDER
HAS RUPTURED ALSO. WHEN THE WASTE TANK BLADDER RUPTURES, THE
SUPPLY WATER GN2 SUPPLY VALVES MUST BE CLOSED THUS ELIMINATING
SUPPLY TANK B, C AND D FROM USE AND EFFECTING MISSION LIFE.
REFERENCES: I) RI DRAWING VS70-623201; 2) SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEM
HANDBOOK, DRAWING NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC HANDBOOK,
VS70-960102, PAGE 60ED
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-277
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/31/87
LIFE SUPPORT
2127
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
WASTE TANK 1 DRAIN VALVE (I)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE WATER SUBSYSTEM
STORAGE ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
ECLSS AREA 90
90V62LVI7
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION, CHEMICAL
REACTION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
_A-_GE O-?W-ASTE FLUID INTO CAB_=_ATM_PHERE, RE_UIRES USE OF
FLIGHT RULES 13-17 FOR CLEAN-UP. NEED TO USE CONTINGENCY WASTE
COL_CTION METHODS. THHI_ AL_WS =ONLY 3 DAYS OF URINE= COLLECTION
DEVICES PER CREW MEMBER. DUE TO SHORT DURATION OF ASCENT,
DESCENT AND ABORT CASES, THE EFFECTS WERE CONSIDERED
INSIGNIFICANT.
REFERENCES: i) RI DRAWING VS70-623201; 2) SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEM
HANDBOOK, DRAWING NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC HANDBOOK,
VS70-960102, PAGE 60ED
u
mm
mm
==
mm
m
mm
l
m
[]
I
mm
mm
ms
z
[]
m
z
B
mm
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-278
ms
m
wi
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
LIFE SUPPORT
2128
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE :
WASTE TANK 1 DRAIN VALVE (i)
INTERNAL LEAKAGE, FAILS TO CLOSE
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE WATER STORAGE ASSEMBLY
STORAGE ASSEMBLY
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/3 AOA: 3/3
ATO: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
ECLSS AREA 90
90V62 LVl 7
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION, CHEMICAL
REACTION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE'.
POSSIBLE LEAK AT GSE DRAIN, OR VACUUM LEAK (LOSS OF CABIN
PRESSURE) IF DOUBLE FAILURE OCCURS, OTHERWISE NO EFFECT..
REFERENCES: i) RI DRAWING VS70-623201; 2) SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEM
HANDBOOK, DRAWING NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC HANDBOOK,
VS70-960102, PAGE 60ED
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-279
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/31/87
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 2129
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM: WASTE TANK 1 DRAIN VALVE (I)
FAILURE MODE: RESTRICTED FLOW, FAILS TO OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE WATER SUBSYSTEM
STORAGE ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: ECLSS AREA 90
PART NUMBER: 90V62LV17
] B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POSSIBLE INABILITY TO DO GROUND SERVICE MAINTENANCE.
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA mI
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REFERENCES: I) RI DRAWING VS70-623201; 2) SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEM
HANDBOOK, DRAWING NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC HANDBOOK,
VS70-960102, PAGE 60ED
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE".
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
v/311s7
LIFE SUPPORT
2130
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
GSE FILL QD AND PLUG (i)
FAILS TO OPEN, RESTRICTED FLOW
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE WATER SUBSYSTEM
STORAGE ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
ECLSS AREA 90
90V62TPI01
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, CHEMICAL REACTION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INABILITY TO PERFORM GROUND SERVICE MAINTENANCE.
REFERENCES: i) RI DRAWING VS70-623201; 2) SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEM
HANDBOOK, DRAWING NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC HANDBOOK,
VS70-960102, PAGE 60ED
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-281
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/31/87
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 2131
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM: GSE FILL AND PLUG (i)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO CLOSE
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) LIFE SUPPORT SUBSYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
S)
9)
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE WATER SUBSYSTEM
STORAGE ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: ECLSS AREA 90
PART NUMBER: 90V62TPI01
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, CHEMICAL REACTION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INABILITY TO SEAL LINE WITHOUT PLUG DURING GROUND SERVICING, NO
MISSION IMPACT.
REFERENCES: i) RI DRAWING VS70-623201; 2) SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEM
HANDBOOK, DRAWING NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC HANDBOOK,
VS70-960102, PAGE 60ED
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9/14/8 
LIFE SUPPORT
2132
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
GSE FILL QD AND PLUG (i)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE, FAILURE TO MATE OR DEMATE
SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDILEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE WATER SUBSYSTEM
STORAGE ASSEMBLY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
S)
9)
HDW/FUNC
/NA
/NA
/NA
/NA
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL:
ONORBIT: /NA AOA:
DEORBIT: /NA ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
B [ ] c [ ]REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
ECLSS AREA 90
90V62TPI01
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LEAKAGE DURING GROUND SERVICING, NO MISSION EFFECT.
REFERENCES: I) RI DRAWING VS70-623201; 2) SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEM
HANDBOOK, DRAWING NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC HANDBOOK,
VS70-960102, PAGE 60ED, 60EF AND 60EM
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-283
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9/14/87
LIFE SUPPORT
2133
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
GSE DRAIN QD AND PLUG (i)
FAILS TO OPEN, RESTRICTED FLOW
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE WATER SUBSYSTEM
STORAGE ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: ECLSS AREA 90
PART NUMBER: 90V62TPI00
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, CHEMICAL REACTION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INABILITY TO PERFORM GROUND SERVICE MAINTENANCE.
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REFERENCES: I) RI DRAWING VS70-623201; 2) SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEM
HANDBOOK, DRAWING NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC HANDBOOK,
VS70-960102, PAGE 60ED, 60EF AND 60EM
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/14/87
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 2134
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM: GSE DRAIN QD AND PLUG (I)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO CLOSE, INTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE WATER SUBSYSTEM
STORAGE ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
ECLSS AREA 90
90V62TPI00
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INABILITY TO SEAL LINE WITHOUT PLUS DURING GROUND SERVICING, NO
MISSION IMPACT.
REFERENCES: I) RI DRAWING VS70-623201; 2) SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEM
HANDBOOK, DRAWING NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC HANDBOOK,
VS70-960102, PAGE 60ED, 60EF AND 60EM
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-285
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9/14/87
LIFE SUPPORT
2135
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
GSE DRAIN QD AND PLUG (I)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE, FAILS TO MATE OR DEMATE
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE WATER SUBSYSTEM
STORAGE ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL:
ONORBIT: /NA AOA:
DEORBIT: /NA ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
/NA
/NA
/NA
/NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
ECLSS AREA 90
90V62TPI00
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LEAKAGE DURING GROUND SERVICING, NO MISSION EFFECT.
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REFERENCES: i) RI DRAWING VS70-623201; 2) SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEM
HANDBOOK, DRAWING NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC HANDBOOK,
VS70-960102, PAGE 60ED, 60EF AND 60EM
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT _
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7131187
LIFE SUPPORT
2136
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT".
HDW/FUNC
2/2
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DUMP LINES, FITTINGS, JOINTS AND UNIONS
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
2) WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
3) WASTE WATER SUBSYSTEM
4) DUMP LINE ASSEMBLY
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [
LOCATION: ECLSS AREA 90, AND M.D. BODY AREA 40
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LEAKAGE OF WASTE FLUIDS INTO BELOW MIDDECK AREA TRACKED BY FLUID
LEVEL LOSS IN WASTE TANK I, OR CABIN ATMOSPHERE PRESSURE DURING
WASTE TANK DUMP. THE DUMP ISOLATION VALVE MUST BE SHUT TO
PRECLUDE EITHER WASTE FLUID IN THE CABIN, CABIN PRESSURE LOSS OR
FREEZING OF FLUIDS IF THE RU_ OCCURS OUTSIDE OF THE CABIN.
THE RESULTANT ARS CONDENSATE STORAGE CAPACITY RESTRICTION TO THE
REMAINING SPACE IN THE WASTE TANK COULD EFFECT MISSION SCHEDULE.
NEED TO USE CONTINGENCY WASTE COLLECTION METHODS. THIS
ALLOWS ONLY 3 DAYS OF URINE COLLECTION DEVICES PER CREW MEMBER.
REFERENCES: i) RI DRAWING VS70-623201; 2) SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEM
HANDBOOK, DRAWING NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC HANDBOOK,
VS70-960102, PAGE 60ED, 60EF AND 60EM
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-287
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
7/31/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
LIFE SUPPORT FLIGHT:
2137 " ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DUMP LINES, FITTINGS AND CONNECTIONS
RESTRICTED FLOW, BLOCKED FLOW
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE WATER SUBSYSTEM
DUMP LINE ASSEMBLY
SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
ECLSS AREA 90 AND MID BODY AREA 40
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, LINE/NOZZLE HEATER
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
RESTRICTED DUMP FLOW. THE WORST CASE IS BLOCKED FLOW REQUIRING
USE OF CONTINGENCY CROSS-TIE CONNECTION, BLOCKAGE IS DOWNSTREAM
OF CONNECTION OR USE OF CONTINGENCY WATER CONTAINER, OR
CONTINGENCY WASTE COLLECTION METHODS BLOCKAGE IS UPSTREAM OF
CONTINGENCY CROSS-TIE. ARS CONDENSATE STORAGE IS LIMITED TO
REMAINING SPACE IN WASTE TANK 1 AND COULD EFFECT MISSION
SCHEDULE.
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REFERENCES: I) RI DRAWING VS70-623201; 2) SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEM
HANDBOOK, DRAWING NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC HANDBOOK,
VS70-960102, PAGE 60ED, 60EF, AND 60EM
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iINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
v13118v
LIFE SUPPORT
2138
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
WASTE TANK 1 DUMP ISOLATION VALVE (i)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE WATER STORAGE ASSEMBLY
DUMP LINE ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
ECLSS AREA 90
90V62LVI5
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION, CHEMICAL
REACTION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF CABIN PRESSURE DURING WASTE FLUID DUMP AND LEAKAGE OF
WASTE FLUIDS INTO CREW MODULE DURING WASTE FLUID STORAGE.
POTENTIAL MISSION LOSS BECAUSE OF NO WAY TO DISPOSE OF ARS
CONDENSATE AND THEY MUST BE SHUT DOWN TO ELIMINATE LEAKAGE INTO
CABIN. NEED TO USE CONTINGENCY WASTE COLLECTION METHODS. THIS
ALLOWS ONLY 3 DAYS OF URINE COLLECTION DEVICES PER CREW MEMBER.
REFERENCES: i) RI DRAWING VS70-623201; 2) SPKCE SHUTTLE SYSTEM
HANDBOOK, DRAWING NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC HANDBOOK,
VS70-960102, PAGE 60ED
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-289
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
7/31/87
LIFE SUPPORT
2139
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
2/2
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
WASTE TANK 1 DUMP ISOLATION VALVE (I)
RESTRICTED FLOW, FAILS TO OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
i
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE WATER SUBSYSTEM
DUMP LINE ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/2
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
ECLSS AREA 90
90V62LVI5
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION, CHEMICAL
REACTION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: ..........
LOSS OF EFFECTIVE BACKUP TO WASTE TANK DUMP VALVE; POSSIBLE
REDUCTION OR LOSS OF MISSION IF VALVE FAILS CLOSED, IMPOSSIBLE TO
DO WASTE FLUID TANK DUMP, REQUIRES CONTINGENCY WASTE COLLECTION
METHODS, NO MEANS OF DUMPING ARS CONDENSATE FORCING LOSS OF
MISSION DUE TO LIMITED CAPACITY OF WASTE TANK 1 CAPACITY.
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REFERENCES: I) RI DRAWING VS70-623201; 2) SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEM
HANDBOOK, DRAWING NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC HANDBOOK,
VS70-960102, PAGE 60ED
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-290
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9/14/87
LIFE SUPPORT
2140
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
WASTE TANK 1 DUMP ISOLATION VALVE (i)
FAILS TO CLOSE, INTERNAL LEAKAGE
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
/NA
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREi_DOW-N HIERARCHY:
i) LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE WATER SUBSYSTEM
DUMP LINE ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
ECLSS AREA 90
90V62LVI5
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PARTFAILURE, VIBRATION, CHEMICAL
REACTION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IN THE EVENT OF THE LOSS OF THE DUMP VALVE OR DURING RE-ENTRY
WHEN THE VALVE IS CLOSED THIS IS THE SINGLE ITEM TO PROTECT FROM
UNRESTRICTED CABIN PRESSURE LOSS.
REFERENCES: I) RI DRAWING VS70-623201; 2) SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEM
HANDBOOK, DRAWING NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC HANDBOOK,
VS70-960120, PAGE 60ED, 60EF AND 60EM
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-291
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7131157
LIFE SUPPORT
2141
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
QD AND TP @ HIGH CAP. FILTER (2)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE WATER SUBSYSTEM
DUMP LINE ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
ECLSS AREA 90
90V62TP130, 90V62TPI31
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WASTE FLUID LEAKAGE INTO CREW MODULE AND/OR CABIN PRESSURE LOSS
DURING WASTE TANK DUMP OR IF DUMP ISOLATION VALVE FAILS.
REQUIRES CLOSURE OF THE DUMP ISOLATION VALVE AND RESTRICTION OF
THE ARS CONDENSATE TO THE REMAINING SPACE IN THE WASTE TANK 1
WHICH COULD EFFECT THE MISSION SCHEDULE. NEED TO USE CONTINGENCY
WASTE COLLECTION METHODS. THIS ALLOWS ONLY 3 DAYS OF URINE
COLLECTION DEVICES PER CREW MEMBER.
REFERENCES: i) RI DRAWING VS70-623201; 2) SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEM
HANDBOOK, DRAWING NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC HANDBOOK,
VS70-960102, PAGE 60ED
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uINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/31/87
LIFE SUPPORT
2142
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HIGH CAPACITY FILTER (i)
RESTRICTED FLOW, BLOCKED FLOW
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE WATER STORAGE ASSEMBLY
DUMP LINE ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
ECLSS AREA 90
90V62FL3
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WASTE TANK DUMP RATES OR BLOCKED FLOW. USE OF CONTINGENCY WASTE
COLLECTION METHODS AND USE WASTE TANK 1 FOR ARS CONDENSATE DUMP.
RESTRICTED MISSION SCHEDULE IS A RESULT.
REFERENCES: i) RI DRAWING VS70-623201; 2) SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEM
HANDBOOK, DRAWING NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC HANDBOOK,
VS70-960102, PAGE 60ED
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-293
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9/14/87
LIFE SUPPORT
2143
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HIGH CAPACITY FILTER (I)
FAILS OPEN, RUPTURE OF FILTER
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE WATER SUBSYSTEM
DUMP LINE ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
ECLSS AREA 90
90V62FL3
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION, CHEMICAL
REACTION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE'.
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECTS, POTENTIAL FOR CORROSION OR BLOCKAGE OF QD'S
OR VALVES DOWNSTREAM.
REFERENCES: i) RI DRAWING VS70-623201; 2) SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEM
HANDBOOK, DRAWING NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC HANDBOOK,
VS70-960120, PAGE 60ED, 60EF AND 60EM
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE : 7/31/87
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 2144
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 2/2
ABORT: /NA
ITEM: CONTINGENCY H20 CROSS-TIE QD AND PLUG (I)
FAILURE MODE: INABILITY TO MATE OR DE-MATE, FAILS TO OPEN,
RESTRICTED FLOW
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE WATER SUBSYSTEM
DUMP LINE ASSEMBLY
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
/NA RTLS: /NA
/NA TAL: /NA
2/2 AOA: /NA
/NA ATO: /NA
/NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
ECLSS AREA 90
80V62TPI03 (MC276-0020-II01)
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, BURRING
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF WASTE FLUID DUMP OR WASTE TANK USAGE, REQUIRES
CONTINGENCY WASTE COLLECTION METHODS. MISSION SCHEDULE IMPACT
DUE TO USE OF CONTINGENCY WASTE COLLECTION METHODS AND LOSS OF
ARS CONDENSATE DUMP CAPABILITY.
REFERENCES: I) RI DRAWING VS70-623201; 2) SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEM
HANDBOOK, DRAWING NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC HANDBOOK,
VS70-960102, PAGE 60ED, 60EF, AND 60EM
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-295
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/31/87
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 2145
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY: _ _ _
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
WASTE TANK 1 DUMP VALVE (i)
SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE WATER SUBSYSTEM
DUMP LINE ASSEMBLY
\CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: MID BODY AREA 40
PART NUMBER: 40V62LV14
B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART FAILURE, IONIZING RADIATION, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WASTE FLUID LEAK INTO MIDFUSELAGE AREA. REQUIRES USE OF DUMP
ISOLATION VALVE AS PRIMARY DUMP VALVE. IF DUMP ISOLATION VALVE
FAILS COULD SUFFER CABIN PRESSURE LOSS. THE REQUIRED CLOSURE OF
THE DUMP ISOLATION VALVE RESTRICTS WASTE TANK 1 USAGE TO ARS
CONDENSATE DUMP AND USE OF CONTINGENCY WASTE COLLECTION METHODS.
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REFERENCES: i) RI DRAWING VS70-623201; 2) SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEM
HANDBOOK, DRAWING NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC HANDBOOK,
VS70-960102, PAGE 60ED, 60EF, AND 60EM
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/31/87
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 2146
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
/NA
ITEM: WASTE TANK 1 DUMP VALVE (i)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE WATER SUBSYSTEM
DUMP LINE ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION".
PART NUMBER:
MID BODY AREA 40
40V62LVI4
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, IONIZING RADIATION,
VIBRATION, LOSS OF SOLENOID INPUT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
UNABLE TO DO STANDARD WASTE FLUID DUMP, REQUIRES CONTINGENCY
MEASURES, EITHER CONTINGENCY CROSS-TIE HOOKUP OR CONTINGENCY
WATER CONTAINER USAGE.
REFERENCES: i) RI DRAWING VS70-623201; 2) SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEM
HANDBOOK, DRAWING NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC HANDBOOK,
VS70-960102, PAGE 60ED, 60EF, AND 60EM
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-297
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/31/87
LIFE SUPPORT
2147
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
WASTE TANK 1 DUMP VALVE (i)
FAILS TO CLOSE
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE WATER SUBSYSTEM
DUMP LINE ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID BODY AREA 40
40V62LVI4
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION, LOSS OF
SOLENOID INPUT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
UNABLE TO CLOSE VALVE AT END OF DUMP, REQUIRES USE OF DUMP
ISOLATION VALVE AS PRIMARY VALVE AGAINST CABIN PRESSURE LOSS, OR
USE OF CONTINGENCY WASTE FLUID COLLECTION METHODS. THE CLOSURE
OF THE DUMP ISOLATION VALVE RESTRICTS ARS CONDENSATE DUMP TO
WASTE TANK 1 QUANTITY. WASTE WATER DUMP IS STILL POSSIBLE.
REFERENCES: i) RI DRAWING VS70-623201; 2) SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEM
HANDBOOK, DRAWING NO. 6,5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC HANDBOOK,
VS70-960102, PAGE 60ED, 60EF, AND 60EM
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-298
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wINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/31/87
LIFE SUPPORT
2148
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DUMP NOZZLE (i)
RESTRICTED FLOW, BLOCKED
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE WATER SUBSYSTEM
DUMP LINE ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID BODY AREA 40
40V62TPI02
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL SHOCK, FROZEN WASTE FLUIDS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IMPOSSIBLE TO DO WASTE FLUID DUMP FROM THIS LINE IF LINE IS
BLOCKED, REQUIRES RECYCLING OF NOZZLE HEATERS OR ALTERNATE DUMP
METHODS.
REFERENCES: I) RI DRAWING VS70-623201; 2) SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEM
HANDBOOK, DRAWING NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC HANDBOOK,
VS70-960102, PAGE 60ED, 60EF, AND 60EM
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-299
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/14/8v
LIFE SUPPORT
2149
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TANK FLUID QUANTITY LEVEL SENSOR (I)
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT, OUT OF TOLERANCE OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE WATER SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL PARTS
WATER STORAGE ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
ECLSS AREA 90
90V62MT5
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, THERMAL SHOCK,
VIBRATION, IMPROPER VOLTAGE INPUT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: _....
ERRONEOUS FLUID LEVEL INDICATION, MUST RELY ON PRESSURE
TRANSDUCER OR CONSOLE CHART FOR FLUID LEVEL INDICATION AND DUMP
SCHEDULE. SYSTEMICALLY DUMP TANK TO PRECLUDE EXCESSIVE FILLING.
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REFERENCES: i) RI DRAWING VS70-623201; 2) SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEM
HANDBOOK, DRAWING NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC HANDBOOK,
VS70-960102, PAGE 60ED
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/14/87
LIFE SUPPORT
2150
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TANK FLUID LEVEL SIGNAL CONDITIONER (i)
IMPROPER VOLTAGE LEVEL
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE WATER SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL PARTS
WATER STORAGE ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FORWARD AVIONICS BAY i, AREA 81
81V75AI6, 5 VOLT DC POWER SUPPLY
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, THERMAL SHOCK,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INACCURATE WASTE TANK FLUID LEVEL INDICATION, MUST RELY ON
PRESSURE TRANSDUCER FOR FLUID LEVEL INDICATION AND CONSOLE CHARTS
FOR DUMP SCHEDULE..
REFERENCES: i) RI DRAWING VS70-623201; 2) SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEM
HANDBOOK, DRAWING NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC HANDBOOK,
VS70-960102, PAGE 60ED
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-301
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/31/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 2151 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: TANK INLET VALVE CIRCUIT BREAKER (i)
FAILURE MO_E "_ FAILS TO _MAI_ C_ED, PREMATURE OPERATION, OPEN
(ELECTRICAL) _ ..........
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
e)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE WATER SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL PARTS
WATER STORAGE ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL ML86B, CBI6
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO POWER TO VALVE FOR FLUID DUMP, NO MISSION EFFECT. THE VALVE
IS NORMALLY CONFIGURED OPEN, THUS NO MISSION EFFECT UNLESS A
SUBSEQUENT FAILURE OCCURS IN THE WASTE FLUID STORAGE TANK AND
LINES, IN WHICH CASE TANK ISOLATION WOULD NOT BE FEASIBLE.
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REFERENCES: i) RI DRAWING VS70-623201; 2) SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEM
HANDBOOK, DRAWING NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC HANDBOOK,
VS70-960102, PAGE 60ED
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REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-302
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DATE. "
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
7/31/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
LIFE SUPPORT FLIGHT:
2152 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TANK INLET VALVE CIRCUIT BREAKER (I)
FAILS TO OPEN, DELAYED OPERATION
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE WATER SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL PARTS
WATER STORAGE ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL ML86B, CBI6
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE VALVE STATUS IS NOT NORMALLY CHANGED FROM PRELAUNCH TO
LANDING, EXCEPT FOR GROUND SERVICING AND CHECKOUT. IN THE CASE
OF FAILURE DURING SERVICING IT IS A DELAY, BUT NOT CRITICAL. IF
THE FAILURE IS DUE TO SHORTING ACROSS OPEN AND CLOSE SOLENOID
CONTACTS BETWEEN ASCENT THRU DEORBIT IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THE
VALVE COULD CLOSE, THUS LIMITING MISSION LIFE BUT THAT IS ONLY IF
A SECOND FAILURE OCCURS.
REFERENCES: i) RI DRAWING VS70-623201; 2) SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEM
HANDBOOK, DRAWING NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC HANDBOOK,
VS70-960102, PAGE 60ED
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-303
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/14/87
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 2153
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: TANK INLET VALVE SWITCH (i)
FAILURE MODE: SINGLE CONTACT OPEN (ELECTRICAL), PHYSICAL
BINDING/JAMMING
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE WATER SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL PARTS
WATER STORAGE ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] BC ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
D&C PANEL ML31C, 80V73AI27
V62KO710E
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, THERMAL SHOCK,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
UNABLE TO OPEN VALVE (FOR OPEN CONTACT) DURING GROUND SERVICING.
IF CLOSE VALVE CONTACT IS OPEN, IT IS NOT POSSIBLE TO CLOSE VALVE
IN THE EVENT OF A TANK FAILURE. DUE TO SHORT DURATION OF ASCENT,
DESCENT AND ABOART CASES, THE EFFECTS WERE CONSIDERED
INSIGNIFICANT.
REFERENCES: i) RI DRAWING VS70-623201; 2) SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEM
HANDBOOK, DRAWING NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC HANDBOOK,
VS70-960102, PAGE 60ED
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INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
8/14/8v
LIFE SUPPORT
2154
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TANK INLET VALVE SWITCH (I)
SHORTED SINGLE CONTACT
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE WATER SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL PARTS
WATER STORAGE ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ]
LOCATION: D&C PANEL ML31C, 80V73AI27
PART NUMBER: V62K0710E
c[p]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, THERMAL SHOCK,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WORST CASE IS SHORT ACROSS CLOSE CONTACT, THUS UNABLE TO OPEN
VALVE AND INABILITY TO DO ARS CONDENSATE OR WASTE FLUID STORAGE
IN WASTE TANK, MUST USE CONTINGENCY METHODS. DUE TO SHORT
DURATION OF ASCENT, DESCENT AND ABORT CASES, THE EFFECTS WERE
CONSIDERED INSIGNIFICANT.
REFERENCES: I) RI DRAWING VS70-623201; 2) SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEM
HANDBOOK, DRAWING NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC HANDBOOK,
VS70-960102, PAGE 60ED
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-305
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
8/14/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
LIFE SUPPORT FLIGHT:
2155 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TANK INLET VALVE,SOLENOID (2)
SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE WATER SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL PARTS
WATER STORAGE ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
ECLSS AREA 90
90V62LVI6
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, THERMAL SHOCK,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT UNLESS ANOTHER FAILURE OCCURS. UNABLE TO :CLOSE TANK
VALVE, REQUIRES USAGE OF CONTINGENCY WASTE COLLECTION METHODS.
LOSS OF ARS CONDENSATE STORAGE IF ATTEMPT TO CLOSE VALVE IS DUE
TO LOSS OF WASTE TANK 1 STORAGE CAPABILITY.
i
z
m
ms
ms
[]
m
l
mm
m
B
m
m
ms
m
l
REFERENCES: i) RI DRAWING VS70-623201; 2) SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEM
HANDBOOK, DRAWING NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC HANDBOOK,
VS70-960102, PAGE 60ED
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/14/87
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 2156-
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM: TANK INLET VALVE, SOLENOID (2)
FAILURE MODE: OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE WATER SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL PARTS
WATER STORAGE ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
ECLSS AREA 90
90V62LVI6
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, THERMAL SHOCK,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
UNABLE TO CLOSE VALVE IN THE EVENT OF ADDITIONAL FAILURE, BUT NOT
EFFECT NORMALLY.
REFERENCES: I) RI DRAWING VS70-623201; 2) SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEM
HANDBOOK, DRAWING NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC HANDBOOK,
VS70-960102, PAGE 60ED
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-307
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:-
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
8/14/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
LIFE SUPPORT FLIGHT:
2157 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
WASTE WATER TANK INLET VALVE OPEN INDICATOR (2)
ERRONEOUS Iq_DICATION
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE WATER SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL PARTS
WATER STORAGE ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS : 3/3
TAL: 3/3
AOA: 3/3
ATO: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION".
PART NUMBER:
ECLSS AREA 90
90V62LVI6
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, THERMAL SHOCK,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIO_A_
UNAB_TO CHANGE INDICATOR VALUE, _ST RELY ON_TIP_ _ .... _z
TRANSDUCERS FOR VALVE POSITION INDICATION OR VISUAL OBSERVATION
OF DUMP.
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REFERENCES: I) RI DRAWING VS70-623201; 2) SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEM
HANDBOOK, DRAWiNGNO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC HANDBOOK,
VS70-960102, PAGE 60ED
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/14/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
LIFE SUPPORT FLIGHT: 3/3
2158 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TANK INLET VALVE INICATOR DIODE (I)
OPEN (ELECTRICAL), SHORTED, EXCESSIVE RESISTANCE
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
2) WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
3) WASTE WATER SUBSYSTEM
4) ....ELECTRICAL PARTS
5) WATER STORAGE ASSEMBLY
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [
LOCATION: D&C PANEL ML31C, 80V73AI27
PART NUMBER: A7CRI
] c [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, THERMAL SHOCK,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
UNABLE TO DETERMINE VALVE POSITION BY INDICATOR, MUST RELY ON
MULTIPLE TRANSDUCERS FOR VALVE STATUS. DUE TO SHORTDURATION OF
ASCENT, DESCENT AND ABORT CASES, THE EFFECTS WERE CONSIDERED
INSIGNIFICANT.
REFERENCES: i) RI DRAWING VS70-623201; 2) SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEM
HANDBOOK, DRAWING NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC HANDBOOK,
VS70-960102, PAGE 60ED
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INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/14/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
LIFE SUPPORT FLIGHT: 3/3
2159 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TANK INLET VALVE INICATOR RESISTOR TO MDM OF1 (I)
OPEN (ELECTRICAL), SHORTED, EXCESSIVE RESISTANCE
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE WATER SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL PARTS
WATER STORAGE ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: D&C PANEL ML31C, 80V73AI27
PART NUMBER: V62X0583E (AIR2), 5.1 KOHM
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, THERMAL SHOCK,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATiONALE:
UNABLE TO DETERMINE VALVE POSITION BY INDICATOR, MUST RELY ON
MULTIPLE TRANSDUCERS FOR VALVE STATUS.
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REFERENCES: i) RI DRAWING VS70-623201; 2) SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEM
HANDBOOK, DRAWING NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC HANDBOOK,
VS70-960102, PAGE 60ED I
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m
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/31/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
LIFE SUPPORT FLIGHT: 3/3
2160 ABORT: /NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
(ELECTRICAL)
TANK OUTLET VALVE CIRCUIT BREAKER (i)
FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED, PREMATURE OPERATION, OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE WATER SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL PARTS
WATER STORAGE ASSEMBLY
CRiTICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL ML86B, CB23
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO POWER TO VALVE FOR FLUID DUMP LINE CLEANING DURING GSE.
REFERENCES: i) RI DRAWING VS70-623201; 2) SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEM
HANDBOOK, DRAWING NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC HANDBOOK,
VS70-960102, PAGE 60ED
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-311
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
7/31/87
LIFE SUPPORT
2161
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT-.
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TANK OUTLET VALVE CIRCUIT BREAKER (I)
FAILS TO OPEN, DELAYED OPERATION
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE WATER SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL PARTS
WATER STORAGE ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: /NA. AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL ML868, CB23
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PERMANENT DAMAGE TO VALVE MOTORS, EFFECTS GROUND SERVICING
ACTIVITIES.
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
REFERENCES: i) RI DRAWING VS70-623201; 2) SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEM
HANDBOOK, DRAWING NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC HANDBOOK,
VS70-960102, PAGE 60ED
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/14/87
LIFE SUPPORT
2162
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TANK OUTLET VALVE SWITCH (2)
OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE WATER SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL PARTS
WATER STORAGE ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
D&C PANEL ML31C, 80V73AI27
V62K0715E
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, THERMAL SHOCK,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT EXCEPT DURING GROUND SERVICING FOR SYSTEM FLUSHING.
REFERENCES: i) RI DRAWING VS70-623201; 2) SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEM
HANDBOOK, DRAWING NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC HANDBOOK,
VS70-960102, PAGE 60ED
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/14/87
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 2163
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM: TANK OUTLET VALVE SWITCH (2)
FAILURE MODE: SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE WATER SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL PARTS
WATER STORAGE ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
D&C PANEL ML31C, 80V73A127
V62K0714E
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, THERMAL SHOCK,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT EXCEPT DURING GROUND SERVICING FOR SYSTEM FLUSHING.
REFERENCES: I) RI DRAWING VS70-623201; 2) SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEM
HANDBOOK, DRAWING NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC HANDBOOK,
VS70-960102, PAGE 60ED
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wINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:"
8/14/87
LIFE SUPPORT
2164
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TANK OUTLET VALVE, SOLENOID (i)
OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE WATER SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL PARTS
WATER STORAGE ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
ECLSS AREA 90
90V62LV17
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, THERMAL SHOCK,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT DURING GROUND SERVICING FOR SYSTEM FLUSHING.
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
REFERENCES: I) RI DRAWING VS70-623201; 2) SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEM
HANDBOOK, DRAWING NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC HANDBOOK,
VS70-960102, PAGE 60ED
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INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/14/87
LIFE SUPPORT
2165
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT-.
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TANK OUTLET VALVE, SOLENOID (i)
SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE WATER SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL PARTS
WATER STORAGE ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
ECLSS AREA 90
90V62LVI7
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, THERMAL SHOCK,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT EXCEPT DURING GROUND SERVICING FOR SYSTEM FLUSHING.
REFERENCES: i) RI DRAWING VS70-623201; 2) SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEM
HANDBOOK, DRAWING NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC HANDBOOK,
VS70-960102, PAGE 60ED
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/31/87
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 2166
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: TANK OUTLET VALVE SWITCH INDICATOR
FAILURE MODE: ERRONEOUS OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE WATER SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL PARTS
WATER STORAGE ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW MODULE, MIDDECK, AREA 80
PANEL ML31C, DS2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO "TELL-TALE" INDICATION OF VALVE POSITION DURING GROUND
SERVICING. SHOULD INDICATE "BARBER-POLE" AT ALL TIMES BECAUSE
CIRCUIT BREAKER IS OPEN.
REFERENCES: i) RI DRAWING VS70-623201; 2) SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEM
HANDBOOK, DRAWING NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC HANDBOOK,
VS70-960102, PAGE 60ED
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/14/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
LIFE SUPPORT FLIGHT: 3/3
2167 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TANK OUTLET VALVE DIODE (i)
OPEN (ELECTRICAL), SHORTED, EXCESSIVE RESISTANCE
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE WATER SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL PARTS
WATER STORAGE ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: D&C PANEL ML31C, 80V73AI27
PART NUMBER: A7CRI
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, THERMAL SHOCK,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT EXCEPT DURING GROUND SERVICING FOR SYSTEM FLUSHING.
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REFERENCES: I) RI DRAWING VS70-623201; 2) SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEM
HANDBOOK, DRAWING NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC HANDBOOK,
VS70-960102, PAGE 60ED
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE".
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/14/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
LIFE SUPPORT FLIGHT: 3/3
2168 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TANK OUTLET VALVE RESISTOR TO MDM OF2 (i)
OPEN (ELECTRICAL), SHORTED, EXCESSIVE RESISTANCE
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE WATER SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL PARTS
WATER STORAGE ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: D&C PANEL ML31C, 80V73AI27
PART NUMBER: V62X0580E (AIR1), 5.1 KOHM
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, THERMAL SHOCK,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT EXCEPT DURING GROUND SERVICING FOR SYSTEM FLUSHING.
REFERENCES: i) RI DRAWING VS70-623201; 2) SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEM
HANDBOOK, DRAWING NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC HANDBOOK,
VS70-960102, PAGE 60ED
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/14/87
LIFE SUPPORT
2169
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM".
FAILURE MODE:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
PRESSURE SENSOR (VARIABLE RESISTANCE BRIDGE)
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT
SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDILEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE WATER SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL PARTS
WATER STORAGE ASSEMBLY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
B[ ] cc ]REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
ECLSS AREA 90
90V62MT21 (V26PO500A TRANSDUCER)
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, THERMAL SHOCK,
VIBRATION, IMPROPER VOLTAGE INPUT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INEFFECTIVE PRESSURE INDICATION, POSSIBLE UNTRACEABLE CABIN
PRESSURE LOSS SOURCE IF OTHER MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCUR.
(i)
REFERENCES: i) RI DRAWING VS70-623201; 2) SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEM
HANDBOOK, DRAWING NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC HANDBOOK,
VS70-960102, PAGE 60ED
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/14/8v
LIFE SUPPORT
2170
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PRESSURE SENSOR SIGNAL CONDITIONER (I)
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE WATER SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL PARTS
WATER STORAGE ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: "3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
L_tNDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A C ] B C ] c [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID DECK AREA 40
40V62A23
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, THERMAL SHOCK,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IMPROPER PRESSURE INDICATION, POSSIBLE UNTRACEABLE CABIN PRESSURE
LOSS SOURCE.
REFERENCES: i) RI DRAWING VS70-623201; 2) SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEM
HANDBOOK, DRAWING NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC HANDBOOK,
VS70-960102, PAGE 60ED
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
713118v
LIFE SUPPORT
2171
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
WASTE H20 DUMP ISOL. VALVE CIRCUIT BREAKER (I)
FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED _.
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN
BREAKDOWN - :HIERARCHY
1) LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
2) WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
3) WASTE WATER SUBSYSTEM
4) ELECTRICAL PARTS
5) WATER STORAGE ASSEMBLY
6)
7)
8)
9)
SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
D&C PANEL ML86B
CBI7 (80V73AI30)
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INABILITY TO POWER DUMP ISOLATION VALVE OPEN. LOSS OF ARS
CONDENSATE STORAGE, PRODUCES CHANGE IN MISSION SCHEDULE. NEED TO
USE CONTINGENCY WASTE COLLECTION METHODS. THIS ALLOWS ONLY 3
DAYS OF URINE COLLECTION DEVICES PER CREW MEMBER.
REFERENCES: i) RI DRAWING VS70-623201; 2) SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEM
HANDBOOK, DRAWING NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC HANDBOOK,
VS70-960102, PAGE 60ED
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wINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/31/87
LIFE SUPPORT
2172
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
WASTE H20 DUMP ISOL. VALVE CIRCUIT BREAKER (i)
FAILS TO OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
s)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE WATER SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL PARTS
WATER STORAGE ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
D&C PANEL ML86B
CBI7 (80V73AI30)
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POSSIBLE BURN-UP OF VALVE SOLENOID IF SOLENOID DRAWING EXCESS
CURRENT, THEREBY PRODUCING NEED TO USE CONTINGENCY WASTE
COLLECTION METHODS OR OTHER BACKUP SYSTEMS IF SUBSEQUENT FAILURES
OCCUR.
REFERENCES: i) RI DRAWING VS70-623201; 2) SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEM
HANDBOOK, DRAWING NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC HANDBOOK,
VS70-960102, PAGE 60ED
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INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/14/8v
LIFE SUPPORT
2173
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
WASTE H20 DUMP ISOL. VALVE CIRCUIT BREAKER (i)
SINGLE CONTACT OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
\
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE WATER SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL PARTS
WATER STORAGE ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
D&C PANEL ML31C, 80V73AI27
V62K0530E
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, THERMAL SHOCK,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IMPOSSIBLE TO OPEN DUMP ISOLATION VALVE, NO METHOD OF ALTERNATE
WASTE FLUID DUMP OR ARS CONDENSATE STORAGE METHOD BEYOND WASTE
TANK. NEED TO USE CONTINGENCY WASTE COLLECTION METHODS. THIS
ALLOWS ONLY 3 DAYS OF URINE COLLECTION DEVICES PER CREW MEMBER.
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REFERENCES: I) RI DRAWING VS70-623201; 2) SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEM
HANDBOOK, DRAWING NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC HANDBOOK,
VS70-960102, PAGE 60ED
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wINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/14/87
LIFE SUPPORT
2174
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
WASTE H20 DUMP ISOL. VALVE CIRCUIT BREAKER (i)
SINGLE CONTACT SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE WATER SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL PARTS
WATER STORAGE ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS:
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL:
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
HDW/FUNC
/NA
/NA
/NA
/NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [
LOCATION: D&C PANEL ML31C, 80V73AI27
PART NUMBER: V62K0530E
] c [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, THERMAL SHOCK,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IMPOSSIBLE TO OPEN VALVE IF OCCURS DURING ASCENT BECAUSE OF BURN-
UP OF SOLENOID. NO METHOD OF ARS CONDENSATE STORAGE BEYOND WASTE
TANK, CHANGE IN MISSION SCHEDULE.
REFERENCES: I) RI DRAWING VS70-623201; 2) SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEM
HANDBOOK, DRAWING NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC HANDBOOK,
VS70-960102, PAGE 60ED
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-325
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/14/87
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDACID: 2175
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
WASTE H20 DUMP ISOL. VALVE CIRCUIT BREAKER (i)
PHYSICAL BINDING JAMMING
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE WATER SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL PARTS
WATER STORAGE ASSEMBLY
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
/NA RTLS: /NA
/NA TAL: /NA
2/2 AOA: /NA
/NA ATO: /NA
/NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
D&C PANEL ML31C, 80V73AI27
V62K0531E
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, THERMAL SHOCK,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IMPOSSIBLE TO OPEN VALVE, NO METHOD OF ALTERNATE WASTE FLUID DUMP
OR ARS CONDENSATE STORAGE METHOD BEYOND WASTE TANK CAPACITY.
REFERENCES: i) RI DRAWING VS70-623201; 2) SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEM
HANDBOOK, DRAWING NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC HANDBOOK,
VS70-960102, PAGE 60ED
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I
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/31/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
LIFE SUPPORT FLIGHT: 2/2
2176 ABORT: /NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
WASTE H20 DUMP ISOL. VALVE CIRCUIT BREAKER (i)
OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE WATER SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL PARTS
WATER STORAGE ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
ECLSS AREA 90
90V62LVI5
CAUSES'.
FIELDS
CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, ELECTROMAGNETIC
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WORST CASE IS FAILURE OF OPEN ACTUATION IN WHICH CASE CANNOT DO
WASTE FLUID DUMPS. MISSION SCHEDULE IMPACT BECAUSE NO ARS
CONDENSATE STORAGE OTHER THAN WASTE TANK AND MUST USE CONTINGENCY
WASTE COLLECTION METHODS.
REFERENCES: i) RI DRAWING VS70-623201; 2) SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEM
HANDBOOK, DRAWING NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC HANDBOOK,
VS70-960102, PAGE 60ED
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/31/87
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 2177
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT".
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
/NA
ITEM: WASTE H20 DUMP ISOL. VALVE CIRCUIT BREAKER (i)
FAILURE MODE: SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE WATER SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL PARTS
WATER STORAGE ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDiNG/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
ECLSS AREA 90
90V62LVI5
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WORST CASE IS A SHORTED SOLENOID BEFORE ON-ORBIT, THEN WHEN THE
CIRCUIT BREAKER IS CLOSED ON-ORBIT TO OPEN THE VALVE - THE
CIRCUIT BREAKER "POPS" AND THE VALVE CANNOT BE OPENED. THIS
CREATES A LIMITATION OF ARS CONDENSATE AND WASTE FLUID COLLECTION
CAPACITY TO THE WASTE TANK i, THUS LIMITING MISSION LIFE.
REFERENCES: i) RI DRAWING VS70-623201; 2) SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEM
HANDBOOK, DRAWING NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC HANDBOOK,
VS70-960102, PAGE 60ED
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/14/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
LIFE SUPPORT FLIGHT: 3/3
2178 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DUMP ISOLATION VALVE INDICATOR DIODE (I)
OPEN (ELECTRICAL), SHORT, EXCESSIVE RESISTANCE
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE WATER STORAGE ASSEMBLY
ELECTRICAL PARTS
WATER STORAGE ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
D&C PANEL ML31C, 80V73AI27
A6CRI
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, THERMAL SHOCK,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ONLY MDM OF2 DISPLAY AVAILABLE FOR VALVE STATUS.
REFERENCES: I) RI DRAWING VS70-623201; 2) SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEM
HANDBOOK, DRAWING NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC HANDBOOK,
VS70-960102, PAGE 60ED
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/14/87
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 2179
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/3
ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DUMP ISOLATION VALVE RESISTOR TO MDM OF2 (i)
OPEN (ELECTRICAL), SHORTED, EXCESSIVE RESISTANCE
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE WATER STORAGE ASSEMBLY
ELECTRICAL PARTS
WATER STORAGE ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [
LOCATION: D&C PANEL ML31C, 80V73AI27
PART NUMBER: V62X0534E (A2RI), 5.1 KOHM
] c [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, THERMAL SHOCK,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
MDM OF2 VALVE STATUS NON-EXISTENT; MUST RELY ON INDICATOR WINDOW.
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REFERENCES: i) RI DRAWING VS70-623201; 2) SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEM
HANDBOOK, DRAWING NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC HANDBOOK,
VS70-960102, PAGE 60ED
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m
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/31/87
LIFE SUPPORT
2180
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
WASTE H20 DUMP ISOL. SWITCH INDICATOR (I)
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
S)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE WATER STORAGE ASSEMBLY
ELECTRICAL PARTS
WATER STORAGE ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [
LOCATION: D&C PANEL ML86B
PART NUMBER: 80V73AI27, INDICATOR DS3
] c [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, ELECTROMAGNETIC
FIELDS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INACCURATE INFORMATION ON VALVE STATUS.
VALVE STATUS.
MUST RELY ON MDM OF2 FOR
REFERENCES: i) RI DRAWING VS70-623201; 2) SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEM
HANDBOOK, DRAWING NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC HANDBOOK,
VS70-960102, PAGE 60ED
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INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/31/87
LIFE SUPPORT
2181
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT".
ABORT"
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DUMP LINE HEATER CIRCUIT BREAKER (2)
FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE WATER SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL PARTS
DUMP LINE ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
D&C PANEL ML86B
80V73AI30, CB4 AND CBI0
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IMPOSSIBLE TO USE ONE OF THE LINE HEATERS IN THE POTABLE AND
WASTE FLUID DUMP AND VACUUM VENT DUMP, REQUIRES RELIANCE ON
SECOND HEATER FOR SYSTEMS INVOLVED. IF SECOND HEATER FAILS THEN
MUST GO TO CONTINGENCY WASTE COLLECTION METHODS OR CONTINGENCY
CROSS-TIE USAGE• IF SECOND HEATER CIRCUIT BREAKER FAILS THEN
THERE IS A POSSIBILITY OF FREEZING THE VACUUM VENT DUMP LINE AND
CREATING A POTENTIALLY EXPLOSIVE HYDROGEN GAS ENVIRONMENT IN THE
VACUUM VENT LINE.
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REFERENCES: I) RI DRAWING VS70-623201; 2) SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEM
HANDBOOK, DRAWING NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC HANDBOOK,
VS70-960!02, PAGE 60ED, 60EF, AND 60EM
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/31/87
LIFE SUPPORT
2182
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DUMP LINE HEATER CIRCUIT BREAKER (2)
FAILS TO OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE WATER SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL PARTS
DUMP LINE ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [
LOCATION: D&C PANEL ML86B
PART NUMBER: 80V73AI30, CB4 AND CBI0
] c [ ]
CAUSES:
FIELDS
CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, ELECTROMAGNETIC
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FOR THE CIRCUIT BREAKER "FAILS TO OPEN" FAILURE THERE IS NO
MISSION OR VEHICLE IMPACT.
REFERENCES: I) RI DRAWING VS70-623201; 2) SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEM
HANDBOOK, DRAWING NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC HANDBOOK,
VS70-960102, PAGE 60ED, 60EF, AND 60EM
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM'.
MDAC ID:
7/31187
LIFE SUPPORT
2183
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DUMP LINE HEATER (2)
OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE WATER SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL PARTS
DUMP LINE ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] c[P]
LOCATION. •
PART NUMBER:
MID BODY AREA 40
40V62HRI07, 40V62HR207
CAUSES: ACOUSTICS, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART
FAILURE, IONIZING RADIATION, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WITH LOSS OF HEATER, AND IF REDUNDANCY FAILS (SECOND LINE
HEATER), THEN MUST USE WASTE WATER CROSS-TIE TO CWC TO DUMP WATER
OR USE CONTINGENCY WASTE COLLECTION METHODS. IF THERE IS LINE
FREEZING THERE IS POTENTIAL RUPTURE OF LINE, REQUIRING CLOSURE OF
DUMP ISOLATION VALVE WHICH HAS A DIRECT IMPACT ON MISSION LIFE
DUE TO ARS CONDENSATE STORAGE LIMITATIONS. THERE IS A MISSION
IMPACT IF THE CONTINGENCY WASTE COLLECTION METHODS ARE USED,
RESTRICTED TO 3 DAYS' SUPPLY.
REFERENCES: I) RI DRAWING VS70-623201; 2) SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEM
HANDBOOK, DRAWING NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC HANDBOOK,
VS70-960102, PAGE 60ED, 60EF, AND 60EM
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wINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
LIFE SUPPORT
2184
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
312R
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DUMP LINE HEATER (2)
SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE WATER SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL PARTS
DUMP LINE ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID BODY AREA 40
40V62HRI07, 40V62HR207
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE CIRCUIT BREAKER "POPS" AND MUST RELY ON THE ALTERNATE HEATER
TO PRECLUDE LINE FREEZING. IF THE LINE FREEZES WILL HAVE MISSION
LOSS DUE TO EXTERNAL CABIN PRESSURE LEAK.
REFERENCES: I) RI DRAWING VS70-623201; 2) SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEM
HANDBOOK, DRAWING NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC HANDBOOK,
VS70-960102, PAGE 60ED, 60EF, AND 60EM
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-335
-% INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/31/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 2185 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
WASTE H20 DUMP HEATER LINE THERMOSTAT (4)
FAILS TO OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE WATER SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL PARTS
DUMP LINE ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [
LOCATION: MID BODY AREA 40
PART NUMBER: 40V62SI07 AND 40V62S207
] c [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
THERMAL SHOCK, ELECTROMAGNETIC FIELDS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POSSIBT._ EXCESSIVE HEATING OF HEATER LINE IF BACKUP THERMOSTAT
FAILS TO OPEN. THE UNCONTROLLED HEATER WOULD NORMALLY SET OFF AN
FDA ALARM AND IN THE EVENT THE RUNAWAY HEATER WAS NOT ANUNICATED,
THE POTENTIAL FOR LINE BOILING OR RUPTURE IS NOT CREDIBLE.
THE HEATER CAN STILL BE CONTROLLED BY THE CIRCUIT BREAKER ALSO.
REFERENCES: i) RI DRAWING VS70-623201; 2) SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEM
HANDBOOK, DRAWING NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC HANDBOOK,
VS70-960102, PAGE 60ED, 60EF, AND 60EM
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/31/87
LIFE SUPPORT
2186
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/_3NC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
WASTE H20 DUMP HEATER LINE THERMOSTAT (4)
FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE WATER SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL PARTS
DUMP LINE ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ]
LOCATION: MID BODY AREA 40
PART NUMBER: 40V62SI07 AND 40V62S207
c[P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, IONIZING RADIATION,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INABILITY TO USE LINE HEATER AND MUST RELY ON ALTERNATE LINE
HEATER. THERE IS POTENTIAL FOR LINE FREEZING IF BOTH LINE
HEATERS ARE INOPERATIVE AND RUPTURE OF LINE, THUS RESTRICTION OF
MISSION DUE TO ARS CONDENSATE STORAGE CAPACITY.
REFERENCES: i) RI DRAWING VS70-623201; 2) SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEM
HANDBOOK, DRAWING NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC HANDBOOK,
VS70-960102, PAGE 60ED, 60EF, AND 60EM
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INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 2187
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
/NA
ITEM: WASTE H20 DUMP LINE TEMPERATURE TRANSDUCER (i)
(POTENTIAL COMPARATOR)
FAILURE MODE: OUT OF TOLERANCE
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE WATER SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL PARTS
DUMP LINE ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID BODY AREA 40
40V62MT20
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, THERMAL SHOCK,
VIBRATION, IMPROPER VOLTAGE INPUT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INACCURATE WASTE WATER DUMP LINE TEMPERATURE INDICATION, POSSIBLE
LINE FREEZING IF HEATERS ARE INOPERATIVE. REQUIRES USE OF
CONTINGENCY WATER OR CROSS-TIE CONTINGENCY FOR FLUID DUMP TO
PROTECT FROM LINE FREEZING.
REFERENCES: i) RI DRAWING VS70-623201; 2) SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEM
HANDBOOK, DRAWING NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC HANDBOOK_
VS70-960102, PAGE 60ED, 60EF, AND 60EM
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
LIFE SUPPORT FLIGHT: 3/2R
2188 ABORT: /NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
WASTE H20 DUMP LINE TEMPERATURE SIGNAL CONDITIONER
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE WATER SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL PARTS
DUMP LINE ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS:
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA:
DEORBIT: /NA ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
HDW/FUNC
/NA
/NA
/NA
/NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ]
LOCATION: FORWARD AVIONICS BAY i, AREA 81
PART NUMBER: 81V754AI6
c[P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, THERMAL SHOCK,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INACCURATE INPUT TO LINE TEMPERATURE SENSOR, INACCURATE
TEMPERATURE INDICATION. REQUIRES USE OF CONTINGENCY FLUID
CONTAINER OR CONTINGENCY CROSS-TIE FOR WASTE FLUID DUMP.
REFERENCES: I) RI DRAWING VS70-623201; 2) SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEM
HANDBOOK, DRAWING NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC HANDBOOK,
VS70-960102, PAGE 60ED, 60EF, AND 60EM
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-339
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/31/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT FLIGHT: 3/2R
MDACID: 2189 ABORT: /NA
ITEM: DUMP VALVE/NOZZLE HEATER CIRCUIT BREAKER (I)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE WATER SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL PARTS
DUMP LINE ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AoA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
D&C PANEL ML86B, MIDDECK AREA 80
80V73AI30, CB65
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IMPOSSIBLE TO COMPLETE FLUID DUMP. NEED TO USE CONTINGENCY WATER
CONTAINER (CWC). USE CONTINGENCY CROSS-TIE FOR FLUID DUMPS,
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REFERENCES: i) RI DRAWING VS70-623201; 2) SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEM
HANDBOOK, DRAWING NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC HANDBOOK,
VS70-960!02, PAGE 60ED, 60EF, AND 60EM
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7131187
LIFE SUPPORT
2190
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DUMP VALVE/NOZZLE HEATER CIRCUIT BREAKER (I)
FAILS TO OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE WATER SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL PARTS
DUMP LINE ASSEMBLY
SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ]
LOCATION: D&C PANEL ML86B, MIDDECK AREA 80
PART NUMBER: 80V73A130, CB65
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE
c [ ]
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT ON MISSION OR VEHICLE UNLESS A SECOND FAILURE; E.G.,
HEATER OR VALVE SHORT OCCURS, IN WHICH CASE EXCEEDANCE OF SHUTTLE
WIRING CAPABILITY IS A POTENTIAL.
REFERENCES: i) RI DRAWING VS70-623201; 2) SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEM
HANDBOOK, DRAWING NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC HANDBOOK,
VS70-960102, PAGE 60ED, 60EF, AND 60EM
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REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-341
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
7/31/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
LIFE SUPPORT FLIGHT:
2191 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DUMP VALVE ENABLE/NOZZLE HEATER SWITCH (I)
SINGLE CONTACT SHORTED _
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE WATER SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL PARTS
DUMP LINE ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] c[p]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MIDDECK AREA 80, D&C PANEL ML31C
80V73AI27, $8
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
UNABLE TO POWER OFF DUMP VALVE ENABLE/NOZZLE HEATER CIRCUIT IF
SHORTED GROUND. THAT "POPS" CIRCUIT BREAKER AND LOSS OF WASTE
WATER DUMP CAPABILITY. NEED TO USE CONTINGENCY WATER CONTAINER
(CWC). USE CONTINGENCY CROSS-TIE FOR DUMPS, PROBABLY MISSION
W HCONTROL DECISION OF LOSS OF MISSION .
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REFERENCES: i) RI DRAWING VS70-623201; 2) SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEM
HANDBOOK, DRAWING NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC HANDBOOK,
VS70-960102, PAGE 60ED, 60EF, AND 60EM
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nINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
LIFE SUPPORT
2192
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DUMP VALVE ENABLE/NOZZLE HEATER SWITCH (i)
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE WATER SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL PARTS
DUMP LINE ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R
DEORBIT: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: /NA
TAL: /NA
AOA: /NA
ATO: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MIDDECK AREA 80, D&C PANEL ML31C
80V73AI27, $8
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF WASTE WATER DUMP CAPABILITY IF SWITCH HANDLE FAILS IN THE
OFF POSITION. USE CONTINGENCY WATER CONTAINER OR CONTINGENCY
CROSS-TIE FOR DUMPS.
w REFERENCES: I) RI DRAWING VS70-623201; 2) SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEM
HANDBOOK, DRAWING NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC HANDBOOK,
VS70-960102, PAGE 60ED, 60EF, AND 60EM
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-343
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
v/311sv
LIFE SUPPORT
2193
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DUMP VALVE ENABLE/NOZZLE HEATER SWITCH (I)
SINGLE CONTACT OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
2) WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
3) WASTE WATER SUBSYSTEM
4) ELECTRICAL PARTS
5) DUMP LINE ASSEMBLY
6)
7)
8)
9)
SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MIDDECK AREA 80, D&C PANEL ML31C
80V73AI27, $8
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
UNABLE TO POWER UP DUMP VALVE OR TURN NOZZLE HEATERS ON, MUST USE
CONTINGENCY DUMP METHOD.
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REFERENCES: I) RI DRAWING VS70-623201; 2) SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEM
HANDBOOK, DRAWING NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC HANDBOOK,
VS70-960102, PAGE 60ED, 60EF, AND 60EM
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7131187
LIFE SUPPORT
2194
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
312R
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DUMP VALVE ENABLE/NOZZLE HEATER INDICATOR (i)
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE WATER SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL PARTS
DUMP LINE ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA AT0: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MIDDECK AREA 80, D&C PANEL ML31C
V62S0541E
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE, LOSS OF INPUT,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
UNABLE TO DETERMINE IF DUMP VALVE/NOZZLE HEATER ARE POWERED
EXCEPT BY THE NOZZLE TEMPERATURE INDICATORS. IF ALL REDUNDANCY
FAILS THEN LOSS OF DUMP CAPABILITY AND CONTINGENCY WASTE
COLLECTION METHODS MUST BE USED.
REFERENCES: I) RI DRAWING VS70-623201; 2) SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEM
HANDBOOK, DRAWING NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC HANDBOOK,
VS70-960102, PAGE 60ED, 60EF, AND 60EM
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-345
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE".
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
LIFE SUPPORT
2195
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
WASTE H20 DUMP VALVE SWITCH (I)
SINGLE CONTACT OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
/NA
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE WATER SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL PARTS
DUMP LINE ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
D&C PANEL ML31C, 80V73AI27
$4
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, THERMAL SHOCK,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
UNABLE TO OPEN VALVE OR USE WASTE FLUID DUMP, MUST USE
CONTINGENCY WATER CONTAINER OR CONTINGENCY CROSS-TIE CONNECTION
TO POTABLE WATER DUMP FOR WASTE WATER DUMP. IF FAILURE OCCURS AT
CLOSURE OF VALVE THEN THE DUMP ISOLATION VALVE MUST BE USED TO
TERMINATE THE DUMP AND ONLY A SINGLE FAILURE BEYOND THAT WOULD BE
REQUIRED TO SUFFER LOSS OF VEHICLE OR LIFE DUE TO CABIN
DEPRESSURIZATION.
REFERENCES: I) .......RI DRAWING VS70-623201; 2) SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEM
HANDBOOK, DRAWING NO. 6.5;3) _RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC HANDBOOK,
VS70-960102, PAGE 60ED, 60EF, AND 60EM
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE :
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
LIFE SUPPORT
2196
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
WASTE H20 DUMP VALVE SWITCH (I)
SINGLE CONTACT SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE WATER SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL PARTS
DUMP LINE ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
D&C PANEL ML31C, 80V73AI27
$4
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, THERMAL SHOCK,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
UNABLE TO CLOSE DUMP VALVE WHEN $8 SWITCH IS TURNED ON. CABIN
PRESSURE LEAK DUMP ISOLATION VALVE FAILS. REQUIRES CONTINGENCY
WATER CONTAINER USAGE FOR WASTE FLUID DUMP AND END OF MISSION
BECAUSE OF LIMITED ARS CONDENSATE STORAGE CAPABILITY.
REFERENCES: I) RI DRAWING VS70-623201; 2) SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEM
HANDBOOK, DRAWING NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC HANDBOOK,
VS70-960102, PAGE 60ED, 60EF, AND 60EM
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-347
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 2197
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
/NA
ITEM: WASTE H20 DUMP VALVE SWITCH (I)
FAILURE MODE: PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
WASTE M_AGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE WATER SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL PARTS
DUMP LINE ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
D&C PANEL ML31C, 80V73AI27
$4
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, THERMAL SHOCK,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WORST CASE IF FAILS WHEN VALVE IS OPEN, THEN CANNOT CLOSE AND
DUMP ISOLATION VALVE IS SOLE REDUNDANCY BEFORE CABIN PRESSURE
LOSS AND POTENTIAL LOSS OF LIFE.
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REFERENCES: i) RI DRAWING VS70-623201; 2) SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEM
HANDBOOK, DRAWING NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC HANDBOOK,
VS70-960102, PAGE 60ED, 60EF, AND 60EM
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WINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
LIFE SUPPORT
2198
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
WASTE H20 DUMP VALVE SOLENOID (I)
OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
I) LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
2) WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
3) WASTE WATER SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL PARTS
DUMP LINE ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: MID BODY AREA 40
PART NUMBER: 40V62LVI4
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, THERMAL SHOCK,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WORST CASE IS IF FAILURE OCCURS DURING DUMP PROCESS AND CANNOT
CLOSE VALVE. ONLY SINGLE FAILURE (DUMP ISOLATION VALVE) FROM
CABIN DEPRESSURIZATION AND POTENTIAL LOSS OF LIFE.
REFERENCES: i) RI DRAWING VS70-623201; 2) SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEM
HANDBOOK, DRAWING NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC HANDBOOK,
VS70-960102, PAGE 60ED, 60EF, AND 60EM
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-349
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 2199
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
/NA
ITEM: WASTE H20 DUMP VALVE SOLENOID (I)
FAILURE MODE: SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE WATER SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL PARTS
DUMP LINE ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LI_OFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID BODY AREA 40
40V62LVI4
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, THERMAL SHOCK,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
UNABLE TO ACTUATE VALVE CLOSURE, CABIN ATMOSPHERE LOSS AND
POSSIBLE VEHICLE LOSS IF DUMP ISOLATION VALVE FAILS. WITH ONLY A
SINGLE FAILURE (DUMP ISOLATION VALVE) CABIN DEPRESSURIZATION,
POTENTIAL LOSS OF LIFE.
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REFERENCES:I) RI DRAWING:VS70-623201;_2) SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEM
HANDBOOK, DRAWING NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC HANDBOOK,
VS70-960102, PAGE 60ED, 60EF, AND 60EM
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wINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
LIFE SUPPORT
2200
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
WASTE H20 DUMP VALVE SOLENOID (i)
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE WATER SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL PARTS
DUMP LINE ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS:
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: /NA ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
HDW/nmC
/NA
/NA
/NA
/NA
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID BODY AREA 40
40V62LVI4
B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, THERMAL SHOCK,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INDICATION OF VALVE OPEN ON MDM OF3, "TELL-TALE" INDICATES
CLOSED. MUST RELY ON DUMP LINE PRESSURE SENSOR FOR VERIFICATION
OF VALVE STATUS.
REFERENCES: I) RI DRAWING VS70-623201; 2) SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEM
HANDBOOK, DRAWING NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC HANDBOOK,
VS70-960102, PAGE 60ED, 60EF, AND 60EM
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-351
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 2201
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM: DUMP VALVE INDICATOR RESISTOR TO MDM OF3 (I)
FAILURE MODE: LOSS OF OUTPUT ( OPEN (ELECTRICAL), SHORTED,
EXCESSIVE RESISTANCE)
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE WATER SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL PARTS
DUMP LINE ASSEMBLY
SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: D&C PANEL ML31C, 80V73AI27
PART NUMBER: V62X0539E (A2R2) 5.1 KOHM
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, THERMAL SHOCK,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
OUT OF RANGE INDICATION ON MDM OF3, MUST RELY ON "TELL-TALE" FOR
VALVE STATUS INDICATION.
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REFERENCES: i) RI DRAWING VS70-623201; 2) SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEM
HANDBOOK, DRAWING NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC HANDBOOK,
VS70-960102, PAGE 60ED, 60EF, AND 60EM
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 2202
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM: DUMP VALVE INDICATOR DIODE (I)
FAILURE MODE: LOSS OF OUTPUT (OPEN (ELECTRICAL), SHORTED,
EXCESSIVE RESISTANCE)
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE WATER SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL PARTS
DUMP LINE ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS:
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: /NA ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
HDW/FUNC
/NA
/NA
/NA
/NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
D&C PANEL ML31C, 80V73AI27
A6CR2
CAUSES:
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FALSE MDM OF3 READING REGARDING VALVE STATUS.
PRESSURE SENSOR FOR VALVE STATUS.
MUST RELY ON
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
REFERENCES: I) RI DRAWING VS70-623201; 2) SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEM
HANDBOOK, DRAWING NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC HANDBOOK,
VS70-960102, PAGE 60ED, 60EF, AND 60EM
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM".
MDAC ID:
7/31/87
LIFE SUPPORT
2203
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DUMP NOZZLE HEATER (i)
OPEN (ELECTRICAL), SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE WATER SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL PARTS
DUMP LINE ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: MID BODY AREA 40
PART NUMBER: 40V62HRI
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO HEATING OF DUMP NOZZLE, REQUIRES ALTERNATE WASTE
COLLECTION/DUMP METHOD.
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
/NA
REFERENCES: i) RI DRAWING VS70-623201; 2) SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEM
HANDBOOK, DRAWING NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC HANDBOOK,
VS70-960102, PAGE 60ED, 60EF, AND 60EM
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7131187
LIFE SUPPORT
2204
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT".
ABORT".
HDW/FUNC
312R
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
WASTE H20 DUMP NOZZLE TEMP. TRANSDUCER (2)
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT, OPEN (ELECTRICAL), SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE WATER SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL PARTS
DUMP LINE ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: MID BODY AREA 40
PART NUMBER: 40V62MTI8 AND 40V62MT23
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, THERMAL SHOCK,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ERRONEOUS NOZZLE TEMPERATURE INDICATION, MUST RELY ON ALTERNATE
COMPARATOR FOR NOZZLE TEMPERATURE. IF ALTERNATE COMPARATOR FAILS
MUST USE CONTINGENCY WASTE DUMP/COLLECTION METHODS.
REFERENCES: I) RI DRAWING VS70-623201; 2) SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEM
HANDBOOK, DRAWING NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC HANDBOOK,
VS70-960102, PAGE 60ED, 60EF, AND 60EM
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-355
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INDEPENDENT ORBITr[ _ ASSE3SMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANAl'SiS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
LIFE SUPPORT
2205
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
WASTE H20 DUMP NOZZLE SIGNAL CONDITIONER (2)
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT, OPEN (ELECTRICAL), SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
s)
9)
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE WATER SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL PARTS
DUMP LINE ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] S [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID BODY AREA 40 AND FWD. AVIONICS BAY 3, AREA 83
40V75A23 AND 83V75AI8
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, THERMAL SHOCK,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF NOZZLE TEMPERATURE READING, MUST RELY ON ALTERNATE GAUGE
REFERENCES: i) RI DRAWING VS70-623201; 2) SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEM
HANDBOOK, DRAWING NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC HANDBOOK,
VS70-960102, PAGE 60ED, 60EF, AND 60EM
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m
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
LIFE SUPPORT FLIGHT: 3/3
2206 ABORT: /NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DUMP NOZZLE RESISTOR TO MDM OF4 (HEATER STATUS)(1)
OPEN (ELECTRICAL), SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
WASTE WATER SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL PARTS
DUMP LINE ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: MID DECK AREA 80, 80V73A127, PANEL ML31C
PART NUMBER: A3RI (5.1 KOHM)
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
THERMAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE'.
LOSS OF SIGNAL TO MDM OF4 FOR NOZZLE HEATER STATUS. MUST RELY ON
THERMAL TRANSDUCERS FOR NOZZLE HEATER OPERATION VERIFICATION.
REFERENCES: i) RI DRAWING VS70-623201; 2) SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEM
HANDBOOK, DRAWING NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC HANDBOOK,
VS70-960102, PAGE 60ED, 60EF, AND 60EM
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-357
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/03/87
LIFE SUPPORT
2207
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
I/i
I/i
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CREW MODULE INTERNAL LINE AND FITTINGS
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
I) LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
2) WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
3) VACUUM VENT SUBSYSTEM
HARDWARE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH : /NA RTLS : i/1
LI FTOFF : 1/1 TAL: 1/1
ONORBIT : 1/1 AOA : i/i
DEORBIT : 1/1 ATO : 1/1
LANDiNG/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: ECLSS AREA 90
PART NUMBER:
] B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
HYDROGEN GAS RELEASE INTO CABIN ATMOSPHERE - LIFE AND VEHICLE
THREATENING CONDITION AND CABIN PRESSURE LOSS.
REFERENCES: I) RI DRAWING VS70-623201; 2) SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEM
HANDBOOK, DRAWING NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC HANDBOOK,
VS70-960102, PAGE 60EC
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9114187
LIFE SUPPORT
2208
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
I/i
I/I
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
INTERNAL LINE AND FITTINGS
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
VACUUM VENT SUBSYSTEM
HARDWARE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: I/I RTLS : I/1
LI FTOF F: I/1 TAL: I/1
ONORBIT: i/1 AOA: I/1
DEORBIT: 1/1 ATO: 1/1
LANDING/SAFING: i/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
VALVE)
PART NUMBER:
ECLSS AREA 90 (DOWNSTREAM OF VACUUM VENT ISOLATION
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
UNCONTROLLED CABIN PRESSURE LOSS, LIFE AND VEHICLE THREATENING
CONDITION.
REFERENCES: i) RI DRAWING VS70-623201; 2) SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEM
HANDBOOK, DRAWING NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC HANDBOOK,
VS70-960102, PAGE 60ED, 60EF AND 60EM
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9/14/87
LIFE SUPPORT
2209
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
i/I
i/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
EXTERNAL LINE AND FITTINGS
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
VACUUM VENT SUBSYSTEM
HARDWARE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: i/I RTLS : I/1
LI FTOFF: 1/1 TAL: I/1
ONORBIT: 1/1 _ AOA: 1/1
DEORBIT: 1/1 ATO : I/1
LANDING/SAFING: i/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID BODY AREA 40
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POTENTIAL GASEOUS HYDROGEN LEAK INTO CARGO BAY FROM HYDROGEN
SEPARATORS. POSSIBLE EXPLOSIVE ATMOSPHERE DURING ASCENT AND
DESCENT PRODUCING LOSS OF LIFE AND VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: i) RI DRAWING VS70-623201; 2) SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEM
HANDBOOK, DRAWING NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC HANDBOOK,
VS70-960102, PAGE 60ED, 60EF AND 60EM
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/03/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
LIFE SUPPORT FLIGHT: I/1
2210 " ABORT: i/I
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DYNATUBE FITTING AT CREW CABIN WALL (i)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
VACUUM VENT SUBSYSTEM
HARDWARE
SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH : /NA RTLS : i/1
LI FTOFF : 1/1 TAL: I/1
ONORBIT : I/1 AOA: I/1
DEORBIT: 1/1 ATO: 1/1
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
ECLSS AREA 90
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CABIN PRESSURE LOSS, PRODUCES _SS-0F MISSION, POSSiBLY_SS OF
LIFE IF DEVELOPED CATASTROPHICALLY.
REFERENCES: i) RI DRAWING VS70-623201; 2) SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEM
HANDBOOK, DRAWING NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC HANDBOOK,
VS70-960102, PAGE 60EC
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-361
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
8/03/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
LIFE SUPPORT FLIGHT: i/i
2211 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
VACUUM VENT NOZZLE (i)
RESTRICTED FLOW
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
VACUUM VENT SUBSYSTEM
VACUUM VENT NOZZLE
HARDWARE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: MID BODY AREA 40
PART NUMBER: 40V62TPI25
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, ICE BUILDUP
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF VACUUM VENT DUMP CAPABILITY, CREATES FES SHUTDOWN DUE TO
HYDROGEN GAS CONCENTRATION THUS LIMITING MISSION LIFE.
(POTENTIAL EXPLOSIVE HYDROGEN GAS ENVIRONMENT). DUE TO SHORT
DURATION OF ASCENT, DESCENT AND ABORT CASES, THE EFFECTS WERE
CONSIDERED INSIGNIFICANT.
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REFERENCES: i) RI DRAWING VS70-623201; 2) SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEM
HANDBOOK, DRAWING NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC HANDBOOK,
VS70-960102, PAGE 60
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wINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/o3/87
LIFE SUPPORT
2212
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE :
VACUUM VENT LINE HEATER THERMOSTAT (2)
FAILS TO OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
VACUUM VENT SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL PARTS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] BC ] cc ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID BODY AREA 40
40V62SI09 AND 40V62S209
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO PROBLEM LEAVING HEATERS ON 100%.
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
REFERENCES: I) RI DRAWING VS70-623201; 2) SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEM
HANDBOOK, DRAWING NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC HANDBOOK,
VS70-960102, PAGE 60EC
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-363
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/03/87
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 2213
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT".
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
/NA
ITEM: VACUUM VENT LINE HEATER THERMOSTAT (2)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO REMAIq_LOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
VACUUMVENT SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL PARTS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: MID BODY AREA 40
PART NUMBER: 40V62SI09 AND 40V62S209
CAUSES: ACOUSTICS, CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IMPOSSIBLE TO ACTUATE HEATER, SWITCH TO ALTERNATE HEATER LINE.
UNABLE TO VACUUM VENT DUMP IF BOTH HEATERS FAIL, WOULD CREATE
HYDROGEN SEPARATORS SHUTDOWN BECAUSE OF HYDROGEN GAS
CONCENTRATION IN SUPPLY WATER THUS LIMITING MISSION LIFE DUE TO
POSSIBLE LINE FREEZING (POSSIBLE EXPLOSIVE HYDROGEN GAS
ENVIRONMENT).
REFERENCES: i) RI DRAWING VS70-623201; 2) SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEM
HANDBOOK, DRAWING NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC HANDBOOK,
VS70-960102, PAGE 60EC
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nINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/03/87
LIFE SUPPORT
2214
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 2/IR
ABORT: /NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
VACUUM VENT LINE HEATER (2)
OPEN (ELECTRICAL), SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
VACUUM VENT SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL PARTS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 2/i R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID BODY AREA 40
40V62HRI09, 115, 209
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REQUIRES SWITCHING TO ALTERNATE HEATER. UNABLE TO VACUUM VENT
DUMP IF BOTH HEATERS FAIL, WOULD CREATE HYDROGEN SEPARATOR
SHUTDOWN BECAUSE OF HYDROGEN GAS CONCENTRATION IN SUPPLY WATER,
THUS LIMITING MISSION LIFE. POTENTIAL LINE FREEZING WITHOUT
HEATERS.
FOR SHORTED FAILURE OF THE SUPPLY AND WASTE DUMP HEATERS CAN ALSO
BE TURNED OFF BY CIRCIUT BREAKER "POPPNG" OR POTENTIAL EXPLOSIVE
HYDROGEN GAS ENVIRONMENT IN VACUUM VENT LINE.
REFERENCES: i) RI DRAWING VS70-623201; 2) SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEM
HANDBOOK, DRAWING NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC HANDBOOK,
VS70-960102, PAGE 60EC
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-365
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/14/87
LIFE SUPPORT
2215
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LINE TEMPERATURE SIGNAL CONDITIONER (I)
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT, OPEN (ELECTRICAL), SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
VACUUM VENT SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL PARTS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: /NA
ONORBIT_ 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FORWARD AVIONICS BAY 2, AREA 82
82V75A17
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, THERMAL SHOCK,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF VACUUM VENT DUMP TEMPERATURE GAUGE, NO EFFECT ON MISSION.
POTENTIAL HYDROGEN SEPARATOR SHUTDOWN AND CONTAMINATION OF SUPPLY
WATER BY HYROGEN GAS IF HEATERS FAIL DUE TO LINE FREEZING, BUT
THAT IS SECOND NON-REDUNDANT FAILURE.
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REFERENCES: i) RI DRAWING VS70-623201; 2) SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEM
HANDBOOK, DRAWING NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC HANDBOOK,
VS70-960102, PAGE 60EC
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m
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/14/87
LIFE SUPPORT
2216
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LINE TEMPERATURE SENSOR (i)
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT, OPEN (ELECTRICAL), SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
VACUUM VENT SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL PARTS
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/3 AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: MID BODY AREA 40
PART NUMBER: 40V62MT22A
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, THERMAL SHOCK, LOSS
OF INPUT, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF VACUUM VENT DUMP CAPABILITY BECAUSE OF THERMAL GAUGE
LOSS, NO EFFECT ON MISSION. POTENTIAL HYDROGEN SEPARATOR
CONTAMINATION BY HYDROGEN GAS, ONLY IF HEATERS FAIL AND CAUSING
REDUCTION OF MISSION LIFE.
REFERENCES: i) RI DRAWING VS70-623201; 2) SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEM
HANDBOOK, DRAWING NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC HANDBOOK,
VS70-960102, PAGE 60EC
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INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/03/87
LIFE SUPPORT
2217
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
NOZZLE HEATER CIRCUIT BREAKER (I)
FAILS TO OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
VA_VENT SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL PARTS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID DECK AREA 80, D&C PANEL ML86B
CB66
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO PROBLEM WITH HEATER ON 100% OF TIME.
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
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REFERENCES: i) RI DRAWING VS70-623201; 2) SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEM
HANDBOOK, DRAWING NO. 6'5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC HANDBOOK,
VS70-960102, PAGE 60EC
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I
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE :
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/03/87
LIFE SUPPORT
2218
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
i/i
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
NOZZLE HEATER CIRCUIT BREAKER (i)
FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
VACUUM VENT SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL PARTS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: I/I AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID DECK AREA 80, D&C PANEL ML86B
CB66
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IMPOSSIBLE TO MAINTAIN NOZZLE TEMPERATURE. POTENTIAL RESTRICTION
OF VACCUM VENT DUMPS AND HYDROGEN SEPARATOR SHUTDOWN BECAUSE OF
HYDROGEN GAS CONCENTRATION IN SUPPLY WATER, THUS LIMITING MISSION
LIFE. (POTENTIAL EXPLOSIVE HYDROGEN GAS ENVIRONMENT)
REFERENCES: i) RI DRAWING VS70-623201; 2) SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEM
HANDBOOK, DRAWING NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC HANDBOOK,
VS70-960102, PAGE 60EC
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM _ALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/03/87
LIFE SUPPORT
2219
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/_NC
i/i
/NA
ITS:
FAIL_ MODE:
NOZZT._ HEATER SWITCH (i)
OPEN (ELRCTRICAL)
_D _ALYST: K. BARIC_ SUBSYS T._.AD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
VACUUM VENT SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL PARTS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
_DUND_CY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
_CATION:
PART _BER:
MID DECK AREA 80, D&C P_EL ML31C
$9
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFE_S/_TIONALE:
INABILITY TO ACTIVATE NOZZLE HEATERS, NO D_PS PE_ITTED.
_STRI_ION OF VA_ _NT D_PS C_ATES _DROGEN SEP_TOR
S_TDO_ DUE TO HYDROGEN GAS CONCENT_TION IN SUPPLY WATER, T_S
LIMITING MISSION LIFE. (POTENTIAL EXP_SIVE HYDROGEN GAS
E_IRO_ENT)
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_FE_NCES: I) RI D_WING VS70-62320i; 2) SPACE s_TT_ sYSTEM
_DBOOK, D_WING NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEG_TED SCHEMATIC _DBOOK,
VS70-960i02, PAGE 60EC
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/o3/87
LIFE SUPPORT
2220
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
i/i
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
NOZZLE HEATER SWITCH (I)
SHORTED CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
VACUUM VENT SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL PARTS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS:
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL:
ONORBIT: i/i AOA:
DEORBIT: /NA ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /
HDW/FUNC
/NA
/NA
/NA
/NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ]
LOCATION: MID DECK AREA 80, D&C PANEL ML31C
PART NUMBER: $9
c [ ]
CAUSES: ND
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REQUIRED TO OPERATE HEATER WITH CIRCUIT BREAKER UNLESS SHORT TO
GROUND AND THUS NO POWER TO NOZZLE HEATER. IF CIRCUIT BREAKER
FAILS, WOULD LIMIT VACUUM VENT DUMPS AND CREATE POTENTIAL
HYDROGEN SEPARATOR SHUTDOWN DUE TO HYDROGEN GAS CONCENTRATION
IN SUPPLY WATER, THUS LIMITING MISSION LIFE. (POTENTIAL
EXPLOSIVE HYDROGEN GAS ENVIRONMENT IN VACUUM VENT LINE)
REFERENCES: I) RI DRAWING VS70-623201; 2) SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEM
HANDBOOK, DRAWING NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC HANDBOOK,
VS70-960102, PAGE 60EC
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I
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/14/87
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 2221
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM: RESISTOR TO MDM OF4 (HEATER INDICATOR) (I)
FAILURE MODE: LOSS OF OUTPUT (OPEN, SHORT)
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
VACUUM VENT SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL PARTS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID DECK AREA 80, 80V73A127, PANEL ML31C
A3R2 (5.1 KOHM)
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
THERMAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO "HEATER ON/OFF" INDICATION.
VERIFICATION OF HEATER STATUS.
USE TEMPERATURE TRANSDUCER AS
REFERENCES: 1) RI DRAWING VS70-623201; 2) SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEM
HANDBOOK, DRAWING NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC HANDBOOK,
VS70-960102, PAGE 60EC
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REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-372
i
wINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/03/87
LIFE SUPPORT
2222
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: i/i
ABORT: /NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
VACUUM VENT NOZZLE HEATER (I)
OPEN (ELECTRICAL), SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
VACUUM VENT SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL PARTS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: i/i AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID BODY AREA 40
40V62HR9
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF DUMP CAPABILITY, RESTRICTED VACUUM VENT DUMPS AND CREATES
ENVIRONMENT FOR HYDROGEN SEPARATOR SHUTDOWN BECAUSE OF HYDROGEN
GAS CONCENTRATION IN SUPPLY WATER, THUS LIMITING MISSION LIFE.
POTENTIAL EXPLOSIVE HYDROGEN GAS ENVIRONMENT IN VACUUM VENT
LINE. IN CASE OF SHORT TO GROUND, THE CIRCUIT BREAKER IS POPPED,
POTENTIAL LOSS OF LIFE.
REFERENCES: I) RI DRAWING VS70-623201; 2) SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEM
HANDBOOK, DRAWING NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC HANDBOOK,
VS70-960102, PAGE 60EC
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-373
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
LIFE SUPPORT
2223
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
NOZZLE TEMPERATURE SENSOR (I)
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT, OPEN (ELECTRICAL), SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
VACUUM VENT SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL PARTS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: MID BODY AREA 40
PART NUMBER: 40V62MTI9
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, THERMAL SHOCK, LOSS
OF INPUT, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF SENSOR OUTPUT, NO EFFECT ON HEATER FUNCTION.
REFERENCES: i) RI DRAWING VS70-623201; 2) SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEM
HANDBOOK, DRAWING NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC HANDBOOK,
VS70-960102, PAGE 60EC
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/14/87
LIFE SUPPORT
2224
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
NOZZLE TEMPERATURE SENSOR CONDITIONER (i)
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT, OPEN (ELECTRICAL), SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
S)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
VACUUM VENT SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL PARTS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: MID BODY AREA 40
PART NUMBER: 40V62A23
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, THERMAL SHOCK,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF TEMPERATURE SENSOR, NO EFFECT ON MISSION OR LIFE.
i
REFERENCES: i) RI DRAWING VS70-623201; 2) SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEM
HANDBOOK, DRAWING NO. 6.5; 3) RI INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC HANDBOOK,
VS70-960102, PAGE 60EC
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SMOKE DETECTION/FIRE SUPPRESSION SUBSYSTEM
Analysis Worksheets
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MDAC-ID
3oo1 (*)
3002
3003 (*)
3004
3005 (*)
3006
3007 (*)
3008
3009
3010
3Ol1 (*)
3o12 (*)
3013
3014 (*)
3015
3016
3017 (*)
3018
3019
3020
3021
3022
3023
3024
3025 (*)
3026
3027
3028
3029 (*)
3030
3031
3032
3033
3034
3035
3036
3037
3038
3039
3040
SMOKE DETECTION AND FIRE SUPPRESSION SUBSYSTEMS
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY
FLIGHT ABORT SCREENS
H/F H/F A B C ITEM NAME
2/IR
3/3
2/1R
3/3
2/1R
3/3
1/1
3/3
3/3
3/3
2/2
2/2
3/3
2/2
3/3
3/3
2/2
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3 fIR
2/1R
3/3
3/1R
3/IR
2/1R
3/IR
3/3
3/IR
3/3
3/IR
3/IR
3/1R
3/3
3/3
3/1R
3/3
2/IR P N P
3/3
2/IR P N P
3/3
2/IR P N P
3/3
i/i
3/3
3/3
3/3
/NA
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/IR P P P
2/IR P P P
3/3
3/IR P P P
3/IR P P P
2/IR P P P
3/IR P P P
3/3
3/IR P P P
3/3
2/IR P P P
3/IR P P P
3/IR P P P
3/3
3/3
3/IR P P P
3/3
CB, SMOKE DETN (3)
CB, SMOKE DETN (3)
CB, SMOKE DETN (i)
CB, SMOKE DETN (i)
CB, SMOKE DETN CABIN (i)
CB, SMOKE DETN CABIN (i)
CB, FIRE SUPPRESSION (3)
CB, FIRE SUPPRESSION (3)
RESISTOR (3)
RESISTOR (3)
SW, SMOKE DETN SENSOR RESET (i)
SW, SMOKE DETN SENSOR RESET (i)
SW, SMOKE DETN CIRCUIT TEST (i)
SW, SMOKE DETN CIRCUIT TEST (i)
FIRE SUPPR PRESSURE SENSOR (3)
FIRE SUPPR PRESSURE SENSOR (3)
DIODE (3)
DIODE (3)
DIODE (3)
DIODE (3)
RESISTOR (I)
RESISTOR (I)
RESISTOR (9)
RESISTOR (8)
RESISTOR (I)
RESISTOR (9)
RESISTOR (9)
RESISTOR (8)
RESISTOR AIR1 (i)
DIODE (ii)
DIODE (ii)
DIODE (9)
RESISTOR A6RII, RI2 (2)
RESISTOR A6RII, RI2 (2)
RESISTOR A6RII, RI2 (2)
DIODE A6CRI, CR2 (2)
DIODE A6CRI, CR2 (2)
RESISTOR AIR6, R7 (2)
RESISTOR AIR6, R7 (2)
ANNUNCIATOR CNTRL ASSY (2)
(*) Potential Critical Items.
C-377
SMOKEDETECTIONAND FIRE SUPPRESSIONSUBSYSTEMS(concluded)
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY
FLIGHT ABORT SCREENS
MDAC-ID H/F H/F A B C
3041 3/3 3/3
3042 3/IR 3/IR P P P
3043 3/IR 3/IR P P P
3044 (*) I/I i/I P P P
3045 3/3 3/3
3046 (.) 1/1 1/1 p p P
3047 3/3 3/3
3048 (*) i/I i/1 P P P
3049 3/3 3/3
3050 3/3 3/3
3051 3/3 3/3
3052 (*) i/I I/I P P P
3053 3/3 3/3
3054 3/3 3/3
3055 3/3 3/3
3056 (*) I/i I/i P P P
3057 (*) 2/2 2/2
3058 (*) 2/IR 2/IR P P P
3059 (*) 2/2 2/2
3060 (*) 1/1 1/1 P F P
3061 3/3 3/3
3062 3/IR /NA P P P
3063 3/3 3/3
3064 3/3 3/3
3065 (,) 1/1 1/z p p P
ITEM NAME
ANNUNCIATOR CNTRL ASSY (2)
SMOKE DETN LIGHT MATRIX-LAMPS
C&W ELECTRONICS UNIT SIREN (2)
SWITCH-FIRE SUPPR AV BAY (3)
RESISTOR (2.2K) (3)
RESISTOR (2.2K) (3)
RESISTOR (I.8K) (3)
SW, FIRE SUPPR AV BAY DISCH (3)
LIGHT, FIRE SUPPR BAY DISCH (3)
ANNUNCIATOR CNTRL ASSY (i)
_CIATOR CNTRL ASSY (I)
DIODE (3)
DIODE (3)
DIODE (3)
RESISTOR (3)
PYRO CONTROLLER (3)
PYRO CONTROLLER (3)
SMOKE DETECTOR (9)
FIRE SUPPRESSANT ASSEMBLY (9)
FIRE SUPPRESSANT ASSEMBLY (9)
PORT FIRE SUPPRESSANT ASSY (i)
PORT FIRE SUPPRESSANT ASSY (1)
HYBRID DRIVER (TYPE III) (3)
HYBRID DRIVER (TYPE I) (3)
HYBRID DRIVER (TYPE II) (3)
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(*) Potential Critical Items.
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DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
7/10/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
LIFE SUPPORT FLIGHT:
3001 " ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CB-SMOKE DETN BAY 2A/3B, IB/3A, IA/2B (CB8, 7, 7)
OPEN (ELECTRICAL), SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: J.D. ARBET SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
S)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
SMOKE DETECTION
POWER
CIRCUIT BREAKERS CB8 (MNA), CB7 (MNB), CB7 (MNC)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 2/IR RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/iR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL 014, 015, 016
33V73A14, AI5, AI6
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF ONE SMOKE DETN BAY CIRCUIT BREAKER RESULTS IN THE LOSS
OF REDUNDANT SENSING WITHIN TWO (2) A/V BAYS. WITH NO OTHER
SYSTEM FAILURES THE FIRE WILL BE SENSED BY THE REMAINING
(REDUNDANT) SENSOR. THE ABILITY OF THE CREW TO SENSE A FIRE
WOULD BE MOST DIFFICULT BECAUSE THE AIR CIRCULATION IS RESTRICTED
WITHIN THE BAY AND ONCE IT ESCAPES IT MUST CIRCULATE THROUGHOUT
THE CABIN TO BE DETECTED. LOSS OF FUNCTION HAS THE POTENTIAL FOR
LOSS OF LIFE. SCREEN B IS NOT APPLICABLE DUE TO RULE
2.3.4.b.2.a (pg 2-12) OF SPECIFICATION NSTS-22206.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-379
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
7/10/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
LIFE SUPPORT FLIGHT:
3002 " ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
CB-SMOKE DETN BAY 2A/3B, IB/3A, IA/2B (CB8, 7, 7)
FAILS TO OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: J.D. ARBET SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
SMOKE DETECTION
POWER
CIRCUIT BREAKERS CB8 (MNA), CB7 (MNB), CB7 (MNC)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL 014, 015, 016
33V73AI4, AI5, AI6
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT SINCE THE NOMINAL POSITION FOR ALL FLIGHT PHASES IS
CLOSED.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/lO/87
LIFE SUPPORT
3003
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CB-SMOKE DETN L/R FLT DECK (CB7)
OPEN (ELECTRICAL), SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: J.D. ARBET SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
SMOKE DETECTION
POWER
CIRCUIT BREAKER CB7 (MNA)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH{ 2/IR RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 014
33V73AI4
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF THIS CIRCUIT BREAKER RESULTS IN THE LOSS OF REDUNDANT
SENSING IN THE CREW COMPARTMENT. LAG IN WITH NO OTHER SYSTEM
FAILURES A FIRE WILL BE SENSED BY THE CABIN SENSOR. DETECTION OF
THE IGNITION SOURCE REQUIRES THE CREW TO USE SIGHT, TOUCH,
AND SMELL. A SIGNIFICANT LAG IN LOCATING THE IGNITION SOURCE
COULD BE EXPERIENCED SINCE NO LEFT/RIGHT ISOLATION INDICATION IS
AVAILABLE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-381
DATE"
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
7/10/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
LIFE SUPPORT FLIGHT:
3004 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CB-SMOKE DETN L/R FLT DECK (CB7)
FAILS TO OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: J.D. ARBET SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
SMOKE DETECTION
POWER
CIRCUIT BREAKER CB7 (MNA)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:- 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: PNL 014
PART NUMBER: 33V73A14
] B[ ] c[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT SINCE THE NOMINAL POSITION FOR ALL FLIGHT PHASES IS
CLOSED.
REFERENCES:
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REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-382
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/10/87
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 3005
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/1R
ITEM: CB-SMOKE DETN CABIN (CB6)
FAILURE MODE: OPEN (ELECTRICAL), SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: J.D. ARBET SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
SMOKE DETECTION
POWER
CIRCUIT BREAKER CB6 (MNC)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 2/IR RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/1R TAL: 2/1R
0NORBIT: 2/1R AOA: 2/1R
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 2/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 016
33V73AI6
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF THIS CIRCUIT BREAKER RESULTS IN THE LOSS OF THE
SENSING UNIT IN THE CREW COMPARTMENT. WITH NO OTHER SYSTEM
FAILURES A FIRE WOULD BE SENSED BY THE LEFT AND/OR RIGHT FLIGHT
DECK SENSORS. DETECTION OF THE IGNITION SOURCE REQUIRES
THE CREW TO USE SIGHT, TOUCH AND SMELL. THE ORDER IN WHICH THE
SENSORS TRIGGER AND CONCENTRATION LEVELS SHOULD PROVIDE INSIGHT
TO LEFT/RIGHT ISOLATION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-383
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/10/87
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 3006
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT'.
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: CB-SMOKE DETN CABIN (CB6)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: J.D. ARBET SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
SMOKE DETECTION
POWER
CIRCUIT BREAKER CB6 (MNC)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 016
33V73AI6
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT SINCE THE NOMINAL POSITION FOR ALL FLIGHT PHASES IS
CLOSED.
REFERENCES:
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/10/87
LIFE SUPPORT
3007
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT".
HDW/FUNC
i/1
1/I
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CB-FIRE SUPPR, BAY i, 2, 3 (CBS, 8, 9)
OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
LEAD ANALYST: J.D. ARBET SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
FIRE SUPPRESSION
POWER
CIRCUIT BREAKER CB8 (MNB), CB8 (MNC), CB9 (MNA)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH : 2/IR RTLS : i/1
LI FTOFF: I/1 TAL: I/1
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: I/1
DEORBIT: i/1 ATO : i/1
LANDING/SAFING : 2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: PANEL 015, 016, 014
PART NUMBER: 33V73AI4, AI5, AI6
B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF A CIRCUIT BREAKER RESULTS IN THE LOSS OF THE
CAPABILITY TO DISPENSE THE SUPPRESANT FROM THE PERMANENTLY
MOUNTED BOTTLE IN THE ASSOCIATED AVIONICS BAY. IN THE PRELAUNCH,
ON ORBIT, AND LANDING/SAFING PHASES BACKUP PORTABLE FIRE
EXTINGUISHERS ARE AVAILABLE FOR USE TO EXTINGUISH THE FIRE. IN
ALL OTHER PHASES, CREW MOVEMENT IS RESTRICTED THEREFORE THE
PORTABLE EXTINGUISHERS ARE INACCESSIBLE, AND THERE IS A POTENTIAL
FOR LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES".
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-385
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/10/87
LIFE SUPPORT
3008
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CB-FIRE SUPPR BAY I, 2, 3 (CB8, 8, 9)
FAILS TO OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: J.D. ARBET SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
FIRE SUPPRESSION
POWER
CIRCUIT BREAKER CB8 (MNB), CB8 (MNC), CB9 (MNA)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL 015, 016, 014
33V73AI4, AI5, AI6
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT SINCE THE NOMINAL POSITION FOR ALL FLIGHT PHASES IS
CLOSED.
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wINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/10/87
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 3009
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: RESISTOR-A2RI, A2R2, A2R3 (5.1K)
FAILURE MODE: OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
LEAD ANALYST: J.D. ARBET SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
SMOKE DETECTION
POWER
FIRE SUPPRESSION-ANNUNCIATION
RESISTOR-ISOLATION (AGENT DISCH LT)
\
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL LIAI
31V73AIAI
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD, TEMPERATURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT ON SMOKE DETECTION SYSTEM, ALL SENSORS WORK NOMINALLY.
FAILURE RESULTS IN THE INABILITY TO ILLUMINATE THE ASSOCIATED
AGENT DISCH LIGHT DURING AN ACTUAL ACTIVATION (SUPPRESSANT
DISCHARGED) OR DURING A TEST. DISCHARGE OF THE SUPPRESSANT
CAN BE SENSED.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-387
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
7110187
LIFE SUPPORT
3010
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR-A2RI, A2R2, A2R3 (5.1K)
SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: J.D. ARBET SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
SMOKE DETECTION
POWER
FIRE SUPPRESSION-ANNUNCIATION
RESISTOR-ISOLATION (AGENT DISCH LT)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: 3/3
TAL: 3/3
AOA: 3/3
ATO: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: PNL LIA1
PART NUMBER: 31V73AIA1
] B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHocK, OVERLOAD, TEMPERATURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DISCHARGE LIGHT FAILS TO OPERATE DURING AN ACTUAL ACTIVATION
(FIRE SUPPRESSANT IS DISCHARGED). IN ADDITION, THE CIRCUIT
BREAKER WILL OPEN DUE TO THE OVERCURRENT CONDITION (SEE MDAC ID
3001, 3003, 3005 FOR THE EFFECTS OF THE OPEN CIRCUIT BREAKER).
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wINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/10/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT FLIGHT: 2/2
MDAC ID: 3011 ABORT: /NA
ITEM: SW-SMOKE DETECTION SENSOR RESET ($7)
FAILURE MODE: PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING, OPEN (ELECTRICAL), FAILS
TO SWITCH, JAMMED IN MAINTAINED POSITION
LEAD ANALYST: J.D. ARBET SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
2) SMOKE DETECTION
3) RESET
4) SWITCH
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS:
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL:
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA:
DEORBIT: /NA ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ]
HDW/FUNC
/NA
/NA
/NA
/NA
c[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL LIAI
31V73AIAI
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF SMOKE DETECTOR RESET CAPABILITY FOR ANY SENSOR THAT HAS
BEEN TRIGGERED (L+3HR). THIS RESULTS IN THE LOSS OF THE SENSOR
CAPABILITY TO ANNUNCIATE A FIRE. THIS MEANS REDUNDANT
ANNUNCIATION IS LOST, BUT THE SMOKE CONCENTRATION INDICATION IS
STILL
AVAILABLE FROM EACH SENSOR. ONE CONTACT FAILING TO CLOSE IS A
SUBSET WHICH RESULTS IN THE LOSS OF TWO (2), THREE (3), OR FOUR
(4) SENSORS. THE CONCENTRATION PARAMETER IS A FAULT DETECTION OF
ANNUNCIATION (FDA) ITEM. IF POSSIBLE, THE CALCULATION OF THE
RATE OF CHANGE SHOULD ALSO BE DEVELOPED AND INCLUDED IN THE FDA.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-389
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
7/10/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
LIFE SUPPORT FLIGHT: 2/2
3012 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SW-SMOKEDETECTIONSENSORRESET ($7)
SHORTED, ONE CONTACTFAILS TO OPENAFTER CLOSURE
LEAD ANALYST: J.D. ARBET SUBSYSLEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
m
m
m
m
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY : --
I) LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
2) SMOKE DETECTION
3) RESET i
4 ) SWITCH
5)
6) z
7) ---
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 2/2 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: PNL LIAI
PART NUMBER: 31V73AIAI
] B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PROVIDES A CONTINUOUS RESET SIGNAL TO TWO (2), THREE (3), OR FOUR
(4) SMOKE DETECTORS, DISABLING THE SENSORS CAPABILITY TO
ANNUNCIATE A FIRE. THIS MEAN SOME REDUNDANT ANNUNCIATION IS
LOST, BUT THE SMOKE CONCENTRATION INDICATION IS STILL AVAILABLE
FROM EACH SENSOR THROUGH THE FDA AND CRT'S. IF POSSIBLE, THE
CALCULATION OF THE RATE OF CHANGE SHOULD ALSO BE DEVELOPED AND
INCLUDED IN THE FDA ...... _ _
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wINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/10/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
LIFE SUPPORT FLIGHT: 3/3
3013 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SW-SMOKE DETECTION CIRCUIT TEST ($8)
SHORTED, FAILS TO SWITCH, JAMMED IN OFF POSITION
LEAD ANALYST: J.D. ARBET SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
SMOKE DETECTION
TEST FUNCTION
FIRE SUPPRESSION-ANNUNCIATION
SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: PNL LIAI
PART NUMBER: 31V73AIAI
] B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE".
LOSS OF SMOKE DETECTOR TEST CAPABILITY. NOMINALLY ONE IS
PERFORMED AT L+3H TO PROVIDE EMERGENCY SYSTEM CONFIDENCE IN THE
SENSOR ELECTRONICS. LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO CHECKOUT AGENT DISCH
LIGHTS. IN CASE OF A FIRE THE AGENT DISCH FUNCTION IS
UNAFFECTED.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-391
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE : 7/10/87
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 3014
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
3/3
ITEM: SW-SMOKE DETECTION CIRCUIT TEST ($8)
FAILURE MODE: PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING, FAILS TO SWITCH,
SHORTED, FAILED IN A OR B POSITION ONE CONTACT OR ALL
LEAD ANALYST: J.D. ARBET SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
SMOKE DETECTION
TEST FUNCTION
FIRE SUPPRESSION-ANNUNCIATION
SWITCH ($8)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL LIAI
31V73AIAI
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ONE LEG OF S/F LEG OF REDUNDANCY. FOUR (4) OR FIVE (5)
SENSOR (POSITION B OR A) ARE MAINTAINED IN A TEST CONDITION AND
ANY ALARM SIGNAL WILL NOT TRIGGER THE MASTER ALARM OR SIREN.
SMOKE CONCENTRATION LEVELS ARE STILL AVAILABLE FOR ALL SENSORS.
THE AGENT DISCH LTS WILL BE ILLUMINATED AND THEREFORE WILL NOT
PROVIDE AN INDICATION OF SUPPRESSANT DISCHARGE IF COMMANDED.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/10/87
LIFE SUPPORT
3015
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE :
FIRE SUPPRESSANT PRESSURE SENSOR
FAILS TO OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: J.D. ARBET SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
FIRE SUPPRESSION
ANNUNCIATION
FIRE SUPPRESSANT ASSEMBLY
PRESSURE SENSOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH : 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LI FTOFF : 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT : 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO : 3/ 3
LANDING/SAFING : 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: ..... AVIONICs-BAY I, 2,_AND 3; AREA 81, 82' AND 83 ..........
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL sHOCK, PIECE-PART FAfLURE,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
RESULTS IN NO AGENT DISCH LIGHT INDICATION UPON DISCHARGE OF A
BOTTLE. THE DETECTOR CONCENTRATION LEVEL AND CREW SENSES WILL
PROVIDE INSIGHT TO AGENT DISCHARGE.
AFFECTED BAY.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-393
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/10/87
LIFE SUPPORT
3016
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FIRE SUPPRESSANT PRESSURE SENSOR
PREMATURE OPERATION, ERRONEOUS OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: J.D. ARBET
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
FIRE SUPPRESSION
ANNUNCIATION
FIRE SUPPRESSANT ASSEMBLY
PRESSURE SENSOR
SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AVIONICS BAY I, 2, AND 3; AREA 81, 82, AND 83
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALEi
PROVIDES A FALSE INDICATION OF FIRE SUPPRESSANT DISCHARGE. AFTER
VERIFICATION OF FALSE INDICATION, A SUBSEQUENT REQUIREMENT TO
DISCHARGE THE BOTTLE COULD BE MONITORED VIA OTHER MEANS (PIC CAP
VOLTAGE, CONCENTRATION LEVEL CHANGES, CREW SENSES).
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REFERENCES:
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wINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/10/87
LIFE SUPPORT
3017
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE-A4CRI, A4CR2, A4CR3
OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
LEAD ANALYST: J.D. ARBET SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
SMOKE DETECTION
RESET
DIODE-ISOLATION (PRE FLT BUS RESET)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL LIAI
31V73AIAI
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD, TEMPERATURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF SMOKE DETECTOR RESET CAPABILITY FOR TWO (2), THREE (3),
OR FOUR (4) SENSORS (A4CR2, CR3, OR CRI), IF THEY HAVE BEEN
TRIGGERED. THIS RESULTS IN THE LOSS OF THE SENSOR CAPABILITY TO
ANNUNCIATE A FIRE. THIS CASE CAN EXIST AFTER A TEST IS
PERFORMED (L+3HR) AND REDUNDANT ANNUNCIATION IS LOST. SMOKE
CONCENTRATION IS STILL AVAILABLE AS AN OUTPUT TO THE FDA AND
CRT'S. MISSION TERMINATION SHOULD BE CONSIDERED BECAUSE THE NEXT
FAILURE HAS THE POTENTIAL FOR LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO THE
INABILITY TO ANNUNCIATE AN INCIPIENT FIRE.
REFERENCES:
w
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-395
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/lO/87
LIFE SUPPORT
3018
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE-A4CRI, A4CR2, A4CR3
SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: J.D. ARBET SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
2) SMOKE DETECTION
3) RESET
DIODE-ISOLATION (PRE FLT BUS RESET)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL LIAI
31V73AIAI
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, TEMPERATURE, OVERLOAD, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT, ISOLATION OF THE THREE SMOKE DETECTOR RESET CIRCUITS
IS MAINTAINED.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/1o/87
LIFE SUPPORT
3019
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FlrNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE-A3CRI, A3CR2, A3CR3
OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
LEAD ANALYST: J.D. ARBET SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
SMOKE DETECTION
PRE FIT BUS RESET
DIODE-ISOLATION (ONBOARD RESET)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL LIAI
31V73AIAI
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, TEMPERATURE, OVERLOAD, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT, ISOLATION OF THE THREE SMOKE DETECTOR RESET CIRCUITS
IS MAINTAINED. SUBSEQUENT ATTEMPTS TO RESET FROM THE PREFLIGHT
BUS DURING VEHICLE TURNAROUND WILL EXPOSE THE FAILURE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-397
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT OR_[_[R ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM AI_LYSIS WORKSHEET
7/10/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
LIFE SUPPORT FLIGHT:
3020 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: DIODE-A3CRI, A3CR2, A3CR3
FAILURE MODE: SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: J.D. ARBET SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
i i
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
SMOKE DETECTION
PRE FIT BUS RESET
DIODE-ISOLATION (ONBOARD RESET)
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/3 AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL LIAI
31V73AIAI
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, TEMPERATURE, OVERLOAD, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT, IF THE RESET SWITCH IS CLOSED A MOMENTARY CONNECTION
OF MAIN BUSES OCCURS BUT EACH CIRCUIT HAS A THREE (3) AMP CIRCUIT
BREAKER TO PROTECT THE BUSES IF A SHORT TO GROUND EXISTS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-_98 ORIGINAL PAGE IS
OF POOR QUALITY
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mINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
711o187
LIFE SUPPORT
- 3021
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR-AIR12
OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
LEAD ANALYST: J.D. ARBET SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
s)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
SMOKE DETECTION -
TEST POWER
DIODE-ISOLATION (CNTL BC3 CURRENT LIMIT}
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL LIAI
31V73AIAI
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, TEMPERATURE, OVERLOAD, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF SMOKE DETECTOR TEST CAPABILITY, NO OTHER IMPACT.
NOMINALLY A TEST IS PERFORMED AT L+3H TO PROVIDE EMERGENCY SYSTEM
CONFIDENCE IN THE SENSOR ELECTRONICS. ACTUAL CAPABILITY FOR
SMOKE DETECTION AND FIRE SUPPRESSION IS NOT AFFECTED.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-399
_NDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/10/87
LIFE SUPPORT
3022
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR-AIR12
SHORTED, SHORTED TO GROUND
LEAD ANALYST: J.D. ARBET SUBSYS LEAD: M.J° SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
SMOKE DETECTION
TEST POWER
DIODE-ISOLATION (CNTL BC3 CURRENT LIMIT)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL LIAI
31V73AIAI
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, TEMPERATURE, OVERLOAD, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF SMO_ DETECTOR TEST CAPABILITY, NO OTHER IMPACTS.
NOMINALLY A_TEST IS PERFOP/_q) A-TL+3H TO PROVIDEEME_GENCY SYSTEM
CONFIDENCE IN THE SENSOR ELECTRONICS. ACTUAL CAPABILITY FOR
SMOKE DETECTION AND FIRE SUPPRESSION ISNOT AFFECTED_pQSSIBL_
LOSS OF CNTL BC3 (SEE EPD&C FMEA).
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REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-400 m
mm
wINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE :
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/10/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
LIFE SUPPORT FLIGHT: 3/3
3023 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
(5. iK)
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR A6R2, R4, R6, R8, RI0, RI4, RI6, RI8, R20
OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
LEAD ANALYST: J.D. ARBET SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
s)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
SMOKE DETECTION
STATUS INDICATION
RESISTOR-ISOLATION (SMOKE DETN TM EXCEPT PAYLOAD)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION :
PART NUMBER:
PNL LIAI
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD, TEMPERATURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF SMOKE DETECTOR TELEMETRY ALARM DISCRETE SIGNAL. THE
ONBOARD SYSTEM IS UNAFFECTED AND ANNUNCIATES NORMALLY ANY FIRE
SITUATION.
REFERENCES".
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-401
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE".
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/10/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
LIFE SUPPORT FLIGHT: 3/IR
3024 ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM".
(5.1K)
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR A6R4, R6, RS, RI0, RI4, Rl6, RI8, R20
SHORTED, SHORTED TO GROUND
LEAD ANALYST: J.D. ARBET
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
SMOKE DETECTION
STATUS INDICATION
RESISTOR-ISOLATION (SMOKE DETN TM EXCEPT PAYLOAD)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/iR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL LIAI
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD, TEMPERATURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE GROUNDED RESISTOR WILL DRAW HIGH CURRENTS NOT ALLOWING THE
C&W TO ALARM DURING AN INCIPIENT FIRE. THIS RENDERS ONE LEG OF
REDUNDANCY INOPERABLE. THE SMOKE CONCENTRATION FDA WILL OPERATE
AND THE REDUNDANT SMOKE DETECTOR WORKS. HOWEVER, LOSS OF
LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUNDANCIES HAS THE POTENTIAL FOR LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES:
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REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-402
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/22/87
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 3025
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/1R
ITEM: RESISTOR A6R2 (CABIN)
FAILURE MODE: SHORTED, SHORTED TO GROUND
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
SMOKE DETECTION
STATUS INDICATION
RESISTOR-ISOLATION (CABIN SMOKE DETECTOR)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 2/1R RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/1R TAL: 2/1R
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/1R
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 2/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL LIAI
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD, TEMPERATURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF CABIN SMOKE DETECTOR C&W. THE FLIGHT DECK DETECTORS HAVE
ONLY THE SMOKE CONCENTRATION FDA TO ALERT THEM OF AN INCIPIENT
FIRE. LOSS OF REDUNDANCY (UNLIKE) HAS THE POTENTIAL FOR LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-403
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/10/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
LIFE SUPPORT FLIGHT: 3/3
3026 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
(12K)
FAILURE MODE :
RESISTOR A6RI, R3, RS, R7, R9, RI3, RIS, RI7, RI9
OPEN (ELECTRICAL), SHORTED, SHORTED TO GROUND
LEAD ANALYST: J.D. ARBET SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
SMOKE DETECTION
STATUS INDICATION
RESISTOR-ISOLATION (CABIN SMOKE DETECTOR)
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/3 AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL LIAI
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD, TEMPERATURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: .............
THE TELEMETRY ALARM DISCRETE SIGNAL IS EITHER LOST OR BIASED.
THE ONBOARD SYSTEM IS UNAFFECTED AND REACTS NORMALLY TO ANY FIRE
SITUATION.
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REFERENCES:
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REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-404
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/10/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
LIFE SUPPORT FLIGHT: 3/IR
3027 ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM:
(I.2K)
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR AIR1, R2, R3, R4, R5, R8, R9, RI0, RII
OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
LEAD ANALYST: J.D. ARBET SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
SMOKE DETECTION
SIREN INPUT
RESISTOR-ISOLATION (SMOKE DETN SIREN)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/1R RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL LIAI
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD, TEMPERATURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ONE SMOKE DETECTOR MASTER ALARM/SIREN INDICATION. THE
REDUNDANT STATUS LIGHT INDICATION WILL STILL ILLUMINATE. SMOKE
CONCENTRATION ALARM, TELEMETRY INDICATION, AND CABIN DISPLAY ARE
STILL AVAILABLE. LOSS OF FUNCTION HAS THE POTENTIAL FOR LOSS
OF LIFE/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-405
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/10/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT FLIGHT: 3/IR
MDAC ID: 3028 ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM: RESISTOR AIR2, R3, R4, R5, R8, R9, RI0, RII (I.2K)
FAILURE MODE: SHORTED, SHORTEDTO GROUND
LEAD ANALYST: J.D. ARBET SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
SMOKE DETECTION
SIREN INPUT
RESISTOR-ISOLATION (SMOKE DETN SIREN)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/1R RTLS: 3/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL LIAI
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE GROUNDED RESISTOR WILL DRAW A HIGH CURRENT NOT ALLOWING
STATUS LIGHT INDICATION OR TH-E c&W TO A_ DURING _ INciPiENT
FIRE. THIS RENDERS ONE LEG OF REDUNDANCY INOPERABLE. THE SMOKE
CONCENTRATION FDA WILL OPERATE AND THE REDUNDANT SMOKE DETECTOR
WORKS. HOWEVER, LOSS OF LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUNDANCIES HAS THE
POTENTIAL FOR LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9/22/87
LIFE SUPPORT
3029
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 2/IR
ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR AIR1
SHORTED, SHORTED TO GROUND
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
2) SMOKE DETECTION
3) SIREN INPUT
4) RESISTOR-CABIN C&W
5)
6)
?)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 2/IR RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL LIAI
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF CABIN SMOKE DETECTOR C&W. THE FLIGHT DECK DETECTORS HAVE
ONLY THE SMOKE CONCENTRATION FDA TO ALERT THEM OF AN INCIPIENT
FIRE. LOSS OF REDUNDANCY (UNLIKE) HAS THE POTENTIAL FoR LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-407
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/1o/87
LIFE SUPPORT
3030
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE AICRI, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, I0, II
OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
LEAD ANALYST: J.D. ARBET SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
SMOKE DETECTION
SIREN INPUT
DIODE-ISOLATION (SMOKE DETN SIREN)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/1R RTLS: 3/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL LIAI
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD, TEMPERATURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ONE SMOKE DETECTOR MASTER ALARM/SIREN INDICATION. THE
ASSOCIATED STATUS LIGHT INDICATION WILL ST_LL ILLUMINATE AND_THE
SENSOR CONCENTRATION PARAMETER IS AVAILABLE. LOSS OF FUNCTION
HAS THE POTENTIAL FOR LOSS OF LIFE.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7110187
LIFE SUPPORT
3031
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT".
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE AICRI, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, i0, ii
SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: J.D. ARBET SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
SMOKE DETECTION
SIREN INPUT
DIODE-ISOLATION (SMOKE DETN SIREN)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL LIAI
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD, TEMPERATURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
GROUNDED DIODE HAS NO EFFECT.
SENT.
THE ALARM WILL WORK IF A SIGNAL IS
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-409
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM_ALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
9/22/87
LIFE SUPPORT
3032
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/_C
3/1R
3/IR
ITEM:
FAIL_ MODE:
DIODE AICRI, 2, 3, 4, 5, 8, 9, i0, ii
SHORTED TO GROUND
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
B_AK_WN HIERARCHY:
i) LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
2) SMO_ DETE_ION
3) STA_S INDICATION
4) DIODE-ISO_TION
5)
6)
?)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/_C
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RT_: 3/IR
LI_OFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
_DING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUND_CY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
_CATION:
PART _BER:
CAUSES: MEC_ICAL SHOCK, TEMPERATU_, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SIgN AND LIGHTS WILL NOT WO_ FOR FAILED DIODE SEGMENT OR ANY
O_ER SEGMENT IN SERIES WITH THIS ONE (AICRI, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 WITH
TONE A, AND AICR7, 8, 9, i0, ii WITH TONE B). REDUNDANT SENSORS
_CIATED WI_ D_FE_NT TO_S. _SS OF _NCTION MAY
LEAD TO _SS OF LIFE.
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REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-410
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wINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/10/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 3033 " ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR A6R!I, RI2 (I.2K)
OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
LEAD ANALYST: J.D. ARBET SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
SMOKE DETECTION
LIGHT INPUT
RESISTOR-ISOLATION (SMOKE DETN LT-PAYLOAD)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF:- 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL LIAI
31V73AIAI
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD, TEMPERATURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF REDUNDANT SIGNAL TO ILLUMINATE THE PAYLOAD LIGHT (PNL
LIAI). THE MASTER ALARM/SIREN INDICATION IS UNAFFECTED AND THE
REDUNDANT SIGNAL SHOULD ILLUMINATE THE LIGHT. THE PANEL R7 LIGHT
AND TELEMETRY SIGNAL ARE UNAFFECTED.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-411
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/10/87
LIFE SUPPORT
3034
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR A6RII, RI2 (I.2K)
SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: J.D. ARBET SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
SMOKE DETECTION
LIGHT INPUT
RESISTOR-ISOLATION (SMOKE DETN LIGHT-PAYLOAD)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: 31V73AIAI
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD, TEMPERATURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: ....
LOSS OF REDUND_ SIGNAL TO ACTIVATE THE MASTER ALARM _D SIREN
CIRCUITS AND TO ILLUMINATE THE PAYLOAD LIGHT. IF EITHER A6RII OR
A6RI2 SHORT, THE MOST PROBABLE EFFECT WILL BE THE LOSS OF THE
AMPLIFIER 30V73AI7 IN ACA NO. 2 AND LOSS OF PAYLOAD
ANNUNCIATION IN THE CABIN PANEL (LIA1). LOSS OF LIKE AND UNLIKE
REDUNDANCY HAS THE POTENTIAL FOR LOSS OF LIFE.
REFERENCES:
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REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-412 i
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9/22/87
LIFE SUPPORT
3035
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR A6RII, RI2 (I.2K)
SHORT TO GROUND
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
2) SMOKE DETECTION
3) LIGHT INPUT
4) RESISTOR
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
SUBSYS LEAD: M,J. SAIIDI
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/1R RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO INDICATION OF FIRE WILL OCCUR. THE GROUNDED RESISTOR WILL
DRAIN THE SYSTEM WHICH IS ACTIVATED BY THE SMOKE ALARM.
REDUNDANT SIGNAL (DIFFERENT LEG) WILL ACTIVATE THE FIRE ALARM.
LOSS OF FUNCTION HAS THE POTENTIAL FOR LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-413
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/10/87
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 3036
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM: DIODE A6CRI, CR2
FAILURE MODE: OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
LEAD ANALYST: J.D. ARBET SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
SMOKE DETECTION
LIGHT INPUT
DIODE-ISOLATION (SMOKE DETN LIGHT-PAYLOAD)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD, TEMPERATURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF REDUNDANT SIGNAL TO ILLUMINATE THE PAYLOAD LIGHT (PNL
LIA1). THE MASTER ALARM/SIREN INDICATION IS UNAFFECTED AND THE
REDUNDANT SIGNAL SHOULD ILLUMINATE. LOSS OF LIKE AND UNLIKE
REDUNDANCY HAS THE POTENTIAL FOR LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE ......
REFERENCES:
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REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-414
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
711o187
LIFE SUPPORT
3037
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE A6CRI, CR2
SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: J.D. ARBET SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
SMOKE DETECTION
LIGHT INPUT
DIODE-ISOLATION (SMOKE DETN LIGHT-PAYLOAD)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD, TEMPERATURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT CIRCUIT OPERATES AS IF NO FAILURE EXISTS.
ISOLATION IS LOST.
CIRCUIT A/B
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-415
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/10/87
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 3038
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: RESISTOR AIR6, R7 (12K)
FAILURE MODE: OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
LEAD ANALYST: J.D. ARBET SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
SMOKE DETECTION
ALARM INPUT
RESISTOR-BLEED (SMOKE DETN LIGHT AND SIREN PAYLOAD)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL LIAI
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD, TEMPERATURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO MAJOR EFFECT. THE RESISTOR IS USED TO HOLD SMALL VOLTAGE
SIGNALS TO ZERO WHEN THE SENSORS ARE NOT INDICATING FIRE.
POSSIBILITIES COULD EXIST FOR NUISANCE TRIGGERS OF THE SYSTEM.
REFERENCES:
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REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-416
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/10/87
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 3039
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT"
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
ITEM: RESISTOR AIR6, R7 (12K)
FAILURE MODE: SHORTED, SHORTED TO GROUND
LEAD ANALYST: J.D. ARBET SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
SMOKE DETECTION
ALARM INPUT
RESISTOR-BLEED (SMOKE DETN LIGHT AND SIREN PAYLOAD)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION".
PART NUMBER:
PNL LIAI
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD, TEMPERATURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO INDICATION OF FIRE WILL OCCUR. THE GROUNDED RESISTOR WILL
DRAIN THE SYSTEM WHICH IS ACTIVATED BY THE SMOKE ALARM. THE
REDUNDANT SIGNAL (DIFFERENT LEG) WILL ACTIVATE THE FIRE ALARM.
LOSS OF FUNCTION MAY LEAD TO A FIRE WITH A POTENTIAL FOR LOSS OF
LIFE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-417
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/10/87
LIFE SUPPORT
3040
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ANNUNCIATOR CONTROL ASSEMBLY (ACA) i AND 2
OPEN (ELECTRICAL), LOSS OF OUTPUT, SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: J'D. ARBET SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
SMOKE DETECTION
ACA
LAMP DRIVER (SMOKE DETN LTS)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AREA 30
36V73AI6, 17
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD, TEMPERATURE,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF FIRE SENSOR LIGHT INDICATION. UPON AN ALARM, THE SENSOR
OUTPUT CAN BE VERIFIED BY MONITORING THE CONCENTRATION PARAMETER
READOUTS ON THE CRT DISPLAY.
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[]
t I
u
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
 11o18 
LIFE SUPPORT
3041
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ANNUNCIATOR CONTROL ASSEMBLY (ACA) 1 AND 2
PREMATURE OPERATION
LEAD ANALYST: J.D. ARBET SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
SMOKE DETECTION
ACA
LAMP DRIVER (SMOKE DETN LTS)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AREA 30
36V73AI6, 17
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, ELECTROMAGNETIC FIELDS,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FALSE FIRE SENSOR LIGHT INDICATION. LIGHT WILL NOT BE
ACCOMPANIED WITH A TONE AND VERIFICATION CAN BE OBTAINED BY
MONITORING THE CONCENTRATION PARAMETER READOUTS ON THE CRT
DISPLAY.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-419
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
mm
DATE: 7/10/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT FLIGHT: 3/IR
MDAC ID: 3042 ABORT: 3/IR u
ITEM: SMOKE DETECTION LIGHT MATRIX-LAMPS
FAILURE MODE: PARTIAL OUTPUT, OPEN (ELECTRICAL), LOSS OF OUTPUT,
SHORTED
SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDILEAD ANALYST: J.D. ARBET
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
2) SMOKE DETECTION
3) LIGHT MATRIX
4) LAMP
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/1R RTLS: 3/!R
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/1R
B [ P ] C [ P ]REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
PNL LIAILOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD, TEMPERATURE,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ONE LAMP WITHIN A FIRE SENSOR LIGHT INDICATION. UPON AN
ALARM, SECOND LAMP WILL ANNUNCIATE THE PROBLEM. AUDIO ALARM AND
SMOKE CONCENTRATION FDA ARE UNLIKE REDUNDANCY. LOSS OF ALL
FUNCTION HAS THE POTENTIAL FOR LOSS OF LIFE DUE TO REACTION
TIME DELAY IN APPRAISING FIRE SITUATION.
REFERENCES-.
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REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-420
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wINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE'.
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
LIFE SUPPORT FLIGHT: 3/IR
3043 ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
OUTPUT
C&W ELECTRONICS UNIT SIREN A & B
PREMATURE, OPERATION, ERRONEOUS OUTPUT, LOSS OF
LEAD ANALYST: J.D. ARBET SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
I)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
SMOKE DETECTION
C&W ELECTRONICS UNIT
SIREN
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
3/IR
3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] c[p]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AVIONICS BAY 3A AREA 83
83V73A4
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD, TEMPERATURE,
ELECTROMAGNETIC FIELDS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF EMERGENCY SYSTEM SIRE OUTPUT. VISUAL ANNUNCIATIONAND
SMOKE CONCENTRATION FDA ARE UNLIKE REDUNDANCY. LOSS OF FUNCTION
HAS THE POTENTIAL FOR LOSS OF LIFE DUE TO REACTION DELAY IN
APPRAISING FIRE SITUATION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-421
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
LIFE SUPPORT FLIGHT: I/i
3044 ABORT: I/i
ITEM:
(Sl, 2, 3)
FAILURE MODE:
TO SWITCH
SWITCH-FIRE SUPPRESSION AV BAY i, 2, 3 ARM/SAFE
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING, OPEN (ELECTRICAL), FAILS
LEAD ANALYST: J.D. ARBET SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
I) LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
2 ) FIRE SUPPRESSION
3 ) SWITCH
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH : 2/IR RTLS : i/1
LI FTO FF : I/1 TAL: i/1
ONORBIT : 2/IR AOA : i/i
DEORBIT : I/! ATO : i/i
LANDING/SAFING : 2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] c[p]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL LIAI
31V73AIAI
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF THE COMPONENT RESULTS IN THE LOSS OF THE CAPABILITY TO
DISPENSE SUPPRESSANT INTO THE AVIONICS BAY. IN THE PRELAUNCH,
ONORBIT, AND LANDING/SAFING PHASES REDUNDANT PORTABLE FIRE
BOTTLES ARE AVAILABLE FOR USE TO EXTINGUISH A FIRE. IN THE
OTHER PHASES, CREW MOVEMENT IS RESTRICTED THEREFORE THE PORTABLE
EXTINGUISHERS ARE INACCESSABLE. LOSS OF REDUNDANCY HAS THE
POTENTIAL FOR LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES".
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REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-422
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wDATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
7/2o/87
LIFE SUPPORT
3045
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR-NO IDENTIFIER (2.2K)
OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
LEAD ANALYST: J.D. ARBET SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
FIRE SUPPRESSION
RESISTOR-ISOLATION (SUPPRESSANT ARM TM)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AVIONICS BAY-LCA 2, 3, I/AREA 82, 83, 81
PART NUMBER: 82V76AI7
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD, TEMPERATURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF TELEMETRY DISCRETE FOR ARM FUNCTION STATUS. THE ONBOARD
SYSTEM IS UNAFFECTED AND REACTS NORMALLY AND THE CAPACITOR
VOLTAGE PARAMETER PROVIDES AN INDICATION OF STATUS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-423
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
7/2o/ 7 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
LIFE SUPPORT FLIGHT:
3046 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
i/i
i/i
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR-NO IDENTIFIER (2.2K)
SHORTED, SHORTED TO GROUND
LEAD ANALYST: J.D. ARBET SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
FIRE SUPPRESSION
RESISTOR-ISOLATION (SUPPRESSANT ARM TM)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 2/IR RTLS : I/1
LI_OFF: I/1 TAL: I/1
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: I/1
DEORBIT: I/1 ATO: i/1
LANDING/SAFING: 2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AVIONICS BAY-LCA 2, 3, I/AREA 82, 83, 81
82V76AI7
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD, TEMPERATURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A SHORT TO GROUND CAN RESULT IN THE LOSS OF THE CAPABILITY TO
DISPENSE SUPPRESSANT INT0 THE AVIONICS BAY. IN THE PRELAUNCH,
ON-ORBIT, AND LANDING/SAFING PHASES REDUNDANT PORTABLE FIRE
BOTTLES ARE AVAILABLE FOR USE TO SUPPRESS A FIRE. IN THE OTHER
PHASES, CREW MOVEMENT IS RESTRICTED THEREFORE THE PORTABLE
EXTINGUISHES ARE INACCESSABLE. HOWEVER, LAUNCH/ENTRY ARE SHORT,
TRANSITIONAL FLIGHT PHASES. LOSS OF REDUNDANCY HAS THE POTENTIAL
FOR LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER KSSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/20/87
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 3047
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: RESISTOR-NO IDENTIFIER (I.8K)
FAILURE MODE: OPEN (ELECTRICAL), SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: J.D. ARBET SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
FIRE SUPPRESSION
RESISTOR-BLEED (ARM-TM)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AVIONICS BAY-LCA 2, 3, I/AREA 82, 83, 81
82V76AI7
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD, TEMPERATURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE TELEMETRY ARM DISCRETE SIGNAL IS EITHER LOST OR BIASED. THE
ONBOARD FIRE SUPPRESSION SYSTEM IS UNAFFECTED AND REACTS NORMALLY
AND THE CAPACITOR VOLTAGE PARAMETER PROVIDES AN INDICATION OR
STATUS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-425
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
LIFE SUPPORT FLIGHT: i/i
3048 ABORT: I/i
ITEM:
(S4, SS, S6)
FAILURE MODE:
TO SWITCH
SWITCH-FIRE SUPPRESSION AV BAY I, 2, 3 AGENT DISCH
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING, OPEN (ELECTRICAL), FAILS
LEAD ANALYST: J.D. ARBET SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
2) FIRE SUPPRESSION
3) SWITCH
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH : 2/IR RTLS : i/1
LI FTOFF : i/1 TAL: I/1
ONORBIT : 2/IR AOA: I/1
DEORBIT : i/1 ATO : i/1
LANDING/SAFING: 2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL LIAI
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF THE COMPONENT RESULTS IN THE LOSS OF THE CAPABILITY TO
DISPENSE SUPPRESSANT INTO THE AVIONICS BAY. IN THE PRELAUNCH,
ONORBIT, AND LANDING/SAFiNG PHASES REDUNDANT PORTABLE FIRE
BOTTLES ARE AVAILABLE FOR USE TO EXTINGUISH A FIRE. LOSS OF
REDUNDANCY HAS THE POTENTIAL FOR LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE. IN THE
OTHER PHASES, CREW MOVEMENT IS RESTRICTED THEREFORE THE PORTABLE
EXTINGUISHERS ARE INACCESSABLE.
REFERENCES:
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
LIFE SUPPORT FLIGHT: 3/3
3049 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
(S4, $5, $6)
FAILURE MODE:
LIGHT-FIRE SUPPRESSION AV BAY i, 2, 3 AGENT DISCH
PREMATURE OPERATION
LEAD ANALYST: J.D. ARBET SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
FIRE SUPPRESSION
PUSH BUTTON INDICATOR
LAMP
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, TEMPERATURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ONE LAMP WITHIN A AGENT DISCH LIGHT INDICATION. UPON
DISCHARGE THE SECOND LAMP WILL ANNUNCIATE THE COMPLETION OF THE
FUNCTION. IN ADDITION, MONITORING SMOKE DETECTOR CONCENTRATION
VARIATIONS OR CREW SENSE OF HALON 1301 IN THE CABIN AIR
CAN VERIFY DISCHARGE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-427
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/20/87
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 3050
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: ANNUNCIATORCONTROLASSEMBLY (ACA) 3
FAILURE MODE: OPEN (ELECTRICAL), LOSS OF OUTPUT, SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: J.D. ARBET SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
_)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
FIRE SUPPRESSION
ACA
LAMP DRIVER (AGENT DISCHG LT)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AREA 30 FLT DECK
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD, TEMPERATURE,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF THE AGENT DISCH LIGHT INDICATION. MONITORING OF THE
SMOKE CONCENTRATION LEVEL VARIATIONS OR CREW SENSE CAN BE USED TO
DETECT AGENT DISCHARGE.
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REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-428
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wINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
 /2o/87
LIFE SUPPORT
3051
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ANNUNCIATOR CONTROL ASSEMBLY (ACA) 3
PREMATURE OPERATION
LEAD ANALYST: J.D. ARBET SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
FIRE SUPPRESSION
ACA
LAMP DRIVER (AGENT DISCHG LT)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: AREA 30 FLT DECK
PART NUMBER:
B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, ELECTROMAGNETIC FIELDS,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FALSE AGENT DISCH INDICATION. VERIFICATION OF SUPPRESSANT STATUS
CAN BE VERIFIED (LEVEL OF CONFIDENCE) BY MONITORING SMOKE
DETECTOR CONCENTRATION LEVEL OR CREW SENSE.
REFERENCES'.
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-429
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WO_SHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/20187
LIFE SUPPORT
3052
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
i/I
I/i
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE-NO IDENTIFIER
OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
LEAD ANALYST: J.D. ARBET SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
FIRE SUPPRESSION-ARM CKT
DIODE-ISOLATION (PRE FLT ARM CKT)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 2/1R RTLS : 1/1
LI FTOFF: I/1 TAL: i/1
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: i/1
DEORBIT: 1/1 ATO: 1/1
LANDING/SAFING: 2/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AVIONICS BAY-_A 2, 3, I/_A 82, 83, 81
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD, TEMPERATURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS DIODE IS ON THE FIRE SUPPRESSION ARMING SWITCH LINE.
FAILURE RESULTS IN LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO DISPENSE SUPPRESSANT
INTO THE AVIONICS BAY. IN THE PRELAUNCH, ONORBIT, AND
LANDING/SAFING PHASES REDUNDANT PORTABLE FIRE SUPPRESSANT BOTTLES
ARE AVAILABLE FOR USE TO EXTINGUISH A FIRE. IN ALL OTHER PHASES,
CREW MOVEMEN[f IS RESTRICTED THEREFORE THE PORTABLE EXTINGUISHERS
ARE INACCESSABLE.
REFERENCES".
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE".
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/20/87
LIFE SUPPORT
3053
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE-NO IDENTIFIER
SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: J.D. ARBET SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
FIRE SUPPRESSION-ARM CKT
DIODE-ISOLATION (PREFLT ARM CKT)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AVIONICS BAY-LCA 2, 3, 1/AREA 82, 83, 81
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD, TEMPERATURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS DIODE IS ON THE FIRE SUPPRESSION ARMING SWITCH LINE. NO
EFFECT ON CIRCUIT, FLIGHT OPERATIONS WORKNOMINALLY. NOTE: NOT
SURE WHY THE DIODE EXISTS IN THE CIRCUIT. IF THE PREFLT BUS IS
USED FOR CHECKOUT, THE CHECKOUT WOULD BE MORE COMPLETE WITHOUT
THE DIODE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-431
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE'.
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
v/2o/sv
LIFE SUPPORT
3054
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE-NO IDENTIFIER
OPEN (ELECTRICAL), SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: J.D. ARBET SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
I)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
e)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
FIRE SUPPRESSION-PRE FLT ARM CKT
DIODE-ISOLATION (PRE FLT ARM CKT)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AVIONICS BAY-LCA 2, 3, 1/AREA 82, 83, 81
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD, TEMPERATURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS DIODE IS ON THE PRE-FLIGHT TEST ARMING REMOTE SWITCH LINE.
NO EFFECT ON FLIGHT CIRCUIT. ONLY PREFLIGHT ACTIVITIES ARE
AFFECTED IF OPEN. A SECOND FAILURE REQUIRED TO AFFECT THE FLIGHT
CIRCUIT IF THE COMPONENT IS SHORTED.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
?/2o/8?
LIFE SUPPORT
3055
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR-NO IDENTIFIER (5.11K)
OPEN (ELECTRICAL), SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: J.D. ARBET SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
s)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
FIRE SUPPRESSION-PRE FLT ARM CKT
RESISTOR-ISOLATION (ONBOARD ARM CKT)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS : 3/3
TAL: 3/3
AOA: 3/3
ATO : 3/3
] c [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AVIONICS BAY-LCA 2, 3, I/AREA 82, 83, 81
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD, TEMPERATURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS RESISTOR IS ON THE PRE-FLIGHT ARMING REMOTE SWITCH LINE. NO
EFFECT ON FLIGHT CIRCUIT. ONLY PREFLIGHT ACTIVITIES ARE AFFECTED
IF OPEN. A SECOND FAILURE IS REQUIRED TO AFFECT THE FLIGHT
CIRCUIT IF THE COMPONENT IS SHORTED.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-433
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
7/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
LIFE SUPPORT FLIGHT:
3056 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
1/i
I/i
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PYRO CONTROLLER NO. i, 2, 3
LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST : J.D. ARBET SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
2) FIRE SUPPRESSION
3 ) PYRO CONTROLLER
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 2/!R RTLS: I/i
LIFTOFF: I/I TAL: i/I
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: I/I
DEORBIT: i/I ATO: I/i
LANDING/SAFING: 2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
LCA-2, LCA-3, FLCA-I
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD, TEMPERATURE ',
PARTIAL INPUT, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF THE COMPONENT RESULTS IN THE LOSS OF THE CAPABILITY TO
DISPENSE SUPPRESSANT INTO THE AVIONICS BAY. IN THE PRELAUNCH,
ONORBIT, AND LANDING/SAFING PHASES REDUNDANT PORTABLE FIRE
BOTTLES ARE AVAILABLE FOR USE TO EXTINGUISH A FIRE. IN THE
OTHER PHASES, CREW MOVEMENT IS RESTRICTED THEREFORE THE PORTABLE
EXTINGUISHERS ARE INACCESSABLE.
REFERENCES:
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REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-434
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/20/87
LIFE SUPPORT
3057
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
2/2
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PYRO CONTROLLER NO. i, 2, 3
PREMATURE OPERATION
LEAD ANALYST : J.D. ARBET SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
2) FIRE SUPPRESSION
3) PYRO CONTROLLER
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/2
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
LCA-2, LCA-3, FLCA-I
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, ELECTROMAGNETIC FIELDS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INADVERTANT DISCHARGE OR FIRE SUPPRESSANT. EMERGENCY SYSTEM
CAPABILITIES LOSS IN CASE A REAL SMOKE/FIRE SITUATION DEVELOPS.
HALON 1301 IS VERY TOXIC TO THE CREW AND THE MISSION CANNOT BE
SUSTAINED.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-435
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9/22/87
LIFE SUPPORT
3058
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT-.
ABORT:
HDW/FE_C
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SMOKE DETECTOR (9)
LOSS OF ALL OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
2) SMOKE DETECTION
3) DETECTOR
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
P_LAUNCH: 2/IR RTLS: 2/1R
LIFTOFF: 2/1R TAL: 2/1R
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: 2/1R
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/1R
,LANDING/SAFING: 2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: FAILURE OF PUMP, POWER SUPPLY ELECTRONICS, VDC, ALARM
OUTPUT, INLET FILTER BLOCKED
EFFECTS/RATIONAl:
LOSS OF SMOKE DETECTOR FUNCTION FOR ALARMS AND SMOKE
CONCENTRATION DETECTION. THE FIRE CAN BE SENSED AND ALARMED BY
THE REDUNDANT DETECTOR. LOSS OF FUNCTION HAS THE POTENTIAL FOR
LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9/22/87
LIFE SUPPORT
3059
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
2/2
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FIRE SUPPRESSANT ASSEMBLY (9)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE, PREMATURE OPERATION
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
FIRE SUPPRESSION
FIRE SUPPRESSANT ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 2/2 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 2/2 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/2
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 1,2, 3, CREW AREA
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART FAILURE OF PYRO INITIATOR, SPRING, DIAPHRAM
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF FIRE SUPPRESSANT WITHOUT THE INDICATION FOR A FIRE.
CABIN CONTAMINATION WITH HALON 1301 WILL EXCEED OSHA STANDARDS OF
i000 PPM WITHIN 50 HOURS OF DISCHARGE. THE LIOH CANISTERS DO NOT
ABSORB MUCH HALON 1301 (80 gpm & 2.5 kg) AND THE REMAINING
SUBSTANCE IS CONSIDERED TOXIC FOR THE CREW IN THE CABIN CLOSED
ENVIRONMENT. THE MISSION SHOULD BE TERMINATED AT THE FIRST
OPPORTUNITY.
REFERENCES-.
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-437
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9/22/87
LIFE SUPPORT
3060
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
i/i
1/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FIRE SUPPRESSANT ASSEMBLY (9)
FAILS TO OPERATE
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
FIRE SUPPRESSION
FIRE SUPPRESSANT ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 2/IR RTLS: i/i
LIFTOFF: i/I TAL: i/I
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: i/I
DEORBIT: !/i ATO: I/I
LANDiNG/SAFING: 2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PYRO FAILS TO IGNITE, KNIFE JAMS, NOZZLE RESTRICTED
FLOW, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INABILITY TO SUPPRESS IMMINENT FIRE. FOR PRELAUNCH, ONORBIT, AND
LANDING/SAFINGf ...THE_., C._RE__C_ R_EACT ..A:N___p I__VE _THE C6BI_ M_O_BILITY T O
USE A UNLIKE REDUNDANT PORTABLE BOTTLE. HOWEVER, SCREEN B IS
FAILED BECAUSE UPON DETECTION OF THIS FAILURE, THE CREW
MAY NOT HAVE ENOUGH TIME FOR CORRECTIVE ACTION. DURING LIFTOFF,
DEORBIT, AND ABORT SITUATION, THE CREW HAS THE POTENTIAL FOR LOSS
OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO THEIR IMMOBILITY AND INABILITY TO OPERATE
THE PORTABLE BOTTLES.
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REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-438 I
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/22/87
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 3061
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT'.
HDW/FUNC
3/3
313
ITEM: PORTABLE FIRE SUPPRESSANT ASSEMBLY
FAILURE MODE: INTERNAL/EXTERNAL LEAKAGE, STRUCTURAL FAILURE
(RUPTURE), PREMATURE OPERATION
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
FIRE SUPPRESSION
PORTABLE FIRE SUPPRESSANT ASSSEMBLY
BROMO TRIFLOUROMETHANE SUPPRESSANT TANK
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: CREW COMPARTMENT
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PREMATURE LOSS OF FIRE SUPPRESSANT.
AVAILABLE.
THREE OTHER BOTTLES
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-439
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 3062 ABORT:
ITEM: PORTABLE FIRE SUPPRESSANT ASSEMBLY
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO RELEASE
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
/NA
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
FIRE SUPPRESSION
PORTABLE FIRE SUPPRESSANT ASSSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/1R RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW COMPARTMENT
CAUSES: MISHANDLING/ABUSE, CHEMICAL REACTION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF THE CAPABILITY TO EXTINGUISH A FIRE WITH THE FAILE_
BOTTLE. DURING PRELAUNCH, ON-ORBIT, AND LANDING/SAFING THREE
PORTABLE EXTINGUISHERS ARE AVAILABLE. LOSS OF FUNCTION CAN LEAD
TO LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE.
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ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9/22/87
LIFE SUPPORT
3063
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM-.
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER (TYPE III) (3)
OPEN (ELECTRICAL), LOSS OF OUTPUT, SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
2) SMOKE DETECTION
3) GROUND DRIVER
4) ARMING DRIVER (3)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO MISSION IMPACT.
FIXED.
PRELAUNCH, WHEN IT IS USED, THE ITEM CAN BE
REFERENCES:
w
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-441
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9/22/87
LIFE SUPPORT
3064
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER (TYPE I) (3)
OPEN (ELECTRICAL), LOSS OF OUTPUT, SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
2) SMOKE DETECTION
3 ) GROUND DRIVER
4) FIRE DRIVER (3 )
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO MISSION IMPACT.
FIXED.
PRELAUNCH, WHEN IT IS USED, THE ITEM CAN BE
REFERENCES:
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DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
9)22/8v
LIFE SUPPORT
3065
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
1/1
I/i
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER (TYPE II) (3)
OPEN (ELECTRICAL), LOSS OF OUTPUT, SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
2) SMOKE DETECTION
3) GROUND DRIVER
4) FIRE DRIVER (3)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 2/IR RTLS: I/I
LI FTOFF : i/1 TAL: i/1
ONORBIT : 2/IR AOA: I/1
DEORBIT : i/1 ATO : i/1
LANDING/SAFING: 2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD, PIECE-PART
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE PRECLUDES THE DISCHARGE OF HALON INTO THE AVIONICS BAY.
FOR PRELAUNCH, ON-ORBIT, AND LANDING/SAFING, THE CREW CAN ACCESS
THE PORTABLE SUPPRESSANT BOTTLES. LOSS OF FUNCTION HAS THE
POTENTIAL FOR LOSS OF LIFE. DURING LIFT OFF AND DE-ORBIT
REDUNDANT SYSTEM IS INACCESSABLE AND THERE IS A POTENTIAL FOR
LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-443
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AIRLOCK SUPPORT SYSTEM
Analysis Worksheets
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MDAC-ID
AIRLOCK SUPPORT SYSTEM
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY
FLIGHT ABORT SCREENS
H/F H/F A B C
5OOl 3/3
5002 3/3
5003 (*) 2/2
5004 3/2R
5005 (*) 2/2
5006 (*) 2/2
5007 3/3
5008 3/3
5009 (*) 2/2
5010 3/3
5011 (.) 2/2
5012 313
5013 3/2R
5014 (*) 2/2
5015 3/3
5o16 3/3
5017 (*) 2/2
5018 3/3
5o19 (.) 2/2
5020 (*) 2/2
5021 3/2R
5022 (*) 2/IR
5023 3/3
5024 3/3
5025 (*) 2/2
5026 3/2R
5027 (*) 2/IR
5028 (*) 2/IR
5029 (*) 2/2
5030 (*) 2/2
5031 (*) 2/2
5032 3/IR
5033 (*) 2/2
5034 3/2R
5o35 (.) 2/IR
5036 3/3
5o37 (.) 2/1R
5038 3/3
5039 (*) 2/IR
5040 3/2R
ITEM NAME
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
313
313
3/3
3/3
2/1R
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
PPP
PP P
PPP
P P P
PP P
PP P
PPP
PP P
PPP
PPP
PPP
PPP
PP P
VISUAL PRESSURE GAUGE (2)
SUPPLY H20 PRESS. SENSOR (i)
EMU WATER SUPPLY VALVE (2)
EMU WATER SUPPLY VALVE (2)
EMU WATER SUPPLY VALVE (2)
EMU WATER SUPPLY SWITCH (2)
POSITION INDICATOR (2)
RESISTOR (AIR1 AND A2RI) (2)
CB, EMU WATER SUPPLY (i)
CB, EMU WATER SUPPLY (i)
EMU WASTE WATER VALVE (2)
EMU WASTE WATER VALVE (2)
EMU WASTE WATER VALVE (2)
EMU WASTE WATER SWITCH (2)
POSITION INDICATOR (2)
RESISTOR (AIR2 AND A2R2) (2)
CB, EMU WASTE WATER (1)
CB, EMU WASTE WATER (1)
SUPPLY AND WASTE COUPLINGS (4)
SUPPLY LINES AND FITTINGS (1)
WASTE LINES AND FITTINGS (1)
02 LINES AND FITTINGS (I)
VISUAL 02 PRESSURE GAUGE (i)
02 SUPPLY PRESSURE SENSOR (2)
EMU 02 SUPPLY VALVE (2)
EMU 02 SUPPLY VALVE (2)
EMU 02 SUPPLY VALVE (2)
EMU 02 SUPPLY COUPLINGS
DEPRESS CAP VENT (i)
CAP VENT DEBRIS SCREEN (I)
CAP VENT DEBRIS SCREEN (1)
DEPRESS VALVE/CAP (1 EACH)
DEPRESS VALVE (i)
DEPRESS VALVE/CAP (1 EACH)
AIRLOCK TO CABIN VENT CAP (2)
AIRLOCK TO CABIN VENT CAP (2)
AIRLOCK TO CABIN FILTER (2)
AIRLOCK TO CABIN FILTER (2)
EQUALIZATION VALVE (2)
EQUALIZATION VALVE (2)
(*) Potential Critical Items.
C-445
AIRLOCK SUPPORTSYSTEM (concluded)
MDAC-ID
5041 (*)
5042
5o43 _(*)
5044
5045
5046
5047
5048
5049
5050
5051
5o52 (*)
5053
5054
5055 (*)
5056 (*)
5057
5058
5059 (*)
5o6o (*)
5061
5062
5063
5064
5065
5066 (*)
5o67 (.)
5068
5069 (*)
5070
5071
5072
5073
5074
5075
5076
5077
5078
5079
5080
5081
5082
5083
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY
FLIGHT ABORT SCREENS
H/F H/F A B C
2/2 3/3
3/3 3/3
2/2 3/5
3/3 3/3
3/3 3/3
3/2R 3/3 P P P
3/3 3/3
3/2R 3/3 P P P
3/3 3/3
3/2R 3/3 P P P
3/3 3/3
2/2 3/3
3/3 3/3
3/2R 3/3 P P P
2/2 3/3
2/2 3/3
3/2R 3/3 P P P
3/2R 3/3 P P P
2/2 3/3
2/2 3/3
3/3 3/3
3/3 3/3
3/3 3/3
3/3 3/3
3/2R 3/3 P P P
2/IR 3/3 P F P
3/IR 3/3 P F P
3/2R 3/3 P P P
3/IR 3/3 P F P
3/2R 3/3 P P P
3/2R 3/3 P P P
3/2R 3/3 P P P
3/3 3/3
3/3 3/3
3/3 3/3
3/3 3/3
3/3 3/3
3/3 3/3
3/3 3/3
3/3 3/3
3/3 3/3
3/3 3/3
3/3 3/3
ITEM NAME
EQUALIZATION VALVE (2)
PRESSURE DIFFERENTIAL (2)
PRESSURE DIFFERENTIAL (2)
DIFF. PRESS_0RE SEN_SOR (i)
WALL TEMPERATURE SENSOR (i)
VENT CAP (2)
VENT CAP (2)
FILTER (2)
FILTER (2)
EQUALIZATION VALVE (2)
EQUALIZATION VALVE (2)
EQUALIZATION VALVE (2)
PRESSURE DIFFERENTIAL (2)
PRESSURE DIFFERENTIAL (2)
BUS SELECT SWITCH (2)
REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER (4)
DIODE (4)
DIODE (4)
POWER SUPPLY (2)
POWER SUPPLY (2)
EMU INPUT SWITCH (I)
EMUV0LT/CURRENT INDICATOR (i)
CURRENT SENSOR (i)
VOLTAGE SENSOR (i)
VACUUM VENT ISOLATION VALVE (I)
VACUUM VENT ISOLATION VALVE (i)
SW, ISOL VLV CNTRL (i)
SW, ISOL VLV CNTRL (i)
SW, ISOL VLV BUS SELECT (i)
SW, ISOL VLV BUS SELECT (i)
CB, ISOL VLV (i)
CB, ISOL VLV (I)
DIODES, ISOL VLV (2)
BUS ISOLATION DIODES (2)
BUS ISOLATION DIODES (2)
BUS SELECT SENSOR (2)
CNTRL VLV SWITCH INDICATOR (i)
BARBER POLE INDICATOR (I)
RESIS, ISOL VALVE SW SENSOR (2)
RESIS, BUS SELECT SW SENSOR (2)
RESIS, ISOL VLV SENSOR POWER (i)
DEDICATED SIS COND (i)
DEDICATED SIG COND (i)
(*) Potential Critical Items.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/04/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5001 ABORT: "
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: VISUAL PRESSURE GAUGE
FAILURE MODE: ERRATIC OPERATION, FAILS OUT OF TOLERANCE,
INTERMITTENT OPERATION, PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING, ERRONEOUS
OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
2) AIRLOCK
3) WATER SYSTEM
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL AW82 D
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NOT MISSION ESSENTIAL. A PRESSURE TRANSDUCER IN THE EMU,
DOWNSTREAM OF THE FLOW RESTRICTOR, INDICATES THE FEED WATER
PRESSURE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-447
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WoRKSHEET
DATE: 8/04/87
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDACID: 5002
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
"ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: ECLSS H20 SUPPLY PRESS. SENSOR (V64-P0201A)
FAILURE MODE: _ E_TIC OPE_,_FKILSOUT OF TO_, _
INTERMITTENT OPERATION, PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING, ERRONEOUS
OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
2) AIRLOCK
3) WATER SYSTEM
4) PRESSURE SENSOR
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORB_T: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES:
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NOT MISSION ESSENTIAL. A PRESSURE TRANSDUCER IN THE EMU
DOWNSTREAM OF THE FLOW RESTRICTOR, INDICATES THE FEED WATER
PRESSURE.
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REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-448
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wINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/04/87
LIFE SUPPORT
5003
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
EMU WATER SUPPLY VALVE (2)
FAILS TO OPEN
LEAD ANALYST : R. E. DUFFY SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
2) AIRLOCK
3) WATER SYSTEM
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3 _
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL AW82D
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO INABILITY TO TOP OFF WATER TANKS AND PURGE
THE EMU SYSTEM OF AIR BUBBLES, IN THE EMU. THE CONTINGENCY PLAN
CALLS FOR ONE SCU TO BE SHARED BY BOTH EMU'S. (FAILURE ANALYSIS
ASSUMES BASELINE MISSION WITH TWO SUITED CREWMEMBERS).
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-449
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
8/04/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
LIFE SUPPORT FLIGHT:
50O4 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
EMU WATER SUPPLY VALVE (2)
FAILS TO CLOSE, INTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
I) LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
2) AIRLOCK
3) WATER SYSTEM
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: .3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE SCU SELF SEALING QUICK DISCONNECT PROVIDES AN_KE
REDUNDANCY. HOWEVER, LOSS OF FuNcTIoN CAN LEAD TO LOSS OF
MISSION DUE TO A DRASTIC REVALVING OF THE "SUPPLY WATER
MANAGEMENT SYSTEM" WHICH WILL HAMPER THE ORBITER WATER SYSTEM'S
OPERATION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-450
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE".
SUBSYSTEM".
MDAC ID:
8/o4/87
LIFE SUPPORT
5005
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
EMU WATER SUPPLY VALVE (2)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
2 ) AIRLOCK
3 ) WATER SYSTEM
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FREE WATER IN THE AIRLOCK AND CABIN CREATES ELECTRICAL SHORT
HAZARDS AND HIGH HUMIDITY FORCING THE ISOLATION OF THE EMU SUPPLY
WATER LINE. IN ADDITION, THE EMU MAY NOT BE SERVICED PROPERLY.
REFERENCES".
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REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-451
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE :
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID :
8/04/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
LIFE SUPPORT FLIGHT: 2/2
5006 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE :
CONTACT
EMU WATER SUPPLY SWITCH (2)
OPEN (ELECTRICAL), FAILS TO SWITCH, OPEN, SINGLE
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
AIRLOCK
WATER SYSTEM
SUPPLY VALVE (Sl, S3)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: ACOUSTICS, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART
FAILURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FAILURE ASSUMES THE VALVE IS LEFT CLOSED PRIOR TO SERVICING
THE EMU (WORST CASE). SAME SCENARIO AS VALVE FAILED CLOSED (MDAC
ID 5003).
REFERENCES:
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REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-452
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/04/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 5007 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: EMU WATER SUPPLY STATUS INDICATOR (2)
FAILURE MODE: ERRATIC OPERATION, FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN/CLOSED,
FAILS MID-TRAVEL, FAILS OUT OF TOLERANCE, FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
AIRLOCK
WATER SYSTEM
SUPPLY VALVE
STATUS INDICATOR (DSI, DS3)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NOT MISSION ESSENTIAL.
REFERENCES:
i
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-453
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE ."
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
81o4187
LIFE SUPPORT
5008
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR (AIR1 AND A2RI)
OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
AIRLOCK
WATER SYSTEM
SUPPLY VALVE
SENSORS V64X0515E & 535E
SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL AW82D
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SENSORS V64-X0515E AND V64-XO535E ARE DISABLED. NOT MISSION
ESSENTIAL. BARBER POLE INDICATION STILL OPERATIONAL.
REFERENCES:
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/04/87
LIFE SUPPORT
5009
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
EMU WATER SUPPLY CIRCUIT BREAKER (2)
FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
AIRLOCK
WATER SYSTEM
SUPPLY VALVE
CIRCUIT BREAKER (cB57, CB58)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL ML86B
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FAILURE ASSUMES THE FAILURE OF THE BREAKER LEAVES THE VALVE
CLOSED PRIOR TO SERVICING THE EMU (WORST CASE). SAME SCENARIO AS
VALVE FAILED CLOSED (MDAC ID 5003).
REFERENCES:
i
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-455
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSY_EM _ALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/04/87
LIFE SUPPORT
5010
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/_C
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAIL_ MODE:
EMU WATER SUPPLY CIR_IT B_R (2)
FAI_ TO OPEN
T._AD _ALYST: R.E. DUFFY SUBSYS T._AD: M.J. SAIIDI
B_K_ HIE_CHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYST_
AIR_CK
WAT_ SYSTEM
SUPPLY VAL_
CIR_IT BRE_R (CB57, CB58)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT P_SE HDW/_NC ABORT
P__CH: 3/3 RT_:
LI_OFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LAND_G/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/_C
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUND_CY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
_CATION:
P_T _BER:
P_EL ML86B
CAUSES: _C_ICAL SHOCK, VIB_TION
EFFECTS/_TIONALE:
_SS OF OVER_AD PROTECTION. NO MISSION IMPACT.
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uINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/o4/87
LIFE SUPPORT
5011
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 2/2
ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
EMU WASTE WATER VALVE (2)
FAILS TO OPEN
LEAD ANALYST : R. E • DUFFY SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
2) AIRLOCK
3) WATER SYSTEM
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION".
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO INABILITY TO DRAIN CONDENSATE FROM EMU.
(FAILURE ANALYSIS ASSUMES BASELINE MISSION WITH TWO SUITED
CREWMEMBERS ).
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-457
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/o4/sv
LIFE SUPPORT
5012
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
EMU WASTE WATER VALVE (2)
FAILS TO CLOSE, INTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
2 ) AIRLOCK
3 ) WATER SYSTEM
4)
s)
6)
v)
s)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LiFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LAND_NG/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: ACOUSTICS, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FAILURE IS INCONSEQUENTIAL ONCE THE SUPPLY VALVE IS CLOSED
AND SCU IS DISCONNECTED. IN ADDITION, THE SCU REGULATOR TO THIS
LINE WILL BE CLOSED ONCE THE PRESSURE UPSTREAM FALLS BELOW 16.5
PSI.
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REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-458
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/04/87
LIFE SUPPORT
5013
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
EMUWASTE WATER VALVE (2)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
2) AIRLOCK
3) WATER SYSTEM
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE VALVE WILL LEAK WATER OUT TO THE ECLSS DISPLAY AND CONTROL
CABINET WHEN THE EMU MAKES A WATER DUMP. FREE WATER IN THE
CABINE CAN CAUSE OTHER FAILURES IN THE ELECTRICAL SYSTEM. THE
FAILURE IS NOT READILY NOTICEABLE BECAUSE THE WATER QUANTITIES
ARE SMALL. WHEN THE SCU PRESSURE REGULATOR VALVE IS CLOSED, AND
THE WASTE MANAGEMENT FAN/SEPARATOR IS ACTIVATED, THIS VALVE WILL
LEAK AIR INTO THE WASTE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-459
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/04/87
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 5014
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 2/2
ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE :
CONTACT
EMU WASTE WATER SWITCH (2)
OPEN (ELECTRICAL), FAILS TO SWITCH, OPEN, SINGLE
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
2 ) AIRLOCK
3 ) WATER SYSTEM
4) WASTE VALVE (S2, S4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL AW82D
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FAILURE ASSUMES THE VALVE IS LEFT CLOSED PRIOR TO SERVICING
THE EMU (WORST CASE). SAME SCENARIO AS VALVE FAILED CLOSED (MDAC
ID 5011).
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REFERENCES:
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REPORT DATE 10/23/87 c-460
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mINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/04/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 5015 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: EMU WASTE WATER STATUS INDICATOR (2)
FAILURE MODE: ERRATIC OPERATION, FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN/CLOSED,
FAILS MID-TRAVEL, FAILS OUT OF TOLERANCE, FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
AIRLOCK
WATER SYSTEM
WASTE VALVE
INDICATOR STATUS (DS2, DS4)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL AW82D
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
EMU FUNCTION CAN INDICATE OPERATION. NO MISSION IMPACT.
REFERENCES:
i
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-461
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/04/87
LIFE SUPPORT
5016
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR (AIR2 AND A2R2)
OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
AIRLOCK
WATER SYSTEM
WASTE VALVE
SENSORS V64X0505E & 525E
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL AW82D
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SENSORS V640X0505E AND X0525E ARE DISABLED. NOT MISSION
ESSENTIAL. BARBER POLE OPERATION STILL OPERATIONAL.
REFERENCES:
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REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C--462
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/04/87
LIFE SUPPORT
5017
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
EMU WASTE WATER CIRCUIT BREAKER (2)
FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
AIRLOCK
WATER SYSTEM
WASTE VALVE
CIRCUIT BREAKER (CB60, CB61)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL ML86B
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FAILURE ASSUMES THE CIRCUIT BREAKER FAILURE LEAVES THE VALVE
CLOSED PRIOR TO SERVICING THE EMU (WORST CASE). SAME SCENARIO AS
VALVE FAILED CLOSED (MDAC ID 5011).
REFERENCES:
m
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-463
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/04/87
LIFE SUPPORT
5018
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
EMU WASTE WATER CIRCUIT BREAKER (2)
FAILS TO OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
I) LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
s)
AIRLOCK
WATER SYSTEM
WASTE VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL ML86B
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF OVERLOAD PROTECTION. NO MISSION IMPACT
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
e/o4/sv
LIFE SUPPORT
5019
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT".
HDW/FUNC
2/2
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
EMU WATER SUPPLY AND WASTE COUPLINGS
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
2) AIRLOCK
3) WATER SYSTEM
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OFMISSI-ONDUE TO CREWM_'S-iNABILiTYT0 TOP OFF ORICHANGE
WATER IN THE EMU TANKS. IN ADDITION, FREE WATER IN THE AIRLOCK
AND CABIN CREATES ELECTRICAL HAZARDS AND HIGH HUMIDITY.
REFERENCES".
_ r
w
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-465
t
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM"
MDAC ID:
8/o4/87
LIFE SUPPORT
5020
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
EMU WATER SUPPLY LINES AND FITTING
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
2) AIRLOCK
3) WATER SYSTEM
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT P_SE HDW/_C ABORT HDW/_NC
P__CH: 3 / 3 RT_ : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
_DING/SAFING: 3/3-
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NOTE: THE LEAK IS LOCATED BETWEEN THE SUPPLY VALVE AND THE SCU.
FOR LEAKS BEYOND THE SUPPLY VALVE SEE THE IOA "SUPPLY WATER
MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM". THE LINE IS ISOLATED DURING ASCENT AND
ENTRY. ON ORBIT, A SEVERE LEAK CAUSES LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO
CRE_N INABILITY TO TOP-OFF WATER T_KS AND PURGE THE E_. IN
ADDITION, FREE WATER IN THE AIRLOCK AND CABIN C_ATES ELECTRICAL
SHORT _ZARDS AND HIGH _IDITY, FORCING THE ISOLATION OF THE E_
SUPPLY LINE.
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REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-466
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5021 " ABORT:
HDW/FbNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM: EMU WASTE WATER LINES AND FITTINGS
FAILURE MODE: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
2) AIRLOCK
3) WATER SYSTEM
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NOTE: THE LEAK IS LOCATED BETWEEN THE WASTE WATER VALVE AND THE
SCU. FOR LEAKS BEYOND THIS VALVE SEE IOA "SUPPLY WATER
MANAGEMENT SYSTEM". THE SYSTEM WILL LEAK WATER OUT TO THE ECLSS
DISPLAY AND CONTROL CABINET WHEN THE EMU MAKES A WATER DUMP.
FREE WATER IN THIS AIRLOCK AND CABIN CAN CAUSE OTHER FAILURES IN
THE ELECTRICAL SYSTEM.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-467
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
8/04/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
LIFE SUPPORT FLIGHT:
5022 - ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
02 SUPPLY LINES AND FITTINGS
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
2) AIRLOCK
3) OXYGEN SYSTEM
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
• LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NOTE: THE LEAK IS LOCATED BETWEEN THE EMU OXYGEN SUPPLY VALVES
AND THE SCU' FOR LEAKS BEYOND THIS VALVE SEE IOA "ARPCS"
ANALYSIS. DURING LIFTOFF AND ENTRY, THE LEAK IS ISOLATED BECAUSE
THE VALVE IS CLOSED. ON ORBIT THE EXCESS OXYGEN IN THE AIRLOCK
CREATES A FIRE HAZARD.
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REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-468
D
m
iINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/04/87
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 5023
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/3
ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: VISUAL 02 PRESSURE GAUGE (i)
FAILURE MODE: ERRATIC OPERATION, FAILS OUT OF TOLERANCE,
INTERMITTENT OPERATION, PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING, ERRONEOUS
OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
I) LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
2 ) AIRLOCK
3 ) OXYGEN SYSTEM
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL AW82D
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE-.
NO MISSION IMPACT.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-469
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/04/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 5024 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: 02 SUPPLY PRESSURE SENSOR (2)
FAILURE MODE: ERRATIC OPERATION, FAILS OUT OF TOLERANCE,
INTERMITTENT OPERATION, ERRONEOUS OUTPUT, OPEN, LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
AIRLOCK
OXYGEN SYSTEM
PRESSURE SENSOR (V64P0202A)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES:" CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO MISSION IMPACT.
REFERENCES:
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/04/87
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 5025
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
3/3
ITEM: EMU 02 SUPPLY VALVE (2)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
2) AIRLOCK
3) OXYGEN SYSTEM
4) SUPPLY VALVE (2)
5)
6)
7)
8)
s)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 5/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO INABILITY TO MAINTAIN OXYGEN CAPACITY IN
THE EMU (CRITICALITY ASSUMES BASELINE MISSION WITH TWO SUITED
CREWMEMBERS). FAILURE TO PREVENT DEPLETION OF THE PLSS OXYGEN
TANKS PRIOR TO EVA.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-471
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/o4/87
LIFE SUPPORT
5026
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/_C
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAIL_ MODE:
02 SUPPLY VALVE (2)
FAI_ TO C_SE, INTE_AL _GE
_D _ALYST: R.E. DUFFY SUBSYS T._AD: M.J. SAIIDI
B_AK_ HIE_CHY:
I) LIFE SUP_RT SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
AIR_CK
OXYGEN SYSTEM
SUPPLY VAL_ (2)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT P_SE HDW/_NC ABORT HDW/_C
P_UNCH: 3/3 RT_: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/3
_DING/SAFING: 3/3
_DUND_CY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
_CATION:
P_T _BER:
CAUSES: ACOUSTICS, CONT_INATION, _C_ICAL SHOCK, PIECE-P_T
FAIL_E, VIB_TION
EFFECTS/_TIONA_:
INABILITY TO ISO_TE THE AFFECTED S_ _G. P_SS_ C_ BE
_AGED BY SELF SEALING QUICK COUPLING. _SS OF _D_D_CY IS
_SS OF E_ MISSION. THE _AK _Y BE ISO_TED C_SING THE CABIN
OXYGEN CROSSO_R VALES LV3 _D LV4 WITH SWITCHES S15 _D S18.
_FE_NCES:
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/04/87
LIFE SUPPORT
5027
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
EMU 02 SUPPLY VALVE (2)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
2)
3)
_)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
AIRLOCK
OXYGEN SYSTEM
SUPPLY VALVE (2)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/2R RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL:
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA:
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
2/iR
2/IR
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: ACOUSTICS, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DURING LIFT OFF AND ENTRY, THE LEAK WILL RESULT IN HIGH CABIN
PP02 TRIGGERING THE KLAXON AND CREATING A FIRE HAZARD. THE LEAK
CANNOT BEISOLATED BECAUSE OXYGEN SUPPLY TO THE LAUNCH/ENTRY
HELMETS IS REQUIRED. ONORBIT THE LEAK CAN BE ISOLATED BY CLOSING
LV3 AND LV4 WITH SWITCHES S15 AND S18. HOWEVER THE EMU MISSION
CANNOT BE ACCOMPLISHED.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-473
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
8/04/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
LIFE SUPPORT FLIGHT:
5028 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
EMU 02 SUPPLY COUPLINGS
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
2) AIRLOCK
3) OXYGEN SYSTEM
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: 3/3
TAL: 3/3
AOA: 3/3
ATO: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: ACOUSTICS, MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RAT!ONA_:
DURING ORBIT, WHEN THE OXYGEN SUPPLY VALVES ARE OPENED, THE LEAK
WILL RESULT IN HIGH PP02 IN THE AIRLOCK CREATING A FIRE HAZARD.
IN ADDITION, DEPENDING ON THE LEAK'S SEVERITY, THE CREWMEMBER MAY
NOT GET ENOUGH FLOW TO PREVENT DEPLETION OF THE PLSS
OXYGEN TANKS_RTO_TO EVA.
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REFERENCES:
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REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-474
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wINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/04/87
LIFE SUPPORT
5029
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DEPRESS CAP VENT (I)
FAILS TO OPEN, PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
2) AIRLOCK
3) DEPRESS SYSTEM
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL AW82A
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, MISHANDLING/ABUSE,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
HATCH CANNOT BE OPENED FOR EVA UNLESS THE AIRLOCK IS
DEPRESSURIZED.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-475
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM _ALYSIS WO_SHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
81o418v
LIFE SUPPORT
5030
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
3/3
ITS:
FAIL_ MODE:
CAP VENT DEBRIS SCREEN (i)
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
T,_AD _ALYST: R.E. DUFFY SUBSYS T._AD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
2 ) AIRLOCK
3) DEPRESS SYSTEM
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2
DEORBIT: 3/3
_DING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
RTLS: 3/3
TAL: 3/3
AOA: 3/3
ATO: 3/3
REDUND_CY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MISHANDLING/ABUSE
EFFECTS/_TIONA_:
IF THE FIRST DEBRIS SCREEN C_OT BE _MO_D mEN IT BECOMES
BLOC_D WITH FROST, _LL DECOMPRESSION C_OT BE A_AINED, THE
HATCH C_OT BE OPENED TO START THE EVA.
REFE_NCES:
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/04/87
LIFE SUPPORT
5031
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/._lrNC
2/2
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CAP VENT DEBRIS SCREEN (i)
RESTRICTED FLOW
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
2) AIRLOCK
3) DEPRESS SYSTEM
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, LODGED DEBRIS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE-.
IF THESECOND DEBRIS SCREEN BECOMES BLOCKED WITH FROST BEFORE
FULL DECOMPRESSION IS ATTAINED, THE HATCH CANNOT BE OPENED TO
START THE EVA.
REFERENCES:
m
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-477
v
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/04/87
LIFE SUPPORT
5032
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DEPRESS VALVE/CAP (i EACH)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
2) AIRLOCK
3) DEPRESS SYSTEM
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
TEMPERATURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
AIRLOCK PRESSURE CANNOT BE MAINTAINED FORCING THE CLOSURE OF THE
VACUUM VENT ISOLATION VALVE.
REFERENCES :
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE".
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/04/87
LIFE SUPPORT
5033
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DEPRESS VALVE (I)
FAILS TO OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
I) LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
2 ) AIRLOCK
3) DEPRESS SYSTEM
4)
5)
6)
7)
S)
9)
CRiTICALiTIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
TEMPERATURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
AIRLOCK CANNOT BE DEPRESSURIZED, HATCH CANNOT BE OPENED FOR EVA.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-479
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
8/04/87
LIFE SUPPORT
5034
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DEPRESS VALVE/CAP (i EACH)
FAILS TO CLOSE
LEAD ANALYST: R. E. DUFFY SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
2 ) AIRLOCK
3 ) DEPRESS SYSTEM
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
_DING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
TEMPERATURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
AIR_CK CAN BE REPRESSURIZED AFTER SEALING THE SYSTEM WITH THE
VALVE SEALING CAP. ALTERNATELY, THE VACUUM VENT ISOLATION VALVE
CAN BE CLOSED.
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REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-480
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8104187
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 5035
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
3/3
ITEM: AIRLOCK TO CABIN VENT CAP (2)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO OPEN, PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING,
RESTRICTED FLOW
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
AIRLOCK
PRESSURE EQUALIZATION
AIRLOCK TO CABIN
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, MISHANDLING/ABUSE,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
AIRLOCK CAN ONLY BE REPRESSURIZED THROUGH ONE VALVE.
REDUNDANCY CAN LEAD TO LOSS OF LIFE.
LOSS OF
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-481
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/04/87
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 5036
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM: AIRLOCK TO CABIN VENT CAP (2)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO CLOSE
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
I) LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
AIRLOCK
PRESSURE EQUALIZATION
AIRLOCK TO CABIN
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WITHOUT THE VENT CAP THE PRESSURE DROP ACROSS THE BUTTERFLY OF
THIS EQUALIZATION VALVE WILL BE GREATER. THIS MAY LEAD TO
INCREASED LEAK RATES WHILE THE AIRLOCK IS DEPRESSURIZED.
HOWEVER, THERE ARE NO OTHER EFFECTS.
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REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-482
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wINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
81o4187
LIFE SUPPORT
5037
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
AIRLOCK TO CABIN FILTER (2)
RESTRICTED FLOW
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
AIRLOCK
PRESSURE EQUALIZATION
AIRLOCK TO CABIN
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, LODGING DEBRIS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
AIRLOCK CAN ONLY BE REPRESSURIZED THROUGH ONE OF TWO VALVES.
LOSS OF REDUNDANCY CAN LEAD TO LOSS OF LIFE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-483
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM _ALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/04/87
LIFE SUPPORT
5038
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT-.
ABORT:
HDW/_NC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILU_ MODE:
AIR_CK TO CABIN FILTER (2)
FAI_ OPEN
L_.AD _ALYST: R.E. DUFFY SUBSYS _AD: M.J. SAIIDI
B_K_ HIE_CHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) LIFE SUPPORT SYST_
2) AIR_CK
3) P_SS_ EQUALIZATION
AIR_CK TO CABIN
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT P_SE HDW/_NC ABORT HDW/_NC
P_UNCH: 3/3 RT_: 3/3
LI_OFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
_DING/SAFING: 3/3
RED_D_CY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
_CATION:
P_T _BER:
CAUSES: _C_ICAL SHOCK, MIS_DLING/ABUSE, PIECE-P_T FAILU_,
VIB_TION
EFFECTS/_TIONA_:
THE FAIL_ IS QUESTIONABLE. HOWE_R, SHOULD IT OCC_, THE
EFFE_S _ NOT CONSEQUENTIAL.
_FE_NCES:
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REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-484
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/04/87
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 5039
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
3/3
ITEM: AIRLOCK TO CABIN EQUALIZATION VALVE (2)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO OPEN, RESTRICTED FLOW
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
AIRLOCK
PRESSURE EQUALIZATION
AIRLOCK TO CABIN
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] S [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, MISHANDLING/ABUSE,
PIECE-PART FAILURE, TEMPERATURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
AIRLOCK CAN ONLY BE REPRESSURIZED THROUGH ONE OF TWO VALVES.
LOSS OF REDUNDANCY CAN LEAD TO LOSS OF LIFE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-485
i
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
81o415v
LIFE SUPPORT
5040
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
AIRLOCK TO CABIN EQUALIZATION VALVE (2)
FAILS TO CLOSE, INTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
AIRLOCK
PRESSURE EQUALIZATION
AIRLOCK TO CABIN
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, MISHANDLING/ABUSE,
PIECE-PART FAILURE, TEMPERATURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WILL PRECLUDE DEPRESSURIZATION OF THE AIRLOCK.
OF A GOOD SEAL WITH THE VENT CAP LEADS TO LOSS OF MISSION.
LOSS
REFERENCES:
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/04/87
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 5041 "
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
3/3
ITEM: AIRLOCK TO CABIN EQUALIZATION VALVE (2)
FAILURE MODE: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
AIRLOCK
PRESSURE EQUALIZATION
AIRLOCK TO CABIN
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDiNG/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION".
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, MISHANDLING/ABUSE,
PIECE-PART FAILURE, TEMPERATURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LE_ IN THIS VALVE CAN LEAD TO LOSS OF THE ABILITY TO
DEPRESSURIZE THE AIRLOCK. LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO CONTINUAL CABIN
LEAK IF THE CREW GOES EVA.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-487
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/04/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 5042 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: AIRLOCK TO CABIN PRESSURE DIFFERENTIAL (2)
FAILURE MODE: ERRATIC OPERATION, FAILS MID-TRAVEL, FAILS OUT OF
TOLERANCE, INTERMITTENT OPERATION, PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING,
DELAYED OPERATION, ERRONEOUS OUTPUT, PARTIAL OUTPUT, LOSS OF
OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
AIRLOCK
PRESSURE EQUALIZATION
AIRLOCK TO CABIN
MEASUREMENT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, MISHANDLING/ABUSE,
PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CREW INCONVENIENCE. IF THE AIRLOCK PRESSURE DROPS BELOW 4.2 PSIA
AND THE EMU IS STILL ON VEHICLE POWER, A WARNING TONE IS ISSUED
AND THE CREWMEMBER IS INSTRUCTED TO SWITCH TO BATTERY POWER AND
TO DISCONNECT THE SCU.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/04/87
LIFE SUPPORT
5043
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
AIRLOCK TO CABIN PRESSURE DIFFERENTIAL (2)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
s)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
AIRLOCK
PRESSURE EQUALIZATION
AIRLOCK TO CABIN
MEASUREMENT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO CONTINUAL CABIN LEAK IF CREW GOES ON EVA
(HATCH DOOR TO PAYLOAD BAY IS LEFT OPEN DURING EVA).
REFERENCES".
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-489
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/04/87
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 5O44
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: AIRLOCK DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE SENSOR
FAILURE MODE: ERRATIC OPERATION, FAILS OUT OF TOLERANCE,
INTERMITTEN OPERATION, DELAYED OPERATION, ERRONEOUS OUTPUT,
PARTIAL OUTPUT, OPEN (ELECTRICAL), LOSS OF OUTPUT, SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
AIRLOCK
PRESSURE EQUALIZATION
AIRLOCK TO CABIN
MEASUREMENT (V64P010IA, P0102A)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CREW INCONVENIENCE. SEE MDAC ID 5042.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/04/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 5045 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: AIRLOCK WALL TEMPERATURE SENSOR
FAILURE MODE: ERRATIC OPERATION, FAILS OUT OF TOLERANCE,
INTERMITTEN OPERATION, ERRONEOUS OUTPUT, OPEN (ELECTRICAL), LOSS
OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
AIRLOCK
PRESSURE EQUALIZATION
AIRLOCK TO CABIN
MEASUREMENT (V64T0130A, T0131A)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
L_FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION".
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CREW INCONVENIENCE. NO OTHER EFFECTS.
AFTER FAILURE IS LOST.
RECORDING OF MEASUREMENT
REFERENCES:
m
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-491
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/04/87
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 5046
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM: AIRLOCK TO AMBIENT VENT CAP (2)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO OPEN, PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING,
RESTRICTED FLOW
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
AIRLOCK
PRESSURE EQUALIZATION
AIRLOCK TO PAYLOAD BAY
SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, MISHANDLING/ABUSE,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FAILURE ASSUMES THE TUNNEL ADAPTER IS ATTACHED AND AFTER
LIFT-OFF THE EQUALIZATION VALVE VENT CAP CANNOT BE REMOVED. THIS
PREVENTS THE VALVE FROM OPERATING. A SECOND FAILURE WOULD BE
LOSS OF SPACELAB MISSION, DUE TO THE INABILITY TO OPEN THE
HATCH.
REFERENCES:
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REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-492 I
l
wINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/04/87
LIFE SUPPORT
5047
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
AIRLOCK TO AMBIENT VENT CAP (2)
FAILS TO CLOSE
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
2) AIRLOCK
3) PRESSURE EQUALIZATION
4) AIRLOCK TO PAYLOAD BAY
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WITH THE TUNNEL ADAPTER ATTACHED, THIS FAILURE HAS NO EFFECT
SINCE THIS DOOR IS ALWAYS OPEN TO THE SPACELAB. WITHOUT THE
TUNNEL ADAPTER, THIS FAILURE IS NOT REALISTIC SINCE THE CAP WOULD
HAVE NOT BEEN NOMINALLY REMOVED.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-493
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
8/04/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
LIFE SUPPORT FLIGHT:
5048 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
AIRLOCK TO AMBIENT FILTER (2)
RESTRICTED FLOW
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
AIRLOCK
PRESSURE EQUALIZATION
AIRLOCK TO PAYLOAD BAY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, LODGED DEBRIS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FAILURE ASSUMES THE TUNNEL ADAPTER IS ATTACHED AND AFTER LIFT
OFF THE EQUALIZATION VALVE CANNOT FUNCTION DUE TO A SEVERELY
CONTAMINATED FILTER. A SECOND FAILURE WOULD BE LOSS OF SPACELAB
MISSION, DUE TO THE INABILITY TO OPEN THE HATCH.
REFERENCES:
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REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-494
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mINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/04/87
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 5049
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: AIRLOCK TO AMBIENT FILTER (2)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
AIRLOCK
PRESSURE EQUALIZATION
AIRLOCK TO PAYLOAD BAY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE IS QUESTIONABLE.
NO FURTHER EFFECTS.
HOWEVER, SHOULD IT OCCUR, THEY ARE
REFERENCES".
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-495
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/04/87
LIFE SUPPORT
5O5O
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/_NC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
AIRLOCK TO AMBIENT EQUALIZATION VALVE (2)
FAILS TO OPEN, RESTRICTED FLOW
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
AIRLOCK
PRESSURE EQUALIZATION
AIRLOCK TO PAYLOAD BAY
SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3 / 3 RT LS : 3/ 3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
_DING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, MIS_DLING/ABUSE,
PIECE-PART FAILURE, TEMPERATURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATiONALE:
THE FAILURE ASSUMES THE TUNNEL ADAPTER IS ATTACHED AND AFTER
LIFT-OFF THE VALVE CANNOT BE OPENED TO EQUALIZE THE PRESSURE
ACROSS THE HATCH AND ACROSS THE SPACELAB. THE SECOND VALVE
FAILURE IS LOSS OF MISSION.
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REFERENCES:
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REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-496 i
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/o4/87
LIFE SUPPORT
5051
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/3
ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
AIRLOCK TO AMBIENT EQUALIZATION VALVE (2)
FAILS TO CLOSE, INTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
AIRLOCK
PRESSURE EQUALIZATION
AIRLOCK TO PAYLOAD BAY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, MISHANDLING/ABUSE,
PIECE-PART FAILURE, TEMPERATURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WITH THE TUNNEL ADAPTER ATTACHED, THIS FAILURE HAS NO EFFECT
SINCE THE HATCH FACING THE CABIN CAN BE CLOSED TO ISOLATE THE
PAYLOAD BAY EQUIPMENT FROM THE CREW. IN ADDITION, THE HATCH IN
THE TUNNEL ADAPTER FACING THE SPACELAB CAN BE CLOSED. FURTHER,
THE VENT CAP FOR THE FAILED VALVE CAN BE INSTALLED TO BLOCK THE
LEAK.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE i0123187 C-497
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/o4/87
LIFE SUPPORT
5052
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
AIRLOCK TO AMBIENT EQUALIZATION VALVE (2)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
2) AIRLOCK
3) PRESSURE EQUALIZATION
AIRLOCK TO PAYLOAD BAY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, MISHANDLING/ABUSE,
PIECE-PART FAILURE, TEMPERATURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: _......
THiS FAIL_ ASSUMES THERE IS NO TUNNEL ADAPTER ATTACHED. THE _
LEAK CAN DEPRESSURIZE THE AIRLOCK FORCING EVACUATION BY THE
AIRLOCK CREW. THE LEAK IS ASSUMED TO BE SMALLER THAN THE FLOW
THROUGH THE TWO EQUALIZATION VALVES IN THE HATCH FACING THE
CABIN.
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REFERENCES:
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REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-498
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wINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/04/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 5053 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: AIRLOCK TO AMBIENT PRESSURE DIFFERENTIAL (2)
FAILURE MODE: ERRATIC OPERATION, FAILS MID-TRAVEL, FAILS OUT OF
TOLERANCE, INTERMITTENT OPERATION, PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING,
DELAYED OPERATION, ERRONEOUS OUTPUT, PARTIAL OUTPUT, LOSS OF
OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
AIRLOCK
PRESSURE EQUALIZATION
AIRLOCK TO PAYLOAD BAY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, MISHANDLING/ABUSE,
PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CREW INCONVENIENCE. SEE MDAC ID 1141.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-499
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
8/04/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
LIFE SUPPORT FLIGHT:
5054 ABORT:
FAILURE MODE:
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY
BREAKDOWN HIE_CHY:
I) LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
2) AIRLOCK
3) PRESSURE EQUALIZATION
4) AIRLOCK TO PAYLOAD BAY
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
AIRLOCK TO AMBIENT PRESSURE DIFFERENTIAL (2)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE _
SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE CR_ITICALITY ASSUMES THAT THE_LEAK THROUGH THE GAUGE CANNOT BE
GREATER THAN THE FLOW THROUGH BOTH CABIN HATCH EQUALIZATION
VALVES !P_R NSTS-22206, 2.3.1.i, CHANGE 2, THE LEAK ASSESSED CAN
ONLY OCCUR FROM WITHIN THE INSTRUMENT AND NOT THE PENETRATION.
THE CREW CAN WORK AROUND THIS FAILURE IF NECESSARY.
FUNCTIONALLY, THE LEAK MAY TE_INATE THE MISSIONS DUE TO
OVERTAXING OF THE CONSUMABLES SYSTEM.
REFERENCES:
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/04/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
LIFE SUPPORT FLIGHT: 2/2
5055 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CONTACT
EMU POWER/BATTERY CHARGER BUS SELECT SWITCH (2)
OPEN (ELECTRICAL), FAILS TO SWITCH, OPEN, SINGLE
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
AIRLOCK
EMU POWER/BATTERY CHARGER (Sl, S2)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL AWISH
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE ASSUMES A NOMINAL MISSION WITH TWO CREWMEN.
ABILITY TO PROVIDE SCU POWER TO EMU.
LOSS OF
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-501
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE : 8/04/87
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 5056
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 2/2
ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: EMU POWER/BATTERY CHARGER RPC (4)
FAILURE MODE: INTERMITTENT OPERATION, ERRONEOUS OUTPUT, PARTIAL
OUTPUT, FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST : R.E. DUFFY SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
AIRLOCK
EMU POWER/BATTERY CHARGER
REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER (4)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
VIBRATION, ACOUSTICS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE TO PRODUCE THE CORRECT OUTPUT FOR THE EMU WILL CAUSE LOSS
OF MISSION. FAILURE ASSUMES A NOMINAL MISSION WITH TWO CREWMEN.
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REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-502
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/04/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5057 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM: EMU POWER/BATTERY CHARGER DIODE (4)
FAILURE MODE: SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
AIRLOCK
EMU POWER/BATTERY CHARGER
DIODE (4)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] S [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: ACOUSTICS, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE MAY BE UNNOTICED UNTIL THE RPC FAILS. MAIN A AND
MAIN B ARE TIED TOGETHER THROUGH THIS LINE. LOSS OF REDUNDANCY
IS LOSS OF ABILITY TO OPERATE EMU IN THE AIRLOCK, AND CHARGE
BATTERIES. LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-503
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET ........
8/04187
LIFE SUPPORT
5058
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
EMU POWER/BATTERY CHARGER DIODE (4)
OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
2) AIRLOCK
3) EMU POWER/BATTERY CHARGER
DIODE (4)
SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/_3 ..........
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: ACOUSTICS, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE TO SUPPLY POWER THROUGH SELECTED BUS.
CAUSES LOSS OF MISSION.
LOSS OF REDUNDANCY
REFERENCES:
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REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-504
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/04/87
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 5059
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
3/3
ITEM: EMU POWER/BATTERY CHARGER POWER SUPPLY (2)
FAILURE MODE: ERRATIC OPERATION, INTERMITTENT OPERATION,
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT, PARTIAL OUTPUT, OPEN (ELECTRICAL), LOSS OF
OUTPUT, SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SA!IDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
S)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
AIRLOCK
EMU POWER/BATTERY CHARGER (2)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCy SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: ACOUSTICS, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE TO PRODUCE THE CORRECT OUTPUT FOR THE EMU WILL CAUSE LOSS
OF MISSION. FAILURE ASSUMES A NOMINAL MISSION WITH TWO CREWMEN.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-505
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/04/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
LIFE SUPPORT FLIGHT: 2/2
5060 ABORT: 3/3-
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CONTACT
EMU POWER/BATTERY CHARGER POWER SUPPLY (2)
OPEN (ELECTRICAL), FAILS TO SWITCH, OPEN, SINGLE
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
AIRLOCK
EMU POWER/BATTERY CHARGER
MODE SWITCH ($3, $5)
SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
J
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL AWI8H
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PEICE-PART FAILURE,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE TO SWITCH EITHER FROM EMU POWER SUPPLY MODE OR BATTERY
CHARGE MODE WILL CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION. FAILURE ASSUMES A
NOMINAL MISSION WITH TWO CREWMEN.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID_
8/04/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
LIFE SUPPORT FLIGHT: 3/3
5061 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CONTACT
EMU INPUT SWITCH (i)
OPEN (ELECTRICAL), FAILS TO SWITCH, OPEN, SINGLE
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
AIRLOCK
EMU POWER/BATTERY CHARGER
INPUT SWITCH ($4)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION. "
PART NUMBER:
PANEL AWI8H
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PEICE-PART FAILURE,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE TO SWITCH BETWEEN EMU 1 AND 2 FOR VOLTAGE AND CURRENT
CHECK. NOT MISSION ESSENTIAL, VOLTAGE CAN BE CHECKED THROUGH THE
EMU INDICATOR.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-507
\ INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/04/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT FLIGHT: 3/3
" MDAC ID: 5062 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: EMU VOLT/CURRENT INDiCATOR _
FAILURE MODE: ERRATIC OPERATION, FAI_ OUT OF TOLERANCE,
INTERMITTENT OPERATION, ERRONEOUS OUTPUT, OPEN (ELECTRICAL), LOSS
OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAiiDi
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
AIRLOCK
EMU POWER/BATTERY CHARGER
INPUT SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL AWI8H
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PEICE-PART FAILURE,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: .......
NOT MISSION ESSENTIAL, VOLTAGE CAN BE CHECKED THROUGH _THEEMU
VOLTAGE INDICATOR, _D THE B_TTERIES CAN BE CHARGED FOR A
SPECIFIED AMOUNT OF TIME.
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REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-508
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/04/87
LIFE SUPPORT
5063
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT".
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
EMU POWER SUPPLY CURRENT SENSOR
OPEN (ELECTRICAL), LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
AIRLOCK
EMU POWER/BATTERY CHARGER
CURRENT (V64C0211A, C0214A)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: .... 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
B[ ] C[ ]
LOCAT I ON:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, PEICE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NOT MISSION ESSENTIAL, SEE MDAC ID 5062.
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-509
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/04/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 5064 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: EMU POWER SUPPLY VOLTAGE SENSOR
FAILURE MODE: ERRATIC 6PE__, FAILS OUT OF T_LERANCE,
INTERMITTENT OPE_TION, ERRONEOUS OUTPUT, OPEN (ELECTRICAL), LOSS
OF OUTPUT, SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIfDI
BREAK_WN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM i_
AIRLOCK
EMU POWER/BATTERY CHARGER
MEASUREMENTS (V64V0210A, V0213A)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONAl:
NOT MISSION ESSENTIAL, SEE MDAC ID 5062.
REFERENCES:
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REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-510
m
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/04/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
LIFE SUPPORT FLIGHT: 3/2R
5065 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
OPERATION
VACUUM VENT ISOLATION VALVE (i)
FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN, FAILS TO OPEN, PREMATURE
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
AIRLOCK
VACUUM VENT ISOLATION VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORB_T: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: 90V62LVI8
CAUSES : CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PEICE-PART FAILURE,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
THIS ISOLATION VALVE IS INSTALLED IN THE DEPRESSURIZATION DUCTS
AND IS NORMALLY USED IN THE OPEN POSITION. FAILURE TO REMAIN
OPEN PREVENTS DEPRESSURIZATION OF THE AIRLOCK USING THE
DEPRESSURIZATION SYSTEM. THE AIRLOCK CAN BE DEPRESSURIZED
THROUGH THE PAYLOAD BAY HATCH EQUALIZATION VALVES. LOSS OF
FUNCTION LEADS TO LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-511
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/04/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5066 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
VACUUM VENT ISOLATION VALVE (I)
FAILS TO CLOSE
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
2)
3)
4}
5)
6)
7)
8}
9)
AIRLOCK
VACUUM VENT ISOLATION VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NOMINALLY THIS FAILURE HAS NO EFFECT BUT THE ORBITER MISSION
SHOULD BE TERMINATED DUE TO THE EFFECTS A DUCT LEAK COULD HAVE,
SCREEN B HAS BEEN FAILED BECAUSE UPON FAILURE TO CLOSE IT IS NOT
KNOWN IF THE CREW WILL HAVE ENOUGH TIME TO CORRECT FOR
THE FAILURE. IT IS RECOMMENDED A MANUAL OVERRIDE BE INCLUDED IN
THIS VALVE.
REFERENCES:
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REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-512
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/04/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
LIFE SUPPORT FLIGHT: 3/IR
5067 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM".
FAILURE MODE:
CONTACT
VACUUM VENT ISOL. VLV. CNTRL. SWITCH (i)
OPEN (ELECTRICAL), FAILS TO SWITCH, OPEN, SINGLE
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
AIRLOCK
VACUUM VENT ISOLATION VALVE
CONTROL SWITCH (SII)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/2R RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION :
PART NUMBER:
PANEL ML3 iC
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE VACUUM ISOLATION VALVE CANNOT BE CLOSED ON DEMAND. THE
ISOLATION VALVE IS DESIGNED TO CLOSE WITHIN 2 SECONDS IN THE
EVENT OF AN EXCESSIVE CABIN PRESSURE LOSS RATE AND VIA THE CABIN
OXYGEN SYSTEM 1 AND 2 FLOW SENSOR CIRCUITRY. LOSS OF FUNCTION
COULD LEAD TO LOSS OF LIFE AND VEHICLE. SCREEN B HAS BEEN FAILED
BECAUSE UPON FAILURE TO CLOSE, IT IS NOT KNOWN IF THE CREW WILL
HAVE ENOUGH TIME TO CORRECT FOR THE FAILURE.
REFERENCES: PAGE 143 OF MOOG'S COMPONENT SUMMARY
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-513
INDEPEND_
ORBITER SUBS1 "_"
DATE: 8/04/87
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPOR_
MDAC ID: 5068
ASSESSMENT
_YSISWORKSHEET
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM: VACUUM VEN
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO
PREMATURE OPERATION
CNTRL. SWITCH (I)
[_TERMITTENT OPERATION,
LEAD ANALYST : R.E. DUFFY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
I) LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
2 ) AIRLOCK
3 ) VACUUM VENT ISOLATICi
4) CONTROL SWITCH (SII)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
_YS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
[TIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/_:/ ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/Z TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/_ AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/_ ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, _C_ _.
VIBRATION
¼L SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE ISOLATION VALVE REMAINS 0_ _r "T='E SWITCH CAN BE DISABLED WITH
THE BUS SELECT SWITCH 0RTR_,III_C_BREAKER AND THE VALVE WILL
REMAIN IN ITS OPEN POSITION.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE".
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/04/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
LIFE SUPPORT FLIGHT: 3/IR
5069 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CONTACT
VACUUM VENT ISOL. VLV. BUS SELECT SWITCH (i)
OPEN (ELECTRICAL), FAILS TO SWITCH, OPEN, SINGLE
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
AIRLOCK
VACUUM VENT ISOLATION VALVE
BUS SELECT SWITCH ($10)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL ML3 IC
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE VACUUM ISOLATION VALVE CANNOT BE CLOSED ON DEMAND. THE
ISOLATION VALVE IS DESIGNED TO CLOSE WITHIN 2 SECONDS IN THE
EVENT OF AN EXCESSIVE CABIN PRESSURE LOSS RATE AND VIA THE CABIN
OXYGEN SYSTEM 1 AND 2 FLOW SENSOR CIRCUITRY. LOSS OF FUNCTION
COULD LEAD TO LOSS OF LIFE AND VEHICLE. SCREEN B HAS BEEN FAILED
BECAUSE UPON FAILURE TO CLOSE, IT IS NOT KNOWN IF THE CREW WILL
HAVE ENOUGH TIME TO CORRECT FOR THE FAILURE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-515
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/04/87
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 5070
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM: VACUUM VENT ISOL. VLV. BUS SELECT SWITCH (i)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN, INTERMITTENT OPERATION,
PREMATURE OPERATION
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
e)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
AIRLOCK
VACUUM VENT ISOLATION VALVE
BUS SELECT SWITCH (S10)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART _BER:
PANEL ML3 IC
CAUSES:
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE ISOLATION VALVE REMAINS OPEN, THE SWITCH FAILURE CANNOT
OPERATE THE VALVE UNTIL THE CONTROL SWITCH IS ENGAGED. IN
ADDITION THE BREAKERS CAN BE PULLED TO MAINTAIN THE ISOLATION
VALVE OPEN.
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REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-516
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wINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/04/87
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 5071
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/F_NC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM: VACUUM VENT ISOL. VLV. CIRCUIT BREAKER (2)
FAILURE MODE: OPEN (ELECTRICAL), INADVERTENTLY OPENS
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
AIRLOCK
VACUUM VENT ISOLATION vALVE
CIRCUIT BREAKER (CB7, CB8)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL ML86B
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE ISOLATION VALVE REMAINS OPEN, THIS FAILURE WILL NOT ALLOW THE
VALVE TO OPERATE ON DEMAND UNLESS THE SYSTEM IS SWITCHED TO THE
ALTERNATE MAIN CIRCUIT BREAKER. LOSS OF REDUNDANCY IS LOSS OF
MISSION DUE TO THE POTENTIAL LIFE THREATENING SITUATION
CREATED BY THE LACK OF ON-DEMAND ABILITY TO CLOSE THE ISOLATION
VALVE IF A DUCT LEAK DEVELOPS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-517
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/04/87
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 5072
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM: VACUUM VENT ISOL. VLV. CIRCUIT BREAKER (2)
FAILU_ MODE: FAILS TO OPEN rl
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
AIRLOCK
VACUUM VENT ISOLATION VALVE
CIRCUIT BREAKER (CB7, CB8)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL ML86B
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE ISOLATION VALVE REMAINS OPEN, THIS FAILURE MAY DISABLE THE
SWITCHES TO OPERATE THE VACUUM ISOLATION VALVE ON DEMAND. LOSS
OF REDUNDANCY OR THE ABILITY TO OPERATE THE VALVE IS LOSS OF
MISSION.
REFERENCES:
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE :
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/04/87
LIFE SUPPORT
5073
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
VACUUM VENT ISOL. VLV. CONTROL DIODES (2)
OPEN (ELECTRICAL), SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
AIRLOCK
VACUUM VENT ISOLATION VALVE
INDICATOR DIODES (A8CR5 & 6)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: ACOUSTICS, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO MISSION IMPACT. THE ISOLATION VALVE CONTROL SWITCH HAS BARBER
POLE INDICATION. IN ADDITION, SHOULD THE VALVE CLOSE, THE SYSTEM
WILL GIVE INDICATION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-519
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM _ALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
MDAC ID:
8/04/87
LIFE SUPPORT
5074
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABO_:
HDW/_C
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILU_ MODE:
BUS ISO_TION DIODES (2)
OPEN (ET._CTRICAL)_
BAD _ALYST: R.E. DUFFY SUBSYS BAD: M.J. SAIIDI
B_AK_ HIE_CHY:
I) LIFE SUP_RT SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
AIR_CK
VA_ _NT ISO_TION VAL_
INDICATOR DIODES (A8CR3 & 4)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT P_SE HDW/_NC ABORT HDW/_NC
P__CH: 3/3 RT_: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
_DING/SAFING: 3/3
RED_D_CY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
_CATION:
P_T _BER:
CAUSES: ACOUSTICS, MEC_ICAL SHOCK, PIECE-P_T FAILU_,
VIB_TION
EFFECTS/_TIONA_:
NO MISSION IMPACT. INDICATORS WILL NOT WO_ _EN THIS BUS IS
SET._CTED.
REFE_NCES:
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/o4/87
LIFE SUPPORT
5075
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
BUS ISOLATION DIODES (2)
SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST : R.E. DUFFY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
AIRLOCK
VACUUM VENT ISOLATION VALVE
INDICATOR DIODES (A8CR3 & 4)
SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION".
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: ACOUSTICS, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
MAIN A AND B ARE COUPLED, NO OTHER EFFECTS UNLESS THERE IS A
SECOND FAILURE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-521
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/04/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 5076 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: BUS SELECT SENSOR (2)
FAILURE MODE: ERRATIC OPERATION, FAILS OUT OF TOLERANCE,
INTERMITTENT OPERATION, ERRONEOUS OUTPUT, OPEN (ELECTRICAL), LOSS
OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
2) AIRLOCK
3) VACiVOMVENT ISOLATION VALVE
MEASUREMENT (V62S0205E, S0206E)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NOT MISSION ESSENTIAL. CIRCUIT OPERATION CAN BE INDICATED
THROUGH THE CONTROL VALVE INDICATORS.
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REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-522
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/04/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 5077 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: CONTROL VALVE SWITCH INDICATOR (2)
FAILURE MODE: ERRATIC OPERATION, FAILS OUT OF TOLERANCE,
INTERMITTENT OPERATION, ERRONEOUS OUTPUT, OPEN (ELECTRICAL), LOSS
OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
AIRLOCK
VACUUM VENT ISOLATION VALVE
MEASUREMENT (V62X0207E, X0208E)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NOT MISSION ESSENTIAL. VALVE OPERATION CAN BE VERIFIED THROUGH
BARBER POLE INDICATOR, OR OTHER SYSTEM PERFORMANCE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-523
w
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/04/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 5078 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: VACUUM VENT BARBER POLE INDICATOR (i)
FAILURE MODE: FALS MID-TRAVEL, FAILS TO OPEN/CLOSE, PHYSICAL
BINDING/JAMMING, FAILS TO SWITCH
T._AD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
AIRLOCK
VACUUM VENT ISOLATION VALVE
INDICATOR (DS7)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBi'T: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL ML3 IC
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NOT MISSION ESSENTIAL. VALVE OPERATION CAN BE VERIFIED THROUGH
V62-X0207E AND X0208E INDICATORS, OR OTHER SYSTEM PERFORMANCE.
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REFERENCES: i
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REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-524
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
LIFE SUPPORT FLIGHT: 3/3
5079 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
(2)
FAILURE MODE:
ISOL. VALVE SWITCH SENSOR RESISTOR (ASR5 AND A8R6)
OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
AIRLOCK
VACUUM VENT ISOLATION VALVE
SENSORS V62X0207E & 8E
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: "3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL ML3 IC
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SENSORS V62X0207E AND V62X0208E ARE DISABLED. NOT MISSION
ESSENTIAL. VALVE OPERATION CAN BE VERIFIED THROUGH BARBER POLE
INDICATOR, OR 6T_HE_SY-_M_'_F-6_cE _....... ......- .................
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-525
u--
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
LIFE SUPPORT FLIGHT: 3/3
5080 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
(2)
FAILURE MODE:
BUS SELECT SWITCH SENSOR RESISTORS (A8RI AND A8R2)
OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
AIRLOCK
VACUUM VENT ISOLATION VALVE
SENSORS V62S0205E & 6E
SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING_SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL ML3 IC
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SENSORS V62S0205E AND V62S0206E ARE DISABLED. NOT MISSION
ESSENTIAL. VAL_OPERATION CAN BE VERIFIED THROUGH THE ISOLATION
CONTROL SWITCH SENSORS OR OTHER SYSTEM PERFORMANCE,
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REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-526
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LINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/2o/87
LIFE SUPPORT
5081
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ISOL. VALVE SENSOR POWER RESISTOR (ASR3 & 4)
OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
LEAD ANALYST: R. E. DUFFY SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
?)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
AIRLOCK
VACUUM VENT ISOLATION VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL ML3 lC
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A8R3 AND ASR4 ARE USED TO LIMIT THE CURRENT TO THE ISOLATION
VALVE POSITION INDICATORS, THEY ARE REDUNDANT. SHOULD BOTH
RESISTORS FAIL, POWER TO ACTUATE THE BARBER POLE INDICATOR AND
TELEMETRY SENSORS IS LOST. NOT MISSION ESSENTIAL. VALVE
OPERATION CAN BE VERIFIED THROUGH OTHER SYSTEM PERFORMANCE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-527
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT FLIGHT:
MDACID: 5082 ABORT:
ITEM: DEDICATED SIGNAL CONDITIONER (83V75AI8)
FAILURE MODE: LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
_)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
AIRLOCK
SIGNAL CONDITIONER
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATI ONALE :
POSSIBLE _SS OF SENSORS V64P0101A AND V63P0202A.
IMPACT.
NO MISSION
REFERENCES:
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REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-528
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8120/87
LIFE SUPPORT
5083
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DEDICATED SIGNAL CONDITIONER (83V75AI6)
LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST : R.E. DUFFY SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
2) AIRLOCK
3) SIGNAL CONDITIONER
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POSSIBLE LOSS OF SENSOR V64P0102A & 201A, AND V64T0131A & 130A.
NO MISSION IMPACT.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-529
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APPENDIX D
POTENTIAL CRITICAL ITEMS
MDAC-ID FLIGHT ITEM FAILURE MODE
L_
I
F_
I
Supply Water Subsystem
11oo 2/2
ii01 2/2
1102 2/2
1103 2/2
11o5 2/2
1106 2/2
1110 2/2
1113 2/2
1135 2/2
1137 2/2
1141 2/2
1145 2/2
1147 2/2
114s 2/2
1149 2/2
i151 2/2
1154 2/2
1167 2/2
1178 2/2
1179 2/2
1180 2/2
1181 2/2
1182 2/2
1183 2/2
1184 2/2
1i85 2/2
H2 SEPARATOR (2)
H2 SEPARATORS (2)
H2 SEPARATORS (2)
H2 SEPARATORS
MICROBIAL FILTER (i)
MICROBIAL FILTER QD (2)
TANKS INLET ISOL VLV (4)
TANKS OUTLET ISOL VLV (4)
RELIEF VALVE, 1.5 PSID (2)
RELIEF VALVE, 1.5 PSID (2)
QD, GSE FILL/DRAIN (2)
TANK A PRESS CNTL VLV (i)
RESTRICTED FLOW
INTERNAL LEAKAGE
INTERMITTENT OPERATION,
PARTIAL OUTPUT
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
FAILS TO OPEN,
RESTRICTED FLOW
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
FAILS TO OPEN
TANK A PRESS CNTRL VALVE (i) PHYSICAL BINDING
TANK A PRESS CNTL VLV (i) EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
TANK A VENT VALVE (1) FAILS TO CLOSE,
TANK A VENT VALVE (i)
CROSSOVER VALVE (I)
ISOL VLV, FES B LINE (i)
GALLEY SUPPLY VALVE (1)
GALLEY SUPPLY VALVE (I)
GALLEY SUPPLY VALVE (I)
SOLENOID, GALLEY VLV (i)
SOLENOID, GALLEY VALVE (1)
SWITCH, GALLEY VALVE (i)
SWITCH, GALLEY VALVE (I)
SWITCH, GALLEY VALVE (i)
INTERNAL LEAKAGE,
PHYSICAL BINDING
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
FAILS TO REMAIN
CLOSED, FAILS TO
CLOSE, INTERNAL
LEAKAGE
FAILS TO REMAIN
OPEN, FAILS TO OPEN
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
FAILS TO CLOSE,
OPEN (ELECTRICAL),
SHORTED
FAILS TO OPEN,
OPEN (ELECTRICAL),
SHORTED
PHYSICAL BINDING
OPEN (ELECTRICAL) ,
ANY SINGLE CONTACT,
FAILS TO SWITCH
SHORTED, ANY
SINGLE CONTACT
D-I
MDAC-ID FLIGHT ITEM FAILURE MODE
Supply Water Subsystem (cont'd)
1189 2/2
1191 3/2R
1193 2/IR
1204 3/2R
1205 3/2R
1206 3/2R
1210 2/IR
1221 2/2
1222 2/2
1223 2/2
1228 2/2
1229 2/2
1231 3/2R
1232 3/2R
1233 2/2
1234 2/2
1235 2/2
1236 2/2
1237 2/IR
1238 3/2R
CB, GALLEY VALVE (i)
DUMP ISOL VALVE (i)
DUMP ISOL VALVE (I)
DUMP VALVE (i)
DUMP VALVE (i)
DUMP VALVE (I)
SWITCH, DUMP VALVE (1)
NOZZLE HEATER (i)
NOZZLE HEATER (i)
DUMP NOZ ZLE
QD, CONT X-TIE (i)
QD, CONT X-TIE (I)
QD, ECLSS BAY (2)
QD, GALLEY/DISPENSER (2)
LINES AND FITTINGS
LINES AND FITTINGS
FAILS TO REMAIN
CLOSED, OPEN
(ELECTRICAL)
FAILS TO REMAIN
.........OPEN, FAILS TO _=
OPEN, RESTRICTED
FLOW
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
FAILS TO R_IN
OPEN, FAILS TO
OPEN, RESTRICTED
FLOW
FAILS TO REMAIN
CLOSED, FAILS TO
CLOSE, INTERNAL
LEAKAGE
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
SHORTED, ANY
SINGLE CONTACT
OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
SHORTED
RESTRICTED FLOW
FAILS TO REMAIN
CLOSED, FAILS TO
CLOSE, INTERNAL
LEAKAGE
FAILS TO REMAIN
OPEN, FAILS TO OPEN
RESTRICTED FLOW
RESTRICTED FLOW
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE,
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
(RUPTURE )
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE,
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
(RUPTURE)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE,
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
(RUPTURE)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE,
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
(RUPTURE)
INTERNAL LEAKAGE,
WCL-H20
RESTRICTED FLOW,
POTABLE WATER
LINES AND FITTINGS
LINES AND FITTINGS
WATER CHILLER (i)
WATER CHILLER (I)
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MDAC-ID FLIGHT ITEM FAILURE MODE
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Waste Water Subsystem
2008 2/2
2013 2/2
2014 2/2
2015 2/2
2041 2/2
2042 2/2
2043 2/2
2111 2/2
2112 2/2
2113 2/2
2114 2/2
2116 2/2
2136 2/2
2137 2/2
2138 2/2
2139 2/2
2141 2/2
2142 2/2
2144 2/2 .
2145 2/IR
2147 2/IR
2171 2/2
2173 2/2
2174 2/2
2175 2/2
2176 2/2
2177 2/2
2181 2/IR
2195 2/IR
2196 2/IR
2197 2/IR
2198 2/IR
2199 2/IR
2207 1/1
2208 I/I
URINAL ADAPTER QR (i)
TUBE, EMU EXTENSION (i)
TUBE, EMU EXTENSION (I)
EMU QD (i)
WCS TO WWS QD (i)
WCS TO WWS LINE (i)
WCS TO WWS DYNATUBE (I)
WWS LINE AND JUNCTIONS
WWS LINE AND JUNCTIONS
MISALIGNMENT
RESTRICTED FLOW
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
RESTRICTED FLOW,
CLOSED
ARS CONDENSATE SPLY TUBE (i) EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
ARS CONDENSATE SPLY TUBE (I) RESTRICTED FLOW,
WASTE TANK INLET VALVE (I)
DUMP LINES AND FITTINGS
DUMP LINES AND FITTINGS
WTNK DUMP ISOL VLV (i)
WTNK DUMP ISOL VLV (i)
CLOSED
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
RESTRICTED FLOW,
BLOCKED FLOW
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
RESTRICTED FLOW,
FAILS TO OPEN
QD/TP @ HIGH CAP. FILTER (2) EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
HIGH CAP FILTER (I) RESTRICTED FLOW,
CONT H20 X-TIE QD/PLUG (I)
WASTE TANK 1 DUMP VLV (I)
WASTE TANK 1 DUMP VLV (i)
CB, WWS DMP ISOL VLV (i)
CB, WWS DMP ISOL VLV (i)
CB, WWS DMP ISOL VLV (i)
CB, WWS DMP ISOL VLV (i)
CB, WWS DMP ISOL VLV (I)
CB, WWS DMP ISOL VLV (i)
CB, DMP LINE HTR (I)
SW, WWS DMP VLV (I)
SW, WWS DMP VLV (i)
SW, WWS DMP VLV (i)
SOLENOID WWS DMP VLV (i)
SOLENOID WWS DMP VLV (i)
CREW MODULE LINE (i)
INTERNAL LINE AND
FITTINGS
BLOCKED FLOW
INABILITY TO MATE
OR DE-MATE, FAILS
TO OPEN, RESTRICTED
FLOW
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
FAILS TO CLOSE
FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED
SINGLE CONTACT OPEN
(ELECTRICAL)
SINGLE CONTACT
SHORTED
PHYSICAL BINDING
JAMMING
OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
SHORTED
FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED
SINGLE CONTACT OPEN
(ELECTRICAL)
SINGLE CONTACT SHORTED
PHYSICAL BINDING
OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
SHORTED
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
D-3
.AC-ID FLIGHT IE-
"_iste Water Subsystem (con t_
:209 1/1
il i/l
t3 2/IR
14 2/IR
_Z!8 1/1
;=2o i/i
*_'2 i/i
#
S- __Detection and Fire S
EXTERNAL
FITTINC
DYNATU_
VACUUM
VACUUM _
HTRTHE_:
VACUUM VE_I --.
.VD
(1)
_ATER (2)
CB, NOZZLE hT_ITER (i)
SW, NOZZI_ _ " _I)
sw,_Nozz_ _-_-_; i)
=VA_ _- IC_ _._ (I)
bsystem
_ 2/IR
3003 2/IR
3005 2/IR
3007 1/I
3_11 2/2
0:B, SM6
_CB, SMOF
_.B, SMOKE DEI_J CABIN (i)
D.B-FIRE SUPY =.... N (3)
_W, SMK Di _ S_... IESET (I)
3C12 2/2 _W, SMY
ESET (i)
_W, SMC .--
L_I4%CUIT IST <-:
3017 2/2
3025 2/IR
3G29 2/IR
2_.4 1/1
_STOR A6_. (C_IN)
ss_, _ _ _',v2AY (3)
FAILURE MODE
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
RESTRICTED FLOW
FAILS TO REMAIN
CLOSED
OPEN (ELECTRICAL),
SHORTED
FAILS TO REMAIN
CLOSED
OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
sHORTED CLOSED
OPEN (ELECTRICAL},
SHORTED
OPEN (ELECTRICAL),
SHORTED
OPEN (ELECTRICAL),
SHORTED
OPEN (ELECTRICAL),
SHORTED
OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
pHYSICAL BINDING/
JAMMING, OPEN
(ELECTRICAL), FAILS
TO SWITCH, JAMMED
IN MAINTAINED
SHORTED, ONE CONTACT
FAILS TO OPEN AFTER
CLOSURE
PHYSICAL BINDING/
JAMMING, FAILS TO
SWITCH, SHORTED,
FAILED IN A OR B
POSITION ONE C
OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
SHORTED, SHORTED
TO GROUND
SHORTED, SHORTED
TO GROUND
PHYSICAL BINDING/
JAMMING, OPEN
(ELECTRICAL), FAILS
TO SWITCH
O_&t PAGE ;S
OF POOR QUALITY
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MDAC-ID FLIGHT ITEM FAILURE MODE
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Smoke Detection and Fire Suppression Subsystem (cont'd)
3046 1/1
3048 I/I
3052 i/i
3O56 1/1
3057 2/2
3058 2/IR
3059 2/2
3060 I/i
3065 i/i
RESISTOR (2.2K)
SW, FIRE SUPPR AV
BAY DISCH (3)
DIODE
PYRO CONTROLLER (3)
PYRO CONTROLLER NO. (3)
SMOKE DETECTOR (9)
FIRE SUPPRESSANT ASSY (9)
FIRE SUPPRESSANT ASSY (9)
HYBRID DRIVER (TYPE II) (3)
SHORTED, SHORTED
TO GROUND
PHYSICAL BINDING/
JAMMING, OPEN
(ELECTRICAL),
FAILS TO SWITCH
OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
LOSS OF OUTPUT
PREMATURE OPERATION
LOSS OF ALL OUTPUT
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE,
PREMATURE OPERATION
FAILS TO OPERATE
OPEN (ELECTRICAL),
LOSS OF OUTPUT, SHORTED
Airlock Support System
5003 2/2 EMU WATER SUPPLY VLV (2)
5005 2/2 EMU WATER SUPPLY VLV (2)
5006 2/2 SW, EMU WATER SUPPLY (2)
5009 2/2
5o11 2/2
5014 2/2
CB, EMU WATER SUPPLY (i)
EMU WASTE WATER VLV (2)
SW, EMU WASTE WATER (2)
5017 2/2
5019 2/2
5020 2/2
5022 2/IR
5025 2/2
5027 2/1R
5028 2/IR
5029 2/2
CB, EMU WASTE WATER (I)
SUPPLY AND
WASTE COUPLINGS (4)
SUPPLY LINES AND FITTING
02 SUPPLY LINES
EMU 02 SUPPLY VALVE (2)
EMU 02 SUPPLY VALVE (2)
EMU 02 SUPPLY COUPLINGS
DEPRESS CAP VENT (i)
5030 2/2
5031 2/2
5033 2/2
5035 2/IR
CAP VENT DEBRIS SCREEN (I)
CAP VENT DEBRIS SCREEN (i)
DEPRESS VALVE (I)
AIRLOCK TO CABIN
VENT CAP (2)
FAILS TO OPEN
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
OPEN (ELECTRICAL),
FAILS TO SWITCH,
OPEN, SINGLE CONTACT
FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED
FAILS TO OPEN
OPEN (ELECTRICAL),
FAILS TO SWITCH, OPEN,
SINGLE CONTACT
FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
FAILS TO OPEN
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
FAILS TO OPEN,
PHYSICAL BINDING/
JAMMING
PHYSICAL BINDING/
JAMMING
RESTRICTED FLOW
FAILS TO OPEN
FAILS TO OPEN,
PHYSICAL BINDING/
JAMMING, RESTRICTED
FLOW
D-5
MDAC-ID FLIGHT ITEM FAILURE MODE
Airlock Support System (cont'd)
5037 2/IR
5039 2/IR
AIRLOCK TO CABIN FILTER (2)
EQUALIZATION VALVE (2)
5041 2/2
5043 2/2
5052 2/2
5055 2/2
EQUALIZATION VALVE (2)
PRESSURE DIFFERENTIAL (2)
EQUALIZATION VALVE (2)
BUS SELECT SWITCH (2)
5056 2/2 REMOTE POWER CNTLR (4)
5059 2/2 POWER SUPPLY (2)
5060 2/2 POWER SUPPLY (2)
5066 2/IR
5067 3/IR
5069 3/IR
VACUUM VENT ISOL VLV (i)
SW, ISOL VLV CNTRL (1)
SW, ISOL VLV BUS
SELECT (i)
mm
RESTRICTED FLOW
FAILS TO OPEN,
RESTRICTED FLOW m
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE i
OPEN (ELECTRICAL),
FAILS TO SWITCH,
oPEN, SING_ CONTACT i
INTERMITTENT OPERATION,
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT,
PARTIAL OUTPUT, []
FAILS OPEN i
ERRATIC OPERATION,
INTERMITTENT OPERATION,
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT_ j
PARTIAL OUTPUT, OPEN
(ELECTRICAL)
OPEN (ELECTRICAL),
FAILS TO SWITCH, OPEN, i
SINGLE CONTACT
FAILS TO CLOSE
OPEN (ELECTRICAL),
FAILS TO SWITCH, OPEN,
SINGLE CONTACT
OPEN (ELECTRICAL),
FAILS TO SWITCH, OPEN, ms
SINGLE CONTACT
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